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W ith the establishment of the permanent European Council presidency and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the role of rotating presidencies has changed. This will have an impact on the role of the 
Trio Presidency in future. Does the rotating presidency still matter?
In this new edition of Think Global – Act European (TGAE), launched by Notre Europe, 14 Europeans 
think tanks answer that question by scrutinizing the 18-month agenda of the Spanish, Belgian 
and Hungarian Trio Presidency. For each specific issue (structural reform, economic governance, 
energy, climate change, migration, internal security, global governance, foreign policy defence, 
enlargement, neighbourhood, EU institutions, European political space and budget) they 
analyse the global context, existing challenges and put forward concrete proposals concerning 
key initiatives that can be taken by the Trio Presidency during this period.
In the sensitive context of the Lisbon Treaty implementation and complex management of the 
economic crisis, specific attention is given to the decisive coordination role that can be played 
by the Trio Presidency in defining more efficient – more integrated – European strategies.
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PREFACE
T he Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the EU Council comes at the time of a new start. Decisions taken as well as precedents set by this Trio will determine the course of European integration in the 
years to come. The first element of this start is our need to emerge from the eco-
nomic crisis and to deal with its social consequences. Despite (or because of) 
this context, the new EU-2020 Strategy should also be the occasion to ensure a 
determined transition to a low-carbon economy.
Moreover, the coming into force of the long-awaited Lisbon Treaty should mark 
the move from a period of institutional reform to one more focused on the elab-
oration of common policies and projects. Finally, these three rotating presiden-
cies must henceforth share the responsibility of agenda-setting with the newly-
appointed permanent President of the European Council.
The numerous ideas and recommendations contained in this report should 
help the Trio Presidency to manage this new start in the most effective way. Af-
ter the publication of the first Think Global – Act European report in May 2008, 
this second edition brings together fourteen of the most eminent think tanks 
dealing with European affairs.
“United in diversity” was the spirit that guided the contributors of this volume, 
as in 2008. However, this time the participating think tanks decided to increase 
their efforts to foster collective thinking. Firstly, as coordinator of the project, 
Notre Europe worked closely, within an Editorial Committee, with three think 
tanks based in the countries of the Trio Presidency, i.e. Real Instituto Elcano, 
Egmont and GKI. Secondly, some of the papers were written by several think tanks 
together. Finally, the think tanks’ representatives for the project agreed to select 
15 recommendations they wished to bring to the specific attention of the Trio.
As President of Notre Europe, I am proud to introduce here the product of a long 
and enriching process of cooperation between the contributing think tanks. 
I congratulate and thank them for the constructive spirit with which they par-
ticipated in the project. I hope that this report will be considered by the Trio and 
the European Council President as a proof that cooperative work can produce 
original, relevant and useful results.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa President of Notre Europe
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T he EU Trio Presidency of Spain, Belgium and Hungary (SBH) – beginning in January 2010 and ending in June 2011 – is not just another round of rotating presidencies. It comes at a crucial moment of transition and profound change in European governance, 
involving new actors, new rules and new priorities.
The challenge is not only about finding the right compromises to put the new institutional 
apparatus into place but to take its full potential for increasing urgently the efficiency of 
policy-making at EU level and timely allowing the EU to take fundamental decisions in a 
worrying international context (I). The Trio is also confronted with an existential problem: 
with the creation of a stable President of the European Council and an enhanced function 
of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, does the rotating presi-
dency still matter and what is the place of the Trio (II)?
Europe in transition?
alongside renewed Parliament and 
Commission, the Lisbon Treaty brings a 
deep re-organisation of institutions. The 
implementation of the new institutional 
rules by the current Trio will set a precedent 
and doubtless determine the conduct of EU 
affairs for a period, in particular the effi-
ciency of its coordination work with Herman 
van Rompuy and Catherine ashton.
However this phase of institutional transi-
tion comes in a difficult international context 
marked by major economic and climate 
crises. The major challenges at stake for our 
societies call for urgent and decisive action, 
and cannot be content with a ‘business as 
usual’ scenario. Taken together, these facts 
should prevent Europeans to waste energy 
on internal quarrels and rather encourage 
them to think about the role they play and 
the role they would like to keep on the inter-
national stage.
This call for a more global approach is 
nothing new. It was already at the core of the 
previous Think Global – Act European report, 
dedicated to the French-Czech-Swedish Trio 
Presidency, which emphasis ed the need to 
better integrate the interna tional context 
into the conduct of EU policy.
But it is particularly relevant today at 
a moment of obvious global shift of 
balance driven by the arrival of the Obama 
administration, closer to Europe than the 
previous administration and yet focused 
strategically on China; China itself recover-
ing faster than the West from the economic 
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crisis and which the Copenhagen Summit 
has shown little cooperative; the with-
drawal of Russia to an introverted concern 
for its own interests; and a rebalancing of 
North-South relations, evident during both 
the Doha Round and the preparations for a 
post-Kyoto agreement.
Paying heed to the risk of a deteriorated 
economic situation (and its social impact) 
in the months to come, the SBH Trio must 
bind the institutional transition to a deep 
transformation of the EU, one which allows 
it to guarantee sustainable growth in the 
medium and long-term.
The experts from the 14 European think 
tanks mobilised in this report have focused 
on this changing global context, and on 
analysing Europe’s current challenges, in 
order to address concrete recommenda-
tions to the SBH Trio.
More coordination for better 
efficiency
Without going into the detail of the proposi-
tions made in every article and summarised 
at the start of each chapter, one fact in par-
ticular emerges from this collective reflec-
tion: today’s situation of crisis demands 
more than ever that Europeans extricate 
themselves from the excessively segment-
ed framework in which EU policy has 
developed until now. This leitmotiv appears 
in each analysis as a warning against the 
logic of progressive adjustments, which 
are too slow to respond to the current chal-
lenges, of a return to growth, of maintain-
ing EU cohesion, and of the strengthening of 
emerging economies. It calls for more inte-
grated European strategies.
The eruption of issues like the world economic 
crisis, climate change, energy supplies onto 
the European agenda as well as the per-
spective of the negotiations of new financial 
perspectives are a call for a transversal 
approach to EU policy-making, with more 
active synergies created between policies.
The urgency of European economic 
governance
The current context of rampant budget 
deficits and increased public debt will favour 
neither the completion of the single market 
nor the structural reforms in employment, 
productivity-related policy (R&D, higher 
education, etc.), industry, taxation, and the 
like. In addition, the divergence between 
national policies within the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) is increasing.
These issues are at the heart of the current 
preoccupations of Europe’s leaders, who 
are looking for ways out of the crisis. They 
demand the thorough revision of Europe’s 
economic governance, with the aim of 
making the EU an economic actor in the 
crisis. The institutional agenda, with its 
planned EU-2020 Strategy for sustainable 
growth, might not alone be able to meet this 
challenge.
Whatever measures are adopted to combat 
the crisis, the options chosen by member 
states will have negative effects (low 
spending, with an impact on social protec-
tion; higher taxes, resented during a period 
of zero growth; a spacing out of the costs, 
which will fall on the next generation; even a 
return to inflation in order to liquidate some 
of the debt, etc.). These could be a source of 
major tension between member states.
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Europeans cannot avoid closer coordina-
tion on these subjects without the risk of 
lasting damage to the EU’s cohesion.
From this point of view, the SBH Trio should 
give immediate priority to a concerted effort 
by member states to decide when to end cri-
sis-management policies (concerning cen-
tral-bank liquidity, massive public debt and 
state interventionism).
a unique European representation (or at 
least for eurozone countries) within the G20, 
IMF and World Bank is also put forward as 
a means of increasing European influence. 
as has been seen in trade policy, a single 
voice is more audible than the cacophony 
of (sometimes contradictory) voices of the 
current range of European and national rep-
resentatives. In place of this representa-
tion of disparate interests which harms the 
common European interest, such a measure 
would encourage member states to coordi-
nate better between themselves.
Energy for all, but clean energy
The need to guarantee citizens access to 
energy can today no longer be separated 
from Europe’s self-imposed CO2 emissions 
targets, nor from the need to increase the 
competitiveness of European business. If 
there were one cross-cutting issue which 
demanded coordination of a wide range of 
EU policies, it would be this one.
In order to guarantee a constant supply 
to all Europe’s regions, Europeans must 
create an internal energy market backed 
up by a major interconnected infrastruc-
ture network. By tackling this issue the SBH 
Trio would be boosting the common interest 
in this field and facilitating the task of the 
High Representative (HR) and permanent 
President in the creation of a Common 
Foreign Policy for Energy, one which would 
aim to establish a coherent European 
position vis-à-vis Russia, the Caspian Sea 
region (decisive for the Nabucco project) 
and the Middle East, in order to secure oil 
and gas supplies to the Union’s borders.
Mutualising the effort necessary to move 
energy consumption towards clean sources 
would be a way of avoiding a situation where 
measures (stimulating technological innova-
tion, creating sectoral leaders, reducing the 
cost of clean energy, etc.) are postponed in 
the name of current budgetary constraints.
Sustainable growth
The adoption in 2008 of the “20-20-20 for 
2020” climate package was an important 
step. But giving Europe a low-carbon 
economy will be much more difficult than 
setting objectives. It means a fundamen-
tal rethinking of our growth model, and 
therefore of all policy aiming at economic 
development. Hence the need to place 
climate change at the heart of the post-Lis-
bon Strategy for growth and development. 
This new Strategy must be able to create 
synergies between the social, economic 
and environmental dimensions of policy. a 
social policy must be considered less as a 
compensation tool than as a factor of pro-
ductivity. Similarly, it is vital to build envi-
ronmental policies which open the way to 
growth (job creation, competitiveness in 
low-carbon products, etc.). Instead of trying 
to reconcile the environment, social policy 
and economic growth, we must try to make 
them reinforce each other mutually.
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In addition, it would be unhelpful to define 
this new Strategy without coordinating the 
discussion with that over the next multian-
nual financial framework. By taking care 
to coordinate these two debates, the SBH 
Trio would help prevent the budget debate 
from becoming bogged down in the defence 
of net-contributor and national interests, 
and would instead be directing the debate 
towards the objectives of the Union.
It must also be pointed out that we cannot 
continue to separate the issues of climate 
change and international trade, even though 
the complexity of the Doha Round negotia-
tion makes new blockages undesirable.
Strategic thinking in external relations
as the HR and the External action Service 
comes into operation, there is particu-
lar interest in how these new ‘instru-
ments’ might play a role in defining a 
clearer European strategy for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). How to adopt a constructive policy 
vis-à-vis Russia which might allow a sta-
bilisation of the Eastern neighbourhood? 
What are the EU’s crisis-management pri-
orities, and how might the criteria used 
for trade-offs over tools (civil and military) 
be clarified? How to integrate the priori-
ties of peace, security and environment 
into the EU’s development cooperation 
policies? None of those questions can be 
dealt seriously without an active exercise 
of clarification of the EU priorities for the 
CFSP and the CSDP.
Instead of waiting for the next European 
Security Strategy review in four or five year’s 
time, the Trio should keep the strategic 
debate high on the agenda of CSDP in par-
ticular, possibly feeding the parallel work on 
the new NaTO strategic concept and linking 
the EU’s overall objectives to particular tools.
In addition concerning enlargement and 
neighbourhood policy, the Trio should 
be aware of adopting a new vision for a 
widening process well before the new 
budgetary period in order to take it into 
account in its financial consequences.
On all those issues, the Trio will still have 
a role to play along with the HR, when it 
will chair the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) which will 
continue to deliberate on all issues of 
external relations that are nested in the 
community dimension of policy-making; 
and via its chairing of the horizontal coor-
dinating General affairs Council, which 
will also coordinate various policies that 
are linked with CFSP tasks and priorities. 
Helping to create convergent interests 
between member states would contribute 
increasing the influence of the HR on the 
international stage.
does the rotating presidency 
still matter?
Establishing a stable presidency of the 
European Council had been an objective 
of several member states for a long time. It 
was taken up by the Convention that drafted 
the Constitutional Treaty as a key element 
of the new institutional set-up and main-
tained when the Lisbon Treaty was nego-
tiated. For the promoters of that idea, the 
six-month rotating presidency of the Council 
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prevented that institution from having a 
consistent long-term and strategic agenda, 
each presidency wanting to impose its own 
priorities. It was also intended to avoid the 
constant change of EU interlocutors in inter-
national bilateral and multilateral meetings. 
However, the deal that was struck during 
the Intergovernmental Conference is a 
hybrid one since the stable presidency only 
concerns the European Council and not the 
Council of Ministers.
The system is therefore from now on the 
following: all the formations of the Council 
including the General affairs Council, most 
preparatory bodies and not the least the 
powerful COREPER, are chaired by the 
rotating presidency except for the European 
Council (chaired by the permanent President, 
designated for two and a half years) and the 
External affairs Council and its preparato-
ry Committees (chaired by the new HR for 
Foreign affairs and Security Policy). The 
Treaty also emphasises the role of the Trio 
Presidency (successive groups of three 
rotating presidencies, the list of which is 
established in advance according to certain 
size and geographic criteria by the Council) 
in drafting an 18-month programme that 
is meant to complement and provide the 
overall consistency of the three agendas of 
the rotating presidencies.
This new setting is criticised for its com-
plexity and for its failure to truly address 
the need for the countries dealing with the 
EU to be able to identify who exactly speaks 
for ‘Europe’. Several analysts therefore 
predict that this hybrid solution can only 
be transitional and that the rotating presi-
dency will not survive what is seen as the 
‘Brusselisation’ of the function of agenda-
setting in the EU. The complicated character 
of the system is indeed clear and disap-
pointing when one remembers that one of 
the objectives of the Laeken Declaration – 
which started the constitutional process in 
2001 – was to simplify the existing treaties 
so that they would be more understandable 
by ordinary citizens.
However the think tanks which have contrib-
uted to this report believe that the rotating 
presidency will continue to play a role. They 
even argue that this role can actually be very 
useful provided that it evolves in the most 
fruitful and complementary way alongside 
the stable presidencies and that it makes 
the most of the coordinating mechanism 
provided by the Trio system. There are two 
major reasons to believe this to be true:
Firstly, the system of the rotating presiden-
cy has some virtues that have tended to be 
forgotten while devising the concept of a 
stable presidency of the European Council. 
One of these is even essential in a period 
when EU citizens’ support for the European 
project seems at best lukewarm. The rotating 
presidency has shown itself to be an unparal-
leled opportunity to “bring Europe” to individ-
ual countries. It is a good opportunity for the 
national government to clarify its priorities 
in European affairs, for a better coordination 
and Europeanisation of its administrations, 
and an incentive for national parliaments, 
political parties and trade unions to get 
involved in European networks.
Moreover, for six months, the people of one 
member state are exposed to an unusual 
level of media coverage of EU affairs, and 
many official events are organised in their 
country. We should not underestimate 
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people’s pride at seeing their national gov-
ernment lead a union of 27 member states 
and represent these states in internation-
al meetings. any diplomat who has been 
active in organising a country presiden-
cy would recognise that it has a learning 
and emotional effect on citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU that is difficult to achieve in 
any other way.
Secondly, the rotating presidency has 
taken on a new dimension with the formal-
isation of the Trio Presidency. The concept 
of the Trio has sometimes been criticised 
as a purely administrative process with no 
political dimension, but it has a number 
of obvious qualities. above all, it creates 
a link between three countries that are 
not necessarily used to working together, 
given differences of size, geographical 
location, history or levels of support for 
European integration. a quick look at the 
last Trio (France, the Czech Republic and 
Sweden), the current one (Spain, Belgium 
and Hungary) and the next one (Poland, 
Denmark and Cyprus) suffices to illustrate 
that point. Compromises reached within 
these Trios can be useful to prepare the 
ground for EU negotiations. The Trio may 
indeed operate in a way similar to the func-
tioning of the Franco-German axis: a shared 
position of three sometimes very different 
member states can become an excellent 
basis for an EU agreement.
Cooperation between these countries’ 
administrations and diplomacies is not 
enough in itself, but the virtue of it should 
not be underestimated. administrations are 
key actors in the preparation of decisions, 
and in their implementation once adopted at 
the EU level. Fostering a spirit of cooperation 
and mutual understanding between them 
should not be overlooked. as for involvement 
at the political level, this has varied from one 
trio to the other, but it has improved over the 
years, and relatively rapidly given that the 
first 18-month programme was established 
by the German, Portuguese and Slovenian 
Trio in 2007. Since then, the work of the Trio 
has been increasingly visible, as is symbol-
ised by the common logo and website of the 
current Trio.
Moreover, the Trio formula was provided by 
the Lisbon Treaty in response to the need for 
more coordination between rotating pres-
idencies in the presence of a stable presi-
dency. The Lisbon Treaty has only been in 
force since December 2009, so it would be 
hasty to condemn this formula before it can 
find its space in the new system. and there 
is no alternative for the rotating presidency 
but to make the most of the Trio if it wishes 
to keep any credibility in the agenda-setting 
process, one most likely to be dominated by 
the stable president of the European Council, 
who is more easily and more permanently in 
touch with the European Commission.
So, does the rotating presidency still matter? 
The answer is yes, for its un matched potential 
to mobilise citizens in individual countries, 
and because it can have a unique contribu-
tion to the function of agenda- setting in the 
EU. However, this contribution will only be 
heard and respected if it is done in a way 
that complements the work of the stable 
president, and if it is made in close coopera-
tion with the other two countries of the Trio 
as a means of facilitating a Council position.
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Eu-2020 STRATEGy
Ten years after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, this is the moment for a thor-
ough critical assessment of the strategy and for the definition of a new EU 
growth strategy for the next decade. The interdependence of Europe’s econo-
mies and of the challenges faced by member states – such as globalisation, 
ageing and climate change – demand coordinated action.
After the Commission’s consultation on the EU-2020 Strategy, a new road-
map should be adopted during the Spring European Council of 2010. Nev-
ertheless, the think tanks recommend that the Trio Presidency take more 
time to do a good diagnostic of the economic crisis and its social impact, to 
build a political consensus on a long-term growth strategy and to allocate 
consistent funding to the process (Notre Europe, Egmont, GKI, Real Insti-
tuto Elcano).
When considering the EU’s new growth 
strategy for the next decade, we should 
firstly ask what to keep from Lisbon and 
what to change. Understanding what 
failed with the Lisbon Strategy is es-
sential in order to avoid committing the 
same mistakes.
The post-Lisbon Strategy should retain 
the founding philosophy of Lisbon – the 
importance of adopting an integrated ap-
proach, fostering positive synergies be-
tween economic, social and environmental action (Notre Europe). But it should 
avoid repeating mistakes. Lisbon’s scope was too broad (Egmont, GKI, Real In-
stituto Elcano) and its goals too ambitious (Notre Europe) and it faced a weak 
implementation capacity (Notre Europe) and a lack of accountability (Egmont, 
GKI, Real Instituto Elcano).
In this context, the EU needs a new growth strategy with a restricted scope 
and clarified objectives (Egmont, GKI, Real Instituto Elcano), which places 
economic, social and environmental concerns on the same footing. The EU 
needs to be more competitive while ensuring the sustainability of its social 
model and honouring its commitments on climate change mitigation. Its new 
paradigm should therefore be to create a competitive and socially cohesive 
low-carbon economy (Notre Europe).
PaRT I
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Having a better-defined strategy is fundamental but not enough to ensure its 
success. The EU needs to define who does what, clarifying the competences 
of the EU and of the member states. It also needs to build an improved system 
of monitoring with better indicators to evaluate achievements (Egmont, GKI, 
Real Instituto Elcano) and assess the synergies between economic, social 
and environmental policies (Notre Europe). In order to obtain better results, 
the EU should consider defining incentives and penalties (Egmont, GKI, Real 
Instituto Elcano).
In order to guarantee that the new strategy is applied, communication on the 
strategy has to be improved at all levels. Establishing ownership of the EU-
2020 Strategy by EU institutions, member states, regional and local authorities 
and socio-economic actors is essential to ensure its delivery. In this context, 
permanent decentralised dialogue at all levels has to be promoted (Egmont, 
GKI, Real Instituto Elcano), and the member states should commit themselves 
to invest in an active communication campaign addressed to socio-economic 
actors (Notre Europe).
In defining its new growth agenda, the EU needs to take into account the con-
sequences of the economic and financial crisis, especially the deterioration 
of EU member states’ public finances – a situation which is not favourable 
to structural reforms. In 2009 fiscal policy-making in the EU was focused on 
pulling the economy out of recession. Discretionary measures and in-built 
fiscal stimuli have cushioned the downturn in economic activity and have 
been a factor in the recent improvement. However, they have also led to a de-
terioration in national accounts, and it is now time to pay down the debt that 
has been accumulated. A possible way to pay off the national debts is to in-
crease green taxes or find additional cap-and-trade revenues. This would al-
low making the policy responses to the financial recovery and climate change 
mutually reinforcing (Bruegel). Additionally, to avoid the risk of dumping by 
non-European firms that are not submitted to the same burden as EU firms, 
the Trio should put on the table the possibility of creating an EU carbon tax on 
imports (Notre Europe).
ECoNoMIC GoVERNANCE
The worst economic and financial crisis in post-war history has pushed to the 
top of the EU’s agenda the need to strengthen European economic governance. 
The causes of and remedies to the crisis can only be tackled at the European 
level (SWP, Real Instituto Elcano).
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The current European economic governance framework was set up by the 
Maastricht Treaty and was further shaped as new priorities and challenges 
emerged. At present it has three main elements: a single monetary policy 
endowed with an independent Central Bank; fiscal policies formulated by 
member states but coordinated through the Stability and Growth Pact; and 
national structural policies coordinated by the Broad Economic Policy Guide-
lines within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs.
The 18 months covered by the current Trio Presidency is the time to improve this 
economic governance framework, since short- and long-term challenges will 
have to be addressed by the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies.
Firstly, the Trio Presidency will have to commit, together with the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank, to a close coordination of crisis-
exit strategies. It will also need to tackle, at EU level, the consequences of 
these strategies – such as high unemployment rates, the aggravation of eco-
nomic divergence in the EU and the deterioration of EU member states’ public 
finances (SWP).
Secondly, the Trio Presidency will need to address long-term issues concern-
ing EU’s economic, social and environmental dimensions and its growth strat-
egy for the next decade. The Trio Presidency should closely link the definition 
of the new EU-2020 Strategy to the debate on the future of the EU budget. It 
should state clear political priorities for the strategy – such as a return to sus-
tainable growth and employment, a decisive improvement in the EU’s com-
petitiveness, a guarantee for the long-term sustainability of public finances 
and social systems and the objective of convergence within the eurozone 
(SWP). It should also guarantee that the correct incentives for member state 
structural reform are provided in the new strategy, (Real Instituto Elcano) in 
order to ensure its successful implementation at the national level.
Finally, two main issues will have to be addressed by the Trio Presidency con-
cerning the single currency: the eurozone enlargement and the external repre-
sentation of the eurozone.
Concerning the eurozone enlargement, the Trio Presidency should work for a 
revision of the convergence criteria for joining the single currency (Real Insti-
tuto Elcano). The criteria set down almost twenty years ago in the Maastricht 
Treaty are outdated and have lost relevance from an economic viewpoint. The 
new criteria to be established should serve to measure the economic health 
of a country and include revised fiscal and monetary factors (Real Instituto 
Elcano).
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The creation of a single monetary and exchange-rate policy, the emergence of 
the euro as a key international currency and the significant weight of the euro-
zone in the world economy have all increased the need for eurozone countries 
to coordinate their positions. The representation of the eurozone in multilat-
eral financial forums remains fragmented and the eurozone is often unable to 
speak with a single voice. As a result the bloc punches below its economic and 
financial weight in the global arena. The Trio should be committed to strength-
ening the external representation of the eurozone in international financial in-
stitutions or other forums, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the G20 (SWP), 
and to working towards a single eurozone voice (Real Instituto Elcano).
Aside from the European economic governance framework, the Trio Presidency 
should also engage in concrete initiatives to support EU innovation and com-
petitiveness. In this context, special attention should be given by the current 
Trio Presidency to the long-standing and unresolved issue of the European pat-
ent system. The Trio Presidency should make it a priority to reach an agreement 
on the Community Patent, in order to create a single market for technology in 
Europe (Bruegel) – one which would offer European industry better conditions 
to boost its competitiveness in the global market.
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PoST lISboN STRATEGy
The EU-2020 Strategy: Re-Launching  
(and Matching) the ambitions  
for a More Competitive and Sustainable 
European Growth in the Globalised World
Jacques Keller-Noëllet Senior Research Fellow, Egmont
Ignacio Molina Senior analyst, Real Instituto Elcano
András Vértes Chairman, GKI
T he world economy (including Europe) is starting the recovery from the crisis at the beginning of 2010. However, the EU which is coming out of the crisis is, to some extent, wounded. Some of its most basic contents – such as the Single Market or the common 
currency – have been emphasised, whereas others – such as cohesion, the fiscal discipline 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, or the goal of coordinating economic policies – are in danger. 
The divergence of opinions and interests is continuing and national economic responses are 
over-emphasised. Some exhaustion is also observable. The EU does not seem strong enough 
to continue fostering reforms and it is not ready to handle the internal frictions.
The Trio Presidency and the new Commission step on such a scene. as President Barroso 
announced, one of the first of the Commission’s tasks is to update and renew the Lisbon Strategy 
(which expires in 2010). The context outlined above is not very promising for a strategic planning 
process. Nevertheless, the EU-2020 Strategy in its rightful place as the most important priority 
to be addressed over the 18 months of Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Team EU Presidency.
An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the lisbon Strategy
The Eu needs to renew a somewhat unsuccessful strategy that failed  
to meet the goals set in 2000
all analyses of the results of the Lisbon Strategy over the last ten years of its existence 
largely concur. The Strategy launched in 2000 has not reached its goals, whether they are 
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measured in absolute terms (progress on general or specific indicators over that period) 
or in terms of the overall qualitative goal of making the European economy “the most com-
petitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion…” Despite the 
mid-term measures taken following the Kok report, the disappointing figures from the first 
five-year period have not really recovered in the second phase, and the final outcome is a 
far cry from the original aspirations. There has even been a backward slide in some areas – 
for instance, the share of GDP devoted to R&D has fallen from 2% in 2000 to 1,8% in 2006 
and, according to the European Innovation Scoreboard, the US is outperforming the EU 
in 11 out of the 15 most important drivers of innovation. Lastly, the fact that the results 
vary greatly from one country to another has undermined the credibility of the approach 
adopted for implementation of the Strategy.
despite this relative failure, the lisbon Strategy has been an interesting 
experience which deserves to be continued and consolidated
Despite its inadequacies in terms of results, the Lisbon Strategy has been an original 
response to the challenge of EU development, and bears witness to what has been a 
‘dawning of awareness’ on four fronts. Firstly, a realisation of the dangers inherent in the 
gap in potential growth and the widening technology gap with the United States, after the 
period from 1945 to 1985, in which Europe caught up. Secondly, a realisation that a ‘holistic 
and sustainable response’ is required, enabling an innovation-driven economic dynamic to 
be reconciled with social and environmental concerns. Thirdly, a realisation that growth 
depends not only on traditional macro-economic policy but also, and perhaps essential-
ly, on structural reform. and lastly, the realisation that this goal can only be reached by 
‘pulling on several strings’ at once, in fields that come within both national and EU remits.
The above analysis of the facts, which dates back to 2000, remains fully valid today, and the 
fact that the desired results have not been forthcoming casts doubt not on the ‘soundness 
of the enterprise itself,’ but merely on the way in which it has been carried out. Moreover, in 
some ways the current crisis serves to press home just how important it is to consider the 
problems facing the Union today as a whole, and in the medium term. Of course we under-
stand the need for short-term plans to save the financial sector and support the economy 
by creating demand, but nothing could be worse for the Union than giving up on the efforts 
made over the last ten years to tackle the weaknesses of its socio-economic structures 
at the root. The crisis doubtless demands a rethink especially of where the ideal balance 
between economic imperatives and the social dimension lies, but this is more a matter of 
fine-tuning than a total overhaul of the general approach. The interdependence of problems 
experienced by economies as closely integrated as those of the member states and the 
value of mutual learning through the exchange of best practice in a fast-changing world 
argue now more than ever in favour of a holistic, coordinated response to the challenges 
of the moment if the Union wants to remain in the vanguard of developed economies. The 
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time has therefore come to look back over the experience of the last ten years to analyse 
the reasons for the relative failure of the strategy so far, and draw the conclusions for the 
next decade.
The reasons for failure
The main reason lies first and foremost in having overestimated the Union’s capabilities, 
while underestimating the obstacles it would meet in carrying out its programme. It was, in 
fact, presumptuous to declare out loud that the aim was to be the best in the world, and to set 
quantified goals without taking into account objective constraints and, in particular, all sorts 
of tensions involved in implementing a plan of this kind in a group as heterogeneous in com-
position and hybrid in nature as the EU. Moreover, the plan itself had numerous design flaws, 
the most serious of which have been clearly identified by all observers: 
The scope was too broad and poorly defined
The ground originally covered by the Lisbon Strategy – which was already very broad – has 
not stopped expanding, with new areas constantly being added – for example, combating 
exclusion (Nice 2000), social protection in general (Stockholm 2001), the environment 
(Göteborg 2001), etc. Not to mention other, surreptitious add-ons depending on presiden-
tial whim or member states’ special interests. and, as logic would have it, this endless mixed 
bag of disparate, unprioritised goals was accompanied by an equally long list of special 
indicators. To such an extent that in 2004 the Kok Report reached the disenchanted conclu-
sion that “Lisbon is about everything and thus about nothing”, and suggested shifting the 
focus to growth and jobs, which was done, up to a point, from 2006 onwards. Nevertheless, 
though now more focused, the Lisbon goals are still too nebulous and diluted (no fewer than 
24 guidelines and numerous sub-guidelines!) for the Union and member states to be able to 
concentrate their efforts on essential matters.
The types of action were confused when it came to implementation
The horizontal nature of the Lisbon Strategy involves, by definition, action by the Union in 
areas which come under shared competence and, very often, the exclusive competence of 
the member states. as the practical aspects of the mixed actions to be undertaken were not 
properly analysed, a whole series of regrettable consequences ensued. First of all there was 
a tendency, at least initially, to believe that the Union should engage on all fronts without 
having previously justified its interference in national affairs in relation to the Lisbon goals 
(posing problems of both rationality and legitimacy). Then, the lack of a clear distinction 
between the various levels of competence led to inevitable confusion as to responsibility, 
which generally resulted in the Union’s share being overestimated and that of member states 
being underestimated – leading Mr Kok to say, still in the same report, that “everyone is 
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responsible and thus no-one”. The space given to the National Plans following the report has 
to some extent helped to rectify that impression. Nevertheless, the distinction between what 
comes under the general powers of coordination and impetus granted to the Union (soft law) 
and what comes under its powers stricto sensu should be indicated more clearly in future 
arrangements concerning the design and implementation of the Lisbon Strategy.
The procedures and texts were too complex
Its pursuit of the all-encompassing renders the Lisbon approach intrinsically complex. But 
instead of attempting to mitigate its complexity, the procedures introduced over time have 
only served to exacerbate it, mainly by ‘increasing the number of mandatory deadlines and 
stakeholders’ each with their, albeit praiseworthy, interest in making their own contribution 
to the proceedings. Now the highlight of the spring European Council, and thus of every other 
Presidency, the Lisbon Strategy generates a glut of reports, firstly from the Commission and 
then from the Council (several configurations quite rightly feeling concerned); the paucity of 
content is often barely disguised by the summary into which those reports are laboriously 
distilled by the European Council, or rather, COREPER. In this respect the 2005 reform did not 
make any marked improvements, and to a certain extent even made the process more cum-
bersome by inventing an intermediary cycle of three years, the benefit of which has not really 
been demonstrated. Moreover, although their targets are better focused, the guidelines are 
still too complicated and are still poorly prioritised making them unsuitable as an instru-
ment for steering government action along a genuine policy course. as for the new integrated 
guidelines born of the 2005 reform, experience has shown them to be often little more than 
a simple juxtaposition of the old Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and Employment 
Guidelines, without any real added value.
There were no sanctions
One of the innovations of the Open Method of Coordination used for the Lisbon Strategy 
was having (in theory) resolved the delicate issue of not being able to impose sanctions in 
relation to member states’ political commitments outside the Community framework, by 
applying what is known as ‘peer pressure’. However, experience has shown that this system 
falters when faced with recalcitrant member states dragging their feet, being little inclined 
to participate in this type of exercise for various reasons, in particular a reluctance to name 
and shame their peers for fear of suffering reprisals when it comes to their turn (to put it in 
biblical terms: “Do not judge, and you will not be judged”). This fairly widespread aversion 
to the ‘peer pressure’ system has led the Commission, under the influence of certain large 
countries such as France and Germany, to reject the Kok Report’s proposal on the subject 
and, consequently, to abandon, to all intents and purposes, any serious system of bench-
marking. This rejection effectively deprives EU bodies of the only operational instruments 
they had to supervise application of the Strategy. In the meantime, initial assessments have 
shown the great difficulty several countries have had in promoting reforms at the desired 
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pace and, consequently, how very uneven progress has been. How, in the circumstances, 
can we ensure that progress will be more evenly spread in the future, and that the whole 
of the Union will be mobilised in pursuit of reform? What place should be granted respec-
tively to benchmarking, sanctions and incentives in the context of these endeavours? What 
concrete tools can be used? These are just some of the questions which forthcoming debate 
on the EU-2020 will have to answer.
The approach was too indiscriminate
Having the courage of their convictions, the designers of the Lisbon Strategy thought it should 
extend to all areas and all countries without taking account of the special circumstances in 
which it was to be applied. However, the desirable pace of reform varies from one sector to 
the other depending on their political sensitivity and lesser or greater external factors. Some 
developments can only be brought about in the long term, while others can occur fairly easily 
given a minimum of political will. add to this the fact that the starting point is often very 
different from one member state to another, and it becomes artificial to set one and the same 
target figure for all, as was the case for instance for the target minimum level of investment 
in research, or employment rates. as far as employment is concerned, the soundness of an 
approach that focuses exclusively on the quantitative aspect while completely ignoring the 
quality of jobs is doubtful. These are just some of the approximations or anomalies which the 
forthcoming debate on the new, reworked EU-2020 will have to consider.
The abuse and misuse of panaceas and gimmicks
The growing gap between ambitions and results shown by the mid-term review (2005) gave 
rise to all sorts of comments, accompanied by various suggestions – including those made in 
the Kok Report – which have been partly, but only partly, taken up by the Commission and the 
Council. Before embarking on another discussion of the need to update the Strategy, it would 
be wise to quickly take stock of this array of suggestions in order to rule out or get into per-
spective a few ideas which are often presented as a panacea, but which can only scratch the 
surface given the magnitude of the overall challenge. These verbal inventions, hollow clichés, 
and false solutions include:
 Mr (or Mrs lisbon) •  as the solution: appointing a single coordinator for national govern-
ments’ actions is an innovation which is attractive on paper and is intended to address 
very real problems, but in an artificial, bureaucratic – and often media-friendly – way, 
without really addressing the causes of the problems which have been encountered in 
applying the strategy.
 ownership: •  one of the most frequently quoted responses is to strive for better stake-
holder ownership of the process, proponents of which include the Kok Report. This 
concept of ownership does deserve a moment’s attention as it concerns very different 
realities depending on the angle from which it is viewed. From the procedural point of 
view, ownership means vesting member states with responsibility for designing and 
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conducting action the underlying principle of which has been determined at EU level. 
This is what happened when the national action plans were introduced, a move which 
was generally well received. From a political point of view, ownership means that gov-
ernments fully and unreservedly stick to the Union’s recommendations, including in 
their political statements for the benefit of their home audiences. This is a general point 
of governance which certainly concerns the Lisbon Strategy, but no more or less than 
it concerns any other of the Union’s policies. Lastly, from a psychological point of view, 
ownership means that the European general public – in particular through national par-
liaments – endorses the Lisbon Strategy and identifies with its principles and demands. 
This is a laudable goal, but is somewhat overambitious for, despite any rousing calls that 
may be sent out, the truth is that – to paraphrase a familiar saying – it is and always will 
be very difficult for a person to fall in love with a Strategy, a Process or an agenda. The 
point here is to put into perspective the potential impact of a catch-all concept which is 
all too readily presented by some as the miracle cure for current ills.
  • The budgetary solution: several commentators saw a redeployment of the Community 
budget and specifically of the appropriations currently allocated to the CaP to what 
have come to be known as the new policies (R&D, innovation, etc.) as a key element in 
the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy. Clearly any increase in Community support – par-
ticularly financial support – for the development of policies at the core of the Lisbon 
Strategy can only be positive. “It would however be quite unrealistic to overestimate 
the extent of this hypothetical boosting of financial resources and the practical effects 
it would have,” for numerous reasons. First of all, the contribution of Community 
financing to support for key Lisbon Strategy policies (e.g. R&D) is minimal compared 
with other sources of funding, and an increase in Community appropriations – however 
desirable and useful – would not be enough to improve the Union’s mediocre perfor-
mance in this area. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Community support should be 
measured not only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms. For instance, the 
recent initiative of the European Research Council enabled the Commission to finance 
projects in the Research and Development sector on the basis of strict criteria of excel-
lence and “hence to maximise the effects of financial intervention by the Union for the 
same level of financial commitment”. Finally, there is no indication at present that sig-
nificant budgetary amounts will be freed up in the forthcoming financial perspectives 
for measures under the Lisbon Strategy. a substantial minority of member states, the 
largest among them, continue to take an extremely restrictive line on any increase in 
resources (the 1% club) and the Common agriculture Policy supporters (whose ranks 
have swelled following the last enlargement) have certainly not given up. and the 
hopes of some that there would be a mid-term review of the current financial perspec-
tive are now mere fantasy.
  • A better coordination between fiscal and monetary policies: it would admittedly 
be difficult to claim today that economic policy coordination is completely satisfac-
tory and the wide range of reactions to the crisis – ill-disguised by the appearance 
of a plan – has again shown this to be the case. But to see this weakness, however 
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regrettable it may be, as the main cause of the failure of the Lisbon Strategy is a step 
too far. Firstly, while there may be a link between macroeconomic policy and struc-
tural reform, this connection is no obstacle to progress being made with reforms, 
irrespective of whether or not simultaneous efforts to coordinate economic policies 
are successful. To link the two aspects too closely, as the aforementioned study 
does, is to risk giving those member states resistant to reform a convenient excuse 
for a certain apathy towards reform. One might even argue that it would be desirable 
in future to draw a clearer distinction between the structural objectives at the core 
of the Lisbon Strategy and short-term management of the economy which, while not 
incompatible with reform, has a different timetable and a different agenda.
Recommendations for the Eu-2020 Strategy
The contents and goals of the Strategy
 Refocus on the essential: •  i.e. in practice what had already emerged from the Kok 
report; if possible restrict the scope even further, ‘clarify and rank the objectives in 
order’.
 The Eu-2020 Strategy as the Growth Pact of the Eu: •  the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
should be divided into astability and a growth section. Stability should remain with 
the, whereas growth should be channelled into the EU-2020 Strategy. Furthermore, in 
order to reduce the pro-cyclical feature and improve the contribution to crisis manage-
ment it is worth making efforts for a more modern and flexible interpretation of the 
SGP. It is worth pondering the possibility of exceptions to the general rules of the SGP 
in a pre-determined fixed period if a country undertakes comprehensive structural 
reforms and the general government deficit increases due to the additional costs of 
the reform programme. as a result of the crisis the position of the European Central 
Bank has been strengthened among the institutions of the European Union. This may 
be an obstacle to the development of structural policy. The prospects of the EU-2020 
Strategy become gloomier if the institutional weight of the European Central Bank 
increases. The macroeconomic environment could improve if in addition to the rate of 
inflation decision makers of the common monetary policy would consider other mac-
roeconomic indicators (mainly unemployment) as well.
 be more realistic, more modest and more cautious •  in expressing objectives in quanti-
tative terms; envisage different scenarios, possibly with ranges of values; do not make 
systematic comparisons with the United States, which can be psychologically coun-
ter-productive, particularly at present.
 Strengthen the social dimension of the basic paradigm •  which states, broadly, “Give 
me a good economic policy and I will make you a good social policy”. Show in the new 
approach that, in the spirit of Lisbon, the relationship between the economic and the 
social is ‘two-way,’ which has been somewhat forgotten in the current implementation 
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of the Strategy, under the influence of a liberal mindset expressed a little too force-
fully; while the crisis must certainly not be allowed to compromise the basic message 
(avoid a return to regressive utopias), certain balances need to be seriously reviewed 
and redressed if the spirit of the strategy is to be respected.
  • This refocusing requires a detailed prior reflection process at the highest level 
which should result in a new reference text (or founding text) to inaugurate the new 
decade. The final report of the Felipe González Reflection Group may be that text.
 develop the external dimension of the Strategy  • which so far has been largely missing 
and explains some of the disappointments encountered; the global nature of the 
present crisis provides an opportunity to use the Strategy as a means of projecting 
Europe’s political and economic ideas on to the international stage.
  • Integrating structural and sustainability policies in the Eu� This would imply that 
the European Union has an overarching unified framework for implementing some 
long-term key structural objectives, such as employment growth, regional policy, 
climate change, energy safety, knowledge-based economy, innovation, education 
and training, etc. The major value added content of this could be that the new strategy 
would co-ordinate and harmonise the Common and Community policies as well as 
those of the member states in a comprehensive framework and extend them to addi-
tional fields (cohesion policy, common agricultural policy, etc.) not having been 
covered by the Lisbon Strategy yet. Harmonisation should be extended to both the 
time horizon and the contents of the individual policies and programmes. The guiding 
principle of the Strategy should be the integration of structural policy and sustain-
ability. The objectives and the priorities of the other fields should be derived from 
the requirements of long-term structural changes. The proposed comprehensive 
strategy calls for the reform of the EU budget. This means that the expenditures of 
the Community budget should be based on the needs of the Strategy and the policies 
related to it rather than the other way round.
how to evaluate the achievements: indicators, incentives… and penalties
 Refine existing indicators such as that relating to the employment rate (too crude at  •
present) or that for innovation and research (the point is to measure actual perfor-
mance rather than the financial resources allocated).
 Introduce new indicators relating in particular to demographic change in the Union and  •
the member states, which determines directly or indirectly a number of the Strategy’s 
objectives.
 Distinguish medium-term structural policy aspects – which are the only ones that  •
strictly come under the Strategy – and short-term aspects relating to the conduct of 
economic policy.
Develop a more rational method for evaluating national plans. •
Reintroduce comparative performance reporting (peer pressure). •
Reflect on the delicate issue of incentives and penalties. •
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The role for member states and for Eu institutions
 Distinguish more clearly at all levels (concept, decision, execution) what falls within  •
the competence of the Union and what remains a matter for the member states; some 
of the present setbacks are a result of the confusion that prevails in this respect in 
current procedures.
 Within the general strategy, develop a specific strategy for members of the eurozone;  •
restrict the role of the European Council to the setting of essential guidelines.
 Strengthen the role of the General affairs Council (especially after the reforms intro- •
duced by the Lisbon Treaty); the GaC must be the real architect of the detailed strategy 
formulation and the periodic adjustments required. Entrusting this task to the GaC is 
also the best way of enhancing coordination at EU and member state level (much more 
effective than the appointment of a Mr Lisbon).
 Put the Commission back at the centre of the system for monitoring application of  •
the Strategy by the member states; ‘a permanent decentralised dialogue’ at all levels 
between the Commission and the member states is the best way of ensuring that the 
Strategy is applied.
Radical simplification of procedures and fewer documents
 The system for the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy became bloated as regards  •
the number of meetings at ministerial level and others and the number of documents 
produced, which makes it too easy for certain members to shirk their obligations to 
comply with the Union’s guidelines and directives.
 Make optimum use of the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty (Permanent President of  •
the European Council, General affairs Council (GaC) to simplify and better coordinate 
procedures.
 Strictly limit the number of operational documents to three: a  • 10-year plan for social 
and economic modernisation laying down the broad guidelines adopted by the 
European Council and adjusted if necessary by the same procedure and, each year, 
annual recommendations to the member states pursuant to the plan and a contribution 
by the Union to the implementation of the plan, adopted by the GaC.
 a single annual meeting of the European Council (preferably in June to ensure better  •
preparation), for the purpose of adjusting the ten-year plan where necessary and 
ratifying the two documents containing the recommendations to member states and 
the Union contribution.
 It is reasonable to distinguish two stages for the periods 2010-2014 and after 2014.  •
Developing the EU-2020 Strategy is not possible with one leapfrog. Taking the EU 
realities into account, it would require three to four years of preparatory work, gaining 
gradual commitment by the member states, the Parliament and society, and assigning 
consistent funding to the process. although the new Commission led by Barroso is 
likely to announce fundamental changes at the beginning of 2010, only some gradual, 
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smaller changes are possible in the 2010-2014 period. after that, it is possible to apply 
deep reforms and together with the new mid-term financial planning period. This way 
the whole budget could be changed, including the introduction of own EU financial 
resources (tax), the policy-driven reshaping of fiscal planning and increasing the EU’s 
total budget; and, in parallel, fiscal framework conditions could be adopted to help 
structural changes.
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PoST lISboN STRATEGy
The Challenge of Building  
a Low-Carbon European Future:  
Combining Economic, Social and 
Environmental Policies into  
a Post-2010 Lisbon Strategy
Elvire Fabry Research associate, Notre Europe
Eulalia Rubio Research Fellow, Notre Europe
T en years after the launching of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU needs to set new guide-lines for assuring a sustainable path of prosperity in the coming decade, in spite of the many factors that work against such an important goal: global economic crisis, 
lassitude created by the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, lack of member states’ involvement and a 
deficit of communication on the issue.
Until recently, little attention has been paid to this issue. The Swedish Presidency had the 
intention to launch a debate on the post-Lisbon Strategy during its six month mandate but 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the preparation of the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Summit eventually proved higher priorities. The launch of the Commission’s consultation 
on EU-2020 has attracted public attention to the question, but it is quite likely that in the 
coming months national governments’ priorities will stay focused on the short-term – how 
to exit from the crisis.
and yet, having reached in December 2008 an agreement on the energy and climate change 
package – the so-called “20-20-20 for 2020” – Europeans are more than ever before in 
need of a common strategy to promote prosperity and sustainable growth. Indeed, Europe’s 
challenge for the coming decade is to honour the EU’s commitments on climate change mit-
igation while maintaining the competitiveness of European economies and securing social 
cohesion. In doing so, they should avoid repeating the mistakes of the Lisbon Strategy – 
very ambitious goals but weak implementation capacity. They should nevertheless retain 
the founding philosophy of ‘Lisbon’: the importance of adopting an integrated approach, 
fostering positive synergies between economic, social and environmental action.
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The post-Lisbon Strategy needs to be strongly linked to this new ambitious climate change 
target Europeans have set for themselves. Europeans have to end ‘Lisbon as usual’ by putting 
at the core of a European agenda the priority of building a low-carbon economy.
Creating a competitive and socially cohesive low-carbon Eu economy: 
in search of a new paradigm for the post-lisbon Strategy
There is growing consensus that shifting Europe into a low-carbon economy will require 
more than target-setting. Due to the uncertainty on long-term carbon prices and the 
high risk of investments in next-generation green technologies, market forces alone will 
not promote the level of investment in eco-innovation which is needed to switch quickly 
to a low-carbon production system. Even a well-known pro-market review such as The 
Economist recognised this point in a recent article commenting on the UK climate change 
plan (“questioning the invisible hand”, The Economist, 17th October 2009). Thus, public 
intervention is required in order to establish a predictable and significantly rising price for 
carbon that incentives long-term private investment in carbon reduction (something that 
the EU ETS system – European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System – has not 
so far attained) and support research and innovation in green technologies to promote 
their development and commercialisation.
One should take into account that technological innovation and energy efficiency gains will 
not be sufficient to provoke major emissions abatement. Witness what has happened in the 
field of transport: from 1996 to 2006, emissions from new cars have decreased by 12.4% 
thanks to improvements in fuel efficiency. yet over the same period car ownership in the EU-27 
has increased by 26% and passenger car use – calculated in terms of km per passenger – has 
risen by 18%. as a result, transport greenhouse gas emissions rose by 26% between 1990 
and 2007 (EEa 2009). In order to reach the EU emission reduction targets for 2020, it will be 
necessary to provoke changes in both production and consumption patterns. This will imply 
the use of pricing measures and subsidies to influence consumers’ behaviour (particularly 
on transport and on household energy use) but also structural actions to promote more sus-
tainable models of consumption and distribution (i.e. a heavy investment in urban and inter-
city public transportation, regulations to promote environmentally-friendly products and 
services, a deliberate strategy to promote a switch away from air and road freight transport 
towards more environmentally efficient rail and maritime freight transport).
While the EU commitment to GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions abatement is frequent-
ly portrayed as a cost for economic competitiveness, it can also be seen as an opportu-
nity. a major investment on green technologies can provide a first-mover advantage in 
global markets to those companies and countries which are quickest to develop new green 
products or services. Europe already has a lead in several ‘green economy’ areas, such as 
wind turbine technology, waste recycling and water treatment systems. It will be important 
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to maintain this comparative advantage – through actions such as support to on-going inno-
vation and research or help to export commercialisation – and to forecast the opportunities 
of creating an advantage in new emerging green market niches. Even if Europeans succeed in 
exploiting these new opportunities, in the short-term the European climate change package 
will imply a loss of international competitiveness for some EU firms. In effect, the risk of 
dumping created by non-European firms that are not be submitted to the same burden is 
high, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. The final post-Kyoto agreement expected by 
December 2012 will help Europeans anticipate the kind of external economic competitive-
ness they should encounter while operating their transition towards a low-carbon economy. 
yet, considering the outcome of the Copenhagen Summit, it is quite probable that the final 
post-Kyoto agreement won’t give real and satisfactory transparency on the goodwill and 
capacity of EU’s main commercial competitors to operate a similar transition to low-carbon 
economy and to limit environmental dumping. If this happens, the EU will have to find alter-
native ways to force the engagement of third parties in the fight against climate change 
and to protect the competitiveness of the EU enterprises. The possibility of creating an EU 
carbon tax on imports will have to be put on the table.
The transition towards a low-carbon economy will provoke major changes in our industrial 
structures. Processes of industrial restructuring will entail high costs, not only for the workers 
concerned but for the local or regional economies. This might endanger EU’s social cohesion, 
which is not only a common EU good but an essential characteristic of the European social 
model. Measures to anticipate changes will be required, as well as accompanying policies to 
reduce the social costs to a minimum, by favouring the transition of workers to other jobs and 
promoting the economic diversification of the affected areas.
Particular attention will then have to be paid to the impact of climate change policies on 
employment. according to a recent ETUC / SDa study (Climate change and employment 
2008), the measures to enable the EU to reduce its CO2 emissions by some 40% by 2030 
will not globally destroy jobs, but they will substantially change the supply and demand of 
jobs and qualifications. Workers will have to be redirected from energy-intensive sectors 
(such as coal and steel industry) to green sector with high employability (public transpor-
tation, renewal energies, sustainable building and construction). This transition will not be 
without difficulty: there is a risk that displaced workers will be trapped in structural unem-
ployment if activation measures and social protection schemes are not correctly anticipat-
ed and followed up.
apart from a redirection of workers from high carbon to low-carbon sectors, the transition 
towards a low-carbon economy will lead to a redefinition of skills across almost all sectors. 
In particular, increasing demand for ‘green’ jobs will lead to a shortage of certain environ-
mental skills. In principle, market forces are expected to promote an increase of private 
investment in these skills. yet, several sectors – such as renewable energy, energy and 
resource efficiency, building renovation, etc. – are already facing skill shortages and there 
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are signs that this is hampering their development. Removing current skill shortages and 
anticipating new skill demands will be crucial to facilitate the greening of EU economies.
Finally, as pointed out by various experts, the transition towards a low-carbon economy will 
entail socially regressive effects. In effect, many of the necessary measures to reduce green-
house gas emissions – in particular fuel taxation – will penalise more those least well-off in 
our societies, as they spend more in fuel consumption in relative terms. In order to ensure 
that our low-carbon future is not inequitable, it will be essential to introduce compensatory 
measures to offset these regressive impacts. The latter is both right from a moral point of 
view and necessary from a strategic perspective: if we do not address the social effects of 
the transition towards a low-carbon economy, it will be very difficult to ensure the political 
consensus which is required to support such a transformation.
From compensatory and penalising social and environmental policies 
to productive integrated policies
Shifting Europe in a low-carbon direction will require a comprehensive and coherent strategy. 
So far, the EU action in this field has been piecemeal and sector-based, and it has mostly 
consisted of the establishment of targets and guidelines for carbon mitigation, leaving 
implementation to member states. It is time to recognise that de-carbonating our economy 
requires a fundamental re-think of our model of growth, and thus of the whole range of 
policies currently being implemented in pursuit of development. Hence the need to place 
climate change concerns at the centre of a post-Lisbon Strategy of development and growth.
The current Lisbon Strategy pays little attention to climate change considerations. Since 
2001, it is supposed to integrate an environmental dimension – in the form of the so-called 
Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS). yet, in practice the two strategies (SDS and 
Lisbon) have been kept as separate processes and environmental concerns have been 
largely excluded from the Lisbon process. On top of that, the balance between the social 
and the economic dimension of the strategy, which characterised the original version of 
Lisbon, has been broken with the 2005 decision to re-focus the Lisbon Strategy on growth 
and jobs. at present, the Lisbon Strategy is essentially focused on promoting growth and 
expanding employment, from which social and environmental benefits are expected to 
flow automatically.
Ironically we need to come back to the initial philosophy of the Lisbon Strategy: fostering 
synergies between social, economic and environmental dimensions. Social action should 
not be designed in a strict compensatory way but also in a way to become a productivity 
asset. and it is important as well to design environmental action in a way to create opportu-
nity for growth. In a similar manner, there is a need to explore the ways to make social and 
environmental not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing. a low-carbon future will entail 
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social risks, but also opportunities for job creation. Inversely, employment and education 
policy, if well-geared, will facilitate the transition towards a low-carbon economy. Thinking 
on the social / environmental synergies is particularly important, as there has been a lack 
of reflection on this topic so far. Three out of the seven objectives of the current SDS are 
‘social’ – public health, social inclusion and global poverty – but they are those which have 
received less attention so far. and among the 57 indicators used to guide the implemen-
tation of the Strategy, none of them represents the interaction between the social and the 
environmental dimension.
Finally, it is important to take into account that synergies do not come automatically. They 
need to be promoted through the use of instruments and indicators designed appropriate-
ly. Too often, the Lisbon Strategy has led to an inventory of possible instruments without 
a clear strategy for a coordinated use of them. To promote a truly integrated approach, it is 
absolutely essential to solve these problems of coordination.
Recommendations to the Trio Presidency
A new strategic goal
The ultimate aim of the post-Lisbon Strategy should not be to convert Europe into “the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy in the world”. The new program-
matic slogan should be “to become the most competitive, socially-just and sustainable 
economy in the world”.
Timetable and duration
The post-Lisbon Strategy will not succeed if it is not built on a good analysis of the economic 
and social consequences of the crisis and the challenges of the energy and climate 
package. Forging consensus on a new analysis takes time, but it is essential to ensure 
the political legitimacy of the new Strategy. Introducing small amendments to the actual 
Strategy is therefore a recipe for failure. The Trio Presidency should modify the timetable 
for the definition of the new Strategy: the 2010 Spring European Council would preferably 
be dedicated to discussing national recovery plans and exit strategies from the crisis while 
an additional year would be needed to build an active political consensus on a long-term 
sustainable strategy for growth and jobs. The duration of the new Strategy should also be 
reviewed. Shifting Europe in a low-carbon direction will require a long time horizon. While 
Lisbon is a medium-term Strategy (10 years), the EU commitments on climate change miti-
gation adopt a medium to long-term view (10-40 years). If we want to place climate change 
concerns at the centre of the new Strategy, then we may have to envisage an extension of 
the calendar, with the establishment of objectives at both the medium-term (2020) and 
long-term (2050) horizons.
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“Stick and carrot”
The exchange of best practice – the basic tool of the Lisbon Strategy so far – will definitely 
be inadequate to achieve the “3x20 for 2020” agreement sustainable targets. The Spanish 
government, which is the first to chair the presidency of the ministries council, should invite 
member states to propose ways of combining new EU regulation pressure and national initia-
tives adapted to national specificities.
Simultaneously, efforts should be made for more and better use of EU funding. as the Stern 
Report adverts, the short-to medium-term costs of investing in mitigation are likely to be high: 
hence, a strategy solely based on the ‘stick’ is unlikely to work: there is a need to provide 
some ‘carrot’ – that is, economic support to member states in their efforts to de-carbonise 
their economies. It is therefore important to significantly increase the amount of EU resources 
devoted to finance low-carbon energy and transport infrastructures and research on green 
technologies. In addition, sustainable conditionality should be integrated in the selective 
process of the European Globalisation adjustment Fund. The budget of this fund is still 
symbolic and its existence is hardly known: it should be boosted in order to become a helpful 
support of a new sustainable strategy. Finally, revenues from the ETS system should be 
clearly earmarked to action on climate change, and part of these resources should be used 
at the EU level and allocated in a redistributive way (i.e. more funding for poorer countries 
and / or for regions or groups most affected by mitigation measures).
Instruments and indicators to promote synergies
as said before, ensuring a truly integrated strategy requires changes in the modes of gov-
ernance as well as in the indicators. Social and environmental objectives should form part 
of the main integrated guidelines. It is also paramount to build up a system of monitoring 
and ex-post evaluation designed to assess whether the mutually reinforcing effects between 
economic, social and environmental policies occur in practice. 
Making the strategy more ‘sexy’
The Lisbon Strategy suffered from the beginning from its very technocratic definition. Should 
the 27 agree on a new strategy, they must be careful to deliver a comprehensible definition and 
explanation of what is at stake, and they must commit themselves to invest in an active com-
munication campaign addressed to economic actors at all levels. a renewed strategy should 
also be given a new name in order not to be handicapped by the “Lisbon Strategy fatigue”.
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PoST lISboN STRATEGy
Greening the Stimulus Debt
Jakob von weizsäcker Research Fellow, Bruegel
background: the two signature challenges of our time
Climate change and the global economic crisis are the two signature challenges of our time. 
The Climate Summit in Copenhagen has increased the sense of urgency surrounding the 
challenge of climate change. But two fundamental disagreements remain. First, there is dis-
agreement on who ‘owns’ the atmosphere, especially between developed and developing 
countries. Second, there is disagreement on the best reduction path, and in particular the 
question how much reduction we should aim for now using current technologies and how 
much reduction should be postponed until technologies are more advanced and countries 
have grown richer. Hence, progress on preserving our climate may continue to be slower than 
what is required.
By comparison, responses by governments and central banks in addressing to the current 
economic crisis have been rapid and fairly effective to date. actions have included massive 
fiscal and monetary stimuli in support of the banking system and the real economy, despite 
substantial disagreements on how best to proceed. However, it should be pointed out that 
we are likely to owe at least part of this capacity to act and coordinate in this economic crisis 
to the painful lessons of the Great Depression.
This arguably more developed capacity to fight the economic crisis is neatly captured by the 
quip: “If our climate were a bank, it would already have been saved”. It raises the question 
whether there might in fact be ways to kill two birds with one stone – to make our policy 
responses to these two challenges mutually reinforcing.
Status quo: greening the stimulus packages
Initially, one obvious approach was to green the expenditures of the fiscal stimulus packages. 
a sizeable proportion, estimated at 15% on average, of the adopted stimuli has been desig-
nated for green spending. This percentage could have been somewhat higher and perhaps a 
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greater proportion could have been allocated to promoting green innovation instead of sup-
porting the construction sector. 
However, since the primary objective of a fiscal stimulus is to support the economy in the 
short-term, it would have been difficult to devote a much larger proportion of the stimulus 
to the longer-term objective of fighting climate change. This explains why Nicholas Stern 
for example only called for 20% of the stimulus packages to be green, not radically more 
than planned.
Policy proposal: greening the stimulus debt
However, the world has moved on and countries now need to reflect not on new fiscal 
stimuli but on how to gradually withdraw their fiscal stimuli and pay down the stimulus 
debt that has been accumulated. In 2009 alone, the EU countries are piling up a stimulus 
debt of around €115 billion or 0.9% of GDP, with the US adding twice as much: an estimated 
€220 billion or 2% of GDP. These enormous additional debts could be ‘greened’ by a firm 
international commitment exclusively repaying that debt with additional revenues from 
CO2 taxes and emissions’ cap-and-trade schemes. This is precisely what I propose should 
be done.
The additional green revenues should be raised as soon as our economies recover, to swiftly 
repay the stimulus debts. The time-path of debt repayment could be explicitly linked to the 
timing of the economic recovery. and once the stimulus debt has been repaid, the green 
revenues could then be used to reduce the fiscal burden on other activities, not least labour. 
Such a shift from taxation that reduces desirable employment to taxation that reduces unde-
sirable pollution can lead to welfare gains.
The envisaged increase in green revenues is ambitious but not utopian. In the EU, green 
tax revenues already make up 2.6% of GDP, substantially more than the annual size of the 
stimulus packages to date. Green tax revenues in the US are substantially lower but the 
Obama administration is working on plans for a cap-and-trade scheme that could eventually 
generate revenues of the amount of magnitude required. and even in China, a country still 
suffering from the communist legacy of low energy efficiency, the political interest in taxing 
energy and environmentally harmful activities is on the rise.
The proposal to commit to repaying the stimulus debt through green taxes once the economy 
picks up would have a number of advantages: 
First, there are efficiency reasons to complement the carrot of green subsidies with the stick 
of green taxes. The latter addresses the underlying problem with great precision, namely that 
private agents do not fully take into account the negative climate externality of CO2 emissions. 
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By contrast, the carrot of green subsidies is better suited to dealing with a narrower and positive 
externality: the spill-over effects of technological innovation aimed at reducing CO2 emission.
Second, green revenues improve not only environmental but also fiscal sustainability. a 
credible commitment by countries under fiscal pressure on how to repay their debts in the 
future could serve to reassure financial markets. For this reason even countries like Ireland 
lacking the fiscal room for manoeuvre for discretionary stimulus packages, might be tempted 
to participate in the greening of part of its debt. 
Third, the proposal implicitly acknowledges that fiscal consolidation after the crisis needs 
to occur through three means: (green) tax increases, but also, and at least as important-
ly, spending cuts and economic growth. Indeed, the stimulus debt to be greened is only a 
fraction of the total crisis debt, which to a large extent is due to automatic stabilisers and the 
fall in GDP.
Only a couple of years ago, this proposal would have been completely unrealistic. Ironically, 
the threat to fiscal sustainability during this economic crisis may be decisive in helping our 
economies to move towards environmental sustainability.
at the European level, the proposal to increase the green revenues raises the question 
how existing European initiatives can be leveraged to that effect. First, there already is the 
European emission trading system. It is of course possible to generate additional revenues 
within this system – for example, by reducing further the free allocation of certificates, by 
agreeing on an effective price floor on emissions (possibly in conjunction with the simul-
taneous introduction of a price ceiling), and by further increasing emissions coverage from 
about 40% at present. Second, there are a number of regulatory initiatives to enhance effi-
ciency standards where the economic rationale could benefit by relying more on revenue-
raising financial incentives and less on firm administrative limits. Third, the introduction of 
a European minimum eco-tax on all fossil fuels should be seriously considered, in line with 
the proposed minimum price for the emissions trading system. In that context, particular 
emphasis should be placed on eliminating the present reduced rates (for example in agricul-
ture or heating), as well as those rebates and transfers that reduce the marginal cost of CO2 
emissions. Those in need could instead be offered social support that is not conditioned on 
fuel consumption.
26 | PART I – SUSTAINABLE GROWTH CONDITIONS
ECoNoMIC GoVERNANCE 
Governing the Eurozone out of the Crisis 
daniela Schwarzer Head of EU Integration Research Division, SWP
Specific challenges for the Trio Presidency
The recent financial and economic crisis has posed the most serious challenge to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) since it was created over ten years ago. at the same time, 
the EMU has proven a safe haven for its participating countries, having avoided currency 
turbulences and severe speculation against single member countries. It has formed a core 
of stability in the single market. The attractiveness of the euro has consequently risen con-
siderably in the eyes of those member states which are not (yet) part of the single currency, 
notably in Central and Eastern Europe, and which were on average more strongly hit by the 
crisis than the EMU members.
at the end of 2009, economic indicators pointed to a possible economic recovery both in 
the EU and the US. But several risks remain and pose specific challenges to the current Trio 
Presidency:
 The situation of the banks in the EMU may still hamper economic recovery: a spill- •
back of corporate insolvencies into the banking sector would put new strains on 
Europe’s banks and would increase the already very strong prudence in the financial 
system. Hence, the allocation of credit to companies may continue to be insufficient. 
This may cause short-term refinancing problems with a danger of provoking insol-
vencies and a reduction of investment – e.g. in research and development – which 
could, in the medium and long-term, negatively impact the competitiveness of the 
EU corporate sector.
 The political and social effects of the financial and economic instabilities will take  •
the crisis into its third phase. Domestic developments such as rising unemployment 
(in some cases up to 15 to 20%, 10% on average for the EU) can make certain gov-
ernments less cooperative and more protectionist. The context for pushing structural 
reforms and measures to complete the single market (e.g. in the financial and services 
sector) has thus deteriorated.
 The continued trend of economic divergence in the EMU (due to different degrees of  •
competitiveness) has been aggravated by the crisis, which has hit less competitive 
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economies harder than those with a high degree of competitiveness. This results in 
continued economic and political tensions, manifest policy divergence and a politi-
cally and economically more complex context for the ECB to act in. 
 The deterioration of public finances risks making public finances in some member  •
states unsustainable (possibly even provoking a sovereign default) and could 
undermine the existing framework of fiscal surveillance in the EMU. 
The current Trio Presidency comes in at a time when the adjustment process to the 
economic and financial crisis is reaching its potential. But all this must be managed 
in a context where, at the domestic level, the willingness to accept structural reforms, 
budgetary adaptations and cooperation within the EU will be somewhat low; and where, at 
the European level, the governance institutions and procedures of the EMU will continue 
to experience a crucial stress test. However, the way the EMU manages its adaptation 
to the economic and financial shock in the next two years will decide its medium-term 
performance in a world economy characterised by shifting power relationships, with 
emerging markets such as China recovering from the crisis at a quicker pace than Europe 
or the US.
Current status
In order to tackle the challenges of the crisis, policy change and institutional adaptation 
will be required, at the European, national and international levels. On the policy side, the 
economic and financial crisis has already caused certain dynamics:
 as early as 2007, the ECB reacted swiftly to the crisis by introducing large amounts of  •
liquidity into the markets. The expansionary monetary policy persists to date. 
 In the EMU member states, budgetary policies have shifted towards expansive growth  •
stimulation. Meanwhile, consolidation and the long-term sustainability of public 
finances seem to have lost importance to most governments. 
 Bank rescue packages and subsidies for key industries have decisively expanded the  •
role of the state in most member states’ economies. The European Commission has at 
least temporarily relaxed the application of EU competition policy.
 Rhetoric and policies in many member states have changed towards a more protec- •
tionist stance. In some cases, national announcements or even policy measures 
have been in contradiction with the principles of the single market.
 The financial crisis has revealed serious inconsistencies in the existing finan- •
cial-market regulation in the EU, for instance in the field of deposit guarantees or 
mortgage credit. as insufficient standards in single member states are perceived 
as having EU-wide implications, the issue of financial-market regulation has made a 
strong return to the EU policy agenda – which, since the arrival of Charles McCreevy 
as Commissioner for the single market in 2004, had been characterised by a more 
market-driven approach with less appetite for EU regulation.
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The management of the financial crisis has also caused certain dynamics on the institu-
tional side:
 The first eurozone summit: in October 2008, the French EU Presidency brought  •
together for the first time the heads of state and government of the EMU (together 
with the British Prime Minister) to discuss support measures for the European 
banking sector. This institutional innovation so far has had no follow-up, but it is a 
format which could be used by the current Trio to discuss the most important EMU 
issues (see below).
 Strengthened European financial supervision: the Ecofin of 9 June 2009 and December  •
2009 and the European Council of 18/19 June 2009 decided to put in place new struc-
tures for a more integrated macro- and micro-prudential oversight , following the rec-
ommendations of the de Larosière Group.
 Winners and losers in terms of credibility: while the European Central Bank has been  •
able to strengthen its position and credibility due to its swift reaction to the crisis, 
the European Commission has lost authority due to its failure to assume leadership 
in the crisis management process, which was partly a result of the reluctance of the 
EU member states. It is a major challenge for the new Commission to re-establish 
its authority in order successfully to ensure the application and (in particular) the 
further development of the mechanisms for fiscal and economic policy coordination 
in the EMU. 
 a new global governance debate: on the global scale, questions of economic gov- •
ernance have moved to the top of the agenda as the causes of and remedies to 
the current crisis can only be tackled at the global level. The creation of the G20, a 
move which takes into account the need to involve the emerging economies more 
strongly, is the most visible development. yet the EU and the eurozone have so 
far come up neither with a consistent position on the future shape of global gov-
ernance institutions in the field of economics and finance, nor with a proposal for 
how the EU and the EMU as entities will meaningfully engage in global economic 
governance.
Proposals for the Trio
Out of the three Trio partners, only Spain and Belgium are members of the European Monetary 
Union. Given the challenges outlined above, both should put EMU and EU economic gover-
nance issues high on their agenda. However, Spain in particular is in a difficult situation 
with regard to its economic outlook, its public finances and soaring unemployment rates. 
Belgium, on the other hand, does not have a particularly strong political role in the EMU. Both 
should hence seek close cooperation with partners such as other large EMU member states – 
in particular Germany and France – the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
in particular the Eurogroup, in order to advance the debate on the economic policy coordina-
tion framework in the EU.
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One of the top priorities in 2010/2011 will be the management of exit strategies. Together 
with the European Commission and the ECB, the EU Presidency should take a strong role in 
the debate on when to leave the crisis-management mode (characterised by an expansion 
of central bank liquidity, massive public deficits and state interventionism). Interest-rate 
increases, budgetary adjustment and a withdrawal of government guarantees for the 
financial sector have to be coordinated in order to avoid a new economic downturn if unco-
ordinated fiscal and monetary restraint cause domestic demand slumps and weigh on 
corporate activities through higher interest rates. It is important to have the highest possible 
degree of confidential exchange between the member states and the ECB – for instance 
within the Eurogroup – and at the member state level to have close coordination between 
the two largest eurozone economies, Germany and France (at present these countries seem 
to be pursuing different fiscal exit strategies). The resulting domestic developments may 
increase internal tensions in the EMU. 
The re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) under the heading ‘EU-2020’ is on the 
agenda of the Informal European Council on February 11th and of the Spring European Council, 
under the Spanish EU Presidency. While the Lisbon agenda has shown the limits of a ten-year 
project in a crisis context, this strategy should be structured in two sections of five years each, 
with a review of the achievements and the global context in 2015 in order to respond to the 
rapidly evolving European and global situation. The current Trio Presidency should, firstly, 
state clear political priorities for the new European growth strategy – such as a return to sus-
tainable growth and employment, a decisive improvement of the EU’s competitiveness (given 
rapid development in other world regions), the guarantee of the long-term sustainability of 
public finances and social systems and the objective of convergence within the eurozone. 
The debate on EU-2020 should be closely linked to the debate on the future of the EU budget, 
which risks being blocked by the old conflicts already apparent in the previous budgetary 
negotiations (see Peter Becker’s contribution in this volume). Given the fact that the eurozone 
is technically one economy with a single monetary policy, specific attention should be paid to 
EMU-wide development needs. This includes both micro-economic aspects (such as the par-
ticularly strong need for structural reforms in some EMU member states, which no longer have 
the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism) as well as macro-economic considerations 
(such as the discussion of the need for fiscal stabilisation mechanisms at the EMU level).
In close connection with the new European Growth Strategy, the economic policy coor-
dination framework in the EU, and most importantly in the EMU, needs to be improved. 
The economic and financial crisis has revealed the deficiencies of supervision, both of 
the financial markets and the member states’ economic and fiscal politcy. The future of 
the Stability and Growth Pact is not clear, given the fact that most EMU member states 
are in breach of the upper limits. There is no clear commitment in most member states 
to correct this situation once the exceptional circumstances of the crisis have ceased to 
exist. Debates on the reform of the coordination framework should logically be linked to 
the objectives of the future European growth strategy. 
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 The improved coordination framework should pay more attention to economic diver- •
gence resulting from discrepancies in the development of national and regional com-
petitiveness. The surveillance framework, which so far has put the strongest focus on 
public finances, should henceforth be expanded to further indicators such as private 
debt, external balances and other indicators of the relative competitive position of a 
member state, leading to a more encompassing framework of macro-economic sur-
veillance. This discussion should be directly linked to the debate on the future of the 
Stability Pact in order to devise a coherent framework. Within the EU economic policy 
framework, the EMU should receive particular attention.
 With regard to developments that undermine macro-economic stability, recommen- •
dations to single member states are of particular importance. Past experience (for 
instance with the recommendations to Ireland under the framework of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines, BEPG, in 2001 which caused a huge national uproar 
as Ireland was asked to pursue more restrictive fiscal policies for macro-economic 
reasons – in times when it was running a budgetary surplus) have shown how difficult 
it is to recommend policy changes to single EU member states. Since this experience 
of 2001, the willingness of the European Commission (and the member states which 
review the BEPG before publication) to request policy change has diminished.
Fresh political will to improve economic policy coordination is thus needed, which 
implies both a pro-active European Commission and a strong Eurogroup chair (to 
be chosen in 2010 for two and a half years) as well as a highly constructive role for 
the Ecofin Presidency (assured by the members of the Trio Presidency). This is a pre-
requisite for soft coordination to work (which will remain the dominant governance 
mechanism as there is no majority among the EU member states to transfer sovereign-
ty in the field of economic or fiscal policy to the EMU or EU level). 
 In order to broaden the trans-European element in the debate on economic policy in  •
the EU and EMU, the European Parliament should be involved as much as possible and 
despite the fact that it has no formal competencies in this field. The monetary dialogue 
of the EP Committee for Monetary and Financial affairs with the ECB President and 
the informal exchange with the Eurogroup President should therefore be maintained 
and even strengthened. The new special Committee dealing with the Economic and 
Financial crisis should equally be nurtured in order to become part of the European 
economic policy debate. Dialogue with national MPs should be increased, involving the 
key European policy-makers in the EMU, the ECB President, the Eurogroup President 
and the European Commissioner.
In general, in managing the EU and EMU economic governance agenda, the Trio Presidency 
must pay close attention to all relevant players. This is particularly true given that the gover-
nance structure of the EMU is still somewhat informal, is under constant evolution and must 
be reshaped in response to the changes the Lisbon Treaty brings about for the EU in general. 
a close and constructive working relationship with the new Commission is key – most impor-
tantly with its President (who must define the overall work programme of the Commission and 
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re-establish it as a relevant actor in the EU’s response to the crisis), with the Commissioner 
for Economic and Financial affairs, with the Commissioner for the Single Market and those 
for related policy areas. Furthermore, the involvement of the EP in the debate on the future 
of economic policy in the EMU and EU is important, most notably because it is a key player in 
the ambitious legislative agenda for financial-market regulation which the Commission will 
start to table from 2010.
Strong political commitment and a strengthening of the authority of all actors involved in eco-
nomic-policy coordination would help the EMU and the EU to act more swiftly in a new round 
of the crisis. The EU under the Trio must prepare for new cases of crisis management which 
may be more complex to solve than many of the incidents since 2007. Today, for instance, 
a case of sovereign default within the EU cannot be excluded (for which the instruments 
currently applied to the comparable cases of Hungary, Romania and Latvia are not applica-
ble, since the Balance of Payment Loans according to art. 119 can only be granted to non-
EMU-member states). Likewise, a possible dollar crisis (and hence a strong and uncontrolled 
appreciation of the euro) is a scenario which might hit the EMU under the EU Trio Presidency. 
Such incidents may require the convening of a new eurozone summit.
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ECoNoMIC GoVERNANCE
New Changes and Old Challenges in the 
Economic Governance of the Eurozone
Clara Crespo Research associate, Real Instituto Elcano
T he tenth anniversary of the creation of the euro coincided with the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. and it did so amid uncertainty over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Its entry into force will allow for some improvements, 
such as greater economic coordination, but some of its weaknesses will remain. Despite this, 
as a whole the eurozone will probably emerge strengthened from the crisis.
This article analyses criticisms and proposals for improved European economic governance, 
including those that remain up for debate after these ten years, those which will probably 
be applied following the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty, and those which might arise as 
a result of the crisis. The crisis has focused much interest on the following two questions: 
who serves as the voice of the euro in the world, and which countries are going to join the 
eurozone and which ones are to be left out. We will address these two issues first, then 
the three traditional pillars of EU economic policy (monetary, fiscal and supply policy), and 
finish with a section on changes in the distribution of power caused by the crisis and the 
Lisbon Treaty.
External representation of the eurozone
One weakness of the eurozone economic governance which became clear during the crisis 
is that of its external representation in the world. This field includes on one hand commu-
nication on the euro’s exchange rate against the world’s major currencies and, on the other, 
the unity of discourse from the euro area countries in international fora such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and, especially now, the G20. 
Communication on the euro’s exchange rate corresponds to the Ecofin meeting of EU finance 
ministers, to the extent that it is the body with jurisdiction to decide on the value of the euro 
after consultation with the European Central Bank (so that such decisions do not jeopar-
dise price stability). However, the Ecofin Council includes members that are not part of the 
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Monetary Union. For this reason, the person in charge of external communication is not the 
six-month rotating President of the Council, nor the new permanent President of the Council, 
but the Chairman of the Eurogroup (the meeting of finance ministers of the eurozone), 
currently Jean-Claude Juncker, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. 
This division of labour has its drawbacks. The political characteristics which make a good 
candidate for the job of President of the Eurogroup (being from a small country in order to put 
other members at ease, and having a strong knowledge of economics at the technical level) 
are the same ones which weaken the international visibility of the euro’s main spokesman. 
The result is that communication on the euro ends up being informally shared out with other 
people. 
For instance, the words of the President of the European Central Bank, currently Jean-Claude 
Trichet, can be interpreted as indications as to the desired euro-dollar value, since in any 
case his decisions on monetary policy will affect that exchange rate, even though that is 
not his goal from a legal standpoint. another person who could be the external voice on the 
exchange rate is the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary affairs. However, 
being a collegial body, the members of the Commission must act in mutual agreement, and 
not all of the countries ‘represented’ on it (Commissioners are not supposed to represent 
their countries of origin in theory) use the euro. What is more, it is a post that lacks power 
to vary the euro-dollar exchange rates beyond what might result from public statements. as 
explained, the President of the Council or the rotating Presidency cannot fulfil this role either, 
since not all Council members are in the eurozone.
Therefore, anyone who expresses an opinion at a given time (it is often the President of France) 
may be interpreted as being a representative for the eurozone. This leads to confusion and 
repeated explanations to the public as to who really is qualified to speak on behalf of the 
entire zone.
Furthermore, the EU continues to debate how its external communications in internation-
al financial institutions or other fora, such as the G20, should be organised. The lack of 
agreement both at the EU and the eurozone level on a standard applicable to all cases affects 
the idea of a single seat at those institutions. It also affects the scope of common positions 
among countries, which historically have carried more weight in the international arena (and 
more contrasting positions) than they might do now, with the rise of the asian economies. In 
most concrete cases, member states are in fact capable of speaking with a single voice, but 
they do not want to commit to doing it as a general rule. They arrive at that single message 
in painfully slow agreement processes and the margin of manœuvre out of the negotiat-
ed common position is very narrow. Often, they concentrate more on achieving a common 
message than on the impact of that message on third players. When there is disagreement at 
the EU level, the common position leaves out the key issues (on which single member states 
take the floor), therefore becoming much less interesting.
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Enlarging the eurozone
In times of financial turbulence, the advantages of having a strong currency become clearer. 
Denmark and Sweden are reconsidering their decision not to adopt the euro, and for the 
countries of Eastern Europe not yet using it, joining has become a top priority.
Membership rules are still the criteria of fiscal and nominal convergence set almost twenty 
years ago in the Maastricht Treaty. The Eurogroup has insisted several times that countries 
which want to join must fulfil these conditions. But it might be rational to revise them, not 
necessarily as a result of the crisis and the new member states’ pressing needs, but because 
they are fairly outdated and have lost relevance from an economic viewpoint. The Maastricht 
criteria were designed in the 1990s, when the priority was to encourage fiscal restraint and 
force countries from outside the area of the German mark to adopt a strong-currency model. 
The two criteria most subject to criticism are the monetary ones, which try to encourage 
strong-currency behaviour: inflation and the national currency are linked to the euro within 
bands for two years (something like purgatory). These criteria are irrelevant for very small 
and economically open countries, where only part of the economic activity is carried out in 
the local currency (and the rest in euros). In these countries, central banks do not have much 
control over economic variables, nor is it in their interest to invest political capital in building 
anti-inflation credibility, because their goal will never be to let their currencies float freely.
as it is usually the case, the problem with revising entry criteria is which ones to establish. 
They should serve to measure the economic health of a country. They should include (revised) 
fiscal and monetary criteria as well as other institutional requirements, such as, for example, 
transparency and good functioning of the statistics system of a country, as the case of Greece 
shows. The alternative, which does not seem feasible or desirable, would be to simply erase 
all membership criteria, and let in any country who wants to join.
The ECb and single monetary policy
Formally speaking, the only goal of the European Central Bank is price stability (the rest of 
the EU’s goals, which include employment and growth, are secondary), so critics fear that it is 
biased against growth. Under the Lisbon Treaty, and despite resistance from the bank itself, 
the ECB has been moved from the category of ‘other institutions’ to that of ‘EU institutions’. 
This means it is obliged to pursue all of the goals of the EU, including economic growth and 
employment. This is not a trivial change, from a legal standpoint. But it will probably not have 
major, real consequences because it has been shown empirically that the ECB already takes 
into account growth forecasts when it modifies exchange rates in order to ease excessive 
cyclical fluctuations. More specifically, several studies show that the ECB makes its decisions 
while keeping in mind the expected rate of inflation and the expected output gap.
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However, it is true that the ECB acts more slowly and with less intensity in changing interest 
rates than does the US Federal Reserve. The minimum and maximum rates set by the Fed 
over the past ten years have been more extreme than those of the ECB, and the Fed tends to 
start a cycle of increases or decreases before the ECB does. One reason is that the European 
and american cycles are not perfectly synchronised, so their interest rates should not be 
either. also, real markets in the eurozone itself are slower to react. It is for this reason that 
during the current crisis the ECB has been accused of lowering interest rates too slowly, 
especially after it became clear that the financial crisis had hit the real economy.
On the other hand, the bank has been praised for being swift in increasing liquidity and 
coordinating with the Fed. at this other extreme there is also worry over the impact this huge 
increase in liquidity will have due to the ‘open bar’ policy (as much liquidity as demanded, 
at the monetary policy interest rate, rather than setting a fixed rate at auctions).
Where the existing policy has clearly failed is in the prudent oversight and regulation of 
financial services. Blame for this should go not so much to the ECB, which has no juris-
diction in this area, but rather to the member states, which were ignorant of what was 
happening.
Reforms proposed by the European Commission are based on a report issued in February 
2009 by a special group headed by Jacques de Larosière. This group certified the failure 
of the weak European mechanism previously created to respond to financial crises. But 
all it recommended was creating a coordination mechanism among national govern-
ments for the purpose of prudential oversight. The mechanism suggested by Larosière, 
strictly EU-based, consists of a decentralised system formed by a European Systemic 
Risk Council (systemic risk is not addressed so far by any supervisory body), led by the 
ECB, and a European System of Financial Supervisors (a network that coordinates the 
national oversight bodies). The usefulness of this mechanism will depend on its capacity 
for making sure that its recommendations are taken into account; in other words, on 
whether it has teeth.
Fiscal policy and the single European bond
Economic policy in the eurozone comprises three uneven pillars: monetary policy, jurisdic-
tion over which has been ceded to the EU; fiscal policy, which is coordinated; and supply or 
structural reform policy. In the latter, one can say there is no more than an exchange of infor-
mation under some general common guidelines.
The Stability and Growth Pact coordinates fiscal policy with the understanding that, under 
normal conditions – and not in the abnormal situation of 2009 – one must offset the tendency 
that governments have toward deficit spending because of their short life spans (the time 
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between elections). Following the reform enacted in 2005, the Pact allows governments to 
register a budget deficit in times of recession, and encourages them to ensure a surplus in 
times of economic expansion. Otherwise, the fear is that some member state will engage in 
deficit spending constantly and, overall, issue too much debt. Other states would then be 
forced to rescue that government, also issuing debt to finance the operation (this is known 
as the bailout problem).
In order to avoid this, a common procedure has been established to oversee and issue 
opinions and recommendations on each member’s fiscal policy. There are no incentives 
for encouraging compliance (above all, for posting a surplus during periods of growth), 
while there are sanctions (at least, theoretically) for profligate countries. Because of the 
crisis, the priority came to be fiscal expansion, as a result of which most governments 
found themselves in the red. The Commission, which is tasked with proposing opinions 
and recommendations in this area, has gained influence, since its recommendations carry 
more legal weight when a country has registered an excessive deficit than when its budget 
deficit is less than 3% of GDP. It is, in fact, more influential in bad economic times than in 
good ones.
The result is that the fiscal exit strategy from the crisis has been designed at the EU level 
somewhat fast: budgetary consolidations are to start in 2010 or 2011 at the latest; it is 
also agreed that the magnitude of the challenge requires fiscal efforts to be greater than 
the general rule of the Pact (which implies a structural adjustment of 0.5% of GDP per year). 
Finally, all member states must register a budget deficit below 3% before 2013-14 (depending 
on the initial position). In this sense, the design of an exit strategy has been swift. In the 
following three or four years we will see whether it was sufficiently credible.
Meanwhile, the crisis focuses the spotlight sharply on the bailout problem. The concern is 
that capital markets, sensing that some member states might decide to rescue others by 
issuing debt of their own, could demand higher yields from the debt issued by the ‘rescuers’. 
In this way, countries with prudent fiscal policies would have to pay a higher cost to finance 
their debt, because they issued debt to save those who were imprudent. It is said that the 
clause in the Treaty which bans bailouts is not credible. But the key issue is that in practice 
financial aid, with the consequent issuing of debt, comes before a state declares itself 
bankrupt, as was the case with the aid granted to Hungary and Latvia. Much remains to be 
seen in the case of Greece. Being a eurozone member, it cannot receive that existent kind 
of aid, but it could always receive another new type. at the same time, its government can 
be subjected to much greater peer pressure by the rest of the Eurogroup, forcing it to apply 
certain economic policies.
Finally, one could look at the proposed issuance of a single European bond. In the event 
that some member state is on the verge of collapse, and the political decision to rescue 
it is taken, all the other countries should get involved, out of solidarity and because the 
PART I – SUSTAINABLE GROWTH CONDITIONS | 37
externalities of the fall would affect everyone. To confront the cost of a bailout, one pos-
sibility would be to issue a single European bond, to which each member state would 
commit in line with negotiations held beforehand. another issue is how the markets 
would digest the issuance of that bond in the current situation. It might also be the case 
that, at this particular time of high issuance, national treasuries do not want a European 
bond to enter as another competitor.
Structural reform policy
The customary mantra for the eurozone says that the absence of independent monetary and 
exchange rate policies requires firm application of structural reforms, mainly in the labour 
and services markets (including today financial markets), but also in retirement pensions, 
education and many other areas, so as to achieve adjustment to unsynchronised business 
cycles via wages and prices instead of employment and output. Flexibility in these markets 
will lead to a better functioning of the monetary area. The crisis may serve as a learning expe-
rience in each country to drive reforms, regardless of the incentives that the EU procedure 
seeks to offer. On top of that, during the Spanish Presidency of the EU (first half of 2010) the 
EU is reforming its Lisbon Strategy in what is to become the EU-2020 Strategy. But those are 
areas under the strict jurisdiction of member states, where the EU can only seek to provide 
incentives and create political momentum for reform.
Under the Lisbon Strategy, the EU established a multilateral oversight procedure similar to 
that of the Stability Pact: each member state drafted a programme (Stability Programme in 
the case of fiscal policy; a National Reform Programme in the case of structural reform policy) 
that presented its plans, in accordance with common lines agreed in the EU, and a year later 
the European Commission and the Council gave their opinion on whether the government had 
lived up to its commitments. However, this procedure did not play a useful role in establish-
ing incentives for governments to implement the necessary reforms.
This is due in part to the fact that the Lisbon Strategy procedure had less legal force than the 
Stability Pact. This asymmetry has been addressed with the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the 
Commission powers in the former, equalling its power to that in the domain of fiscal policy 
(the right to present proposals and to make direct warnings).
But symmetry in the legal power of the procedures is not the main issue. The force of EU 
initiatives in areas that fall under member states jurisdiction depends on establishing a 
mechanism that is so visible and widely accepted that failure of compliance leads to signifi-
cant political cost for individual governments. If governments feel that there is a reward from 
voters for compliance, the mechanism would be even better. What the EU-2020 Strategy will 
try to address is visibility of the Brussels-based examination, with the objective of creating 
the correct incentives for structural reform in member states.
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The distribution of power
Distribution of power among institutions and member states is the reason why summits 
stretch past midnight and the reason why EU issues are obscure to the layman not versed in 
them. In the area of economic policy, to speak of the distribution of power is to speak, on the 
one hand, of the distribution of power among the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament; on the other hand, the power of the ‘ins’ as opposed to that of the ‘outs’ in the 
Council (in other words, the power of the Eurogroup (ministers of the eurozone) as compared 
to that of the Ecofin (all member states).
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament gains power vis-à-vis the other two institutions, since 
it becomes involved in several legislative procedures. In this sense, both the Council and the 
Commission lose some freedom, since they need to take the Parliament into account. at the 
same time, the Commission probably gains more leeway both in the fiscal policy (as a result 
of the dire fiscal situation its recommendations gain legal force) and in structural reform 
policies vis-à-vis the Council. In this last area, the Commission definitely gains power on a 
legal basis: its rights are symmetrical now to its rights in fiscal policy and some articles are 
added in the Treaty which can be a legal basis for more economic coordination, depending on 
the content that the Commission wants to give them. But its effect in practical terms remains 
to be seen.
With regard to the second issue, the Lisbon Treaty increases the power of the ‘ins’ versus that 
of the ‘outs’. Since it was created, the Eurogroup has seen its weight and influence increase, 
even though it is not a formal part of the EU institutional grid. The Lisbon Treaty acknowl-
edges its existence with typical EU acrobatics: its meetings continue to be informal, but in 
those cases in which the Ecofin addresses issues which only affect members of the eurozone, 
non-members will not vote, if there is a vote. What this system actually does is prop up the 
status quo. These days, since meetings of the Eurogroup precede those of the Ecofin, issues 
that are dealt with in the former are presented as fait accompli to the Ecofin ministers. There, 
these issues can be debated again because it is the Ecofin which has formal decision-making 
power. But there are usually few changes. The paradigmatic example is that of application of 
convergence criteria for examining the entry of a new member into the eurozone. This is an 
issue which the countries of Eastern Europe would like to address in the Ecofin meeting, but 
the members of the Eurogroup arrive with their decisions already made. 
The leadership shown by eurozone members with the meeting held on Sunday, 12 October 
2008 has deepened this panorama even more. That meeting, convened by the French President, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, which then held the rotating EU Presidency, after the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
approved an action plan against the crisis which was later endorsed by all 27 member states. 
another effect of the greater power of the Eurogroup is that those who gain the most propor-
tionally are the big member states of the eurozone; in other words, after the new voting rules 
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in the Lisbon Treaty come into effect, Germany will formally consolidate its power over the 
rest, followed by France and Italy. In the Eurogroup formation, the right to vote is suspended 
for countries which do not belong to the eurozone. So the weight of the large countries is rel-
atively larger, and a small loss of power in the Ecofin is magnified in a smaller setting such as 
the Eurogroup. Of course, in actual practice the power of each country also depends on the 
effectiveness of their foreign service, and in this area United Kingdom and France are in one 
class and everyone else in another.
Conclusion
The crisis that began in July 2007 opens up new scenarios in the balance of power, both 
between institutions and member states. The three pillars of economic policy in the 
eurozone once again change in dimension: monetary policy emerges strengthened, the 
goals of fiscal policy change and questions arise over whether the crisis will serve as a 
lesson to encourage structural reforms. But the biggest change is that the crisis has given 
more relevance to other aspects of eurozone governance, such as its enlargement and its 
external representation.
It has never been more necessary than now for the EU to speak with one voice in the inter-
national arena. What is at stake for Europe is shaping the institutions that emerge from the 
crisis. If it is not possible to take part in the international debate with one voice represent-
ing the entire EU, it is the voice of the eurozone that will come forth. and extrapolating from 
what has happened in the past few months, it is the one that will be heard the most. 
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ECoNoMIC GoVERNANCE 
The Governance of  
the European Patent System
bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie Senior Research Fellow, Bruegel 
Nearly 50 years of missed opportunities
Inventors, spin-offs or companies wanting to protect their invention in Europe generally start 
with a priority (initial) filing at their National Patent Office (NPO). From this priority date, 
the applicant has one year to file an application before the European Patent Office (EPO) or 
longer if the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) ‘beyond-Europe extension’ route is chosen. The 
EPO then carries out research (check for novelty) and the substantive examination (check for 
inventive step) and may eventually grant the patent. If the patent is granted, it can only be 
enforced in those member states of the EPC (European Patent Convention) where the patent 
has subsequently been validated and translated, involving additional fees and costs. Each 
year the owner must pay renewal fees in every country where protection is to be prolonged. 
On average, a patent granted by the EPO is validated in six countries only. In other words, 
once granted, a European patent essentially becomes a bundle of national rights. In case of 
litigation, national jurisdictions have the power to invalidate patent rights, even where the 
EPO has granted the patent, and to uphold a patent where the EPO has invalidated it. This is a 
paradoxical situation: we have EU-wide competition policy but national patent oversight. The 
European Union’s competition authority has jurisdiction throughout the European market 
but the countervailing leverage provided by intellectual property policy is ultimately run at 
the national level in each EU member state.
an obvious practical drawback of this asymmetry is that illicit parallel trade in patented 
goods is hard to prevent. It is relatively easy for imitators to import goods into the European 
Union through a country where the patent has not been enforced, and then to distribute them 
with impunity throughout the EU, including in the countries where the patent is enforced. 
as a result, companies have to deploy resources to protect themselves against potential 
patent infringers, a function performed pre-single market partly by border controls. Even if 
an infringer is identified in one of the national markets of the EU, the patent holder must sub-
sequently rely on the legal system of the state in which the infringement takes place in order 
to uphold his or her rights.
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This fragmentation of the European patent system leads to three ‘incongruities’ which 
radically reduce its effectiveness for all innovators and its attractiveness for SMEs and 
academic spin-offs. The first and most widely acknowledged incongruity is the prohibi-
tive costs of patenting in Europe. This is illustrated in the figure below, which shows that 
patents in Europe remain much more expensive, in absolute terms, than anywhere else 
in the world (despite the substantial drop in translation requirements provoked by the 
London agreement). The cumulated translation and procedural costs are of about 17,000 
USD PPP if 13 countries are targeted and 10,000 USD PPP with six countries. In all other 
large patent offices the cost is about five times smaller and fluctuates around 2,000 USD 
PPP. If renewal fees for a ten-year protection period are included in the cumulated costs, 
a European patent fluctuates between 17,000 and 35,000 USD PPP, according to the geo-
graphical scope of protection. This is to be compared with about 5,000 USD PPP or less 
in the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) and all other patent offices. In 
other words, ten years of protection in the US and anywhere else in the world is at least 
three times less expensive than having a patent granted and translated in the European 
patent system. In addition, accounting for market size would worsen the picture. Patent 
cost per capita in Europe is four to six times higher than in the US.
International comparison of cumulated patent costs, 2008 (in uSd PPP)
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Source: M. Mejer and B. van Pottelsberghe, Economic incongruities in the European Patent Systems, Working Paper, 2009/01, Bruegel. 
The second incongruity is related to the legal uncertainty over jurisdictions, especially in case 
of parallel litigations over a given patented invention. Empirical evidence and case studies 
all too amply illustrate the issue at stake. Entering into parallel litigations not only makes a 
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European litigation more expensive in relative terms than in the US, but it also makes it more 
unpredictable, as outcomes frequently diverge across countries.
Inconsistent patent quality is the third incongruity which is worth mentioning. The fact that 
national patent offices still grant patents independently from the EPO makes it possible and 
easy to file parallel applications before the EPO and before several national patent offices. 
This is particularly appealing when the patent is in the grey zone (patentability is not guar-
anteed). If the EPO refuses the patent it is still possible to get protection in national markets. 
Van Pottelsberghe (2009) shows that this is a frequent practice: among the 60,000 patents 
granted each year by national patent offices, 25% are granted to foreign companies who de 
facto leapfrog the EPO’s examination process.
These ‘incongruities’ due the fragmented patent system in Europe have lasted for more than 
47 years. Indeed, the original idea of creating a European patent was first put forward in 1962, 
before the creation of the EPO (1978). Since then, all attempts to eventually create an effective 
and attractive patent system have failed: there is still no single market for technology in 
Europe! Needless to say, Europe is far from being helpful to its innovators in this respect.
Current status
The Community patent project seeks to provide a ‘one-stop-shop’ for obtaining patent pro-
tection in the EU: once granted, the Community patent would be enforced automatically in 
the EU, with a single renewal fee schedule covering all countries. any cross-border litigation 
could then be dealt with through a Unified Patent Litigation System (UPLS), and ultimately in 
the European Court of Justice. according to the current negotiations the Community patent 
would be an additional patent protection route in Europe, alongside the European patent and 
national patents. Companies would be free to choose between the European patent and the 
Community patent at the time of the EPO’s grant decision. The Community patent and a UPLS 
are key ingredients for ensuring that the EU single market works properly. If European govern-
ments wish to foster innovation and create a suitable environment for fast-growing technol-
ogy-based firms, the Community patent project should become a prime objective. a unified 
patent litigation system would further reduce the prohibitive costs caused by parallel litiga-
tions and ease the uncertainty generated by heterogeneous litigation outcomes.
The current situation in European policy-making institutions is as follows. The current Trio 
Presidency aims to make substantial steps forward by submitting first a ‘Draft Council 
Conclusions’ on the patent reform project and then a ‘revised proposal for a Council Regulation’ 
on the community patent. as the devil is in the details, several agreements or protocols must 
still be reached, despite the recent declaration on the EU patent, which is more symbolic than 
indicative of real progress. These details include 1) the renewal fee schedule (some NPOs 
want it very high, users and observers want it at an affordable level); 2) the distribution key of 
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the revenues generated by the community patent’s renewal fees, of which half must be split 
between NPOs; 3) language arrangements (who is performing the translations of what parts 
of the patent and into what language?) and 4) the issue of enhanced partnership, which could 
be translated as making sure that NPOs still provide search and examination services.
Policy recommendations
accelerate the feedback from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the proposed agree-
ments related to the Community Patent. If Europe was able to create both the eurozone 
and the Schengen agreement, there are serious grounds for a ‘legal’ clearance for the 
Community Patent. 
Converge as fast as possible on the proposed design of the Community Patent, including 
language arrangements and fee schedules (search, examination and renewal fees). In this 
respect, search and examination fees should cover most of the cost of performing these 
services. a specific agreement should be reached for more favourable fees for SMEs, small 
innovative companies and universities.
adapt the EPO governance towards less NPOs and more stakeholders. The reform of EPO 
governance could be perceived as a real catalyst for change. The administrative council of 
the EPO is essentially composed of the representatives of national patent offices. The 35 
member countries frequently have divergent – and sometimes conflicting – interests to 
those of the EPO (both in terms of control and financial flows). and these 35 members also 
elect the President of the EPO and the five vice-presidents. a patent policy is more effective 
when it is coordinated with other policies that affect innovation performances (e.g., competi-
tion, industrial, and science and technology policies). So far there is no coordination between 
these policies and the patent policy.
In order to ensure smooth decision-making and proper representation, the EPO administra-
tive council should include representatives of major stakeholders of the patent system and 
a reduced number of NPO members acting as representatives of all NPOs. This arrangement 
would not preclude holding an annual EPO General assembly which all NPOs could attend. 
The new administrative council would include representatives of the business sector (large 
and small firms), representatives of consumer associations and representatives from the 
academic sector (academic networks and technology transfer office associations). In addition, 
four to five members of the European Commission should have a seat: the Commissioners in 
charge of research, competition, enterprise, international trade and the internal market.
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II ENERGy ANd  ClIMATE ChANGE ChAllENGES
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PaRT II
AbSTRACT
ENERGy
The energy issues faced by the European Union today and in the future are nu-
merous and unprecedented in scale. The EU must guarantee an uninterrupted 
energy supply to its consumers at low and stable prices while preserving the 
competitiveness of its economy and ensuring sustainable development.
Mankind consumes more resources than nature can provide. At a global level, 
primary energy consumption is due to increase by 45% by 2030. The European 
Union’s consumption will increase by 11%. Fossil fuel energy resources will 
continue to dominate the energy mix and their complete substitution by alter-
native energy resources remains unlikely in the near future. These fossil fuel 
resources are also becoming increasingly rare and the Union’s dependence on 
external supply is therefore likely to increase. In 2030, the EU is due to import 
67% of its energy needs, with a relative 95% of its needs in oil and 84% in 
natural gas.
International competition for the increas-
ingly rare fossil fuel resources will be 
more pronounced in the coming years. 
Without the diversification of energy 
sources and resources the vulnerability 
of major import-dependent countries will 
increase vis-à-vis fossil fuel supplying 
countries like Russia, which can use their 
advantage as a political lever.
This growing vulnerability and dependence of the EU member states is causing 
intra-European rivalries which undermine the solidarity principle at the heart 
of European integration. Repeated gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine 
have illustrated well this lack of solidarity between members of the Union, in 
this case to the detriment of Eastern and Central European member states. The 
insufficient diversification of energy types and resources in a number of mem-
ber states; the increased dependence on Russian gas; the lack of necessary in-
frastructure for the creation of a Europe-wide energy network; and limited stor-
age capacities are just a few issues that must be addressed by a wide-ranging 
European energy policy.
In order to support the development of such a common energy policy for Europe, 
contributors from the think tanks associated with this project have formulated 
a number of recommendations for the Trio Presidency.
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In order to meet these major challenges, national solutions are no longer suffi-
cient. It is now crucial that Europe develop a common policy in the field of energy. 
The Trio Presidency has a role to play in launching short-term initiatives to tackle 
the most pressing issues, like the building of an internal energy market, the revi-
sion of the EU budget allocated to energy issues, and enabling the EU to speak 
with one voice in the field of energy vis-à-vis third countries (Notre Europe). In 
this respect, active European foreign policy is necessary in the Caspian and the 
Middle East region to secure progress on the Nabucco project, critical for Euro-
pean energy security. In order to ensure the provision of natural gas quantities 
crucial for the viability of the project, the EU should devote more attention to the 
Caucasus and to the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations (ELIaMEP).
The creation of a coherent energy policy, supported by all of the EU member 
states, should also allow the EU to ally the international leadership it has al-
ready demonstrated on climate change to the development of cutting-edge en-
ergy sectors. These sectors should enhance the competitiveness of European 
economies through the stimulation of technological innovation, the creation of 
global sectoral leaders, and the long-term reduction of energy and other input 
costs (Real Instituto Elcano).
In parallel, a wider debate on the mid- to long-term perspectives for the Eu-
ropean energy policy should be launched by the Trio. The aim of the debate 
should be the identification of possible solutions to create an efficient legal 
framework to deal with energy at a European level and to establish a genuine 
European Energy Community over the long-term (Notre Europe).
ClIMATE ChANGE
The nefarious consequences of the advanced scenario of global warming oblige 
our societies to reduce carbon emissions in order to guarantee the sustainable 
development of the planet. According to the projections of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC UN), world emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) will increase in a constant scenario from 25 to 90% between 2000 and 
2030, causing a temperature increase of 0.2°C per decade. Such a rise would 
have disastrous effects for nature, mankind, society and the planet in general. 
The fight against climate change demands the development of a low-carbon 
society, implying radical changes in production and consumption.
Faced with climate change challenges, the EU has played a driving role on the 
international stage and shown real leadership in the negotiations linked to 
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climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The EU has 
committed itself to reduce its GHG emissions by 20%, to increase renewable 
energy’s share in the European energy mix to 20%, and to increase energy ef-
ficiency by 20%, all by 2020.
The European Union’s action to combat climate change should rely on a solid 
internal and external strategy. Without a solid internal strategy that allows the 
EU to respect its own commitments, the Union will not be credible on a glob-
al level. Together with other developed countries it needs to show the way to 
emerging countries, committing itself to energy efficiency and taking action on 
energy demand, as well as by developing and financing low- or zero-pollution 
technologies.
The recommendations expressed by the participating think tanks address each 
of these challenges. The transition to a low-carbon economy is a must in the 
coming years. Putting it into effect will have to be one of the top priorities for 
the coming Trio Presidency.
Ensuring sustainable development and fighting climate change means the de-
velopment of a sustainable energy and transport policy. In this regard, trans-
port and environmental policies are closely linked. Since the transport sector is 
responsible for almost a quarter of European greenhouse gas emissions, there 
is an urgent need for an integrated ‘transport and climate change package’ that 
sketches out a pathway towards a low-carbon transport sector (CEPS).
Regardless of the commitments of the EU Energy and Climate Package, coal 
will remain an important source of energy in Europe. Reduction of carbon emis-
sions from fossil fuel fired power generation will therefore be of key importance. 
It can be achieved through a rapid development of clean coal technologies, like 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) which requires a strong political support. The 
Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies should jointly work on establish-
ing a target for the use of CCT and CCS in the energy sector. Additionally, pre-
liminary discussions on EU regulatory frameworks requiring new power plants 
to be equipped with CCS should take place in 2010 (demosEUROPa).
Low-carbon prices threaten the EU’s environmental leadership. The EU’s emis-
sions trading scheme (ETS) works by capping the output of carbon dioxide and 
then distributing allowances to emit the gas to large energy users. The tighter 
the cap, the more expensive it is for firms to produce carbon dioxide. Carbon 
prices will need to rise quickly to preserve the credibility of the EU’s ETS. The 
European Commission may have to intervene in the market to ensure the rise of 
carbon prices. Such a move would reassure firms that prices will remain high 
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enough to warrant investment in low-carbon technologies. Crucially, it would 
ensure that the EU has climate policies in place to match its rhetoric and to help 
consolidate its leadership of the international environmental agenda (CER).
In the light of the post-Kyoto-Protocol regime (post-2012), an equitable cli-
mate change agreement based on the widest international consensus possible 
should set realistic objectives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Sector-
specific agreements could provide a good instrument to bring the emerging 
economies on board and gradually integrate them into the climate change 
regime. The scope of the climate change architecture must be expanded, in-
cluding forest management in particular. With regard to financing, the most 
cost-effective mitigation instrument remains the carbon market. However, the 
implementation of this mechanism requires an effective enforcement mecha-
nism (Egmont).
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ENERGy
Towards a New Energy Policy for Europe: 
the Need for a New Framework
Sami Andoura Research Fellow, Notre Europe1
T he energy issues faced by the Union today and in the future are numerous and unprec-edented in scale. Whereas many constraints affect the energy situation in Europe today and increasingly so until at least 2030, the European Union must guarantee the 
energy supply to its consumers, while simultaneously preserving and improving the com-
petitiveness of its economy and promoting sustainable development both internally and 
externally. The numerous factors blocking the creation of a genuine common energy policy, 
together with doubts over the current capacity of the EU and its member states to meet the 
challenge, lead us to ask whether the Union disposes of the necessary legal foundations 
to conduct such a common policy. The SBH Trio Presidency has a role to play in launching 
short-term initiatives tackling the most pressing issues, while launching a wider debate on 
the mid- to long-term perspectives for the European energy policy.
A worrying global energy picture severly impacting the Eu
The challenge of energy security
Humankind consumes more resources than nature can provide. Europeans, who represent 
7% of the world population, use 17% of world natural resources each year. In general, 
demand for energy should continue to grow markedly over the next 20 years. at a global 
level, primary energy consumption is due to increase by 45% by 2030. The needs of develop-
ing countries alone will account for 87% of this rise, with China and India taking half (World 
Energy Outlook 2008, IEa). The European Union’s consumption will increase by 11% (Trends 
to 2030 – European Energy and Transport, DG TREN, 2007). Fossil fuel energy will continue to 
dominate the energy mix across the world (80%) and Europe (78%) during this same period. 
The complete substitution of fossil energies by alternative sources remains unlikely in the 
near future, in particular due to delays in developing the necessary new technologies and 
1.  The author is very grateful to Csilla Végh (Notre Europe) for her contribution to this article. 
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the persistent difficulty of connecting sources to the electricity network (Trends to 2030 – 
European Energy and Transport, DG TREN, 2007).
Fossil fuel resources are also becoming increasingly rare. Given proven resources, current 
technologies and the coming increase in consumption, the current extrapolated lifetimes are 
40 to 50 years for oil, about 65 years for natural gas, and about 250 years for coal (World 
Energy Outlook 2008, IEa). The exhaustibility of these resources is paralleled in the European 
Union, where the production of primary energy has fallen considerably in the last 10 years, 
causing increased reliance on imported energy. Whereas the Union already imported 54% of 
its energy needs in 2006 (EU Energy and Transport in figures, DG TREN, 2009), its imports will 
reach 67% in 2030, with a relative 95% of its needs in oil and 84% in natural gas (Trends to 
2030 – European Energy and Transport, DG TREN, 2007). The European Union’s dependence 
on external sources for its energy supply should therefore increase. International competi-
tion for these fossil fuel resources has become a major issue for the years to come.
This competition has a particular impact in Europe, where the increasing vulnerability and 
dependence of EU member states are causing intra-European rivalries which undermine the 
solidarity principle at the heart of European integration. For example, the gas crises between 
Russia and Ukraine (repeated between 2006 and 2009) have shed light on the acute vul-
nerability of certain member states (essentially in Central and Eastern Europe) as well the 
patent lack of solidarity between members of the Union. a Russo-Ukrainian crisis can thus 
hide another crisis – an intra-European one.
Environmental factors
The nefarious consequences of the advanced scenario of global warming oblige our societies 
to reduce carbon emissions in order to guarantee the sustainable development of the planet. 
Such warming would have disastrous effects for nature, humankind, society and the planet 
in general, sparing no place but affecting poor countries the most. The necessary action will 
involve radical changes in production and consumption. Confronted with this situation, the 
Union has demonstrated its capacity to play a leading role in the fight against climate change 
at international level. The global governance of such a system is a major issue. It means asso-
ciating all states – developed, emergent and developing – with a new and complex institu-
tional architecture which accommodates the particularities of each country. In this respect, 
the EU’s position must rest on a solid internal strategy in which it respects its own com-
mitments – to reduce its GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions by 20%, to increase renewable 
energy’s share to 20% of the total, and to increase energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020.
In addition, the Union will not be credible unless it is able to act on its own energy consump-
tion. It has become imperative to make progress on energy efficiency and to take action on 
the demand (consumption) of energy, as well as on the development and financing of low- or 
zero-pollution new technologies. Neither will European action be credible if the Union lets its 
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citizens believe that they can continue not to pay for energy at its real price. This price must 
take account of the fact that resources are rare and that their consumption has a negative 
effect on the environment. That will mean being able to harmonise taxation in energy matters, 
and channelling the resulting resources to a common fund which can finance useful actions 
for controlling consumption, developing alternative energy sources and reducing green-
house gas emissions.
Economic and social issues
Energy is a major economic and social issue for the future of our societies. The priority must 
be to guarantee consumer access to energy at low and stable prices, and to protect these 
prices, but also to guarantee the competitiveness of European industry and develop green 
technologies. The Union faces numerous constraints in this domain.
The construction of an efficient Europe-wide network of infrastructure is indispensable if 
consumers are to be guaranteed secure access to energy. To this end, the Union must give 
itself a capacity for collective action in order to invest in energy transport networks and other 
infrastructure (e.g. oil and gas pipelines, electricity networks, storage facilities for liquefied 
natural gas (LNG), etc.). Member states’ ageing infrastructure must be renewed, developed 
and completed by the interconnections and other facilities which currently lacks (trans-Eu-
ropean infrastructure). These diverse projects necessitate major investments and a serious 
financial commitment on the part of the Union. according to the European Commission’s 
Priority Interconnection Plan (2007), at least 30 billion euros will need to be invested in 
Europe’s energy networks before 2013, comprising 6 billion for the transmission of electric-
ity, 19 billion in gas pipelines and 5 billion in LNG storage facilities.
at the same time, the Union must give itself the means to finance research programmes and 
encourage the emergence of new technologies (especially renewable energies) which take 
into account the above mentioned factors – energy security, environmental, economic and 
social factors – involved in building a 27-countries network, assuring low-carbon energy 
transport and distribution, and guaranteeing energy security. These new ‘green’ or ‘sustain-
able’ technologies must allow the European Union to respond to demand and to advance 
towards greater energy efficiency by helping consumers to change their habits. according to 
a recent European Commission communication, the European Union should invest an extra 
50 billion euros in low-carbon technologies over the next 10 years. This implies a tripling of 
annual investments – from 3 to 8 billion euros – (Press release IP/09/1431, 07/10/2009).
The union’s current position in relation to these factors
among the main obstacles and weaknesses preventing the EU from responding effective-
ly and coherently to the above-mentioned energy challenges are: a national sovereign-
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ty on the choice of energy resources used (energy mix); the preference given by member 
states to national and / or international (non-EU) solutions to the late 20th century’s energy 
crises, and preference accorded to bilateral relations with producer countries in the name 
of national interest; and a certain reluctance of member states to share natural resources 
with neighbours. To these various obstacles can be added the absence of a legal basis in 
the treaties permitting the Union to develop a genuine overarching energy policy, and the 
timidity of European institutions in promoting such a policy.
Concerning the internal energy market, the fragmented opening of gas and electricity 
markets in the 27 member states, along with weak transnational competition and weak 
added value for consumers in terms of reduced energy prices have obscured the potential 
benefits of a true Europe-wide liberalisation of energy markets. Recent legislative initia-
tives adopted in the framework of the internal market (Third Legislative Package) appear 
insufficient to build a single internal market. Such a market needs rules and authority, 
in the form of a single regulator of the gas and electricity markets which guarantee that 
the operators will supply, in good time and at the best price, the energy necessary to 
satisfy demand.
The Union also suffers from a damaging lack of credibility. It remains incapable of 
speaking with a single voice on the international energy scene, either within the relevant 
forums or, even more so, vis-à-vis producer and transit countries. This prevents it from 
exerting its full weight (economic, commercial and political) in its relations with inter-
locutors. The realisation of a true internal energy market would also make the Union a 
weighty partner in negotiations with producer countries. This lack of credibility is linked 
to the absence of energy solidarity between members, in practice and in law. To meet the 
challenge of energy security, the member states face a little-diversified range of sources; 
increased dependence on Russian gas; a lack of necessary infrastructure for the creation 
of a Europe-wide energy network; limited storage capacities; and persistent technical 
difficulties (for example, in allowing the direction of pipe flow to be switched between 
countries when supply is broken) which prevent states from helping neighbours in times 
of crisis.
Finally, the capacity of the Union to finance the necessary projects is at stake. One can 
regret the small size of the sums allocated to the energy issue in the European budget, 
which doubtless can be explained by the belated emergence of the energy issue in 
European debate. On average, the share of the annual European budget allocated directly 
to energy policy in the 2007-13 financial perspectives is around 20 million euros. Until now 
this budget has only allowed the financing of feasibility studies for energy projects, and 
not the realisation of the projects themselves. But given the figures mentioned and the 
need for increased investment in infrastructure, along with new technologies and alterna-
tive energies, this amount seems decidedly low if the Union is to bring any added value to 
the financing of such projects.
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what strategy for the union?
In light of the current situation and to meet these major challenges, national solutions are 
no longer sufficient. In general, the Union must above all develop a common policy in the 
field of energy and equip itself with a capacity to act collectively in order to invest in energy 
transport networks and other infrastructure, to finance research programmes and to conduct 
a common policy with regard to producer countries and transit countries. On these subjects, 
no added value comes from competition between member states. The Union cannot accept 
that the supply of energy to a member state be compromised. It must therefore ensure that 
solidarity can function, with the help of adequate interconnections, and that no third-par-
ty country can reduce supply in a targeted manner. The Commission has made proposals 
but the difficulties of decision-making lead one to ask whether the Union has at its disposal 
today the necessary legal foundations to conduct such policies.
Faced with these challenges, the current Trio Presidency envisages to undertake action in 
the field of energy and climate change, especially with regards to the results of the December 
2009 Copenhagen Summit, the legislative progression of the energy and climate change 
package, in particular of the internal energy market and to the Energy action Plan 2010-2012 
on energy security, efficiency and diversification. The Trio initiatives seem to be promising 
but limited in terms of concrete propositions. Therefore, in order to move forward the integra-
tion in the field of energy, we address the following recommendations to the Trio Presidency.
On short-term:
 The building of an internal energy market and free competition are the two instru- •
ments given priority by the Union in order to guarantee that consumer demand is 
satisfied in the best conditions. These conditions must be fulfiled if the Union is to 
act effectively, both internally vis-à-vis the energy operators and externally vis-à-vis 
producer countries and transit countries. In that respect, the implementation of the 
Third Energy Package aimed at the creation of wide, contestable and liquid energy 
market throughout Europe, ensuring effective competition and therefore contest-
able markets between various suppliers, combined with the creation of an agency 
for Coordination of European Regulators (aCER) for gas and electricity markets are a 
valuable step in that direction. However, it is the responsibility of the Trio with the 
European Commission to make sure that the package is implemented correctly and on 
time, and that the rules it contains is properly enforced by the competent authorities.
 Since the existing EU system is not suitable for delivering a coordinated response to  •
an acute supply crisis, in order to prepare future supply crises, directives concerning 
safeguard security measures need to be revised.
 Compared to the required amount of investments, the part of the EU budget devoted  •
to energy projects (infrastructures, new technologies, research programmes, etc.) is 
very limited. The share of the Community budget allocated to this issue in the new 
financial perspectives of 2014-19 should be significantly increased.
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 In the implementation of the institutional innovations in EU’s foreign policy brought  •
by the Lisbon Treaty i.e. a new Permanent President of the Council (PPC) with a High 
Representative for CFSP / CSDP helped in its task by a European External action 
Service (EEaS) the Trio Presidency should try to promote the capability for the EU to 
project its interest externally and to speak with one voice in the field of energy. The 
Trio could also push for better coordination of the Union’s external action on energy 
through the new European External action Service. In this respect, the EEaS should 
have a clearly defined and strong energy component.
 With regards to climate action, the Trio Presidency should try to guarantee that the EU’s  •
position must rest on both a solid internal strategy in which it respects its own commit-
ments and a global one in which it supports the involvement of developing countries by 
taking the necessary financial commitment to allow these societies to adapt.
On medium to long-term:
 In light of the structural deficiencies that the EU energy policy is suffering (as explained  •
above), it has become necessary to proceed to a real introspection on the way the 
EU energy policy has developed so far. This exercise would enable the EU to realise 
that it at lacks the sufficient and necessary legal foundations to develop energy as a 
core policy and launch a process capable to deliver concrete and tangible results in 
achieving the three objectives (accessibility, sustainability and reliability) altogether. 
This analysis should not take too much time, and could be launched straight after the 
release, in June 2010, of the report of the González Group of Reflection on the Future 
of the EU.
 Once such analysis done, the Trio could launch a real debate on the various options  •
on the way forward the creation of such a new dynamic and flexible process. Some 
of those main options can already be identified: using the existing Union structures 
and the framework of the current treaties and / or the Lisbon Treaty; creating a new 
framework and a genuine European Energy Community based on a new European 
Treaty dedicated to the energy question; and a partnership of a few member states 
(following the examples of Schengen or Prüm) at regional level.
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ENERGy
Key Strategic Decisions for Europe  
in Energy and Climate Change
Paul Isbell Senior analyst, Real Instituto Elcano
Federico Steinberg Senior analyst, Real Instituto Elcano
T he three-pronged challenge of energy policy is to improve energy security, guarantee environmental sustainability and enhance economic competitiveness. The countries of Europe, however, do not, on their own, possess the energy resources sufficient to 
easily attain all three of these goals simultaneously over the short-term. Therefore, Europe’s 
goal is to design a coherent energy policy, supported by all of its member states, that allows 
it to blend the international leadership it has already exercised and demonstrated on climate 
change with the development of cutting-edge energy sectors that will enhance the compet-
itiveness of European economies through the stimulation of technological innovation, the 
creation of global sectoral leaders, and the long-term reduction of energy and other input 
costs. at the same time, the EU should develop more fully a short-term strategy to manage 
more skilfully the EU’s relations with the countries supplying the bulk of its hydrocarbon 
imports – particularly natural gas – in order to maximise security of supply. To achieve this 
triple objective will require strengthening the EU’s single voice within a shifting international 
geopolitical landscape and taking tough but strategic decisions that will have major long-term 
implications for individual European countries, the future of the EU, and the stability of the 
world. The broad outlines of Europe’s energy challenges are well-known: the current fossil 
fuel-dominated economy contributes to global warming, allows fears of energy security 
to grow and threatens the competitiveness of European economies in the future. This 
analysis, therefore, does not seek to be an exhaustive study, but rather to highlight some 
key aspects of the energy issue that we perceive as the most decisive and strategic.
The ‘market-technology-regulation nexus’ versus energy nationalism 
and geopolitical competition
The optimal European energy policy would rely on a well-regulated and supervised market 
that allows technological advances to emerge rapidly, particularly if they enjoy strategic 
support from the state, and even more so if other countries aggressively support such a 
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strategic orientation. This nexus between the market, technology and regulation obviously 
functions better in times of political stability and international cooperation, but the mar-
ket-technology-regulation nexus can also contribute to international security.
However in the future, greater state intervention will be necessary to drive energy transfor-
mation fast enough to avoid the worst features of fossil fuel-induced climate change. It is 
essential to gradually stiffen the economic penalty for using fossil fuels and give priority 
to investment in clean energies. In order to do this, market-based mechanisms should be 
employed, within a regulatory framework coordinated at the EU level, with balanced, even-
handed state intervention that causes as few market distortions as possible.
However, if Europe is the only major world player to embrace such a strategy, it will be difficult 
to sustain. Europe would be at a constant disadvantage because it would be playing under 
different rules than those followed by others powers with clear tendencies toward energy 
nationalism. In fact, if the United States and the emerging powers fail to reach agreement 
on how to advance a new post-Kyoto regime with at least a minimum of credibility, the EU 
– which would no longer be able to lead the fight against climate change – would have to 
consider an alternative, more ‘realist’, long-term energy strategy.
Such an alternative approach might involve replacing the ‘fight against climate change’ as 
the EU’s principal rallying cry for its new energy policies with the growing threats to energy 
security, leading the EU to be less inclined to international cooperation than it has been 
until now. If priority were given to the (more narrow) goal of energy security, more aggres-
sive and nationalist policies might prevail, stemming from the growing concerns in the EU 
over security of supply. In this case, it would be necessary to design a new EU strategy for 
the battle against global warming, focused more on adaptation measures, and less on miti-
gation, given that the lack of an international agreement would make it very difficult to halt 
global warming and its many impacts. at the same time, such an approach would also facil-
itate the fulfilment of the goals of the Lisbon agenda, since the large-scale deployment of 
renewable energy should enhance EU productivity and competitiveness.
Climate change versus energy security as the driving force behind 
European energy policy
In the past few years, the EU has made the battle against global warming the main rallying 
cry of its energy policy. However, even though the European consensus on climate change 
might survive, the fact that there has not been significant progress at the Copenhagen 
Summit means that Europe will have to consider altering its strategy and put more policy 
emphasis on energy-security issues. In a world in which there is insufficient consensus 
on how to fight climate change – and in which most countries perceive energy security in 
strictly national terms – it makes little sense for the EU to stick with a strategy based on 
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international cooperation, one that depends largely on the commitments and behaviour 
of other countries which to date have been relatively uncooperative. In this context, it 
would be better for the EU to highlight threats to energy security: a strategy which is 
in line with the dominant policy orientation in other countries, to say nothing of public 
opinion.
However, if the EU replaces the climate change cause with a discourse stressing the 
growing scarcity of fossil fuels, then the public electorates – faced over the mid-term with 
the possibility of high prices and potential supply cuts – might be more willing to accept a 
radical change in European energy policies. Supply shortages might end up being more of 
a motivating threat than the spectre of climate change: for example, in a scenario in which 
the countries of the world become more and more nationalist, and with geopolitical rivalry 
gaining momentum, public opinion might become more predisposed to the imposition of a 
carbon tax. Even with its weaknesses, this policy might be more efficient than the current 
emission trading system in terms of increasing energy efficiency, reducing consumption of 
fossil-based energies, stimulating the deployment of renewable energies and other clean 
technologies, and cutting emissions of greenhouse gases.
It would nevertheless be a good idea, however, to stress the ‘limitations to the supply of 
hydrocarbons’ rather than underline the ‘dangers of supply cuts’. This is particularly relevant 
for the EU in its relationship with Russia. It should avoid direct confrontation with Russia 
over supply cuts attributable to transit countries, and should aim for cooperation agree-
ments in natural gas and oil while trying to reduce Central and Eastern Europe’s dependence 
on Russian gas. Ties with Russia aside, the EU should combat generalised, unfounded fear 
among the public by emphasising the possibility of supply limitations over the medium and 
long-term. This could result either from the possible depletion of hydrocarbon reserves 
(which would exert upward pressure on prices) or from the fact that in recent years the new 
energy nationalism has caused many producing and exporting countries to invest less than 
what is necessary for supply to continue to meet growing world demand.
In the worst case, if the world enters a period of geopolitical competition for energy and 
other resources, Europe should come to an understanding with Russia to obtain enough 
gas to allow the EU to remain on the sidelines of these intensifying international rivalries. 
Once security of supply is assured, Europe should unilaterally pursue the other goals in its 
energy triangle.
lending priority to competitiveness within the energy policy triangle
Even if the central guiding reference of European energy policy shifts from fighting climate 
change to guaranteeing security of supply, from an economic standpoint it would still be 
essential to boost the competitiveness component of the triangle. This competitiveness 
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objective should be the major goal of EU Energy and Climate Strategy. It is necessary to 
give political support to new energy R&D investment. There must also be sufficient backing 
for policies to build new infrastructure (renewable energies, smart grids, international 
electricity interconnections), to move forward on the electrification of the vehicle fleet and 
to further develop and deploy systems to capture and sequester carbon dioxide. These 
investments should be undertaken in any case, but they will be even more necessary if a 
global scenario emerges that is non-cooperative and conflictual with regard to energy and 
the environment.
It is quite possible that all the sectors mentioned above will have a promising future, and 
that the countries that devise the first technological advances will come to dominate 
them, which would allow the EU at least to partially resolve its problem of insufficient 
competitiveness. If Europe can avoid major military spending – at least in relation to 
a potential arms race between the United States and China – then the EU will have the 
flexibility and the margin to invest in new technologies that generate high value-added 
and allow for increased productivity. and if eventually the rest of the world’s regions, 
already behind in development of energy technology, return to cooperative solutions 
rooted in the “market-technology-regulation nexus,” Europe will have developed a solid 
foundation for energy-technology exports and energy and climate investment in other 
countries.
Priorities for electricity generation:  
interconnections, ‘smart grids,’ and electric cars
as we have stated above, the EU should pursue certain investments and strategic goals, 
regardless of what might happen on the international scene. These include large-scale 
investment in new electricity infrastructure. a new smart grid would allow for employing 
solar and wind technology in such a way that all units of the system – residential and 
office buildings, companies and households, appliances and vehicles, etc. – could be 
consumers and producers of energy at the same time (drawing energy from the grid when 
needed and selling it back into the grid during times of the day when there is a surplus). It 
is also necessary for Europe’s various economies to have trans-European and internation-
al electricity interconnections to ensure that at least 15% of their national consumption 
can be imported. These two measures would ease the volatility of the supply and demand 
of the electricity system, making it possible to manage the system with more and more 
electricity generated from intermittent, renewable sources. Electrifying vehicles on a large 
scale would raise the potential of the smart grid while reducing oil consumption and crude 
imports. The more Europe invests in these three physical components of the electricity 
system, the more renewable energies could contribute (in percentage terms) to the primary 
energy mix, reducing the need to rely so heavily on non-intermittent energy sources (like 
coal or nuclear power) for base load generation.
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Nuclear energy versus clean coal
Finally, Europe must make a very concrete strategic decision: a long-term strategic choice 
between nuclear energy and clean coal (achieved through the deployment of carbon capture and 
sequestration technology) as the necessary complement to natural gas as a source of base load 
generation. Clean coal offers several advantages over nuclear energy. First, it does not produce 
nuclear waste, or anything comparable. Second, and more importantly, a decision to back clean 
coal strategically would turn many political enemies in the fight against global warming (the 
coal lobby and many oil and gas companies) into allies, a political advantage which aggres-
sive strategic backing of nuclear energy could never reproduce. For instance, the coal-abundant 
countries of Eastern Europe might feel more secure and become more cooperative if the EU were 
to follow a Clean Coal Strategy (CCS). The same might be said of the elected representatives of 
the 25 or so ‘coal states’ in the US.
But clean coal’s most important advantage over nuclear energy has to do with the global fight 
against climate change. Coal is still the main source of energy in China, the country which over 
the medium-term will pose the largest obstacle to a global accord on climate change. Deploying 
infrastructure and technology to capture and sequester carbon dioxide in China, given the size of 
its energy sector, could transform the international energy scene, creating new commercial and 
technological markets which the EU – with the right strategic approach – could come to dominate. 
If the EU were to develop clean coal technologies in a short span of time, it would be possible to 
win over China for the climate change cause and at the same time the EU would enhance its tech-
nological leadership in an R&D intensive sector. Without this technological and infrastructure 
alternative, it will be nearly impossible for China to cut its emissions significantly in time to avert 
the most devastating effects of global climate change. Not even a major increase in use of nuclear 
energy will be enough to replace the coal that China will consume in the coming decades.
Conclusion
In sum, although the EU faces many obstacles, a strategy blending market forces together with 
government encouragement of new technologies – albeit it is under proper regulatory oversight – 
should be the guiding principle of Europe’s long-term energy strategy. Even so, it is important to 
acknowledge that greater government intervention will be needed to support both the development 
of renewable energies and technology to capture and store carbon, especially if the international 
context becomes less and less cooperative in the realm of energy and climate change issues.
In the next two years EU countries should work together to achieve these goals. First, they should 
agree on some basic principles to build a common energy policy. Second, they should improve 
electricity interconnections within the EU. and finally, they should devote funds to R&D projects 
associated with clean energies, especially electric cars, renewable energies, and technology to 
capture and storage carbon.
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The Nabucco Project: Implications  
for the EU Strategic Energy Review
Ioannis N� Grigoriadis Research Fellow, ELIaMEP
Global context and new specific challenges
Energy is a key issue of this year’s European political agenda. article 194 (1) of the Lisbon 
Treaty states that the Union energy policy will aim – amongst others things – to “ensure 
the functioning of the energy market,” “ensure security of energy supply in the Union” and 
“promote the interconnection of energy networks”. article 194 (2) declares that the European 
Parliament and the Council will “establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives 
in paragraph 1”. The development of a Southern Gas Corridor has also been declared in the 
2nd EU Strategic Energy Review to be essential to EU energy needs. Energy projects in South-
Eastern Europe, the Caspian and the Middle East, which used to be hampered by regional 
conflicts, are now facing the additional challenge of the global economic crisis. The signature 
of the Intergovernmental accord for the Nabucco project was a positive step and a success 
of the last European Trio Presidency, yet much remains to be done. a strong European energy 
strategy would not only limit the scope for individual member state energy strategies and 
provide a clear example of European solidarity towards smaller member states and the rest 
of the world; it would also increase the probability that crucial projects such as the Nabucco 
are realised. Such a success would increase EU legitimacy in foreign policy-making, which is 
all the more useful as the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty come into force.
Current status
The signature on 13 July 2009 of the Intergovernmental accord for the Nabucco project made 
headlines across Europe. a project ridden with doubt and uncertainty since its inception came 
closer than ever to realisation when representatives of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and 
austria signed an agreement which paved the legal ground for the realisation of the project. 
With an approximate budget of eight billion euros, a length of 3,300 km and a transport 
capacity of 31 billion cubic meters per annum, the Nabucco pipeline aspired to be one of 
Europe’s main tools in its effort to improve its access to energy resources, as well as to reduce 
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its energy dependence on Russia by diversifying its natural gas supply. Non-Russian natural 
gas from the Caspian and the Middle East would gain access to the European energy market. 
an additional interesting feature of the project is that it would not directly involve any states 
or companies which export natural gas and normally control the corresponding pipelines. 
It would be a purely commercial project, open to any exporter and importer of natural gas.
yet problems cast doubt on the feasibility of the project from the very beginning. First, the 
fact that Nabucco partners were not simultaneously natural gas producers meant that all of 
the pipeline’s capacity had to be contracted in the Caspian or the Middle East. yet political 
instability and Russia’s preferential links with natural gas exporting states in the Caspian 
meant that Nabucco partners had to face fierce competition to secure natural gas supplies. 
The inability of the Nabucco partners to secure the supply of natural gas quantities sufficient 
for the operability of the pipeline remained a sword of Damocles hanging over the viability of 
the project. On the demand side, gaining a share of Europe’s natural gas market was already 
a formidable task. This became even more difficult due to the raging economic crisis, which 
took a toll on European economic growth and energy consumption. Moreover, partners failed 
to come to agreement on the economic terms of natural gas transit. Turkey, where the largest 
part of the pipeline would be located, insisted on extracting a 15% discount on the gas price.
These fears were somewhat allayed when azerbaijan committed large quantities from the 
Shah Deniz II natural gas field whose exploitation was expected to begin in 2013. additional 
support for the project came from the Middle East. The Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Maliki, 
stated that Iraq would provide 50% of the pipeline’s natural gas capacity, about 15 billion 
cubic metres. Iraq’s reconstruction and infrastructure development meant that the country 
would be able to export natural gas via pipeline for the first time and also commit quanti-
ties to the Nabucco project, which would be crucial for the viability of the project. Finally, 
the completion of the Trans-arab pipeline linking the networks of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and 
Turkey would mean that Egypt could also become a Nabucco supplier, albeit a minor one. 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were also earmarked as potential sources.
Nevertheless, the credibility of these statements was questionable on political and technical 
grounds. The ability of azerbaijan to provide the promised quantities would depend on the 
successful completion of the offshore Shah Deniz II investment, as well as its determination 
to resist Russian bids to purchase its own gas. as regards the Iraqi statement, it depended 
on major investment in the upstream natural gas infrastructure, an agreement about revenue 
sharing between the central government and Northern Iraqi authorities and the viability of 
the Iraqi government and Iraq itself, following the planned departure of US troops from the 
country. In addition, Egypt’s contribution – while welcome – could not be critical for the 
viability of the project. The contribution of significant quantities from Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan would only be possible through the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline, a 
project which has been frozen for years due to the dispute among littoral states regarding the 
legal status of the Caspian.
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The feasibility of the Nabucco project is also linked to regional politics. The course 
of Turkish-armenian relations may prove critical, as they directly concern one of the 
Nabucco’s chief prospective suppliers, azerbaijan. armenian-azeri relations have 
been marred due to the war in Nagorno Karabagh. Turkey has since then maintained 
an adamant pro-azeri position, demanding the withdrawal of armenian forces. The 
recent rapprochement process between Turkey and armenia which culminated with the 
signature of protocols of reconciliation on 10 October 2007 has the potential to lead to 
a serious deterioration of Turkish-azeri relations. a major issue will be the reopening 
of the Turkish-armenian border, one of the key items on the Turkish-armenian negoti-
ation agenda. The Turkish-armenian border was closed in 1993 in retaliation against 
armenian aggression in the Nagorno Karabagh war. Since then the closed Turkish-
armenian border, which has severely hurt the economy of armenia, and also that 
of Turkey’s Eastern provinces, has turned into a symbol of Turkish solidarity towards 
azerbaijan. If Turkey agrees to the reopening of the border without a resolution of the 
Nagorno Karabagh conflict, this would create disillusionment and anger in azerbaijan. 
Baku might then use its most powerful tool, energy, as leverage against Turkey and the 
West. Withdrawing from supply commitments in the Nabucco project or interrupting the 
flow of oil and natural gas towards Turkey would not be inconceivable then. This could 
derail the realisation of the Nabucco project.
Developments in Iraq will also have a critical bearing on the project. The attempts of the 
Obama administration to create the conditions for the departure of US troops from the 
country have not born fruit yet. While the Kurdish-controlled north of the country enjoys 
relative stability, it would not remain unaffected by a deterioration in Iraqi politics. The 
status of the city of Kirkuk and the dispute between Iraqi Kurdish regional authorities and 
the central government regarding control over revenues from Kirkuk’s oil and natural gas 
fields are two key issues which have yet to be addressed and could have disastrous destabi-
lisation consequences. Without a permanent settlement in Iraq it is difficult to imagine the 
completion of energy projects in the north of the country which might allow the fulfilment 
of Iraqi Prime Minister’s pledge, namely that Iraq would supply half of the Nabucco’s supply 
capacity in natural gas. 
The state of EU-Turkey relations provides an additional point of concern. Turkey’s EU 
accession negotiations are proceeding at a very slow pace. Only one negotiating chapter 
has been finished, while several others have been vetoed by France and Cyprus. In partic-
ular, the opening of the accession chapter related to energy has been blocked by Cyprus 
due to Turkey’s refusal to extend its customs union with the European Union to the new EU 
member states. In addition, Turkey has refused to sign the Energy Community Treaty (ECT) 
of South-Eastern Europe, which would allow for the regional integration of energy markets 
in the Balkans. Its somewhat uncompromising stance on a range of issues of interest for the 
European Union – including the Nabucco negotiations – could be linked with disenchant-
ment from Europe, as accession looks today more distant than in 2004.
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Russia’s regional strategy is another factor. Nabucco has been long seen as a project aiming 
to reduce Russia’s energy leverage on the European Union. To counter this project, Russia 
came up with its own pipeline project in South-Eastern Europe, the South Stream, and 
increased efforts to purchase natural gas from Caspian exporting states, which could have 
been otherwise exported through Nabucco. Meanwhile, the stalemate regarding the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea and the resulting lack of trans-Caspian pipeline networks allowed 
for Russia’s preferential access to the natural gas resources of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Russia’s recent agreement with azerbaijan for the purchase of 0.5 billion cubic metres per 
annum concerned a negligible quantity but showed that Russia maintained considerable 
influence in the Caspian and that azerbaijan should not be considered an exclusive energy 
partner of the West.
Recent overtures towards Turkey underlined the strength of Russia’s regional energy policy. 
The bilateral agreement signed in august 2009 granted Russia the right to construct part 
of the South Stream in Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea, thus avoiding crossing 
Ukrainian territory. This agreement underlined Russia’s improving ties with Turkey, as well 
as the intention of the Turkish government to consolidate Turkey’s transformation into an 
energy hub by promoting competing energy projects.
Proposals 
The rotating Trio Presidency (Spain, Belgium and Hungary) should deliver the promised intro-
duction of a new ‘EU Energy Security and Infrastructure’ instrument, as well as the implemen-
tation of the six priority infrastructure actions, outlined in the 2nd Strategic Energy Review, 
which include the Southern Gas Corridor. The European Commission needs to intensify 
efforts for the finalisation of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation and the promotion of 
natural gas diversification.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy needs to come 
up with a coherent and comprehensive energy strategy and external energy policy which 
would greatly facilitate the realisation of the Nabucco project. The recent ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty could be useful in that respect. The following policy initiatives would 
be of critical importance. In particular, the EU needs to play an active role in conflict reso-
lution in the Caucasus. This includes active involvement in the Nagorno Karabagh nego-
tiations, as well as the Turkish-armenian rapprochement process. Resolving the Nagorno 
Karabagh conflict is essential for the feasibility of the Nabucco project. Given that a large 
part of the natural gas to be transported is expected to be of azeri origin, azerbaijan may 
be tempted to use energy as leverage in its relations with Turkey and the European Union. 
If there is no considerable progress in the Nagorno Karabagh question, Turkish-armenian 
rapprochement could be interpreted as a sell-off of azeri interests by Turkey and trigger 
commercial and diplomatic measures on behalf of azerbaijan. This would not only have 
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negative effect on regional stability, it would also raise questions about the viability of 
the Nabucco project.
More attention should also be devoted to the political situation in Iraq. Supporting moderate 
forces and assisting the US disengagement should be coupled with mediation in Iraq’s 
domestic disputes, such as the future of Kirkuk and control over hydrocarbon resources in 
northern Iraq. Making sure that Iraq does not recede into violence and instability is impera-
tive for the fulfilment of the Iraqi commitment to supply half of Nabucco’s transport capacity, 
which is in turn critical for the realisation of the project.
The revitalisation of EU-Turkey accession negotiations would also boost the chances of 
realising the Nabucco project. While the opposition of the current French President and 
the ambivalence of the German Chancellor could limit the leverage of EU officials, much 
can be done regarding the Cyprus issue. Intensifying efforts towards the resolution of this 
issue could help remove one of the biggest obstacles to the smooth conduct of Turkey’s EU 
accession negotiations. It would also increase the bargaining power of European authorities 
on issues such as the ratification of the Energy Community Treaty by Turkey.
Last but not least, European authorities need to devise a new common energy strategy 
towards Russia based on mutual interest and interdependence. This would give European 
consumers a stronger voice in their negotiations with Europe’s biggest natural gas supplier. 
By clarifying that the construction of the Nabucco and the South Stream are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive, European authorities could even – under certain conditions – allow 
Russia’s participation in the Nabucco project. Promoting an international agreement on the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea would also not only advance regional peace and stability it 
would also facilitate access to natural gas resources east of the Caspian, thus promoting 
European energy security.
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ClIMATE ChANGE
The Climate Change agreement the World 
Needs… Rather Urgently
Peter Timmerman Former Research Fellow, Egmont
T he current international climate change regime is embodied in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Some fundamental elements, such as commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, are due to 
expire in 2013. The need for further steps in the international climate change regime beyond 
2012 is undisputed, irrespective of whether or not one considers the initial steps to have 
been wholeheartedly successful.
The international community, under the aegis of the United Nations, is trying to conclude a 
successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol for the period after 2012. Despite the impressive 
number of heads of state attending the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) meeting in 
Copenhagen, no breakthrough was achieved and thus no comprehensive and binding climate 
change agreement was concluded. Nevertheless, progress was achieved on some important 
elements such as the recognition of the scientific case for climate change and a financing 
commitment by the industrialised countries to help developing countries.
In this contribution the fundamentals of a good deal are discussed, irrespective of when a 
post-Kyoto deal will be concluded.
basic principles of an international agreement
It is imperative that any climate regime fulfils the following core principles in order to be 
acceptable and credible.
The principal focus of the post-2012 international agreement should be the reduction of GHG 
emissions in the atmosphere, because mitigating GHG emissions is central to succeeding in 
the long-term fight against global warming. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
established in its Fourth assessment Report (FaR) that the increase in global average temper-
ature ought not to exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Should this fail, the Panel states 
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that climate change is likely to have irreversible impacts. Notwithstanding the necessity of 
a long-term perspective, climate change currently causes acute problems for an increasing 
number of countries. Part of the post-2012 international agreement will thus also have to offer 
support to tackle these problems and adapt to the consequences of climate change.
Climate change is by nature a global problem which requires the widest international cooper-
ation possible. although countries will be affected to different extents, no country can shield 
itself from the consequences. Therefore, any climate change regime has to engage as many 
countries as possible in order to be effective. In particular, the world’s largest GHG emitters 
should be involved. It would be a non-starter to repeat the situation in which the largest GHG 
emitter is not part of the deal, like the United States under the Kyoto Protocol.
any agreement on international action has to be fair and equitable in order to receive wide-
spread support. Common but differentiated responsibility should continue to be the guiding 
principle. Failure to take historical and future responsibilities into account would make any 
agreement unacceptable.
The post-2012 agreement should set a number of ambitious but realistic objectives, both 
short- and long-term. These goals should take into account the differences in responsibility 
and the different potential for mitigation. To that end it is important that the climate policy 
architecture is cost-effective.
Commitments
The emissions-reduction commitments of the agreement are probably the most intensely 
debated issue of the deal. Extensive discussions have taken place regarding which countries 
should make binding commitments, and to what extent. This is of course vital for all countries, 
but from a holistic point of view, it is more important that the commitments are as global as 
possible, combining short-term achievements and long-term objectives. This will only be 
attainable if every country’s reduction commitment is fair, equitable and realistic. However, 
the urgency of the matter does require an ambitious global target of emissions reduction. The 
IPCC recommends reducing global emissions by at least 50% compared to 1990 levels by 2050. 
Developed countries would have to account for 80% of the reduction compared to 1990 levels. 
Developing countries could continue to increase emissions, thus allowing further economic 
development, but they would have to reduce emissions by 30% below the business-as-usual 
scenario by 2050.
It is clear that the industrialised countries (annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol) have to 
continue to take the lead in global mitigation efforts and take on new, ambitious binding 
commitments. They have the capacity to act and they have historically been the largest 
emitters of GHG. Per capita GHG emissions still largely exceed that of developing countries. 
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There remains a wide margin to reduce the carbon footprint of production and consumption 
patterns in annex I countries. The current financial and economic crisis should not be an alibi 
for inaction either. The current reductions in GHG emissions due to reduced industrial activity 
are of a temporary nature only. However, the negotiations in Copenhagen have demonstrated 
the existence of an ‘ambition gap’ between the major industrialised countries themselves on 
how strong their commitments should be.
The group of developing countries (non-annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol) is not willing 
to accept any binding emissions reduction commitments, arguing that cutting emissions 
would unfairly hamper their economic development. However, the issue is not as straight-
forward as it seems. This group is immensely diverse as it includes oil-rich states, small-
island states, as well as big emerging powers. What can be expected in terms of mitigation 
efforts of a large emerging economy like China is substantially different to what can be asked 
of a developing country like Malawi. The emerging economies are contributing increasing-
ly to global warming and all projections show a continuously rising trend in GHG emissions 
in these countries. at the same time, they have the financial means to undertake mitiga-
tion actions. They should be gradually integrated into a climate change regime with binding 
reduction commitments.
So far, the majority of developing countries has only contributed marginally to global warming 
and cannot be expected to take on strict commitments. There is consensus that the least 
developed countries (LDCs) should not have to accept binding targets, since their contribution 
to the problem is limited. However, an incentive mechanism with non-binding reduction com-
mitments (so-called ‘no-lose targets’) could offer an alternative to integrate the LDCs in the 
international climate system. It might offer them financial benefits if they meet their targets 
and are able to sell the non-used credits on the carbon market. Moreover, assistance can be 
provided to design policy roadmaps in order to gradually curb their projected GHG emissions.
Currently, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the single instrument to engage 
non-annex I countries in the climate change regime. The CDM is one of the three flexible mech-
anisms enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol, together with International Emissions Trading and Joint 
Implementation. It enables industrialised countries to invest in more cost-effective projects in 
developing countries in return for international emissions credits that can be used to meet the 
domestic emissions reduction target. The CDM has become an important market-based instru-
ment. a continuation of the system, albeit reformed, is fundamental in order to accelerate the 
participation of developing countries (especially LDCs) in climate change mitigation.
any new international agreement should expand the scope of the climate change architecture 
to sectors currently excluded, such as forest protection, international aviation and maritime 
transport. Deforestation, which predominantly occurs in some major developing countries, is 
estimated to account for about 17% of global GHG emissions. The explicit acknowledgement 
in the Copenhagen accord to act on deforestation and forest degradation and to establish 
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a mechanism to mobilise the required resources is an important progress achieved. With 
regards to international aviation and maritime transport, no significant progress was made 
during the COP-15. Nevertheless these sectors could serve as a model to agree on a sector-
specific agreement i.e. an International Sectoral Cap and Trade System. Sector-specific agree-
ments could be a potentially innovative and more effective way to bypass the thorny issue 
of agreeing to binding national commitments. Its sector-wide scope would alleviate some of 
the competitiveness concerns that exist in developed countries, because it would provide a 
gradual shift towards equal carbon constraints in developed and developing countries alike. 
In the current state of the debate, it is unlikely that carbon capture and storage and nuclear 
energy could be integrated in the post-Kyoto agreement.
Financing
Financing of mitigation and adaptation actions is another key issue. as the Stern Report 
stated, the benefits of strong and early action largely outweigh the economic costs of not 
acting. Nevertheless, large amounts of money will be required over a long period of time.
Developed countries agreed for the first time in the Copenhagen accord to mobilise $100 
million every year by 2020 to contribute to mitigation in the developing world. Moreover 
a pledge was also made to give $30 billion for adaptation and mitigation in developing 
countries during the period 2010-2012. So far however it’s unclear how exactly these sums 
will be collected, although both private and public sources will be mobilised. Especially for 
the EU, the decision “to pursue opportunities to use markets” is an important recognition of 
the pathway chosen already.
The bulk of climate funding should be collected through market mechanisms on the carbon 
market. In recent years an increasingly important carbon market has developed, within which 
several cap and trade systems are developing. The European Trading Scheme demonstrates 
that large amounts of money can be raised in the private sector through the combination of 
imposed emissions limitations and an international market in carbon credits. For reasons of 
cost-effectiveness, the system should be expanded as widely as possible.
The CDM, another market mechanism, will most likely be part of a post-2012 agreement, 
albeit in a revised form. In order to make new and deeper commitments acceptable for indus-
trialised countries, a wider use of the CDM is necessary to enable mitigation efforts in the 
most cost-effective way. How large the role of the CDM will be in the post-Kyoto agreement 
depends on how the reform will allow the CDM to better meet its objectives, notably to help 
industrialised countries reach their emissions reduction targets while at the same time 
promoting sustainable development in developing countries. To that end, the reform of the 
CDM will have to provide adequate responses to criticism regarding sustainability, effective-
ness, economic efficiency and procedural complexity.
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The CDM is also a considerable source of technology transfer towards developing countries. 
In Copenhagen, the establishment of a Technology Mechanism was agreed upon, which 
should improve technology transfer. However the extent of technology transfers realised 
depends largely on international trade regulation. On the one hand, trade can be a facilitator 
of technology transfer, by removing trade barriers for renewable energy technologies, clean 
coal and energy efficient devices. Climate policies might, however, cause trade policies to 
become more protectionist e.g. by way of border-tax adjustments on the basis of a product’s 
carbon content. European trade policy should oppose measures that might impinge on inter-
national trade and continue to advocate trade facilitation and liberalisation.
Regarding international public funding for climate change policies in the developing world, 
the European Commission proposed in 2009 that the industrialised countries would con-
tribute €22 to 50 billion annually by 2020 on the basis of two criteria: GDP and historical 
responsibility. Nevertheless when it comes to international public funding, it is imperative 
that funds currently allocated to development policy are not simply diverted towards the 
fight against climate change in developing countries. Reducing the amount actually spent 
on development assistance would make developing countries pay, once again, for the conse-
quences of economic development in industrialised countries.
Control
The lack of an effective enforcement mechanism was one of the principal reasons why the 
United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Discussing binding commitments makes no 
sense if there is no system in place to reliably verify the evolution of GHG emissions and, 
if necessary, sanction non-compliance. The post-2012 climate architecture would require a 
strong compliance mechanism, to make binding commitments truly binding.
The creation of a solid and enforceable long-term climate change regime in developing 
countries also requires adequate capacity building in those countries. The focus of capacity 
building should be on institutional and regulatory capabilities, particularly in LDCs. European 
development policy, both at Community level and at national level, can contribute substan-
tially to this objective – e.g. by supporting the development of national low-carbon policy 
roadmaps and establishing reliable GHG inventories.
Recommendation to the Trio Presidency
Despite the way in which the american-Chinese entente finally concluded the Copenhagen 
negotiations, the EU has previously shown it has the capacity to set the pace internationally 
on climate action. If it wishes to continue to do so, it will have to come forward with proposals 
and commitments on all of the policy aspects mentioned. However, the role of the Council of 
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the EU is limited with regard to the design of a new international climate agreement, because 
the Commission negotiates on behalf of the EU. However, on climate financing the Council 
does have important powers. The Presidencies will have to work towards an agreement in 
the Council in which the EU takes on ambitious financial commitments which inspire other 
countries to follow its example.
The successful conclusion of a post-Kyoto agreement requires continued leadership from the 
European Union. The EU must demonstrate ambition, in particular accepting binding commit-
ments when others prove unwilling to do the same. Over the long-term the European Union 
has the means to encourage the gradually deeper involvement of developing countries. But 
new commitments alone are insufficient: an effective and credible climate regime needs a 
strict enforcement mechanism as well. Finally, the European Union has a particular role in 
guaranteeing that trade and development policies are accommodating to and coherent with 
climate policy objectives.
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ClIMATE ChANGE
Weak Carbon Prices Threaten  
the EU’s Environmental Leadership
Simon Tilford Chief Economist, CER
T he EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) works by capping the output of carbon dioxide and then distributing allowances to emit the gas to large energy users. The tighter the cap, the more expensive it is for firms to produce carbon dioxide. The European Commission is 
relying on carbon pricing to encourage companies to invest in new green technologies. It also 
hopes that the ETS will form the basis of a global carbon market. However, carbon prices under 
the scheme have fallen by two-thirds in just over six months. at December’s UN conference in 
Copenhagen, the EU wanted to persuade big emerging economies such as China and India to 
take action to curb their own output of greenhouse gases. This was a tough task, given that 
Europe’s flagship environmental policy is not working.
Firms will only invest in new technology if they are confident that carbon prices will be high 
enough to justify the cost. In early November 2009, the carbon price stood at €14 per tonne. 
although this represents an improvement on the low of €10 reached in February 2009, 
prices are too low to make such investment worthwhile. Back in July 2008, the carbon price 
stood at €30, a sufficiently high level to provide a strong market signal. The current state 
of the carbon market poses a bigger risk to the future of the ETS than the previous collapse 
of carbon prices. Prices fell to just €1 in 2007 because too many allowances were distrib-
uted for the first phase of the ETS (from 2005 to 2007) and firms were not permitted to hold 
on to surplus permits for use in the subsequent phases (2008-12 and 2013-20). However, 
the price of carbon for use in phase two remained above €18 per tonne during 2007 (and 
hence well above current levels), because investors were confident that emissions caps in 
the latter phases would be tighter. In terms of encouraging investment, it is the future price 
that matters.
There are cyclical and structural reasons for the current weakness of carbon prices. The 
cyclical reason is the decline in Europe’s industrial activity, and hence energy use, since 
the middle of 2008. With the supply of carbon allowances fixed and emissions declining, 
carbon prices have inevitably fallen. The EU economy was on course to shrink by around 4% 
in 2009. The release of carbon dioxide by industries covered by the carbon market could 
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decline by as much as 10%. Moreover, the economic recovery will be slow to gain momentum, 
with economic growth (and hence energy consumption) set to remain weak for several years. 
In short, the EU economy will not grow anywhere near as fast between 2008 and 2020 as 
was assumed when the emissions caps were set, and hence emissions will be considerably 
lower than forecast. Instead of expanding by around 2.5% per annum – as assumed by the 
European Commission – economic growth is more likely to be around 1.5%. The cumulative 
impact of this on emissions will be huge.
The ferocity of the economic downturn has also highlighted two structural weaknesses in 
Europe’s carbon market. First, the EU fixed the supply of carbon allowances until 2020. This 
was done for good reasons. Investors needed to be convinced that the cap on emissions would 
be sufficiently tight to ensure consistently high carbon prices, and that the emissions caps 
would not be altered under pressure from governments. However, the lack of a mechanism to 
amend the emissions allocations in the light of changed economic circumstances threatens 
the efficacy of the scheme and its demonstration value internationally.
Second, the method of distributing the allowances is exacerbating the weakness of carbon 
prices. In phase two of the ETS (2008 to 2012), the vast majority of allowances is allocated 
for free. In phase three (2013 to 2020) energy generators will have to purchase them through 
auctions. But auctioning will only be introduced gradually for the other industries covered by 
the market. The upshot is that very few businesses are actually paying to emit carbon dioxide 
at present. and it has become apparent that emissions will remain weaker than projected for 
a number of years, they will be able to put off buying allowances until well into phase three. If 
all businesses had to pay to emit carbon dioxide now (or at least from 2013), prices would not 
be as weak as they are at present.
If EU emissions are falling, why does it matter if carbon prices are low? Surely the main thing 
is that the EU reduces emissions of greenhouse gases? The answer is that it matters why 
emissions are falling. at present, lower carbon dioxide emissions stem from temporary 
factors, not structural ones and that weak carbon prices will delay the necessary structur-
al changes. a structural fall in emissions (one that will not be reversed once the economy 
recovers) requires investment in new technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
and renewable energies. But companies will only make such investments if they are confident 
carbon prices will recover.
Weak carbon prices also threaten to paralyse the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Under the CDM, European emitters can earn carbon allowances by investing in projects to 
cut emissions in developing countries. The rationale for this is two-fold: it is often cheaper 
to reduce greenhouse gases in poor countries than in rich ones, and it leads to the transfer 
of capital and technology to developing countries. The CDM represents an efficient way 
of meeting developing country demands that the developed world help finance their de-
carbonisation. In the process, it also developing countries a stake in an embryonic global 
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carbon market. Unfortunately, at their current levels carbon prices are too low for it to be 
worthwhile for firms to invest in CDM projects.
Carbon prices will need to rise quickly to preserve the credibility of the EU’s ETS. Given the 
dire economic outlook, the Commission may have to intervene in the market to ensure this 
happens. One argument against intervention is essentially ideological: that it would interfere 
with the working of the market. another argument is that intervention would create uncertain-
ty: investors would come to fear that the Commission would interfere in the market whenever 
it was unhappy about the price the market was putting on the price of carbon. Both fears 
are exaggerated. The carbon market – like many others – is the product of regulation – so 
altering the frame of that regulation in light of changed circumstances should not be consid-
ered problematic.
What could the Commission do? It could, for example, tighten the post-2020 (phase four) 
emissions cap, which is not yet set in stone. Given that emitters can retain allowances from 
phases two and three (2008-12 and 2013-20) for use in phase four, reducing the number of 
allowances available in the post-2020 period would help to prevent further falls in prices now. 
But this alone will not be enough to ensure that prices rise rapidly. The Commission should 
also announce that from 2013 auctions will be subject to minimum prices of €25. Those allow-
ances that do not meet the reserve price would then be withdrawn from the market. Such a 
move would increase carbon prices and reassure firms that prices will remain high enough 
to warrant investment in low-carbon technologies. Crucially, it would ensure that the EU has 
climate policies in place to match its rhetoric and help the EU to consolidate its leadership of 
the international environmental agenda.
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ClIMATE ChANGE
The Missing Link:  
an Integrated Strategy to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transport
Arno behrens Research Fellow, CEPS
T he Energy and Climate Package as adopted in mid-2009 is often referred to as paving the way towards a new industrial revolution, a revolution into a low-carbon and largely fossil fuel free future. While the package addresses two of Europe’s most 
important challenges, climate change and security of energy supply, the future of transport 
has not yet included. Transport policy remains a patchwork of different initiatives aimed 
at different sectors and left to incremental policy change. However, incremental policy 
change will not be enough for the transition to a low-carbon transport sector. Bold moves 
will be required, starting with an integrated transport and climate change package, much 
in the same way as the Energy and Climate Change Package has opened the door to a low-
carbon energy future. Transport and mobility are at the heart of European integration. The 
Treaty of Rome has foreseen a Common Transport Policy, which – amongst others things – 
helps to promote the competitiveness of European industry as well as social and economic 
cohesion in Europe. Environmental protection and addressing the risks of climate change 
are part of this. 
The transport sector is not only vital for European integration, it also constitutes an important 
component of the European economy. The sector contributes some 7% of GDP and more than 
5% of total employment in the EU. Progressive European (market) integration and, in particu-
lar, successive ways of enlargement have led to a substantial increase in transport volumes in 
recent years. On average, passenger transport (pkm) increased by 1.7% annually since 1995, 
mainly driven by air and road transport, while freight transport (tkm) increased by 2.7% over 
the same period – mainly driven by road and sea transport. These developments have led to 
an increasing recognition of the negative side-effects of mass transport in Europe, including 
deterioration of infrastructure, land use issues, congestion, air and noise pollution, injuries 
and deaths, as well as substantial amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The latter 
is of particular importance in the context of the EU’s global climate leadership. Failure to 
address GHG emissions in transport would not only jeopardise the achievement of recently 
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adopted EU emissions reduction targets, it would also hinder the industrial transformation of 
the transport sector.
While GHG emissions have decreased in all sectors of the European economy since 1990, 
transport was the only sector that experienced continuous growth in emissions – by some 
36%1 in the period between 1990 and 2006. as a result, the European transport sector was 
responsible for almost a quarter of all EU-GHG emissions in 2006. The fastest growing modes of 
transport were civil aviation (+89%) and navigation (+51%), while in absolute terms the largest 
increase was in road transport (+29%). Road transport continues to contribute the bulk (71%) 
to transport GHG emissions and is responsible for some 17% of total EU-GHG emissions. 
These figures clearly show that the transport sector will need to play a major role in the EU’s 
climate policy. In order to meet the 2°C climate change target, by 2020 emissions from road 
transport need to decrease in absolute terms while increases in emissions in the aviation 
and maritime modes need to be halted. In the longer term, i.e. until 2050, emissions from 
the transport sector need to decrease by up to 80% in order to achieve the global emissions 
reduction targets. achieving these objectives will require a dramatic shift in the way people 
travel and in the way we move goods. 
Reducing transport emissions will have additional benefits in terms of security of energy 
supplies. The transport sector today is 97% dependent on hydrocarbon fuels, and mainly on 
oil. Biofuels and other renewables will not be enough to address vulnerability. The overall EU 
transport demand is projected to increase to such an extent (18% by 2020 according to the 
IEa) that the EU target of replacing 10% of transport fuel use with renewable energy sources – 
although creating an additional security margin – can only moderately reduce European depen-
dence on oil. In times of decreasing domestic oil production and increasing awareness about 
global warming, the transition towards a low-carbon transport system can have the double 
benefit of decreasing import dependence on oil and decreasing GHG emissions thus helping 
to achieve Europe’s climate targets. at the same time, it will ensure innovation in transport 
related industries, thus fostering competitiveness and securing jobs.
A transport revolution 
While the EU Common Transport Policy has “assisted social and economic cohesion and 
promoted competitiveness of European industry, therefore contributing significantly to the 
Lisbon agenda for Growth and Jobs” (European Commission), there has been little progress 
in designing an integrated and strategic response to rising GHG emissions, security of energy 
supply issues and the transport sector’s innovation challenge. European transport policy to 
date has largely been aimed at increasing efficiency, reducing costs and increasing the speed 
1.  all figures include international bunkers, i.e. international traffic departing from the EU.
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of transport. But it has failed to take into account environmental considerations. The trans-
port-related elements of the Energy and Climate Change Package (including the Renewables 
Directive, the Clean Cars Directive and the Fuel Quality Directive) represent a step in the right 
direction but fall significantly short of an integrated strategy that sketches out a pathway 
to a low-carbon transport sector. To do this, Europe needs a ‘transport and climate change 
package’ comparable to the recent Energy and Climate Change Package. This package must 
give answers to fundamental strategic questions about what a sustainable EU transport 
system should look like and how it can be achieved. It may include setting concrete (binding) 
targets for the decarbonisation of the transport sector. In addition, it should comment on 
the cost-effectiveness of alternative low-carbon transport options with the aim of building 
political consensus for their implementation.
The transport and climate change package needs to review a number of policies at European 
but also member state level. The polluter pays principle (PPP) will need to be applied to all 
modes of transport, including responsibilities for GHG emissions (which is currently not the 
case for heavy goods vehicles in the proposed revision of the Eurovignette Directive). Pricing 
mechanisms will need to reflect the real costs of transport. This also means that taxation will 
need to treat comparable fuels in a comparable way. The tax exemption of aviation fuels, in 
the fastest growing mode of transport, needs thus to be reconsidered.
another central policy area will be infrastructure. Upgraded and new transport infrastruc-
ture will be required to master the transition to a low-carbon economy in much the same 
way as smart grids will become the backbone for the energy sector’s transition. In fact, road 
transport infrastructure and electricity grids will need to become more closely integrated 
because decarbonisation of road transportation will not be possible without an increasing 
share of low-carbon electricity in transport. The decarbonisation of the power sector and a 
strong commitment for innovation in the car and related industries are thus prerequisites for 
decarbonisation of road transport. although it looks likely that future road transport will rely 
on electricity, this is not to say that other alternatives to conventional combustion engines 
(e.g. hydrogen) should not be examined.
The largest challenge for decarbonising the transport sector will be in international aviation 
and maritime transport because of a lack of technological options in the near future. Biofuels 
could play an increasing role, together with energy efficiency measures and demand reduc-
tions. In addition, the expansion of the high-speed train network may help in the substitution 
of air and road travel. Given that transport by rail is two to three times more energy efficient 
per tonne of cargo than by road, the continuing decline of the rail freight market share will 
need to be addressed (especially in the new member states) to facilitate a shift towards mul-
timodal transport. 
R&D and new technologies will be at the heart of greening the transport sector. On the one 
hand, technologies will need to be tested. On the other, only deployment ensures decreasing 
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costs. The new transport and climate package should thus introduce technology deployment 
targets, for example in the area of advanced car technologies. This could relate to the vehicles 
themselves (e.g. a certain share of the vehicle fleet needs to be carbon neutral), as well as to 
innovative infrastructure projects (e.g. minimum requirements for electricity infrastructure 
for cars).
To stimulate technological innovation, a number of demonstration or ‘flagship’ projects may 
be considered, aimed at using state-of-the-art technologies. These include advanced telemat-
ics technology in urban transport, to reduce GHG emissions and other harmful environmental 
effects, to reduce congestion, to increase efficiency and generally to increase competitiveness. 
Such systems can now be based on the GaLILEO global navigation satellite system. Mandatory 
large-scale demonstration projects can be justified because they play an important role in 
bringing down the costs of equipment. 
The contributions from technology should be complemented by those from other stake-
holders, including users, government and associated industries. Technology alone will not 
be enough to bring down emissions and demand-side management will also need to be 
given consideration in the proposed transport and climate package, for example through 
pricing mechanisms. Internalising the full environmental and social costs according to the 
polluter pays principle together with better data and information will be crucial in influenc-
ing consumers’ behaviour. 
Similarly, efficiency standards should be the backbone of any sensible climate change policy. 
Fuel efficiency standards have been introduced for cars with the revised Fuel Quality Directive 
in the context of the Energy and Climate Change Package. These should be extended to vans 
and trucks. Standards for aviation and shipping should also be taken into consideration. 
The transition towards a low-carbon EU transport system is a European task. Despite the fact 
that transport policy is still largely determined by national and commercial interests rather 
than European considerations, one or several member states will not be able to achieve this 
transition alone. Greening the transport sector will require an integrated approach from all 
stakeholders, including the automotive industry, the fuel industry, different governmental 
institutions and consumers. Europe will need to develop the most viable pathways towards 
decarbonising the transport sector in different modes and to come up with cost-effective, 
incremental solutions to achieve this vision.
In his political guidelines for the next European Commission, President Barroso dedicated 
his second term in office (2010-2014) to keeping the momentum towards decarbonis-
ing Europe’s electricity supply and the transport sector. This will require close coopera-
tion between the three new Directorates General of the Commission responsible for Energy, 
Transport and Climate action as well as with other DGs such as Research and Industry and 
Entrepreneurship. The approaching end of the ten-year period of the last Commission’s White 
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Paper on European Transport Policy (published in 2001) and the upcoming publication of a 
new White Paper framing the transport policy for the next ten years is a good opportunity 
to prepare for the proposed transport and climate change package. This new White Paper 
will lay down a consultative process that could lead to the necessary legislature required to 
tackle GHG emissions from the transport sector.
The upcoming Presidencies will need to support this process while ensuring that the Council 
moves swiftly in putting the right policies into place. This is of particular importance given 
the inertia of the transport system and the actors involved, as well as the longevity of infra-
structure and the transport fleet. With 2020 approaching quickly, the EU risks missing its 
climate targets if transport emissions are not addressed soon. at the same time, the European 
response needs to be based on a long-term vision for a sustainable transport in the future.
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ClIMATE ChANGE
The Role of Clean Coal  
in addressing Energy and  
Climate Policy
Agata hinc Project Leader, Low Emission Economy, demosEUROPa
 Despite all the efforts aimed at development and global deployment of sustainable energy, the world is going to depend on fossil fuels in the coming decades. Green technologies are being developed and energy efficiency is one of the top priorities 
of energy policies of countries all around the world, But to counteract global warming we 
will need to reduce the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere very rapidly. By 2050 the OECD 
countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 80%. 
a rapid transition to a non-fossil fuel world economy will need to take place in the context of 
projections (made in Energy Technology Perspectives 2008) that CO2 emissions in the energy 
sector will increase by 130% above 2005 levels by 2050 if there is no long-term low-carbon 
strategy and transition-oriented action.
The UE has already decided that a low-carbon economy is a must in the coming years. Putting 
it into effect will need to be a top priority for the current Trio Presidency. Regardless of the 
commitments of the EU Energy and Climate Package from December 2008, coal will remain 
an important source of energy in Europe. In 2007, it accounted for 30% of the EU energy mix. 
It is Europe’s goal to gradually produce more and more electricity from renewables but in the 
meantime some EU member states will still be heavily dependent on coal because it is cheap 
and abundant.
What is more important, both developed and developing countries rely heavily on fossil fuels 
to provide energy and demand for that energy is increasing. China alone accounted for 42% of 
global coal consumption in 2008, compared to 17% for the United States and 16% for Europe and 
Eurasia. This means that in order to achieve global goals China, the United States and Europe will 
need to agree to drastically reduce their consumption of coal and set a plan for transition to a low-
carbon global economy where clean coal will have a role to play as a transition technology before 
the full potential of renewable sources, nuclear energy and energy efficiency is achieved.
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Clean coal technologies
Reduction of carbon emissions from fossil fuel fired power generation will be of key importance. 
It can be achieved through different methods, but three of them are particularly effective.
Firstly, there is the improvement of coal-fired power stations’ efficiency, which can ensure 
that less fuel is required to generate power. This can be achieved inter alia by advancing 
boilers and improving turbines and gasifiers. Increased efficiency of power stations can 
result in a 20% emissions reduction.
Secondly, combining fuel with biomass in cogeneration is an example of how biomass should 
best be used in low-carbon heat and energy production. Co-firing coal with biomass can 
decrease CO2 emissions of a power plant by about 10%. 
Thirdly, there is the possibility of capturing and storing in geological structures the carbon 
dioxide emitted during the process of fossil fuel combustion technology called carbon 
capture and storage (CCS). as this technology can reduce CO2 emissions from a power plant 
to as little as 0%, the EU has decided to concentrate its initial efforts on CCS.
Carbon capture and storage
While producing a unit of electricity from coal, approximately twice as much CO2 is emitted 
as compared to a unit of electricity produced from gas. Therefore in the coming years it will 
be crucial to implement carbon capture and storage in coal-fired power plants and to com-
mercialise them as soon as possible. In fact, CCS is the only technology available to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions from large-scale fossil fuel usage in fuel transformation, industry 
and power generation.
Estimates show that there are worldwide geological conditions for storage of 10,000 billion 
of tons of CO2. Experts predict that in the energy sector and in the industry, CCS can contrib-
ute to one fifth of the reductions that are needed to limit by 50% the emissions of greenhouse 
gases by 2050.
The International Energy agency CCS Roadmap enumerates how many CCS installations are 
to be deployed globally. There are 213 active or planned projects with 101 of commercial 
scale. There are 55 fully integrated commercial scale projects planned to be deployed, each 
of which demonstrates every stage of the CCS process chain of CO2 capture, transport and 
storage. But there are only 7 plants already operating.
This means that CCS global deployment will require great industrial and engineering revolu-
tion. There is no time for an evolutionary approach. The race for full-scale deployment of CCS 
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has begun. Whoever is the first to build a large-scale power plant with CCS will also be the 
first to become global leader in the field and will also be the first ready to export the technol-
ogy. It is a game worth playing. according to the World Energy Outlook, China, with its large 
domestic base of coal resources and continuing strong economic growth, alone accounts for 
71% of the increase in world coal consumption. It builds about 1GW of new coal power gen-
eration every week. This means that, to meet its international obligations linked to counter-
acting climate change, China will need to invest in clean coal. However, it will also need to be 
sure that the technology is economically viable. and this can be ensured only by global CCS 
deployment.
It is clear that developed countries will need to lead this process. There is a general consensus, 
reflected by the declared aims of the G8, the International Energy agency and the European 
Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil fuel Power Plants (ZEP), that the next step 
towards commercialisation of CCS is commercial scale demonstration. There is a need not 
only for deployment of more projects, but also for development of more types of projects in 
order to design the best possible facilities, bringing down costs and creating a valid business 
case for CCS. The G8 set a goal of announcing 20 full-scale demonstration projects by 2010. 
These projects are intended to develop the technology and make it commercially viable, in 
order to enable developing countries to make use of it.
The EU should ensure that it deploys at least seven full-scale CCS demonstration projects and 
develops at least three types of the technology: 
Post-combustion: CO • 2 capture from the flue gas after combustion of the fossil fuel 
Pre-combustion: removal of CO • 2 from the fossil fuel prior to combustion
Oxyfuel: combustion of fossil fuel with pure oxygen rather than air •
Financing clean coal
Carbon capture and storage is currently (at its early stage of development) very costly. 
Market forces alone are unlikely to deliver sufficient investment in this technology, and 
both the costs and risks of demonstration projects can therefore proceed only with gov-
ernments’ financial support. Huge investments will be needed globally. The International 
Energy agency predicts that in order to set up 100 CCS projects by 2020 and over 3,000 by 
2050, there will be a need for $2.5-3 trillion of additional investments.
The effort must be led by the developed world. The IEa called on developed countries to 
make available between $1.5 and $2.5 billion to fund CCS demonstration in developing 
countries. This is a lot, bearing in mind the 29-30 October 2009 European Council pro-
ceedings and conclusions. It was impossible for 27 EU members states to agree upon the 
rules of burden sharing concerning climate change related financial support for develop-
ing countries.
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The EU has agreed to spend €1.05 billion for the CCS demonstration projects of seven 
member states. This is little compared to the $3.4 billion allocated in the US Economic 
Recovery act and $3 billion announced by Canada (1.2 billion from the Canadian federal 
government and 1.8 billion from the alberta provincial budget). australia committed a 
similar amount to the EU $1.65 billion.
additionally, the EU proposed to allocate “300 million allowances in the new entrants 
reserve for the co-financing of CCS and innovative renewables (RES) demonstration projects 
which provide for the development of a wide range of technologies that are not yet commer-
cially viable”. This is a good starting point, although there is still a need to decide who will 
carry out the project selection. In the initial proposition the European Commission wanted 
to do it itself, but some member states formed a coalition against this proposal – they 
would prefer their governments to make the final decisions on financing. This argument 
needs to be resolved soon in order to promote CCS deployment.
Financial support from the recovery package and the New Entrants Reserve (NER 300) 
is designed for CCS demonstration projects, although it is not enough for broader CCS 
deployment. The EU should establish long-term financial mechanisms for GHG emissions 
reduction. So far, the EU budget has played a relatively minor role in meeting climate 
policy objectives. In fact, the way it is structured very often contributes to increases in 
carbon emissions. 9% of the EU greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture but the 
current financial perspective lacks a proper mechanism to address that problem. The EU 
budget should be an important instrument in ensuring that the EU can compete with the 
United States, Canada and australia when it comes to CCS development and full-scale 
deployment.
There are three possible approaches to consider in this context. One possibility is to 
introduce a horizontal criterion for all EU spending to meet the low emission requirement. 
another possibility is to concentrate EU budget spending on assisting the least developed 
member states in their transition to the low emission economy. The third scenario would be 
to create a dedicated fund to invest in strategic green technology such as carbon capture 
and storage and innovative renewables.
Carbon price
a very strong stimulus for a full-scale deployment of CCS in Europe would be a stabilised 
carbon price. Industry estimates that €40 per tone of CO2 would make power plants with 
CCS economically viable. For the time being CCS installations do not attract the interest of 
investors because they cannot compete with conventional power plants. Therefore, the EU 
should make its Emissions Trading Scheme work in a way that it stimulates private-sector 
investments in innovative low-carbon technologies.
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Recommendations for the Sbh Trio Presidency
Political support
There is a need for strong political support for clean coal technologies (especially CCS). They 
have not been adequately supported in the framework of the EU Energy and Climate Package. 
While a specific target of 20% in the EU energy mix in 2020 was set for renewable energy, 
next to greenhouse gas emissions’ reduction and bio-fuels, there was no specific measure 
to support the development of clean coal technologies. The Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian 
Presidencies should jointly work on establishing a target for the use of Clean Capture 
Technologies (CCT) and CCS in the energy sector. The UK government has introduced regula-
tory frameworks requiring new power plants to be equipped with CCS. This kind of solution 
should also be considered at the European level and the preliminary discussions should start 
next year.
lisbon Strategy
a new energy and climate policy will require a transformation of the economy. In this process, 
innovation will play key role and development of skills will be crucial. The low-carbon economy 
should therefore be one of the principal priorities within the framework of the new Lisbon 
Strategy: it should be one of new thematic strategies. There is a need for research projects 
that will advance CCS technologies while providing graduate and undergraduate student 
training opportunities. These projects should aim at advancing CCS scientific, technical, and 
institutional knowledge while simultaneously producing the expertise and workforce needed 
for the emerging carbon capture and storage industry. This kind of stimulus should be intro-
duced into the discussions on the new Lisbon Strategy as soon as possible. The current Trio 
Presidency should put more emphasis on this issue.
Public acceptance
The transition to the low-carbon economy will require changes in different areas of public 
life. Initially, these should include activities to increase awareness among European citizens 
of the risks associated with climate change and the opportunities that flow from the intro-
duction of clean coal technologies. There is a need to build public acceptance in order to 
address misgivings associated with the safety of CCS installations. The SBH Trio Presidency 
should pay special attention to education campaigns on CCS backed up by information about 
existing test units all around the world.
Infrastructure
The EU has already established legal frameworks to guarantee the safety of the geological 
storage of carbon dioxide (the so called CCS Directive). However, when considering incentives 
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for CCS, it is important to remember that deployment of the installations will also depend on 
the development of CO2 infrastructure. Since there is a potential for transnational storage 
sites, special attention should be paid to a trans-European network of pipelines transport-
ing CO2. This is a task for multiple future Presidencies: building the proper infrastructure will 
take time and require heavy investments.
Financing
Many currently existing power stations will have to be replaced in the next five years or 
so. With a proper financial framework, coal power stations with CCS could be a signifi-
cant component of the replacement plant. The EU has established a financial framework to 
support CCS demonstration plants, although the agreement between member states and the 
European Commission on the new entrants reserve should be resolved as soon as possible, 
preferably in the first half of 2010. additionally, funding will need to increase to make sure the 
CCS technology is available in the shortest possible time-frame. The Trio Presidency should 
introduce the idea of new financial mechanisms into the discussion on the EU budget.
Global engagement
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 did not deliver a 
meaningful result to the international negotiations on tackling climate change. The outcome 
of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) is bad news for Europe. First of all, the EU was 
not able to speak with the legendary one voice after a fiasco of its internal negotiations on 
an emission reduction target of 30% by 2020 to be put on the table in Copenhagen by all 27 
member states. Secondly, Europe was ignored in the final round of negotiations by the US 
delegation, which preferred to talk to China, India, South africa and Brazil. The Spanish and 
Belgian Presidencies should redouble their efforts and ensure that the EU is able to prepare 
a new roadmap to COP-16 in Mexico. The roadmap should first of all include an early enough 
decision on a common EU position during the final negotiations in December 2011 and a 
more business-like conversation with the United States. It is almost certain that in the next 
decades, greenhouse gas emissions will increase in emerging economies. In the second 
half of 2009 the US government has decided to start strategic cooperation with China in key 
areas and to take several meaningful initiatives for counteracting climate change. If Europe 
does not want to lag behind, it will have to respond to this challenge before the post-Kyoto 
protocol is in place.
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MIGRATIoNS
The institutional reform brought by the Lisbon Treaty will not automatically in-
crease the Union’s capabilities in areas such as internal affairs. To do this, a 
serious effort of politico-strategic thinking is needed – something that does 
not feature in the Stockholm Programme adopted in December 2009.
The programme provides five-year objectives without the support of a serious 
negotiated political compromise, and without the benefit of a genuine political 
direction. In its current state it resembles not so much a policy programme as a 
technical action plan intended for the follow-up.
Problems which might arise from the Lis-
bon Treaty (in particular, that of exacer-
bated tension between member states, 
since the Treaty formalises the European 
Council’s strategic role – a role small 
states have always preferred the Com-
mission to play) and the weaknesses of 
the Stockholm Programme will mean that 
the policy agenda for asylum and immi-
gration remains controversial over the 
next few years. It is also likely that serious 
political conflicts, which might have been 
avoided, will persist (SWP). The programme’s deficiencies have then created a 
heavy responsibility for the Trio Presidency as without a lasting political agree-
ment on migration policy, the usual inter-institutional quarrels will continue.
In the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), one of the main challenges 
of the Trio Presidency will be to put into practice the institutional and political 
innovations of the Lisbon Treaty – from the European Public Prosecutor to a 
permanent Internal Security Committee within the Council. Another key item for 
the Trio is the implementation of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
adopted in 2008, on the basis of solidarity between member states and ap-
plied in close cooperation with third countries. 
The consolidation of the European immigration policy will also demand to pay a 
special attention to the surveillance of external borders – which requires addi-
tional resources for the Frontex agency (Real Instituto Elcano). But political ac-
tion in this area remains affected by the balance between security and freedom 
(right and liberties) that has to be maintained.
PaRT III
AbSTRACT
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With the Stockholm Programme the Union should move by 2012 at the latest 
from the current system of minimum standards to one of a common European 
asylum. The European Asylum Support Office, launched by the ‘Immigration 
Pact’ is another important innovation. But the Stockholm Programme has 
gaps. In particular, it provides no solution to the fundamental question of 
solidarity between member states. The Trio Presidency must then focus on 
(DIIS / SIEPS):
•	 	adopting	a	resettlement	programme	for	refugees,	which	is	both	binding	and	
effective;
•	 	ensuring	that	cooperation	with	third	countries	on	irregular	migration	–	for	
example, concerning pre-border checks – does not harm the right to asylum 
or other human rights obligations;
•	 	extending	policy	to	unqualified	workers,	with	regard	to	legal	immigration;
•	 	getting	involved	more	actively	in	the	debate	concerning	migrants	integration.
The AFSJ finds itself at a crossroads. The gradual development of a strategy to 
control the Union’s frontiers has created a difficult dialectic between human-
rights-related obligations and the EU’s need to control its external border. The 
‘Europeanisation’ of border-control policy does not exempt member states from 
their international obligations – particularly the principle of non-refoulement, 
by which states must take into account demands for international protection 
which arise at Europe’s borders.
The system of pre-border controls, directed by the Frontex agency, has moved 
the management of human flows beyond the borders of the Union, which makes 
the right of asylum difficult to exercise. Therefore, during the next phase of the 
AFSJ (CEPS):
•	 	a	monitoring	system	for	the	Union’s	borders	and	for	migration	should	be	put	
in place;
•	 	the	activities	of	Frontex	must	be	subjected	to	objective	and	impartial	evalua-
tion, before this agency’s capacities and competences are increased;
•	 	cooperation	between	the	Union	and	third	countries	must	be	developed	in	an	
open manner and with clear guarantees for human rights;
•	 	member	states	and	candidate	countries	must	guarantee	their	capacity	to	en-
sure the respect of migrants’ fundamental rights in all circumstances.
INTERNAl SECuRITy
The internal security of member states does not fall within the competence of 
the Union. Its institutions are not in charge of preventing terrorist attacks: their 
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main role is to make sure that the legal and practical structures for anti-terror-
ism cooperation are solid and effective.
Since 2001, ministers of the interior have harmonised the definition of terrorism – 
which is essential for the cross-border pursuit of terrorists by police. They have 
also classed as a crime the act of recruiting or training terrorists. The European 
arrest warrant, which was agreed upon following the 11th September attacks, has 
simplified and accelerated extraditions of suspects between member states.
The first objective of EU countries is to make the common market as ‘watertight’ 
as possible with regard to terrorism. This implies adopting European legislation 
to facilitate tracing and controlling the movement of explosive substances, to es-
tablish common safety rules for airports and other transport centres, and to en-
sure that private infrastructure is capable of managing potential emergencies.
Terrorism is a difficult subject for Europe’s foreign ministers as a result of the 
deep divisions which appeared over the Iraq war and over the war against ter-
ror in general. But the EU should take advantage of the arrival of the Obama 
administration to agree with the United States on a joint strategy focused on 
sharing foreign-policy priorities where these concern terrorism – in relation to 
Pakistan, where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have sanctuaries, and also concern-
ing peace efforts in the Middle East and Africa (North Africa and the Sahel, East 
Africa and the Horn of Africa – including Sudan and Somalia).
On the issue of security, the EU must take action on three urgent matters (CER):
•	 	Firstly,	 it	must	reconcile	 the	European	Parliament	with	 the	member	states’	
anti-terrorism policy. It would be particular desirable for MEPs to create an 
Internal Security Committee, separate from the Civil Liberties Committee.
•	 	The	Commission	should	also	create	a	European	Internal	Security	Commit-
tee – a coordinating body comprising security experts, Europol, Eurojust, 
Frontex and others.
•	 	Lastly,	the	High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	should	
appoint a special representative for internal security, in the form of a senior 
official chosen from the new European diplomatic service.
JudICIAl CooPERATIoN IN CRIMINAl MATTERS
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is one of the areas where European leg-
islation is advancing the most quickly, but one of the most sensitive fields from 
the point of view of national sovereignty. As a result, European initiatives often 
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attract opposition on the ground. The European arrest warrant, for example, 
has come before constitutional courts in Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Greece and Cyprus – together with the European Court of Justice. Judicial coop-
eration therefore demands that member states have a high level of trust in each 
others’ legal systems.
For a ‘free circulation of judicial decisions,’ the implementation of a system of 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions between member states is needed. But 
this principle of mutual recognition is not directly applicable in member states, 
and its legal instruments for application must still be defined and clarified. In 
addition, as the debate around the Stockholm Programme has shown, existing 
regulation concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters has an impor-
tant flaw: the absence of detailed procedural protections for individuals sub-
ject to judicial proceedings.
To accelerate the creation of an area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
the Trio Presidency must (Europeum):
•	 	adopt	a	catalogue	of	minimum	demands	concerning	the	rights	of	the	defence	
in criminal procedures;
•	 	clarify,	in	criminal	matters,	the	question	of	competent	jurisdictions;
•	 	see	to	it	that	the	content	of	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	passes	into	Euro-
pean legislation on criminal matters;
•	 	organise	a	citizen	information	campaign	about	the	consequences	of	judicial	
cooperation in criminal matters, in order to avoid misunderstandings;
•	 	promote	the	communication	and	sharing	of	experience	between	national	ju-
risdictions, concerning European rules.
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Justice and home Affairs: deepening and integration
The creation of the ‘third pillar’ in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the introduction of the 
main elements of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (aFSJ) in the amsterdam Treaty 
(1997) were key turning-points in the development of the European integration process as 
regards Justice and Home affairs. The aFSJ brought together, in terms of institutions and reg-
ulations, matters such as police cooperation, immigration, border control, visas and judicial 
cooperation, including the Schengen acquis. The overall aim of the aFSJ was to ensure the 
free circulation of persons in an internal market, which is ultimately what determines and 
drives many of the EU’s competences.
There is little doubt, however, that the original driving force – the need to establish a common 
public space, primarily for economic reasons – has been displaced and supplemented by the 
internal development of the European integration process itself. Over the past few years, the 
changing international and security context has prompted the EU to take on competences in 
the field of internal security and to express a clear commitment to guaranteeing the funda-
mental rights of citizens, in an increasingly restrictive environment marked by the need to 
ensure the maintenance of security.
This new scenario is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, which made it one of the EU’s prime objec-
tives to offer its citizens an aFSJ that has now become a hallmark of the European project. 
although considerable progress has been made in this field – such as the mutual recognition of 
judgments and court rulings that has given rise to the European arrest warrant; the creation of 
the Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) and, more recently, the adoption of a common approach 
to immigration and the creation of Frontex – these are merely elements that must be built on – 
ensure that freedom, security and justice become the new frontier of European integration.
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Challenges facing the Spanish Presidency
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, after a tortuous ratification process, has opened 
up new vistas, marked by two factors that will affect the Trio Presidency (Spain, Belgium 
and Hungary) with regard to Justice and Home affairs (JHa). First, the application of the 
Lisbon Treaty has set off the complex process of implementing the measures included 
in it, which will hopefully contribute to the consolidation of the aFSJ as incorporated in 
Title V of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Second, the completion of the 
Hague Programme will give way to a new project, presented by the Swedish Presidency, 
namely the Stockholm Programme. This sets out the priorities for the next five years 
and requires the adoption of an action plan, which will have to be negotiated under the 
Spanish Presidency during the first semester of 2010 if the EU wants the political and 
institutional goals, agreed to under the Swedish Presidency, to become a reality for 
Europe’s citizens.
another challenge to be tackled by the Trio Presidency will be to ensure the coherence and 
unity of the internal and external dimensions of the JHa field. It is widely recognised that all 
spheres of action have an external dimension and that the cooperation of third countries is 
increasingly necessary. This is more than evident in issues such as the war against terrorism 
and the management of both legal and illegal immigration. Internal European coordination 
is equally necessary to ensure that both sectoral and general objectives are met. In this 
context it is essential that the new Stockholm Programme and its future action plan are 
provided with adequate means to ensure the coordination of all the policies directly or indi-
rectly related to these matters.
In this context, the Spanish Presidency can only be praised for seeking to improve the 
EU’s coordination of its JHa policies with third countries, most notably the United States 
and Russia. More specifically, JHa will probably play a significant role in the renewal of 
the Transatlantic agenda that will presumably be agreed to on the US-EU summit due to 
take place in May 2010. This would give a renewed boost to the aFSJ generally, providing it 
with a high degree of visibility while contributing to the internal and external coherence of 
European action in this area.
The lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Now that doubts surrounding the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation have been dispelled, the 
Trio Presidency (Spain, Belgium and Hungary) – and the Spanish Presidency in particu-
lar – will be responsible for setting its institutional innovations in motion. Furthermore, it 
must also overcome the added difficulty of multiple unresolved issues: the need to avoid 
decisions capable of hindering the ratification process led to the freezing of all contro-
versial innovations that might have raised objections among those least favourable to a 
further deepening of European integration.
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The Lisbon Treaty introduces a number of significant innovations in the field of Justice and 
Home affairs. Firstly, the EU has finally been recognised as an international organisation 
with its own legal status, an apparently technical novelty that could nevertheless contribute 
significantly to its credibility as a global actor. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty has done away 
with the existing three-pillar structure, with the result that in the future the entire contents of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community on aFSJ will be subject to the control of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. However, the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice and the powers of the Commission to open proceedings for non-compliance 
against member states will have no direct effect until the expiration of the five-year transi-
tional period applicable once the Lisbon Treaty comes into force.
Second, it can be said that the reasons for furthering the aFSJ have evolved and have effec-
tively been decoupled from the internal market. It could even be argued that the aFSJ has 
overtaken the internal market in importance, judging by the order in which they are ranked 
in the list of EU objectives set out in the Treaty (article 3, Title 1). according to this text, the 
EU’s second major objective (with precedence over the establishment of the internal market) 
is that “the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime”.
Third, under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, the ordinary legislative procedure will only require 
a qualified majority in Council and co-decision with the European Parliament for issues 
such as the right of asylum, border management and control, visas, immigration, and the 
like. Nevertheless, unanimity will still be necessary for sensitive issues such as passports, 
identity cards, family law with cross-border implications, and police cooperation.
Fourth, the European Commission has reinforced its role in Justice and Home affairs, having 
strengthened its right of initiative and gained the ability to initiate proceedings against 
member states for non-compliance with European rules, something that was impossible 
under the framework of the third pillar. This could prove a very significant novelty, which 
could help to overcome one of the main problems that currently hinder the implementation 
of measures agreed at the European level but inadequately applied at the national level, 
thereby undermining their coherence and effectiveness.
Fifth, the aim of the Treaty is to foster cooperation on specific issues between member states, 
with the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation as regards police and judicial-pe-
nal matters.
Finally, and although this is not an exhaustive listing of the improvements and the 
novelties introduced in JHa in the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to highlight the creation 
of a Standing Committee on Internal Security within the Council “in order to ensure that 
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operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the 
Union” (article 71, TEU). Nonetheless, the Treaty still specifically says that “national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each member state” (article 4.2 TEU). another 
significant institutional novelty will be the creation of the position of European Public 
Prosecutor, to act under the auspices of Eurojust. although it is stipulated that he / she is 
to act in affairs of financial crime, the future prosecutor could have an impact on cases of 
transnational crime such as international terrorism and drug trafficking as well.
One of the Spanish Presidency’s main challenges will be to implement most of the insti-
tutional and political novelties introduced in Lisbon, ranging from the President of the 
European Council to the new European Public Prosecutor, and to establish the groundwork 
for the Standing Committee on Internal Security, among other tasks. But it will also have to 
negotiate the criteria for the Stockholm Programme’s action plan, thereby helping to set the 
agenda for the next five years on all matters relating to Justice and Home affairs. Hence, the 
Spanish Presidency, and subordinately the Trio Presidency, will be of prime importance in 
establishing the procedures and coordination guidelines for the new EU to arise from the 
Lisbon Treaty.
The Stockholm Programme’s action plan: an immediate and unavoidable goal 
for the Trio Presidency
The Stockholm Programme, adopted in December 2009, will set out the Union’s priori-
ties regarding JHa for the next five years. The previous multiannual programmes, adopted 
at Tampere and The Hague, aimed to provide political direction in an area that had come 
up against significant resistance from national governments because it impinged on the 
so-called ‘hard core’ of state sovereignty. For this reason, the Stockholm Programme is 
expected to follow on from its predecessors, in that it will include all those initiatives that are 
recognised as fundamental to the EU’s actions but which are carried out by its member states. 
This in no way implies that the future programme will not include novel initiatives, but rather 
that in addition to them it must strive to rationalise those that are already in place. In short, 
it must devise the mechanisms whereby political consensus can be translated into concrete 
measures that can then be adequately implemented.
The lofty proposals that generate such high expectations among Europe’s citizens come into 
collision with the fact that their implementation, dependent on each member state, can often 
be proved difficult, and that numerous obstacles must be overcome before the man in the 
street can actually perceive the benefits deriving from the mere existence of an aFSJ. For 
this reason, the Commission and member states like Spain have pressed for a Stockholm 
Programme whose priorities focus on the citizens’ general interests.
The overall aim of the programme is to make progress in protecting fundamental rights, and 
to this effect the Spanish Presidency will carry out preparatory work for a swift endorsement 
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of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. as regards data protection, in 
the first semester of 2010, efforts will be made to reach the consensus necessary to approve 
a European Information Management Strategy and thereby establish the international legal 
basis for the use of personal data.
The Stockholm Programme aims to establish an effective European area of Justice with the 
aim of overcoming the current state of fragmentation in this area. It is therefore incumbent 
on the EU to provide the necessary means to progress in the application of mutual recogni-
tion in civil and criminal procedures. More specifically, the Spanish Presidency is analysing 
a proposal to create a European Investigation Supervision Order while reinforcing the opera-
tional efficiency of the existing joint investigation teams.
The Spanish Presidency will also aim to enhance the protection of Europe’s citizens by rein-
forcing the security aspects of the aFSJ. With this in mind, it will seek to define a sustain-
able European Internal Security Model to give greater coherence and efficiency to the various 
mechanisms and actors operating in the field, especially as regards the fight against inter-
national terrorism. It will also strive to promote operational cooperation in the prevention of 
crime, especially in assisting victims of gender-based violence, thereby reflecting one of the 
primary concerns of the Rodríguez Zapatero government.
another key issue on the European agenda is the consolidation of an immigration and asylum 
policy based on solidarity between the member states and implemented in close coopera-
tion with third parties, namely the countries of origin and transit. In this respect, both the 
Stockholm Programme and the Trio Presidency must focus their efforts on the enforce-
ment and evaluation of the European Pact on Immigration and asylum – a French initiative 
supported by Spain – that has succeeded in addressing three fundamental issues: the man-
agement of legal immigration, the fight against irregular immigration, and the commitment 
to long-term development processes. at the same time, they must also make progress on 
the external dimension of this policy, and initiate cooperation with other countries to ensure 
a comprehensive approach towards an issue that can only be managed from a global per-
spective. In this respect, one of the Spanish government’s priorities will be to deal with the 
problem of ‘unaccompanied immigrant minors’, which is of particular concern to the EU’s 
Mediterranean member sates. Finally, over the next 18 months the Trio Presidency will have 
to improve the structures and resources currently available to Frontex.
looking ahead
Spain’s semester will be a ‘transitional presidency’, since it will have to deal with the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon Treaty and the move towards what will hopefully become a stronger 
and more credible EU, equipped with a better array of instruments with which to face up to 
the challenges of a highly complex European and international scene.
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Spain has traditionally championed a greater EU involvement in Justice and Home affairs and 
the consolidation of the aFSJ While it is true that Madrid’s leadership in these matters has, 
in general terms, declined somewhat over the past few years, they are still very much at the 
heart of its European ambitions.
We therefore believe that Spain should place JHa firmly at the centre of its programme 
for the 2010 Presidency. Goals such as the definition of a sustainable Internal Security 
Strategy and the setting up of a Committee on Internal Security are of prime importance 
and deserve its full attention during this semester.
Similarly, Spain can contribute to the ultimate objective of reinforcing the aFSJ’s external 
dimension by doing its best to provide fresh content to the renewed Transatlantic agenda.
The other major issue that should figure prominently in the Trio Presidency Programme, 
given its medium-term objectives, is the consolidation of the EU’s immigration policy from 
a comprehensive perspective, with a special emphasis on the management of external 
frontiers – a matter of special interest for both Spain and Hungary – that includes strength-
ening the resources available to Frontex and improving its day-to-day operation. It is 
equally important to step up the negotiations for signing cooperation agreements with 
third countries on the subject of migration.
Spain should take full advantage of the double opportunity offered by its six-month presi-
dency in 2010. On the one hand, it will be the last time that the country holding the rotating 
presidency will be able to shape the EU agenda to this extent, since the appointment of 
a President of the European Council and a High Representative for Foreign affairs and 
Security Policy will inevitably limit the role of national governments in future. On the other, 
Spain will also have the opportunity to influence the way in which many of the novelties 
incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty are implemented. as regards JHa, it would be advisable 
to adopt a stance that focuses on the tangible benefits that the aFSJ can secure for the 
Union’s citizens overall, thereby helping to reduce the opposition of those national govern-
ments that still harbour doubts about this crucial dimension of the European project.
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a sylum and immigration have become a key policy area both at member states and European level. For the 2009 Stockholm Programme, migration remains a top priority with the aim of establishing “a Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in 
migration and asylum matters”.
Following on from the 1999 Tampere and the 2005 The Hague Programmes, the Stockholm 
Programme is set to bring about substantial changes and policy developments. In the area of 
asylum the Stockholm Programme will entail the leap from minimum standards of harmoni-
sation to the realisation of a Common European asylum System (CEaS). as regards irregular 
migration, cooperation with third countries will be further developed to ensure return of 
those rejected, and increased pre-frontier border control. Lastly, new and more substantive 
policy developments on legal immigration may lie ahead, as qualified majority voting will 
finally be introduced in this area.
at the same time, policy-making in this area remains wrought by two inter-linked tensions. In 
substantive terms, it remains a challenge to strike a balance between ‘security’ and ‘freedom’ 
in the immigration area. On the one hand, guaranteeing and expanding the rights and 
freedoms of asylum-seekers and immigrants remains a vested ambition. This is important 
not only to ensure adherence to fundamental EU principles and international human rights, 
but also to be able to attract the needed labour migrants that Western countries increasingly 
compete over. On the other hand, many policy-makers continue to see all aspects of immi-
gration as something primarily connected with threats. Whether it be the challenge to control 
our borders, the economic risks of uncontrolled immigration or concerns over national or 
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even European identity, asylum and immigration continue to prompt calls for more restric-
tive policies.
Closely linked to these concerns is the institutional dilemma of handing over national sov-
ereignty in a policy area such as asylum and immigration. While member states realise that 
hardly any of the challenges brought about by immigration can be effectively addressed by 
each country in isolation, the willingness to let go of national prerogatives and indepen-
dence has been much less visible when actual negotiations begin. Exactly because of the 
politicised nature of this policy area, EU policies on asylum and immigration have consis-
tently fallen short of declared ambitions. From 1999 until today, negotiations in this area 
have remained tough, marked by the original third pillar procedures, and advances often 
delayed and marked by substantial national fingerprints, derogation possibilities and legal 
ambiguities.
In this light, the current EU framework on asylum and immigration should be considered 
important achievements. The Stockholm Programme is set to take the existing policies sub-
stantially further and attempt to fully ‘normalise’ and mature this policy area as a matter of 
EU policy. yet, the two tensions set out above remain and will continue to structure policy-
making in the years to come.
Asylum
With the Stockholm Programme, the EU moves from the current ‘minimum standards’ 
towards the establishment of a CEaS by 2012 at the latest. Following its consultation round 
in 2007, the Commission has thus already tabled proposals to revise all the major legal 
instruments.
With the new proposals the hope is to end what the critics have named the ‘asylum lottery’. 
Wide discrepancies continue to exist among the member states as regards who is granted 
protection and how they are treated. To counter this, the Stockholm Programme aims to 
introduce both better procedural guarantees based on ‘higher standards’ and compulsory 
training modules and regular evaluations for all national asylum authorities.
at the same time, the second phase legislation will have to do away with the substantial 
number of discretionary rules allowing member states to depart from the current procedur-
al safeguards in the asylum procedures and rights afforded to those granted protection. 
arguably, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have already 
gone some way to set limits for restrictive national interpretations.
The European asylum Support Office is another important innovation. Its mandate is set to 
include monitoring functions, training activities and coordination of practical cooperation 
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among member state asylum officers. as such, the hope is that the new EU agency will help 
address the current gap between the legislative framework and its practical implementation 
in each member state. But the proposal has already met resistance and attempts to limit its 
mandate by several countries, concerned that an institutional watchdog in this area might 
prove a bother rather than a boon.
From a more critical perspective the Stockholm Programme still has a number of shortcom-
ings. an important gap concerns the growing number of persons that have been denied 
refugee and subsidiary protection, yet due to the situation in their country of origin cannot be 
removed. Perhaps most problematic, the Stockholm Programme does not provide any solid 
solution to the fundamental problem of solidarity among the member states. The revision of 
the Dublin Regulation contains only minor adjustments, and the Mediterranean and Eastern 
member states are thus obliged to continue to process the majority of asylum cases arriving 
at their borders. 
Some of these countries are also those most behind in the implementation of the asylum 
acquis; the Commission has already brought several infringement proceedings and more 
may be under way. Ensuring compliance under new and strengthened directives is likely 
to become even more difficult as long as these countries can rightly claim that the same 
EU rules place a disproportionate and unrealistic burden upon them. The financial bur-
den-sharing under the European Refugee Fund has so far had limited success. a more 
important step will be taken if an intra-EU resettlement scheme is eventually realised. yet, 
the Stockholm Programme remains cautious in this respect, and such a scheme will be 
crucially dependent on the ongoing willingness of member states to relieve those countries 
facing the largest caseloads.
Irregular migration and border control
In the area of irregular migration and management of the external borders, the Stockholm 
programme is clearly influenced by the Immigration Pact introduced in 2008 by the French 
Presidency. Emphasis is placed on tougher penalties for those facilitating irregular immi-
gration, be it human smugglers and traffickers or employers of illegal migrants in the EU. 
Secondly, ensuring the return of illegal migrants is set to become the challenge par excellence. 
Following the adoption of the much debated Return Directive last year, the legal framework 
is now largely in place, which means that practical cooperation and readmission agreements 
with third countries will be the main priority for the coming years.
The entire approach to ensuring readmission agreements seems likely to change. So far 
common EU readmission agreements have mainly been signed with prospective member 
states, a number of Eastern and South Eastern European countries in exchange for visa facili-
tation agreements and a few less important countries from an EU immigration perspective. 
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The critical transit and origin countries to the south have so far resisted signing EU readmis-
sion agreements, probably because they would thereby play their most important negotia-
tion card once and for all. The Stockholm Programme asks for an evaluation of the current 
approach to readmission agreements by 2010 and puts new emphasis on pursuing more 
flexible and temporary readmission agreements, either through bilateral arrangements or as 
part of the new Mobility Partnerships.
as regards management of the external borders, the Stockholm Programme focuses on 
increasing surveillance, expanding the role of Frontex and cooperation with third countries. 
EUROSUR, a European system for sharing surveillance data relating to border crossings, is 
under development and should be in place by 2013. In addition, the next few years will see 
the roll-out of the Visa Information System and the revised Schengen Information System. 
On top of this, the Stockholm Programme calls for new proposals to set up an entry-exit 
system to record data from all travellers to and from the Schengen area, which is to become 
operational by 2015. If successful, such a system may play an important role in curbing the 
largest group of irregular immigrants in the EU, namely those who enter legally but sub-
sequently overstay their visas. On the other hand, the proposal has already been widely 
criticised for both clashing with EU data protection laws and providing disproportionate 
obstacles to travellers. In addition, one might fear that the use of such a system with regard 
to overstaying migrants might see national authorities engage in large-scale biometric 
checks of migrant populations.
The EU’s border agency, Frontex, is set to become even more important. The Stockholm 
Programme calls for an enhancement of Frontex’s role in providing common analysis and 
coordinating operational activities, such as joint border patrols and return flights. It also 
calls for a clarification of Frontex’s mandate. at present Frontex is limited in its possibilities 
for engaging in cooperation with third countries. It thus seems likely that Frontex will even-
tually have its mandate extended to allow it to carry out technical assistance projects and 
migration control operations in third countries.
This links to a more general emphasis on cooperation with third countries. The external 
dimension of EU’s immigration policy has already expanded rapidly since its introduction 
in the Tampere Programme. agreements to combat irregular migration and ensure read-
mission are now an integrated part of EU’s external relations framework. Several transit 
countries thus aid the prosecution of human smugglers and carry out border control of 
irregular migrants heading towards Europe. at the same time bilateral and EU cooperation 
have facilitated Frontex-coordinated operations to intercept migrants within foreign territori-
al waters. The Lisbon Treaty offers new possibilities for concluding international agreements 
and negotiating with third countries, and the Stockholm Programme thus calls for the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy and the European External 
actions Service to ensure that policy priorities in the field of migration and border security 
are fully integrated in the EU’s foreign policy.
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a particular problem of this ‘externalisation’ of EU border control concerns its relationship 
with asylum. In a policy paper that elsewhere places great emphasis on ensuring ‘the right to 
asylum’ and a European asylum system in full accordance with international law, the lack of 
attention to access to asylum as part of the EU’s integrated border management is striking. 
as the borders of the Union have effectively moved outwards, the possibility of launching 
an asylum claim with an EU member state has so far stayed at home. The result not only 
highlights the European hypocrisy in this area. It has also prompted many traditional transit 
countries, now increasingly destination countries, to replicate similar mechanisms to shift 
asylum responsibilities further away despite calls and EU funding to improve refugee protec-
tion capacity in these countries.
legal economic migration
One of the Stockholm Programme’s main objectives is to develop a common policy on legal 
migration. The ambition includes the development of a more flexible immigration policy that 
standardises visa policy and admission procedures and is easily adaptable to fluctuations in 
labour demands.
The first challenge in this regard will be to expand the focus to increasing the access of semi 
and low skilled workers to the EU. Up until now, achievements have focused on highly skilled 
labour immigration. Nonetheless, the EU still lacks far behind in the competition among 
other Western countries. at present only 5% of highly skilled emigrants from africa move 
towards the EU, while almost 90% go to North america. a better regulatory framework for 
semi and low-skilled labour migrants would, however, bring important benefits to EU pro-
ductive industries like agriculture, construction, and the service economy. at the same time, 
more ambitious and concrete policies in this area may help combat the informal economy 
in these sectors (which in many member states thrive on irregular migration), and thereby 
reduce illegality and its attendant problems for migrants.
a second challenge concerns the need to establish increased dialogue and partnership with 
countries of origin and transit outside the Union. The Stockholm Programme points to the 
necessity of integrating social, economic and trade policies into a comprehensive approach, 
but it arguably fails to properly incorporate the relevant elements of external relations, and to 
address the functioning of Europe’s employment market for migrants and social affairs.
The third challenge will be to narrow the wide gap between rules and policies approved at 
European level and their implementation at national level. The integration of Union and 
national policies on immigration has hitherto proved slow and laborious. The individu-
al member states still decide how and to what extent they wish to set up labour importing 
schemes and engage in partnerships with developing countries. Methods and progress 
vary greatly between countries, and much recruitment is employer based and left to private 
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national actors. In this respect the Lisbon Treaty continues to defer the crucial question of 
deciding how many third country nationals may gain access to individual member states’ 
territory to seek employment or set up businesses. Given the large differences in labour defi-
ciencies between the member states, it will be crucial to find a way to further the process, 
which is both coherent with the extended Schengen agreement and respectful of the differ-
ences in national labour requirements.
Finally, migration not only introduces new workers into a labour force but also new people into 
societies. The Stockholm Programme incorporates a common approach to integration that 
may benefit all parties and the introduction of an immigration code that grants legal immi-
grants a clear and uniform status in all member states. This is laudable and much needed. 
yet, given the economic, social and cultural divergences between the member states, imple-
menting common policies in the domestic arena is likely to remain a challenge.
Conclusions
asylum and immigration is and should be one of the top priorities for the Stockholm 
Programme. Besides the political difficulties of developing a European migration policy, 
emphasis needs to be put on the efficiency of current and future policies and striking a 
balance between concerns over immigration challenges and ensuring freedom and the pro-
tection of human rights.
In particular, we recommend that the Trio Presidency from January 2010 to June 2011 consist-
ing of Spain, Belgium and Hungary should strive to:
 adopt both an intra-EU and external refugee resettlement programme that is binding  •
and effective. This will be crucial both to alleviate the unfair distribution of protec-
tion burdens brought about by the Dublin system and to show solidarity with third 
countries.
 Ensure that cooperation with third countries on irregular migration and implementa- •
tion of pre-frontier border controls does not undermine access to asylum and other 
human rights obligations.
 Expand policies in the field of legal migration to include semi and unskilled workers and  •
de-link cooperation with third countries from efforts to combat irregular migration.
 Engage more thoroughly in the broader debate about how migrants’ social integration,  •
or the lack thereof, influences the development of European societies.
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MIGRATIoNS
Migration Policy-making under  
the Stockholm Programme and the 
Lisbon Treaty: Getting back to the Serious 
Business of Governing?
Steffen Angenendt Senior associate, SWP
Roderick Parkes Head of Brussels Office, SWP
 I t is a myth long peddled by supporters of the Lisbon Treaty: with ratification of the Treaty complete, political leaders will finally be able to place a full stop after the question of institutional issues and “return to the serious business of governing”. We can apparent-
ly look forward to some serious politico-strategic thinking about the big issues – not least 
immigration policy in times of economic crisis.
The myth is a particularly mendacious one for two reasons: 
Firstly, by increasing the clout of the European Parliament, giving national parliaments new 
powers to scrutinise policy and recognising the European Council as an institution with a 
semi-permanent President, the Treaty actually looks set to sharpen existing tensions between 
the EU’s institutions, at least in the short to medium-term.
Secondly, uncertainty about the EU’s institutional architecture has not been the sole, or even 
the main, reason for the focus on inward-looking, inter-institutional issues. More generally, 
there has been a marked loss of appetite for far-sighted – potentially divisive – political 
thinking, especially following the negative referendums in France and the Netherlands as 
well as enlargement. 
In immigration and asylum policy the formulation of the Stockholm Programme has provided 
an opportunity to overcome the gulf between excitable public expectations and mundane 
European realities. It has marked a chance to set out a politico-strategic agenda sufficient-
ly ambitious to ensure that the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional blueprint for justice and home 
affairs (JHa) is put to good use.
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But the document adopted in December 2009 lacks the two core elements necessary to rein-
vigorate policy-making: a political rationale for cooperation and a concomitant horse-trading 
package defusing foreseeable tensions between the member states.
The likely deficits in the Programme place a heavy onus on the current Trio Presidency. 
Without a lasting political settlement for migration policy in place, the usual inter-institu-
tional squabbling will ensue. In asylum and immigration policy, this wrangling has in the past 
entailed a concerted attempt to disrupt and even reverse the progress of European legisla-
tion by recalcitrant national ministries, sub-standard communication with EU citizens and a 
lack of coherence both within migration policy and between migration policy and ‘neighbour-
ing’ policy areas. 
against this background the paper suggests means for the current Trio Presidency to 
overcome a trend towards the re-nationalisation of policy-making, to enhance the public 
legitimacy of policy and to improve links between EU policies.
The backdrop: despite an incipient economic crisis…
The economic crisis, which will increasingly define migration flows over the coming years, is 
already making itself felt. Receiving countries are experiencing a slowdown in labour immi-
gration, whilst sending countries are confronted with increasing re-migration. and many 
migrants – especially low-qualified and irregular immigrants – are being forced to make 
tough choices between staying in the host countries under deteriorating conditions or 
returning home only to be met by even worse situations. Even if firm comparative data and 
in-depth assessments of the impact of the economic downturn on migration are still lacking, 
it can be expected that in the wake of the current crisis international labour migration will 
decline further.
Nevertheless, it is not at all certain that such a reduction of global labour migration would 
be large-scale or permanent. For decades, all industrialised countries have noticed a struc-
tural and increasing demand of foreign labour. Challenged by growing global competition 
and unfavourable demographic trends, many industrialised countries have become aware 
that labour migration is of critical importance for their future competitiveness and wealth. 
according to UN surveys, in 2007 13% of industrialised countries intended to increase the 
numbers of temporary immigrants, and 44% planned to increase the immigration of highly 
skilled workers.
Even before the crisis many European governments had already begun to review their 
migration policies and to develop new migration strategies. They introduced new instru-
ments and institutional settings for a more comprehensive, although more selective, 
migration approach including shortage lists, quotas and caps, and new cooperation schemes 
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with sending countries. Competition between industrialised countries – especially between 
Europe and North america – has intensified, especially as regards efforts to fill future labour 
market shortages and attract highly skilled migrants.
European countries began introducing new human-capital-oriented immigration schemes 
and new options to allow foreign students to stay in the country (United-Kingdom). The defi-
nition of ‘skilled’ was extended (France, Norway), and the options for employer-driven labour 
migration were expanded (Sweden). Since a rising demand for highly skilled labour usually 
leads also to an increasing need for unskilled and low-skilled labour, some countries also 
opened new channels for these migrants to enter (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal), while other 
countries have encouraged ‘incidental’ migration (promoting working holidays, student 
jobs, etc.) or introduced new seasonal migration programs (Spain). In addition, most of the 
‘old’ EU countries finally opened their labour markets to migrants from the new member 
states, which in many cases filled unskilled and low-skilled positions.
Now, due to the recession, governments have started to postpone these reforms. In partic-
ular, they have become more reluctant to admit labour migrants in sectors with uncertain 
economic perspectives. It can be expected that some governments will revise national 
shortage lists and remove occupations from these lists, reduce caps, quotas, and other 
quantitative migration targets, introduce new return policies, and generally further adjust 
to a more demand-driven migration policy to support their ongoing struggle with irregular 
migration.
Such restrictive migration policies are increasingly considered a legitimate means of ‘pro-
tecting’ national labour markets. Faced with a long-term, structural demand for labour 
migration, therefore, the Lisbon Treaty should – in theory – provide the means for the 
member states to overcome immediate political pressures for restriction and exploit the 
benefits of common action.
More inter-institutional wrangling…
The institutional changes made to EU JHa policy-making count amongst the most far-
reaching of the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations. The intergovernmental traits of policy-making, 
including in the question of labour migration, will be thoroughly diluted. yet, this will not 
automatically facilitate policy-making, and the institutional changes imposed by the Treaty 
may actually induce sclerosis rather than alleviating it.
For one thing, the Treaty gives the Commission new clout in the policing of policy implemen-
tation in former third pillar issues. This is a far cry from the current situation where decisions 
have actually been facilitated by member states’ expectation of never having to realise these 
common commitments. Should the Commission take its new policing role seriously, therefore, 
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decision-taking in Council will probably prove rather more laborious, as member states give 
more thought to the implications of their signatures – something which will have an impact 
on the speed of decision-making across the range of home affairs.
Lisbon’s shift to qualified majority in Council on issues like police cooperation will do little 
to speed such decisions or move them beyond a lowest common denominator. after all, 
the member states tend to take decisions according to the consensus principle even when 
unanimity is no longer the rule. Even if the Commission adopts a more ‘conciliatory’ line 
to policing implementation and proposes the re-evaluation and re-negotiation of policies 
that have been poorly implemented rather than instituting proceedings, this will do little 
for the dynamism of the policy area. It will simply see old compromises unravel.
The European Parliament’s influence in migration policy is boosted in two significant ways: 
firstly, the Parliament’s new powers of co-decision in the former third pillar will have an 
impact on its clout over migration. In the past, MEPs have frequently engaged in ‘issue-
linkages’: they made their approval of the migration proposals over which the Parliament 
enjoys rights of co-decision conditional upon the member states in Council taking account 
of their will in the largely intergovernmental third pillar. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the third 
pillar will collapse, and the Parliament will no longer have to dilute its influence over asylum 
and illegal immigration in this way. Secondly, and more simply, the Parliament receives 
more powers over questions of legal migration. add to this potent mix a third factor – the 
powers afforded to national parliaments by the Treaty – and the spectre of ‘legislative-ex-
ecutive’ tension so familiar at the national level could become further entrenched at the 
European one.
The Treaty also looks set to exacerbate tensions between the member states. The Treaty for-
malises the European Council’s role in setting the strategic guidelines for this area of policy. 
Small member states have often objected to the policy-planning role of the European Council, 
arguing that the European Commission – where parity between large and small member 
states is more robustly safeguarded – should take the lead.
And an inward-looking political programme
This situation clearly increases the pressure for politico-strategic thinking to replace inter-
institutional wrangling. With the potential for inter-institutional deadlock unleashed by 
the new Treaty, moreover, it would also help if the tensions within the Council at least were 
defused at an early stage.
With the elaboration of the European Council’s Stockholm Programme, the EU has had a 
plum opportunity to fulfil both tasks – setting politico-strategic guidelines and forging the 
concomitant political horse-trades between the member states.
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yet, the Programme makes a serious, if incomplete, bid to set out five years worth of 
proposals in advance without setting out either a political rationale or underpinning it with 
a serious compromise package. The Programme resembles much less the kind of political 
programme to be expected from the European Council than the technical action Plan due 
to follow it up.
The relative absence of analysis of upcoming migration problems suggests that the 
Programme’s misplaced bid for clairvoyance will follow its own logic. and that logic is one 
of entrenched institutional interests, played out in a long and laborious drafting process 
of future groups, migration pacts, Commission evaluations and ‘non-papers’. This is a 
tug-of-war in which no political actor wishes to be identified as the winner for fear of jeop-
ardising the semantic nuances they have succeeded in inserting into the text.
Without the mobilising force of a political rationale, however, or the credibility that 
derives from its authors standing by their prescriptions, the Programme’s guidelines will 
likely fall prey to these same inter-institutional pressures.
The task for the Trio: finding a political rationale for policy
The challenges of the Lisbon Treaty and the deficits in the Stockholm Programme mean 
that the agenda for immigration and asylum policy will remain contested over the coming 
years, and key political conflicts that could have been settled will live on. The onus on 
the current Trio Presidency is clear.
yet, the circumstances for the Trio seem hardly propitious. Cursory analysis suggests the 
three will struggle to remedy the situation. after all, the influence of the member state 
presidency in the European Council diminishes with the establishment of the semi-per-
manent president, just as that body’s role in agenda-setting receives a boost.
In other respects, however, the three governments have considerable advantages: 
between them, they incorporate the major political fault-lines in immigration and asylum 
policy – big member states versus small; southern versus eastern states; resource-rich 
versus resource-poor states; ‘land-locked’ states versus states on the external borders 
of the EU.
Their ‘personification’ of these political conflict lines presents the Trio with an excellent 
opportunity to resolve points of tension in the Stockholm Programme from the mutual rec-
ognition of asylum grants (land-locked / external), to the geographical focus of the external 
dimension (eastern / southern), from the powers of Frontex and the European asylum support 
office (large / small) to the financing of integration policy or the sharing of data on countries 
of origin (resource rich / poor).
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However, they can only go about achieving political consensus on these disparate issues if 
they identify a common politico-strategic rationale for European JHa cooperation under their 
aegis. and this is perhaps the more intractable issue: how can they imbue the prescriptions 
in the Stockholm Programme with a political rationale?
Three competing political strands are visible in European JHa. In the 1980s, cooperation was 
driven by a liberal vision – the notion of a border-free Europe. The realisation of this agenda 
still counts as one of the defining achievements of European integration. a rights-based 
agenda has, by contrast, been identified in the cosmopolitanism of the Tampere Programme, 
where the interests of immigrants, asylum-seekers and third countries were afforded unex-
pected prominence. a more security-centric agenda was apparent in the emphasis placed 
on law and order by the Hague Programme, crystallising under the banner “a Europe that 
protects”.
The original liberal agenda not only boasts a legitimacy that reaches beyond the current 
political make-up of the European institutions, it also chimes with efforts to attract labour 
migration to the EU – something which is shaping up to be the defining political challenge of 
the next phase of cooperation.
Many elements conducive to such an agenda are actually contained in the Stockholm 
Programme, albeit without being tied to a clear rationale or compromise package.
Most obviously, there is mention of the principle of free movement – the original liberal goal 
of European cooperation in this area. This principle could usefully receive proper reaffirma-
tion vis-à-vis labour migration from new member states. It could also be strengthened for 
third country nationals as a means of attracting certain kinds of labour to the EU – an aspira-
tion which the Union has pursued and foundered upon in the past.
The Programme’s focus on the evaluation and review of existing measures also lends itself 
to a liberalising agenda that takes a critical eye to intrusive interventions in society and the 
economy. Too often, such intrusions unnecessarily disrupt the passage of labour migration 
to the EU, even pushing migrants into ‘grey’ situations in the name of combating irregular 
migration.
The Programme’s sympathy for economic and societal actors to become involved in policy-
making is also to be welcomed. One useful suggestion made by the Commission has, however, 
been omitted – a platform in which social and economic actors could discuss ways of injecting 
dynamism into the regulation of migration.
The Programme’s openness towards palliative solutions to migration control is perhaps the 
final key element in a liberalising approach that requires a shift away from more tradition-
al – and reactive – checks and controls. Sadly, various key proposals have gone missing as 
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negotiations have progressed. The Commission’s proposal for a study on the long-term need 
for labour migration has disappeared. Meanwhile, the notion of a ‘comprehensive’ approach 
to migration has lost importance. It is precisely by comprehensively joining up the various 
elements of migration regulation – from the Union’s increased competency to ensure proper 
recognition of migrants’ qualifications and their social integration, to the full use of the EU’s 
new foreign policy structures to offset brain drain, foster circular migration and reduce the 
push factors of migration – in a long-term perspective that Union action can make a valid con-
tribution to the member states’ migration goals.
In short, by joining the liberal dots and forging a comprehensive horse-trade in its wake, the 
Trio has the potential to turn the building blocks of the Stockholm Programme into a mean-
ingful political and strategic settlement. 
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MIGRATIoNS
Strengthening EU Borders at the Expense 
of the Fundamental Right to asylum?  
The Externalisation of EU’s asylum Policy
Anaïs Faure Atger Researcher, CEPS1
T he EU’s area of Freedom, Security and Justice (aFSJ) is at the crossroads. The next Multi-annual programme on “an open and secure Europe serving the citizen” (the Stockholm Programme) – which outlines the EU’s political priorities to guide EU policy between 
2010-2015 on issues such as asylum and borders – has been adopted by the Council on 
10-11 December. It has placed the construction of a ‘Europe of asylum’ and the commitment 
to further develop the Common European asylum System (CEaS) amongst its key priorities, 
while at the same time moving ahead with the implementation of the integrated manage-
ment of EU’s common external borders. During the last five years the EU has often asserted 
that “the strengthening of European border controls should not prevent access to protection 
systems by those people entitled to benefit from them”. Nevertheless, the progressive devel-
opment of EU’s border management strategy has created a difficult relationship between 
the respect of international human rights obligations and the control-oriented logic pursued 
by the EU along its common external border. On the basis of article 33.1 of the UN Refugee 
Convention of 1951 and article 3.1 of the UN Convention against Torture – the latter consoli-
dated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law and incorporated in article 19.2 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – member states are obliged to accept and examine appli-
cations for international protection at their borders. 
The Europeanisation of border control related policies launched by the Schengen agreement 
has nonetheless justified the implementation of certain external border policies, mainly 
targeted at preventing irregular migration and which disregards ‘the mixed nature’ of human 
flows taking place on the edge of the EU. Notwithstanding the progressive emergence of a 
CEaS, the EU border management strategy has prompted a securitisation and externalisa-
tion of the asylum procedures at the expense of member states’ human rights engagements. 
1.  This contribution has been carried out under the supervision of Prof. Elspeth Guild and Dr. Sergio Carrera. The author 
would like to express her gratitude for their comments. 
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The legislative proposals currently under discussion in this field and the relevant measures 
of the Stockholm Programme, such as the asylum Support Office, seem unlikely to resolve 
this dilemma which puts EU’s fundamental rights obligations at stake.
Asylum and border controls in Europe
The establishment of a European agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the member states of the EU (Frontex) was the first institution-
al initiative formalising the call made by the second multi-annual programme on an aFSJ – 
the 2004 Hague Programme – for an Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy in the 
EU. Frontex’s main tasks consist in coordinating operational cooperation of the common 
EU external border, while the main responsibility and equipment for managing the external 
borders remain entrusted to member states. The formalisation of IBM was subsequently 
reinforced by the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) which now regulates in a 
uniform legal layout the crossing by any individual of the internal and the external borders 
of the EU. While the SBC contains human rights obligations – such as the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’, the right to non discrimination, the right to be treated with dignity, the right 
to be informed of the reason for refusal by a substantiated decision and the right to appeal 
such decisions – these are not explicitly binding for Frontex as the SBC was adopted after 
the establishment of the agency. Furthermore, notwithstanding the theoretical applica-
tion of these administrative guarantees at all borders of the EU, the fact that their enforce-
ment sometimes takes place at the boundaries of (and even outside) the Schengen area, 
undermines the possibilities for scrutinising the ways in which border controls actually 
take place in Europe.
The Europeanisation of external border control policies does not relieve member states from 
their international obligations and more particularly from the principle of ‘non-refoulement’, 
whereby, member states are obliged to accept and examine applications for international 
protection at the EU border. The first multi-annual programme on an aFSJ – the 1999 Tampere 
Programme – provided that the CEaS would be “based on the full and inclusive application 
of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution”. The first 
steps in the development of the CEaS consisted in the establishment of the Dublin system, 
which provided that asylum seekers would have their claim examined in the first European 
country of arrival. The subsequent asylum measures which were proposed, described 
common procedures and rights. Nevertheless, their nature as minimal legislative standards 
– prompted by the reluctance of certain member states towards a Europeanisation of this 
right – has resulted in uneven results across the Union. The Dublin logic basically implies 
that a member state which lets a potential asylum seeker enter its territory is then obliged 
to examine his / her claim for protection in the absence of other linking criteria. Logically, 
another consequence of the Dublin system has been to concentrate asylum claims at the 
external borders of the EU – especially those close to geographical areas where tensions 
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exist. In particular, since the establishment of the system, the Mediterranean border of the 
EU has seen a significant rise in arrivals, including high proportions of asylum seekers.
In 2008, two thirds of Frontex operational budget were allocated to joint operations in the 
Mediterranean. Its activities are mainly concentrated in this region, which has been constantly 
considered to be a priority area for the EU from the perspective of border controls. Based upon 
bilateral agreements concluded between EU member states and third countries (which all too 
often remain non-public and therefore not subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny), enforce-
ment operations for detecting and arresting boats prior to their arrival (pre-border control) 
in European waters are conducted under the coordination of Frontex. For instance, according 
to Frontex figures, during 2008 the ‘Hera operation’ enabled the diversion of 5,596 migrants 
back to the african coasts in collaboration with Mauritanian and Senegalese officers who took 
responsibility for their ‘refoulement’. These preventive border control processes have relocated 
the management of human mobility beyond the external borders of the EU without due account 
of the fact that, as highlighted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
asylum seekers may be on board such small ships. This is indicative of the increasingly important 
external dimension of the EU’s border policies in the context of the so-called EU global approach 
to migration, which calls for responding to irregular immigration through enhanced cooperation 
with third countries. The compatibility of the EU external border management strategy with the 
upholding of the right to asylum in the EU is thus jeopardised – because of the non-transpar-
ent ways in which Frontex operates, because of the lack of democratic accountability of the 
bilateral agreements upon which joint-operations are taking place, and due to the human rights 
tensions emerging as a consequence of pre-border surveillance measures.
human rights implications of the increase in controls  
at Eu’s external borders 
In spite of the open questions in relation to the ways in which the control of common EU 
external borders is taking place, no substantial modification to the way Frontex operates has 
yet taken place. In the Stockholm Programme, the European Council asked the Commission 
to put forward proposals in early 2010 in order “to clarify the mandate and enhance the role 
of Frontex,[…] elements of these proposals could contain preparation of clear common oper-
ational procedures containing clear rules of engagement for joint operations at sea, with due 
regard to ensuring protection for those in need who travel in mixed flows, in accordance with 
international law”. The clarification of the mandate from this perspective would be indeed 
most welcome. However, the enhancement of its ‘border control’-related powers together 
with the increase of its financial and operational resources (to include regular chartering of 
joint return flights) continue being the main political priorities.
Indeed, in February 2008, the European Commission submitted a ‘border package’ presenting 
the future developments in border management in the European Union. The Communication 
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aimed to give substance to the “comprehensive vision for an integrated European border man-
agement system” and consisted of three specific proposals for new (large-scale) computer-
ised databases, as well as two documents proposing substantial modifications to Frontex 
competences. In particular, the Commission proposed the implementation of pilot projects 
(which usually precede further joint operations) with non-EU countries previously identified 
as problematic through the joint operations and risk analysis carried out by Frontex. a new 
satellite-based border surveillance system, EUROSUR, would enable member states to be 
fully aware of the situation at their borders and beyond. It would be managed by Frontex which 
would become a border-management situation center so as to “increase the reaction capabil-
ity of law enforcement authorities” in particular for monitoring all movements at the external 
border. The implementation of the border package has been confirmed by the Stockholm 
Programme.
In the meantime, the situation at the southern maritime border has over the past year increas-
ingly come under the spotlight, something which has led to an increase in calls for European 
solidarity. In fact, the unilateral responses by some member states to human flows tensions 
prompted the French delegation to submit a discussion paper within the Council in order to 
further develop Frontex capacities. The French political desire to “enhance member states’ 
joint maritime operations and find innovative solutions for access to asylum procedures” 
emerged as a reaction to a succession of tragic deaths which took place in the Mediterranean 
Sea over the summer 2009 culminating on 20 august 2009 with the disembarking of only 
five out of 78 potential refugees from Eritrea in Italy. While they had already been spotted by 
other boats, none had provided the necessary help for fear of sanctions for contributing to 
the irregular entry of migrants. In May 2009, the Italians had already been singled out by the 
UNHCR, for escorting a boat full of migrants back to Libya, a country which has not ratified 
the Geneva Convention and where human rights violations are often reported by human 
rights NGOs. The Italians justified their actions on the basis of an agreement concluded with 
Libya which they argued was necessary for safeguarding their own security as the EU had so 
far failed to address the critical situation they were facing and which the EU had itself created. 
The lack of willingness by Malta and Italy to take responsibility over those migrants blocked 
by Frontex in the Mediterranean Sea has thus led to them entering bilateral agreements with 
third countries to ensure that the migrants’ journey is stopped at an ever earlier stage (and 
thus before entering EU’s territory).
The French paper aimed at further strengthening practical cooperation with neighbouring 
countries (in particular Turkey and Libya) for monitoring the EU’s external borders. Frontex 
activities could evolve to intervene as early as the coastal state of departure, off-shore and 
just before reaching the coast of destination, to ensure migrants are unable to disembark. 
Looking at the practical implications of such an initiative, this would imply modifying Frontex 
rules of procedures as well as increasing its financial means. From the perspective of potential 
refugees, this means that access by sea to European territory will be prevented, thus jeopar-
dising the possibility to file an asylum application. It is striking to see the way in which this 
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is fully acknowledged by the French delegation: the third part of the proposal is dedicated to 
‘innovative solutions concerning asylum,’ which involve ensuring that migrants have access 
to the procedure outside the EU. The French initiative seems to disregard the fact that a few 
days earlier, the European Commission had proposed paths for the reallocation and resettle-
ment of refugees to relieve member states along the external border. While these demon-
strate the desire to re-examine the CEaS, ‘the burden-sharing rhetoric’ that has been used 
further moves away from a humanitarian tradition towards considering the granting of asylum 
as a chore requiring financial compensation. This, together with the voluntary dimension of 
such a scheme, further undermines the binding nature of the obligation to grant asylum (as 
enshrined by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).
Policy recommendations for the next phase of the AFSJ
The processes described above are taking shape in two different policy fields of the aFSJ – 
borders and asylum – but they are so closely intertwined that developments in one should nec-
essarily take into account their implications over the other. While the Stockholm Programme 
and the Council Conclusions of October 2009 suggest rules of engagement for Frontex joint 
operations at sea “with due regard to ensuring protection for those in need”, the increasing 
securitisation of the European external borders is already having severe consequences in 
terms of European respect for the principle of asylum. This Human Rights Principle, to which 
all member states have in the past committed themselves, has progressively lost its sacro-
sanct nature and is now considered to be the subject of abuse as well as a barrier or threat to 
internal security.
It is therefore recommended for the next phase of the EU’s aFSJ:
 an EU border and migration monitor should be created to ensure that EU border controls,  •
wherever they take place, are consistent with EU law (the Schengen Border Code) and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights – in particular its article 18 on the right to asylum and 
article 21 on the prohibition of discrimination. Its activities could comprise overseeing 
the respect by member states of the provisions contained in the returns directive.
 Before expanding its capacities and competences, Frontex activities must be subject  •
to an objective and impartial evaluation as well as to the principles of transparency 
and democratic accountability, in particular when its border control activities take 
place outside the EU.
 Collaboration between the EU and third countries should be transparently developed  •
with clear guarantees for human rights and in particular with commitments to 
guarantee the fundamental right to asylum.
 Member states and countries wishing to join the EU need to guarantee their capacity to  •
ensure respect for the fundamental rights of all migrants in all circumstances, including 
in detention centres, and to guarantee the conditions for full compliance with funda-
mental rights obligations.
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INTERNAl SECuRITy ANd JudICIAl CooPERATIoN
The EU and Counter-terrorism: Next Steps
hugo brady Senior Research Fellow, CER
S everal years after bombs claimed over 250 lives in London and Madrid, Europeans still face risks from terrorism. Recent events in afghanistan, India and Pakistan have served as a reminder to western governments and their allies that Islamist 
terror cells remain active worldwide and continue to plot attacks at home and abroad. 
The growing strength of jihadist cells in North africa, close to the EU’s borders, as well 
as in yemen and the Horn of africa, causes concern. and the United States still views the 
EU’s passport-free Schengen area as a potential haven for militants planning new attacks 
against america.
The EU has no direct role in ensuring the internal security of its member states. Its institu-
tions are not actively engaged in the day-to-day business of preventing terrorist attacks: their 
chief contribution is to ensure that the legal and practical structures for counter-terrorism 
cooperation are robust and effective. Terrorism is one of the main priorities of the G6, an 
internal security vanguard made up of the interior ministries of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland and Spain. almost all these countries feel threatened by terrorism and have elaborate 
national counter-terror systems. That means they have agencies and resources specifically 
dedicated to gathering counter-terrorism intelligence; can respond rapidly in the event of a 
terrorist attack to protect civilians and infrastructure; and, to some degree, have integrated 
counter-terrorism priorities into their foreign policies.
amongst the other EU countries, Denmark and the Netherlands also feel threatened and 
have similar security set-ups as regards terrorism. But the rest of the member states have 
less developed counter-terror capabilities and rely on normal law enforcement and intelli-
gence-gathering. Thus, a central purpose of the EU’s work on counter-terrorism is to help 
protect those member countries which feel threatened, by raising the internal security 
standards of all. The EU did agree on a common strategy in 2005 in which the member 
states categorised their common counter-terrorism efforts under the headings ‘prevent’, 
‘protect’, ‘pursue’ and ‘respond’. But the strategy was mostly intended to show how the EU’s 
existing responsibilities were relevant to national counter-terrorism efforts, both before 
(prevent and protect) and after (pursue and respond) an attack. These objectives include 
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regulating to protect civilian infrastructure and secure hazardous materials, helping to 
fight cross-border crime, improving border security and trying to speak with one voice in 
foreign policy.
Since 2001, EU interior ministers have harmonised the definition of terrorism (essential 
for police to pursue terrorists across borders), as well as making it a crime across Europe 
to recruit or train terrorists. agreed in the aftermath of 11th September, a ‘European arrest 
warrant’ has dramatically accelerated and simplified the extradition of suspects between 
member states, as seen in some high-profile terrorism cases. Experts from the EU’s Joint 
Situation Centre (SitCen) – a body composed of national intelligence experts seconded to 
Brussels – brief EU policy-makers about the latest terrorist trends and risks on an ongoing 
basis.
Modern states no longer control communications or utilities, such as power and water in 
the way they once did. Therefore private sector cooperation is indispensable to cope with 
modern security threats. Businesses may find it unpalatable and expensive, but coun-
ter-terrorism regulations can make people safer by reducing the opportunities for terror-
ists to develop low-tech weapons or to target travellers and tourists. The main goal for 
EU countries is to make the single market as ‘terrorism-proof’ as possible. That includes 
agreeing European legislation to track and control the movement of explosive substanc-
es like ammonium nitrate (the principal substance used in numerous terrorist bombings); 
setting down common safety requirements for airports and other transport hubs; and 
attempting to ensure that privately-owned infrastructure can withstand foreseeable 
emergencies.
Terrorist cells need considerable sums to maintain their organisations long enough to plan 
and carry out serious attacks, and to recruit and radicalise others. Contrary to popular 
belief, substantial amounts of terrorist funding still go through the formal banking system. 
Consequently, EU money-laundering laws require private sector workers, such as bankers, 
lawyers and accountants, to file reports about suspicious activity to the local authorities 
whenever they suspect terrorist groups may be moving funds. EU interior ministry officials 
also maintain two terrorism blacklists, updated every six months. One list incorporates 
al-Qaeda and Taliban members already blacklisted by the UN Security Council, and another 
deals with other terrorist organisations from Europe, the Middle East, Latin america and asia. 
Individuals and groups on these lists have had their bank accounts frozen and their travel 
rights suspended (however, the way groups are added to or deleted from these lists has 
provoked controversy).
Traditional foreign policy seems absent from European counter-terror efforts. For example, 
the EU has neither the capabilities nor the political will to deploy a military mission in support 
of counter-terrorism objectives, unlike NaTO in afghanistan. Partly, this is because the 
EU’s clout in hard power is even weaker than in internal security. But more fundamentally, 
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terrorism is a difficult subject for EU foreign ministers because of the deep divisions between 
European countries over the Iraq war, and the war on terror more generally. Controversies over 
the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects, ‘targeted’ killings of suspected al-Qaeda 
operatives and abuses at the abu Ghraib prison and Guantánamo detention camp ensured 
that collective EU efforts remained low-key and limited in scope.
The United States has moved away from the ‘global war on terror’ concept to a more multi-
lateral approach, emphasising a return to the conventions of international law and engage-
ment with key partners such as the EU, United Nations and mainstream Muslim forces. 
President Obama’s decision to close the Guantánamo Bay detention centre represents a 
huge opportunity for the EU to deepen security cooperation with the United States in the 
coming years. The EU and United States should agree on a joint strategy on internal security 
in areas where they have shared concerns arising from terrorism, organised crime and 
unmanaged migration. The strategy could be agreed at an EU-US summit expected under 
Spain’s EU Presidency in 2010. The part of the strategy that deals with counter-terrorism 
should include cooperation on threat assessment; and better cooperation between the FBI 
and Europol, as well as between the CIa and SitCen. The accord would also incorporate 
current EU-US efforts to forge agreements on the sharing of passenger information, data 
protection and the monitoring of international financial transactions. More broadly, the 
main point of the strategy should be to agree on joint foreign policy priorities where these 
are linked to the threat of terrorism.
Pakistan must be at the forefront of these priorities. The fluctuating political and security 
situation there is a constant source of concern for western policy-makers. al-Qaeda and a 
resurgent Taliban both have sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal borderlands. The country is simul-
taneously facing open warfare with the Taliban in its ‘federally administered tribal areas’, and 
other Islamist extremists who have carried out a number of major attacks in urban areas. In 
the worse case scenario, it is not inconceivable that Pakistan – and its nuclear weapons – 
could fall into the hands of extremist political forces. Nevertheless, despite these risks, on 
a per capita basis the EU gives 20 times as much aid to Nicaragua as it does to Pakistan. EU 
countries have gone some way to addressing this imbalance by setting aside €5 million of the 
EU ‘Stability Instrument’ for counter-terrorism efforts in Pakistan, but this is tiny compared to 
what some member states give individually.
a second priority should be the Middle East peace process. arguably, no other issue feeds 
Muslim resentment towards the West more than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political con-
ditions for a settlement do not look good: Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has 
spent his career opposing concessions to the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Palestinian terri-
tories were disastrously split in 2007, when Hamas asserted control over Gaza. Nonetheless, 
President Obama raised the political stakes in June 2009. In a well-received speech to the 
‘Muslim world’ in Cairo, Obama committed the United States to a fresh push for a sustainable, 
two-state settlement to which Netanyahu has been compelled to respond.
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The EU has a role to play in this shifting game. France and Britain – member states with a 
colonial history in the region – are happy to direct much of their diplomatic effort on this 
issue through EU structures. yet, despite being the largest single aid donor to the Palestinian 
authority, the European Commission’s regional office there lacks even an arabic-speaking 
spokesperson in a part of the world where al-Jazeera serves as “the Parliament of the 
arabs”, according to one British official. The establishment of a European External action 
Service (EEaS) would do much to give EU diplomatic efforts in the region more capability 
and visibility (discussed below). To support US efforts, the EU should embrace Israel with 
‘tough love’ – it should make clear that it is keen to deepen bilateral relations and provide 
full assistance for peace talks, but insist on the need for Israel to recommit fully to the 
peace process. 
Turkey should be another priority. The country has become more popular in the arab world 
due to its refusal to cooperate with the United States invasion of Iraq and its Prime Minister’s 
very public protest against the 2008 Israeli incursion into Gaza. During the same period, 
Turkey’s relations with both the United States and EU have worsened. The EU, meanwhile, 
must continue membership negotiations with Turkey, since a unilateral suspension would 
permanently sour relations. To most European Muslims, Turkish membership would send a 
powerful message about the viability of a moderate European Islam. EU countries should 
clamp down on the European organisation of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), an eth-
no-nationalist group already on the EU’s list of outlawed terrorist organisations. That would 
help ensure greater cooperation from the Turkish security services in preventing extremist 
attacks in EU countries.
In africa, both the EU and United States would be more effective if they sponsored counter-
terrorism efforts in regions. The Europeans need to work with the countries of North africa 
and the Sahel desert region, such as Niger and Mali, which are vulnerable to penetration by 
al-Qaeda’s new presence. This fragile region is a potential future sanctuary for al-Qaeda: it 
is already being used to host camps to train terrorists and insurgents. These are amongst 
the poorest nations on earth and are ill-equipped to confront extremist agitation; govern-
ments there already struggle to cope with a mass of problems like organised crime, and the 
smuggling of drugs, weapons and people. Meanwhile, the United States should focus its 
efforts on East africa and the Horn of africa, including Sudan and Somalia. 
Governments on both sides of the atlantic are now more aware of the need to counter extremist 
propaganda with better media and communications strategies. Some even train and assign 
counter-terrorism bloggers to challenge extremist narratives in internet chat rooms. In 
general, media and communications strategies are needed to undermine the narratives that 
sustain Islamist terrorism. For example, instead of overtly linking democracy promotion and 
counter-terrorism – a linkage which undermines both causes – the West should concentrate 
instead on the promotion of free media, economic reform and direct development aid to anti-
corruption efforts in Middle Eastern and african countries.
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Next steps in Eu internal security
The EU faces three pressing challenges in internal security, each of which has important 
implications for national counter-terrorism policies. The first problem is the most immediate: 
how to reconcile the European Parliament – a hitherto toothless critic now empowered with 
co-decision rights under the Lisbon Treaty – to the member states’ counter-terrorism agenda? 
To wield such powers effectively the Parliament needs to demonstrate to interior ministries 
that it is a serious, thoughtful partner in internal security matters.
Hence, over the period 2010-2011, a major priority of the EU Presidency will then be to 
establish political ground rules with the European Parliament. The Trio Presidency should 
begin a frank dialogue with the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, proposing 
the Parliament to establish a separate Internal Security Committee to vet legislation: this 
committee would audit proposed laws for their effectiveness, while the Parliament’s Civil 
Liberties Committee would continue to scrutinise EU legislation for its impact on freedoms. 
Equally the EU Presidency should begin a dialogue with the Parliament laying the ground for 
political compromise on issues MEPs care deeply about, such as the protection of personal 
data. Concurrently, the Trio Presidency should encourage the European Commission to take 
forward plans to ‘terror proof’ the Single Market.
The Lisbon Treaty will also make the European Commission a real actor in internal security 
matters by giving it greater powers to propose new laws and sanction member states 
which fail to implement agreed legislation. It would also establish an EU Internal Security 
Committee – or COSI – involving SitCen, Europol, Eurojust and EU’s border agency Frontex. 
The potential powers of COSI should not be over-stated: it would be concerned with day-to-
day security issues, and would not be a policy-maker or strategy setter on anything like the 
scale of United States National Security Council. But the committee could mitigate the coor-
dination problems currently experienced by existing agencies.
Central to solving the foreign policy conundrum is the second challenge of bringing lead-
ership and direction to the EU’s expanding system of bodies involved in internal security 
matters. Despite its counter-terrorism strategy, the EU’s institutions have had to eke out a 
role for themselves in this area almost on a case-by-case basis, leaving a messy, frequent-
ly overlapping system of committees, agencies and legal frameworks. Little wonder that 
De Kerchove’s predecessor, Gjis de Vries, resigned in frustration in spring 2007. One idea 
would to merge the jobs of the next European Commissioner responsible for internal security 
matters with the current post of counter-terrorism coordinator. That post will be an anachro-
nism in the post-Lisbon era.
The final challenge is whether the EU can speak with one voice on the foreign policy aspects of 
internal security, given that member states face different levels of threat from terrorism and 
cross-border crime. Despite the fact that there is increasingly an external aspect to European 
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internal security cooperation, great uncertainly remains as to ‘who speaks for Europe’ in 
negotiations affecting domestic security. The EU could ensure that internal security issues, 
like terrorism, feature more prominently in general EU agreements with other countries. For 
example, the EU’s new Central asian Strategy contains only vague references to how the EU 
will work with countries in the region to deal with terrorism-related issues, the movement of 
dangerous substances, organised crime, and illegal immigration. The Spanish Presidency 
should also take advantage of a change of approach in the United States on counter-terror-
ism to seek a new EU-US agreement in 2010 on a range of internal security matters, from the 
exchange of passenger and financial data to police cooperation and foreign policy priorities 
related to counter-terrorism.
The new EEaS established by the Lisbon Treaty will merge the parts of the EU’s foreign policy 
machinery currently based in the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and some 
140 overseas missions. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign affairs and Security Policy, 
who will serve as the head of the new service, should ensure that a senior EEaS official is 
appointed as special representative for internal security. This person should also sit on COSI. 
If the EEaS is established, SitCen will for the first time be able to task the EU missions overseas 
to collect counter-terrorism intelligence, if requested to do so by the member states.
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INTERNAl SECuRITy ANd JudICIAl CooPERATIoN
EU Police and Judicial Cooperation  
in Criminal Law: Balancing Efficiency  
and Human Rights Protection
Ivo Šlosarcík Director of Research, Europeum
Global context and specific challenges
Judicial cooperation in criminal law is one of the most rapidly developing areas of the EU 
law. at the same time, EU regulation of criminal law belongs to the most sensitive areas 
from the perspective of national sovereignty and regulatory autonomy. The EU rules also 
frequently trigger conflict(s) with both the EU and the national human rights standards / 
rules. Therefore, new EU initiatives in the area of criminal law are frequently (mis)interpret-
ed in the media and / or challenged before national judicial authorities. For example, the 
pilot instrument of the judicial cooperation in the criminal law, the European arrest warrant 
mechanism, was challenged before the constitutional courts in Germany, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Cyprus as well as before the European Court of Justice.
From the institutional perspective, the EU activity concentrates on the establishment of 
standards of judicial cooperation while the implementation is left to the member states. The 
application of the rules on judicial cooperation in individual cases is also left to the national 
judiciary. The European Court of Justice is involved only indirectly, via answers to preliminary 
questions formulated by the national courts. The decentralisation of the implementation of 
judicial cooperation thus requires a high level of trust among the EU states in the quality of 
their respective legal and judicial systems.
The lion’s share of expenses linked with the judicial cooperation is covered directly by 
member states; the impact of the EU rules of judicial cooperation in criminal law on the EU 
budget is relatively modest.
Regarding the dynamics of the judicial cooperation in criminal law, the year of 2009 is 
important for two reasons: the finalisation of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the formulation of the Stockholm Programme for 2009-2014. The impact of the Lisbon 
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Treaty on the future of the EU judicial cooperation in criminal law is threefold: firstly, the 
Lisbon Treaty replaces unanimity in the Council of the EU by qualified majority voting and 
it includes the European Parliament into the EU legislative process. Secondly, the Lisbon 
Treaty strengthens the control mechanisms over the implementation of the EU rules by 
member states, in particular by extending the Commission‘s power to use enforcement 
actions against member states for violation of (non-compliance with) the EU rules in the 
domain of criminal law. Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty incorporates, albeit in rather vague terms, 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU legal / constitutional system – and the 
EU Charter also explicitly guarantees several rules important / relevant for criminal law, 
such as the ban on inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to fair trial, 
the principle of presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and the principle of ne 
bis in idem.
The Stockholm Programme is the follow-up of the previous five-year plans for the EU 
activity in the domain of internal security, which were adopted in Tampere (1999-2004) 
and The Hague (2004-2009). Regardless of the fact that the Stockholm Programme will be a 
‘soft-law’ norm, it will establish a very influential political commitment and a benchmark for 
the future EU activities in criminal law. The conclusion of the five-year period of The Hague 
Programme in 2009 also provides for an evaluation of the results of the EU activities so far 
and for a more long-term and strategic analysis of future EU action.
Current status
The EU regulation in the domain of internal security is primarily focused on four categories 
of activities: 
 Establishment of agencies and other structures at the EU level which support  •
and coordinate activities of national agencies and institutions. The role of the EU 
bodies is, however, only supplementary and does not intend to replace the national 
structures.
 Establishment of standards of visa, asylum and immigration procedures at EU level,  •
while the implementation and application of these standards is left to national 
authorities.
 Limited substantial harmonisation of criminal law (i.e. common EU rules on the defi- •
nition of the criminal activity and the respective sanctions) for selected crimes with 
strong interstate elements. again, EU activity is relatively limited and does not aspire 
to create a general EU criminal code.
 Establishment of a regime which guarantees mutual recognition of judicial decisions  •
issued / produced by an individual member state’s judiciary in all other EU states. The 
mechanism of mutual recognition thus respects the autonomy of the member states’ 
systems of criminal law and establishes de facto ‘free movement of judicial decisions’ 
within the EU.
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From the four approaches mentioned, it is the principle of mutual recognition which is 
the core of the judicial cooperation in criminal law in the EU. The priority of the mutual-
recognition approach over the harmonisation of the substantive criminal law is stressed 
in the Lisbon Treaty which states that “the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level 
of security […] through the mutual recognition of judgements in criminal matters and, if 
necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws”(art. 67 TFEU).
However, the principle of mutual recognition is not directly applicable in the member 
states and needs to be elaborated in more detailed instruments of EU law (framework 
decisions, directive). In practice, the EU used a ‘step-by-step’ approach and adopted 
specific framework decisions establishing rules (and setting their conditions and limits) 
on mutual recognition regarding specific types of decisions issued in the course of the 
criminal process – such as arrest warrants, evidence warrants, judicial decisions on 
financial penalties and / or confiscations of property or judicial decisions imposing 
custodial sanctions. Some kinds of judicial decision are not regulated yet, e.g. those sus-
pending a driving license as a sanction for a criminal offence.
a relatively large gap in the current EU regulation of judicial cooperation in criminal law is the 
absence of detailed procedural safeguards for individuals prosecuted; in particular, taking 
into account the more vulnerable position of a person prosecuted outside his / her country. 
another missing element of effective judicial cooperation is the absence of common EU 
rules on criminal jurisdiction.
The debate on the Stockholm Programme for 2009-2014 reflects these missing 
elements of the EU regulatory framework. The Swedish Presidency stated that the 
Stockholm Programme should “strike a balance between better law enforcement and 
measures for legal rights and enhanced protection of private life”. as examples of the 
potential EU actions strengthening the human rights protection in the context of the EU 
judicial cooperation in criminal law, the Swedish Presidency mentioned the expected 
EU’s accession to the European Convention for Human Rights, a more intensive role for 
the EU agency of Fundamental Rights in the EU legislative process and the adoption 
of common EU rules for defendants during the criminal investigation and process. The 
Stockholm Programme has been adopted at the European Council Summit in December 
2009.
Since the Lisbon Treaty, which simplified the adoption of the EU legislation by the Council 
of the EU in the domain of judicial cooperation in criminal law, and which entered in force 
on 1st December 2009, intensive related legislative activity can be expected in the years 
2010-2011. By the same time, the increase of powers of the European Parliament in the 
EU legislative process might enhance the public debate on the practical implications of 
the EU norms and on the absence of mutual knowledge / understanding of the specifics 
of systems of criminal law in individual member states.
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Proposals
The current Trio Presidency should consider these actions to both further enhance the 
creation of the EU as an area of judicial cooperation in criminal law and to ensure a high 
level of human rights standards in the criminal proceedings: 
 adopt a catalogue of minimal EU standards of rights for the defendant in the criminal  •
procedure. In particular, the EU rules should reflect the more difficult position of 
the defendant in a country different from the state of his / her citizenship regarding 
his / her weaker knowledge of the local legal system, access to legal advice, weaker 
knowledge of the local language, the absence of a social network and (last but not 
least) the financial burden caused by his / her presence in a foreign state during trial.
 Make clearer rules on the jurisdiction in criminal cases. In particular, the EU rules  •
should clarify the proximity of the offender’s behaviour with the territory, citizens 
and / or interest of a member state which would establish a criminal jurisdiction of 
the state concerned over the person/offender. This would prevent situations where 
a member state might punish / regulate by its criminal-law activities concentrated in 
other EU states and thus effectively ‘export’ its criminal-law standards and prefer-
ences into other EU states.
 Elaborate, by means of soft law or binding legislation, the impact of the EU Charter  •
of Fundamental Rights on criminal law in the EU. 
 Organise an information campaign on the impacts of EU judicial cooperation in  •
criminal law. EU information could eliminate many myths about the practical impact 
of EU rules on citizens. These myths might misinterpret the EU role as an extensive 
intrusion into state sovereignty, or they might (also incorrectly) cause expectations 
that the EU will radically improve national systems of criminal law or that the EU 
courts will serve as an appellate body against the national criminal courts’ judge-
ments (e.g. by making an incorrect analogy between the role of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
Luxembourg).
 Promote communication and the exchange of experience with EU rules between  •
national judiciaries (e.g. via Eurojust) and between national courts and the ECJ (by 
the preliminary question procedure). 
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GlobAl GoVERNANCE
The recent global financial crisis has shown how interdependent the world has 
become and brought to light the need for enhanced global governance. The 
pursuit of better governance beyond EU borders is needed not only because of 
the growing interdependence driven by economic globalisation, but also be-
cause of the rise of transnational challenges such as climate change, energy 
security and supply, terrorism and poverty, which require greater effort and 
shared responsibility at the global level.
In this context, the European Union, as a leading player in the global economy 
and as a model of multilateral cooperation itself, plays a major role in estab-
lishing a viable framework for global governance (GKI). The period of time cov-
ered by the Trio Presidency (Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian) is a crucial time 
for the definition of the EU’s role on the international scene.
For the EU to exert its influence outside 
its borders, it needs efficient governance 
from within. The entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty is an opportunity that must 
be seized by the Trio Presidency to nar-
row the gap between the EU’s widening 
and deepening. It is a fundamental step 
in creating the institutional and legal 
framework for a more active EU (HaS / 
GKI, Bruegel) and it offers a chance to im-
prove economic coordination inside the 
EU (demosEUROPa).
The current Trio Presidency will in the first place have to manage the exit from 
the crisis. This includes putting into practice the lessons learned from the crisis 
and redesigning the financial sector. The EU will need to promote tight coor-
dination with the G20 for the regulation of financial markets (CEPS, demos-
EUROPa), to continue to stimulate self-regulation – as not everything can be 
regulated and controlled by public authorities – and to make the EU’s new in-
stitutional supervision structure work (CEPS).
The Trio Presidency should also make every effort to promote a coordinated 
exit strategy from the crisis and to address the financial, economic and social 
consequences of the crisis at the EU level. Special attention must be given to 
the huge budget deficit and growing public debt in most of the EU, the need 
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to promote active labour market policies to fight unemployment and the need 
to ensure the proper functioning of the single market (GKI, Bruegel).
While shared problems call for common action, the interests and perceptions 
of the international actors, with the emergence of major new global and re-
gional powers such as China, India and Brazil, may be growing more diverse. 
This growing multilateralism makes global governance more complicated to 
achieve.
Therefore, in order to maximise the EU’s influence on decisions and policies 
designed by international bodies, the Trio Presidency should work towards a 
common EU-level representation in key world governance bodies (HaS / GKI, 
Bruegel, demosEUROPa). Speaking with a single voice would force the EU to 
seek genuine internal consensus and would enhance European influence in in-
ternational bodies (demosEUROPa).
In this multilateral world order, one of the main issues for the EU is to make glo-
balisation go hand in hand with regionalisation (GKI). The EU needs to organ-
ise its own regionalised neighbourhood in order to reinforce its role in global 
governance.
Eu FoREIGN PolICy
It has become commonplace to underline the EU’s inability to act coherently 
and effectively with a single voice in the international arena – despite being 
the most powerful trading bloc in the world, having the second most active 
currency in international exchange markets, and providing the most generous 
assistance to developing countries. However, and acknowledging the internal 
and external obstacles to the goal of a real common foreign policy, the EU is 
slowly becoming a global political player.
The European Union’s external policy is traversing an uncertain period, but 
there is a window of opportunity that must be taken (HIIa, GKI). The Trio Presi-
dency of Spain, Belgium and Hungary has a historic responsibility in the com-
ing months, since it will be responsible for implementing the new institutional 
architecture under the Lisbon Treaty. It is known that the EU’s global partners 
have often been disoriented for having to deal with the institutional complexi-
ties of the European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat and the national 
diplomatic services. The foreign policy innovations included in the Treaty now 
demand a clear effort to overcome the mess of bureaucratic obstacles and to 
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achieve a more coherent EU international position (CER, Real Instituto Elcano). 
The launch and implementation of the new External Action Service is thus cru-
cial and will be high on the European agenda during the entire period of the 
Trio Presidency. The Trio will determine such fundamental aspects as its scope 
and staff, organisation and relations with national diplomatic services. And 
although the goal of designing an effective external action service to support 
both the High Representative and the European Council President is an effort 
to simplify procedures, the task is still a complex and difficult one (CER, Real 
Instituto Elcano).
A solid institutional architecture for EU foreign policy is essential in order to 
give a more coherent voice abroad. Nevertheless, Europe needs to build a 
consistent position on international challenges such as development, climate 
change, counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, the Middle East peace 
process, energy supply, the implications of situations of ‘state failure,’ and 
the effects of the global financial crisis (ELIaMEP). The Trio can facilitate and 
optimise the transition to the new institutional structure, while also construc-
tively helping to rethink the main principles of European foreign policy and the 
improved coordination between the policies and actors involved (HIIa,GKI).
There is no doubt that the support and defence of human rights and the rule of 
law are among the principal goals of the European Union’s external policy. The 
principles are reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, and also include the obligation 
to ensure that they apply consistently across the EU’s internal and external poli-
cies (ECFR). This issue is particularly important in the fight against terrorism. 
As it is known, there were serious misunderstandings with the Bush Adminis-
tration regarding how to confront this challenge. The willingness of President 
Obama to reverse the legacy of his predecessor on this point may open the way, 
during 2010 and 2011, to developing a set of principles as a common reference 
in transatlantic efforts to counter terrorism (Real Instituto Elcano). The domes-
tic political situation in the United States and the complexity of some of the is-
sues involved mean that those principles will not be agreed during the Spanish 
Presidency (ECFR). However, the Trio has the responsibility and difficult task to 
assure that this possibility is not abandoned.
Eu dEFENCE PolICy
Ten years have passed since the European Security and Defence Policy was 
launched, with the aim of allowing Europe to respond to international security cri-
sis. The defence dimension of the EU is essential to strengthening the European 
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Union and its credibility. According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “those who 
believe the EU is still principally a soft power are behind the time.1” Despite 
the commonplace of associating the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) – former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) –with a failure 
to strengthen Europe’s military resources, there is a relevance to the 23 peace-
support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia since 2003, which use civil as 
well as military instruments. However, the EU is still far from having the neces-
sary tools and capacities to ensure the defence of the European interests and 
values, and also to play the international role that other world powers expect.
One of the most important steps in the short history of the EU defence policy is 
the Security Strategy Paper produced by Javier Solana in the aftermath of the 
Iraq crisis. The European Security Strategy (ESS), approved in December 2003, 
describes potential threats to the EU and how the EU might respond. Despite the 
positive impact of this document on European strategic thinking, the ESS mostly 
tells us how to do things and is much more vague on what to do (Egmont).
Unfortunately, the debate about the ESS that was concluded by the European 
Council in December 2008 (with the adoption of an implementation report) 
did not set out concrete guidelines for the CSDP (Egmont). The Trio Presidency 
should push for launching a second Strategy Paper which would complement 
the revamped ESS (HIIa, GKI).
In defence policy, the Trio Presidency should maintain the debate over a high-
level EU military strategy, working in parallel with the new NATO strategic con-
cept. The debate should focus on how to link the EU objectives and priorities 
with particular tools. The European Defence Agency and the Permanent Struc-
tured Cooperation included in the new Treaty should be at the top of the Trio 
Presidency agenda (Egmont, SWP).
In the field of crisis management operations around the world, the assessment 
is impressive for some of the missions, while others have had real difficulties in 
finding the personnel or adequate military equipment for the operation (SWP).
Regarding capacities, the recommendations for the Trio Presidency include 
such delicate topics as the need to establish long-term and strategic planning 
for CSDP deployments (SWP); the establishment of a binding and institutiona-
lised ‘lessons learned’ process or the reinforcement of the ‘gendarmerie’ type 
forces (Egmont); and the adoption of the post-2010 Headline Goals (HIIa, GKI).
1.  This sentence is part of a speech by Ferrero-Walner “The European Union and the World: a hard 
look at soft power,” at Columbia University, September, 2007, New york. 
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ENlARGEMENT ANd ThE NEIGhbouRhood
Enlargement has always played a decisive role in the EU. Every time a new 
group of member states has joined, the integration process has also increased 
the EU’s policy remit and strengthened its institutions. The 1970s enlargement 
round preceded the creation of the European Council, the direct election of the 
European Parliament (EP) and led to important innovations in the fields of re-
gional, monetary and foreign policies. The two Mediterranean enlargements 
in the 1980s were immediately followed by the Single European Act. Thirdly, 
the 1990s enlargement towards the North took place only two years before 
the Amsterdam Treaty. Finally, the big two rounds of Eastern enlargements in 
the 2000s were directly linked to the interim Nice Treaty and the constitutional 
experiment that eventually resulted in the Lisbon Treaty. Even the Maastricht 
Treaty was also connected to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the mini-enlarge-
ment represented by the absorption of East Germany. It is clear that the process 
of European integration itself may be interpreted as a virtuous combination of 
widening and deepening. Both from the EU and the newcomers’ perspectives, 
this process is surely among the most successful policy instruments for provid-
ing political stability and economic prosperity.
Despite this historically positive assessment, the prospect for the enlargement 
process is not very promising in 2010-2011. To be sure, the EU continues to 
be attractive in the West Balkans – new applications have just arrived from 
Podgorica and Tirana, and the recent visa liberalisation has fostered some op-
timism in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. This is also the case in Turkey 
(despite the slow progress of the negotiations, which are also blocked infor-
mally by Paris and Berlin) and in other areas where accession was not seriously 
considered until recently, such as Iceland and Ukraine. However, those voices 
which (since the 1960s) have tried to create the impression of widespread Eu-
ropean disapproval of new enlargements seem now to be stronger than ever. 
Furthermore, this ‘enlargement fatigue’ – which is evident in the scepticism 
of many citizens and in the low profile of EU institutions towards new acces-
sions – is reinforced by the perception that Bulgaria and Romania have not 
been able to cope with their obligations as members. It has not helped that 
some EU members have bilateral disputes with candidates – this is producing 
serious crisis in the negotiations with Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. The best 
way to overcome such deadlock is to use the unique opportunity of the new in-
stitutional settlement – not only the top jobs introduced by the Treaty but also 
the fresh mandate of the European Commission and the Trio – to give a new 
boost to enlargement policy and place it higher on the EU agenda (Europeum, 
demosEUROPa).
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A clearly defined roadmap for future enlargements is needed – one that will de-
scribe when each country will be able to liberalise visa regimes, receive candi-
date status and / or open chapters in the accession negotiations, using explicit 
conditionality. In the current EU member states, this strategy should be con-
nected to the guarantee by all member states that they will respect the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda. Regarding the present candidates or future ones, it will 
create a healthy competition among the potential future members – as it was 
the case in the previous 2000s enlargements, most of the EU-related economic 
reform and democratisation in candidate countries is achieved once the nego-
tiations are open. In addition to this roadmap the EU must adopt a more as-
sertive role, as the membership perspective alone cannot deliver a solution to 
the worrying stalemate situations of Bosnia, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. This 
may include a clear EU membership prospect in the medium or long-term. The 
EU must also enforce the solutions that enable them to emerge from the stale-
mate situation and avoid the risk of instability (Europeum, demosEUROPa).
Whether this clear strategy for future enlargement is agreed or not, the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) should help to provide political and policy 
answers for the EU in its relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours. 
The original ENP has become more vague, with the creation of new different – 
and often unconnected – regional and bilateral cooperation forms for the area 
surrounding the EU: Eastern Partnership (EaP), Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), Black Sea Synergy, Northern Dimension, ‘advanced status’ agreements, 
etc. It is unclear if these initiatives represent alternative formations in the EU’s 
neighbourhood or, in some cases, intermediate steps to enlargement.
Brussels may officially treat Eastern Partnership countries as potential can-
didate states but it is nonetheless unclear that Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus or 
the three Caucasus countries are convinced that their future is or should be in 
the EU. Their post-Soviet political elites and societies are losing their commit-
ment (never massive) to the European project. Three key realities clearly dif-
ferentiate the Eastern Neighbourhood from the accession states of the 1990s: 
(i) Russia is another pole of attraction in the region, (ii) these states are weak 
ones, and (iii) they are sovereignty-seeking, with leaders whose priority is to 
bolster statehood, strengthen their personal position and excuse a lack of re-
form. Since it is impossible to ignore Europe’s energy or security needs and 
given that relations with Moscow is one of the most divisive issues for the EU, 
the stance towards Russia should avoid confrontation and be at least coopera-
tive, supporting the idea that the EU’s multilateral cooperation in the Eastern 
neighbourhood could constructively complement the existing EU-Russia rela-
tionship. Notwithstanding this, the EU should build its own and autonomous 
strategy to help its Eastern neighbours prevent and cope with political and 
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economic crises, thinking imaginatively of ways to counter Russia’s strong 
power of attraction in the region (SWP, ECFR).
Regarding the Northern African neighbours, the under-performance and frag-
mentation across different lines of the EU foreign policy towards the region is 
clear. The ‘variable geometry’ uncovers the difficulties in creating a North Afri-
can region that is ridden with inter-state conflicts and heterogeneity. Wealthy 
regimes, such as Algeria and Libya, can cope and go global. Morocco and 
Tunisia look for the EU for support, while Egypt is situated somewhere in the 
middle. Underpinning these tensions, there is a continuing ‘securitisation’ of 
the Mediterranean debate in the EU, which centres on threats emanating from 
the South: islamist terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime. The Trio 
Presidency cannot resolve this deep-rooted quandary, but a gradual shift of 
the European narrative on North Africa is advisable. The EU should acknowl-
edge the objective tensions facing its policy and place a renewed emphasis on 
fundamental political reforms in the partner countries, which Brussels has not 
been able to encourage so far. Without a membership horizon, political condi-
tionality is difficult in countries like these. But the EU can improve its democra-
cy-promotion record by concentrating on what can actually be achieved on the 
ground (DIIS).
136 | PART IV – EU IN THE WORLD
GlobAl GoVERNANCE
Internal and External Challenges  
for the EU: the Economic agenda  
of the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian  
Trio Presidency
András Inotai Director of the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian 
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T he Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian (SBH) Trio Presidency covers not only 18 months in time, but a period of historical challenges for the future of the European integration. Some of them will be concentrated into this one-and-a-half-year period, while others will continue 
(or even become more acute) in the period beyond the SBH Presidency. But the first and most 
decisive steps concerning their nature, direction and intensity will be taken before mid-2011.
Pre-crisis role of the Eu in global developments
Prior to the crisis, the EU could be described as a ‘fragmented power’ in international relations, 
that is, as a power whose effectiveness varied depending on the field, and as a potential 
power whose effectiveness was being hampered by internal fragmentation.
as a result of several decades of development, the EU has become a leading player in inter-
national trade, global capital flows (including mergers and acquisitions due to the develop-
ing internal market) and development aid. also, it has created a much-envied social welfare 
system, high living standards, political and social stability and (somewhat balanced) pros-
perity. Despite shortcomings which are in some ways increasing (particularly as compared to 
the USa), the EU is also a global player in research and development, as well as in education 
and innovation potential.
alongside the United States, the EU has also emerged an international standard-setter. The 
rules of the game of most international economic and financial institutions are based on laws 
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and norms inherited from, and transferred by, Western Europe and the United States. More 
broadly, the institutional representation of the EU is fragmented (between community level 
and nation-state competence), but its weight in international organisations and decision-
making processes is undeniable.
There is however a substantial and in some cases growing gap between the EU’s global 
economic role and its political and security roles. Member states, often cross-competing for 
more influence, can cope less and less effectively with the emerging influence originating 
in other large countries (or groups of countries) of the world. The lack of a common strategy 
towards China, Russia, Latin america – let alone the USa – represents a major barrier to the 
full exercise of Europe’s economic (and potential political) weight in the global arena.
additional gaps can be identified: the quality and speed of the community level decision-
making process. There is a serious challenge to streamlining European institutions, legisla-
tion and procedures.
The SBH Trio Presidency will face three fundamental challenges:
 Crisis management, including exit strategies and the handling of the financial, social  •
and probably also ideological consequences of the crisis and its management,
 Re-emerging global issues (e.g. migration, energy, international stability, monetary  •
issues, etc.),
 The development of European integration, including a new balance between deepening  •
and widening.
although with different urgency, all of them will shape the SBH Trio Presidency.
From crisis management to exit strategies
The global crisis has not ended, even if the main part of the financial crisis seems to be over. The 
unfolding of the macroeconomic crisis has sent rather contradictory signals, both regarding 
recovery and also the possibility of new risks and a potential negative turn. Moreover, the 
social crisis, as a result of the macroeconomic downturn and the collapse of international 
trade, is likely to deepen during the SBH co-Presidency. Finally, an ideological and political 
crisis may be unfolding, as an unfortunate but inevitable accompanying factor of the deep 
economic recession. It could entail growing anti-global, anti-EU, anti-capital sentiments as 
well as nationalism and xenophobia. In order to avoid the real danger that the post-crisis 
environment of Europe will be quite different from the pre-crisis environment, immediate 
action is necessary across the EU, both at European and member states’ levels.
Bruegel has contributed to the discussion on the European exit strategy. It envisages five 
main actions to be phased in over time. First, the identification and recapitalisation of stil 
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ailing banks must be completed, with a clear phasing-out schedule for state support. Second, 
member states should adopt medium-term sustainable budget plans to be implemented 
from 2011. Third, monetary policy should remain as supportive as possible (keeping interest 
rates low). Fourth, the planned European Systemic Risk Board should become operational in 
summer 2010. Finally, an ad-hoc reinforced consultation mechanism must be set up in order 
to ensure the necessary coordination of emergence between member states, and in consulta-
tion with central banks (for a period of 2.5 years but renewable once). 
These measures aim at addressing the consequences of the crisis – one that has already 
resulted in huge budget deficits and rapidly growing public debt in most of the EU, not least 
in the eurozone. The proposed strategy emphasises the need for strengthened coordina-
tion in exceptional circumstances, over and above what is called for by the Stability and 
Growth Pact.
The SBH Trio Presidency will take place at a period of abnormally high budget deficit and 
increasing public indebtedness. available instruments to reverse negative developments 
include:
 Substantial cuts in budget expenditures (with inevitable consequences for welfare  •
spending – a rather difficult step in a period of deepening social crisis),
 Tax increases (potentially threatening even modest economic growth), •
 Making use of inflation to liquidate large part of the outstanding debt (a possible  •
scenario in the US but a less likely one in the EU),
 Spreading the costs of the crisis over a longer period (this, however would mean a  •
partial redistribution of the costs to the younger generation)
None of the responses at hand is thus without adverse consequences and all are bound 
to result in severe economic and political difficulties. The role of the Presidency and the 
Commission will be to trigger adjustment, to help mitigate the adverse effects of it, and to 
avoid that divergences in the speed and nature of the responses give rise to intra-EU tensions. 
It is by no means an easy task.
The EU-27 is unlikely to be able to return to its pre-crisis growth path in the next few years. 
although (sharply) negative growth rates may be overcome in 2010-2011, overall growth will be 
insufficient to offset the fall in output and may remain sluggish. In addition, pre-crisis growth 
and catching-up in new (and potential) members will be seriously affected, even according to 
the most optimistic scenario. While enlargement could be considered a major success story 
prior to the crisis, the continued development of the new member states can no longer be 
taken for granted, especially in countries that relied extensively on foreign savings under a 
fixed exchange rate regime.
One of the most difficult situations to be faced by the EU and the member states is that of 
the labour market. While labour shedding has been avoided in most EU countries (with the 
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exceptions of Spain and some of the new member states, especially the Baltic countries), 
adjustment has now started and subdued growth is unlikely to reverse it in the short-term.
What, in effect, will probably be done is some form of redistribution of jobs among more people 
(through, e.g., the promotion of part-time contracts). Since unemployment (and high inactivi-
ty) rates are unlikely to be reduced during the SBH Trio Presidency period, active labour market 
policies will need to be promoted without jeopardising Europe’s global competitiveness. In 
this context, the SBH Trio Presidency could produce a feasibility study identifying the pros and 
cons of a future-oriented employment strategy, including its potential financial burden.
a last issue is the functioning of the single market. Government’s interventions, starting 
from the bailing-out of banks through substantial financial injections into selected sectors 
(mainly the car industry with its cross-industry implications) and the saving of many jobs, did 
not generate fundamental restructuring or the creation of future-oriented job opportunities. 
On the contrary, it seems in some cases to have consolidated vested interests and unviable 
structures. The new engines of growth are yet to be seen and their emergence may be delayed 
by dysfunctional capital and labour markets. as a consequence, Europe’s relative loss of 
weight and dynamism in comparison to China and other emerging economies will continue, 
and the shift of the global growth pole(s) away from Europe risks being accentuated.
The Eu and global challenges
International trade has started recovering and is likely to recover further in 2010 and 2011, 
provided trade protectionism remains contained as it has been so far. However, China is 
expected to become the leading export nation even if it successfully rebalances its growth 
model. This rise of emerging countries should not be taken as a threat. It will not jeopardise 
the EU’s ability to play a global role in international trade discussions, but will create more 
balanced power relations, with growing weight for the emerging economies. Limitations to 
the EU’s power and influence are in fact more internal than external.
International capital flows may also recover but a different pattern is likely to emerge. FDI 
can be expected to become a genuine two-way street. The EU has to adapt to the fact that it is 
not only European companies that are allowed to invest in rapidly growing markets, such as 
China, India, Russia, Brazil, etc., but also Chinese, Indian, Russian, or Latin american capital 
that may look at the EU as a promising location for their direct investments.
Europe will face serious challenges in the task of restructuring international economic and 
financial organisations. a sustainable solution for the global crisis does not only need a 
prudent and internationally accepted regulatory framework but also institutional restructur-
ing that takes into account the current (and partly future) changes in the global balance of 
power. The challenge for Europe is twofold: 
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 First, it should aim at preparing the ground for a common, EU-level representation and  •
interest implementation (enforcement) in the leading international organisations. The 
aggregate weight of EU members will be reduced across the board, since more space 
and weight has to be given to emerging global players. But Europe will not necessar-
ily be on the losing side if it can act as a community. For instance, even in the case that 
the voting share of EU member states in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were 
to shrink substantially, if there were an EU-level representation the EU could easily 
acquire the largest voting share in this organisation, probably on par with the US. In 
this context, a lot depends on the integration capability and willingness of the member 
countries (mainly the large ones).
 Second, the G20, a necessary but only the first step to reckon with ‘new global  •
realities,’ could be used by the EU to create a genuinely multipolar global system with 
strong EU positions. The first signs do not confirm this direction. Even if talks of a 
G2 are exaggerated in view of the difficulties of involving China in global governance, 
the US-China relationship has undoubtedly gained considerable strategic importance. 
and the question is absolutely justified: where is Europe in this game and what should 
Europe’s role be? In this context, the urgent task of defining the ‘mission of Europe’ in 
the 21st century emerges. It must not be missed in the Trio Presidency agenda.
a number of other global issues determining global development or substantially affecting 
Europe’s future must be dealt with in more detail. Environment and climate change will be 
a constant component of the SBH Trio Presidency. additional issues waiting for a clear (or 
clarified) position at the community level include energy security, a common migration policy, 
instruments and implementation forms of the EU’s ‘soft power’ in current and potential future 
international conflicts, etc.
Internal development of European integration
although practically all global issues mentioned in the previous chapter have an obvious 
impact on the future of the EU, some internal developments have to be addressed by the 
Trio Presidency as well. (Ceteris paribus, they would have an effect on the EU’s global 
position as well.)
Beyond any doubt, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is a fundamental step in creating 
the institutional and legal framework for a more active EU, despite a number of barriers that 
remain and, more importantly, due to the still growing gap between the decision-making 
process of the EU and that in major competing countries / regions (it should not be forgotten 
that the ratified Lisbon Treaty mainly contains changes that are based on the global reality 
a decade ago and certainly well before the crisis; it has to be seen to which extent the Treaty 
will be able to cope with or adjust itself to the new and rapidly changing global realities). 
What is now urgently required is twofold. First, the rapid and unrestricted implementation 
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of the Treaty (‘institutional deepening’); and second, the narrowing of the gap between 
widening and deepening, mainly in certain key economic policy areas of the EU (internal 
market, labour market, social issues). It must be emphasised that, with the exception of the 
big-bang enlargement, the decades-long enlargement process of European integration was 
always preceded by an ongoing process of deepening (common trade policy at the time of 
the British accession, Delors’s single market programme during the Mediterranean enlarge-
ment, or the EMU at the time of the accession of three small and developed countries in 1995. 
The ‘integration vacuum’ created by the lack of the necessary deepening before the enlarge-
ment in 2004 (and 2007) must be filled, without stopping further enlargement – an issue on 
the SBH Trio Presidency agenda. However, this agenda must be more balanced and put more 
emphasis on the process of deepening. The new institutional framework and, hopefully, the 
management of the post-crisis situation will be able to generate the critical minimum of a 
breakthrough in this field.
Final remarks
Considering:
 The rapidly changing global environment, the impact of the crisis on different geo- •
graphic areas and on different economic and social structures in the world,
 as well as the looming medium- and longer-term challenges, •
 Plus recent intra-EU developments, •
the SBH Trio Presidency should launch a major Europe-wide campaign, involving a large 
number of citizens, on the following issues:
 How to define ‘European values’ and ‘identity’ in the 21 • st century,
 Based on such values (and deficiencies or shortcomings), identify the strong and weak  •
points of Europe in the changing global setting,
 Define the key issues of ‘Europe’s mission’ (much more than the outdated formulation  •
of finalité politique) in the emerging new global balance-of-power game,
 Finally, the clarification of instruments, institutional forms, international or regional  •
cooperation schemes (including temporary or lasting alliances), timing and sequenc-
ing (and intra-EU leadership) of implementing the main objectives of such a ‘mission’.
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Crisis Calls for Greater EU Cohesion  
to Manage Globalisation
Adam Jasser Member of the Board, Director of Programmes, demosEUROPa
T he need for economic and financial policy coordination in Europe and globally is going to be even greater in the post-crisis environment than during the French and Czech Presidencies, when the crisis hit with full strength and forced initially disor-
ganised public authorities into an unprecedented global response to shore up the financial 
sector. The crisis provided the ultimate, painful evidence that globalisation has taken deep 
root in the world and that no market, no region or individual country can claim immunity to 
large-scale economic disruptions taking place anywhere on the globe. The myth of ‘decou-
pling’ between mature and developing economies, between old and emerging powers has 
been consigned to the garbage bin. Multilateral dependencies between saving and deficit 
nations, the transnational character of trade and financial flows have made the argument for 
strengthening global governance more compelling than ever. Hence the role of G20, the World 
Trade Oraganisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is likely to continue 
growing in the years ahead. The challenge for the EU is going to be how to translate the bloc’s 
combined economic strength into political clout and maximise its influence on decisions and 
policies designed by the G20 and other international bodies. The broad representation of 
European powers at such bodies is just an illusion of influence because it is not backed by a 
vigorous common stance. The forging of such a common stance should become a prime task 
for the new President of the European Council, the High Representative and President of the 
euro group as well as the Commission and the ECB. The rotating Presidency should have an 
auxiliary role in the process.
Redesigning global finance:  
Eu needs inward reform and external action
a major task around the world is how to redesign the financial sector, the malfunctioning 
of which was an important cause of the crisis. Following the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh in 
September 2009, there is a consensus among leading developed and emerging economies 
that financial sector regulation will need to increase substantially in the coming years. 
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The debate about specific measures focuses on closer and more coordinated supervision, 
limits on derivatives, and basic design of the financial system that could reduce opportuni-
ties for excessive risk-taking. The last part is particularly challenging. The basic moral and 
economic dilemma of policy-makers in Europe and elsewhere is between, on one hand, the 
need to prevent a financial system collapse and restore normal credit action for businesses 
and, on the other, allowing the financial sector to return to bad old ways on the back of the 
generous capital injections and liquidity provision by public institutions. The former could 
nip the recovery in the bud, while the latter creates a sense of impunity or moral hazard 
which could result in another asset bubble and another, more painful recession. The way 
out of this dilemma seems to be a gradual shift away from thinking which holds that there 
are financial institutions in Europe and the United States that are too big to fail. To quote 
Professor Robert Wade of the London School of Economics: “If a bank gets to be too big to 
fail – that is, where it has an assurance that the government will bail it out – then it is too 
big to exist”. One idea making the rounds in Europe and the United States is to return to a 
strict division of financial institutions into ‘plain vanilla’, or utility banking (based on deposit 
gathering) and investment banking (based on arbitrage and risk-taking for maximum profit). 
Critics argue that this may lead to over-regulation and arbitrary decisions on where classic 
banking ends and investment banking begins. as a way forward they point instead to higher 
capital and reserves requirements as a means of restricting the financial sector’s tendency 
to over-leverage. another aspect worth taking into account is the attachment of policy-mak-
ers to maintaining interest rates close to zero. Central banks are gradually withdrawing the 
extra liquidity measures that sustained the financial system, but only a few have had the 
courage to actually hint at higher rates. But a higher cost of capital remains a key tool for pre-
venting excessive borrowing. The trouble is that as governments in Europe and the United 
States struggle with growing fiscal deficits, they are interested in low borrowing rates for 
themselves. The three EU Presidencies – all in the hands of heavily indebted governments – 
may struggle to come clean on the trade-off inherent in this approach: lower rates may help 
finance the budget deficits but they also provide an incentive to investors to borrow cheaply 
and seek higher returns, which can easily re-inflate asset and commodity bubbles. There 
is some evidence of such bubbles building up already and unless this trend is moderated 
soon, there is a potential for another major market disruption and a double-dip recession. 
The 3rd November recommendation by the outgoing Commission that the fiscal and monetary 
stimuli be reeled in during 2011 is a point of departure for more detailed discussions, and 
these may require strong leadership from the current Trio Presidency.
another major long-term challenge is the reform of the international monetary system. 
The world’s over-reliance on the dollar as a reserve currency means the corrective mecha-
nisms that normally affect a currency’s performance and adjust it to economic fundamen-
tals are distorted. This is aggravated by the over-representation of Western nations in the 
International Monetary Fund. although in theory the IMF could operate a new global currency 
that could reduce the world’s dependence on the dollar, it will not be able to perform this 
function without additional funds provided by rising economic powers such as China, India or 
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Brazil. But these countries are reluctant to engage in what they see as an institution serving 
the interests of Western powers. The current Trio Presidency, working closely with the now 
normalised Eurogroup and the Commission, should take the lead in working towards a major 
rebalancing of the IMF’s voting power (as recommended by the G20 meeting in September) in 
favour of emerging economies, even if this is at the expense of individual EU member states. 
The fact that the current Trio Presidency is held by small and medium-sized EU players should 
be encouraging in this respect, provided that they take a sufficiently broad view and engage 
closely with at least one of the big EU players which stand to lose out. France, Germany and 
Britain together have over 15% of IMF votes compared to China’s 3.7%. another way to a more 
diversified monetary system is to maintain pressure on China to liberalise its currency regime, 
something the Commission but also the Council will need to keep in mind as global imbalances 
refuse to correct themselves. The limited international exchangeability of the yuan as well 
as its tightly controlled exchange rate are major hurdles for the Chinese currency’s ability 
to serve as another reserve currency. This paradoxically reinforces China’s dependence on 
investing its huge savings in loans to the US government. The EU will need to engage the 
Chinese more vigorously alongside the United States in talks on the global currency regime, 
to ensure a fairer and more balanced pattern of trade and to help secure a new trade lib-
eralisation deal. This is a diplomatic task for all key players, including the Chairman of the 
Eurogroup (institutionally formalised under the Lisbon Treaty), and the Presidents of the 
European Council, European Commission and European Central Bank.
The Eurogroup, hopefully with the support of the Presidencies, faces another challenge – the 
euro’s difficulty in becoming an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. There are two 
main reasons for this: the fragmentation and lack of adequate liquidity in the EU’s sovereign 
bond market (aggravated by Britain’s self-banishment from the eurozone), and insufficient 
political and fiscal coordination in the eurozone. The fluctuations and disparity in bond 
spreads between Germany, other eurozone members, the UK and new member states which 
remain outside the euro area is a constant drag on the euro’s credibility. However, the EU has 
the potential to gradually enhance the currency’s appeal. a crucial element in this should be 
to shore-up internal coordination and the EU’s ability to react to internal shocks. It was dis-
concerting in late 2008 and early 2009 to see the EU almost dormant in addressing the sudden 
capital stop experienced by poorer EU nations. The eurozone laggards were offered tentative 
support, which helped them weather the storm, but the non-euro nations of Central Europe 
found themselves confronted with a monetary form of the old Iron Curtain. although the 
worst-hit economies received balance-of-payment support from the EU, for many observers 
it seemed like a throwback to the early days of post-communist reforms when the IMF rather 
than the Commission, the ECB or the European Council took the driving seat. Protectionist 
impulses of some leading eurozone politicians who sought to attach national strings to gov-
ernment bailouts of banks and other forms of support for companies did nothing to boost 
confidence in the European project. The Czech Presidency bravely sought to resist both 
the protectionism and the over-simplistic perception of the risks in Central Europe. aided 
by other newcomers, notably the recession-resistant Poland, the Czechs managed to put 
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together enough critical mass to get the message across to EU partners and markets, but 
their ability to follow through was limited due to domestic political instability culminating 
in the collapse of the government in the middle of the Presidency. The subsequent Swedish 
Presidency saw the situation calm down thanks to modest signs of recovery but the topic of 
eurozone’s internal cohesion is set to come back as the EU designs its post-crisis strategy. 
The opening of the EU’s new political cycle, crowned by the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, is providing policy-makers with an opportunity to consolidate the eurozone. The new 
German government’s plan to ease taxes and not to rush with fiscal consolidation aligns the 
eurozone’s largest economy closer with France, boosting chances of a more coordinated exit 
strategy. If this is coupled with a credible plan of reviving the Growth and Stability Pact as 
well as credibly extending the eurozone further east, the euro is bound to consolidate its 
position. One factor which could take the euro closer to a reserve currency status would be to 
return to discussions about the EU becoming an independent issuer of bonds, thus creating 
a pool of liquidity directly linked to the currency. So far the idea has received a very cool 
reception from Germany, which fears that such bonds would amount to an easy way out for 
recalcitrant budgetary offenders such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, at the expense 
of more disciplined eurozone members. Eurozone outsiders in Central Europe are also loath 
to the idea, fearing they would be left out in the cold in the crowded sovereign credit market. 
yet, the idea seems worth revisiting in the context of the next EU budget. One possibility is 
that the budget contains a reserve fund for dealing with internal shocks, financed through 
EU borrowing in the market. The fund could also be used for financing clearly pan-European 
projects such as on energy security and climate change, and could be offset by a mechanism 
under which eurozone members would limit their domestic borrowing in proportion to EU 
level borrowing. a stronger mechanism for monitoring compliance with the Growth and 
Stability Pact is provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, but work should begin on enforcement. a 
determined Presidency could begin such discussions during 2010 in the run-up to the likely 
coordinated push for exit from stimulus and discussions on the next financial perspective, 
both set to take place in 2011.
Combine carbon tax debate with doha round
International trade has been one of the biggest casualties of the crisis. The Doha round of WTO 
talks aiming to further liberalise trade has been largely marooned, with an increasing number 
of diplomats expecting that the 2011 deadline for a deal may need to be pushed back. Despite 
a body of evidence suggesting trade liberalisation would aid the global recovery, many gov-
ernments are treading water, fearing the impact on their domestic industries. The shifting 
global economic landscape and the uncertain future of the post-Kyoto deal on combating 
climate change are additional impediments in the trade talks. The growing debate on the 
global carbon tax, which the European Commission sees as one way to finance the climate 
change adaptation of developing nations, should be dealt with in the WTO context even if this 
could cause further delay in the talks. Here the role of the EU Presidency could be comple-
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mentary to the Commission’s WTO negotiating mandate. The lack of a binding agreement at 
Copenhagen in December 2009 reinforces the case for such an approach going forward. The 
reasons to include the carbon tax in the Doha negotiations are good even though there are a 
number of respectable voices arguing the opposite. angel Gurria, head of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), said recently that “the danger is that 
arguments over border (carbon) taxes could make an agreement (in the Doha round) even 
more difficult to negotiate. There is no need for this distraction, as fears about the potential 
impact of leakage and loss of competitiveness are exaggerated”. He has a point. The devel-
oping nations are generally expecting the EU and the United States to lower barriers on agri-
cultural products and reduce subsidies to their farm sectors. In return they are prepared to 
open up to non-farm goods exports from the developed nations. The exact formula and scale 
of liberalisation on both sides remain sticking points and would be further complicated by 
the carbon tax, which – unlike the emission trading schemes – would apply to transport and 
farming goods. yet, in reality, it is misleading to separate international trade from the push 
to make global industry (producing tradable goods) more environment-friendly and energy 
efficient. In the same way as global currency imbalances distort trade by giving a de facto 
unfair competitive advantage to some countries, carbon-intensive industries enjoy a similar 
advantage over industries which are switching over to low-carbon technologies. If the EU 
genuinely wants to play a leading role in combating climate change, it should design a formula 
linking farm trade liberalisation with making the carbon tax universally accepted.
Fewer Europeans, more Europe in international bodies
The Lisbon Treaty bears a promise of making Europe’s voice on the global scene more 
coherent. Both the President of the European Council and the High Representative will have 
the capacity to represent the Union in external relations. The Presidency will from now on 
have a more auxiliary role in presenting the EU’s views to the outside world. However, it has a 
significant role to play in creating the internal EU unity that is necessary to give the new posts 
a strong influence. The logical next step is for the EU to rethink its representation in key world 
governance bodies. The issue of EU over-representation at the IMF and the need to rebalance 
the voting power at the Fund has already been discussed and it seems some progress there 
is possible. One way to move things forward would be to break with the tradition that the top 
IMF job always goes to a European. If Europe wants to see greater engagement of emerging 
powers in global monetary governance, backing an asian, possibly Indian, candidate to 
succeed Dominique Strauss-Kahn would be a gamble worth taking. It would bear witness 
to Europe’s seriousness in seeking a more balanced, multi-polar global order, and would 
display Europe’s trademark model of consensus-building on the world stage.
Whereas the outside pressures for IMF reform create an incentive for Europeans to act, the 
European representation at the G20 and on the UN Security Council is a much trickier issue. 
yet the establishment of the President of the European Council and High Representative could 
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offer a much-needed stimulus to revisit the issue. Regarding the G20, the EU should seriously 
consider a much leaner representation. at the moment, six EU nations sit in the G20 meetings 
– France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. The last two have sneaked into 
the group on dubious grounds. The benefits of such wide representation of Europeans are 
hard to find, apart from creating a feel-good factor in some capitals. The argument that it 
is better to have more people voicing the European point of view is misguided – who wants 
the same message repeated six times in one meeting? Negative effects are more tangible. It 
creates yet another division line in Europe, with new member states in particular feeling that 
they have been short-changed and deprived of influence on the G20 agenda. To the outsiders, 
the plethora of Europeans at the table is symbolic of Europe’s inconsistency. On the one hand, 
it shows that European nations still harbour an ambition to dominate the global agenda 
despite their shrinking individual power, and on the other it shows the inability of Europeans 
to pool resources, reach internal consensus and speak with a single voice. This state of 
affairs reinforces the perception that Europe is satisfied with appearances of influence rather 
than real power. To illustrate the point: even if Europeans actually reach a consensus on an 
issue discussed by the G20, as they did before Pittsburgh, will all the six EU representatives 
deliver the same speech or will each try to be original, muddling the message as a result? 
How quickly will some of the partners at the table stop listening to yet another European, or 
will they all listen attentively to spot rifts in the allegedly unified EU stance? and what if the 
EU is indeed divided on an issue – does it benefit the bloc to paper over the divisions in the 
run-up to the G20 only to put them on display during the meeting? One way or the other, this 
is no way to do serious business, avoid irrelevance and win the respect of partners. The insti-
tutional changes provided by the Lisbon Treaty should therefore be used as an opportunity 
to radically overhaul the system. The G20 should be purged of all national European repre-
sentation and replaced by the Trio of the President of the European Council, the Commission 
President and the ECB. This would force the EU to seek genuine internal consensus around 
consistent policies. The paradox is that such a smaller European representation, speaking 
with a single voice, would enhance rather than reduce European influence. It would certainly 
be welcomed by the United States and could boost Washington’s appetite for a closer coordi-
nation with the EU on global governance issues. The prospect of a world increasingly run by a 
G2 comprising the United States and China (with Europe, India, Brazil and Russia in the back 
seat) could thus materialise as a G3, in which Europe would wield political influence consis-
tent with its economic clout.
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The Post-Crisis Financial Market agenda
Karel lannoo Chief Executive Officer, CEPS
The post-crisis financial market agenda
The EU is in the midst of a fundamental institutional and regulatory overhaul in response to 
the financial crisis. This process is primarily driven by domestic agendas, but G20 commit-
ments also come into play. Following the de Larosière report, the Council acted rapidly with 
the endorsement of the new institutional structure in December 2009, as proposed by the 
European Commission. after adoption by the European Parliament, the main task ahead is 
to make the new structure work. On the regulatory side, a huge agenda lies ahead, covering 
the upgrade of prudential, conduct of business and product rules. Many decisions await the 
incoming European Commission, although the EU Council of finance ministers has already 
taken a clear line. a tight coordination with the G20 in general and the US in particular is needed 
to counter concerns in the financial sector about regulatory overkill and an uneven playing field. 
In addition, market mechanisms must be respected and, as much as possible, stimulated.
The de Larosière follow-up
The new structure brings a sea change in financial supervision in the EU. at the top is the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will give general risk warnings and recom-
mendations on specific risks. It will specify the procedures to be followed by the European 
Supervisory authorities (ESa) to act upon its recommendations. The ESas will have the 
powers to enact standards and to control their implementation. They will ensure large cross-
border financial groups are adequately supervised through their participation in supervisory 
colleges. all new legislative measures are regulations, hence they will be directly applicable, 
and do not need to be transposed into national law. a political agreement on the different 
measures was reached in the EU Council in December 2009 under the Swedish Presidency. 
The readings by the European Parliament are not expected to change the proposals much, as 
the legislature is largely in favour of the new structure.
The ESRB will only be consultative, but is supposed to derive its authority from its reputation 
and expertise. It will be run by the European Central Bank (ECB) and largely composed of EU 
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central bankers, with limited participation of the supervisors, and only one representative of 
the Council of EU finance ministers. The ESas on the other hand will have legal personality, and 
the power to impose binding agreements to effectively coordinate supervision of cross-border 
groups and structures. However, such decisions may not impinge upon the fiscal responsibili-
ties of the member states, hence the fact that the powers to liquidate a cross-border bank will 
remain at the home-country level, in cooperation with the respective host countries.
The changes which are being discussed in the US (House act of 11 December 2009) are 
different from the EU in that they leave the powers at the macro-prudential level largely with 
the Secretary of the Treasury, who will chair the Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), 
which brings together the different supervisory authorities and the Federal Reserve. On the 
micro-prudential side, the institutional changes in the US comprise the merger of the two 
banking supervisory authorities OCC (Options Clearing Corporation) and OTS (Office of Third 
Supervision), and the creation of a federal insurance authority and a consumer financial pro-
tection agency. They stop short, at least for the moment, of going towards a more radical 
restructuring.
The main challenge for the EU is to make the new structures work. This task is for the ESRB 
more of a conceptual nature: what are macro-prudential risks, and how will it act once these 
risks have been identified? For the ESas, the challenge is more of an operational and organi-
sational nature: how to cope with the enormous workload ahead. EU policy makers will have 
to monitor whether the job division between the ESRB and ESas is clear-cut, and eventual-
ly intervene to clarify the distinction between macro and micro-prudential supervision. as 
for the ESas, policy makers will need to further clarify their tasks: what is a single rulebook, 
and how will this be enacted? What will be the division of responsibilities between the EU 
Commission and the ESas in the enforcement of rules? Will member states accept formal 
mediation between supervisors by the ESas? a prioritisation in the workload of the ESas by 
the EU Council Presidencies and Commission will thus be welcome.
The regulatory agenda
The agenda for the incoming Barroso II Commission has already been set, but many decisions 
need to be taken. The crisis revealed important shortcomings in the regulatory framework, to 
the extent that a core principle of the single market, the single passport and home country 
control, was called into question. To restore this principle, the European Commission will 
have to engage in moving towards a much higher degree of harmonisation in certain areas – 
a more European approach and less reliance on member state systems – and stricter enforce-
ment. The workload could be subdivided into:
 Prudential rules • : further modifications to the capital requirements directive, as further 
to the December 2009 proposals of the Basel Committee; further harmonisation of 
deposit protection schemes or the creation of an EU-wide fund; prudential rules for 
clearing and settlement systems;
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 Product rules: •  more harmonisation of financial products, i.e. hedge funds (alternative 
investment funds), mortgage loans; an EU regime for retail investment products;
 Conduct rules: •  stricter rules for transactions in certain products, such as OTC deriv-
atives; better control of transparency and equality of access to securities markets; 
tighter penalisation of market abuse; remuneration rules.
Following the EU’s 1993 deposit protection directive, three different schemes of protection 
co-exist: the protection offered by the home country (applicable to the head offices and its 
branches or through free provision of services), the protection offered the host country (where 
the bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank) and the home country scheme ‘topped up’ with the 
level offered by the host country (where the level of protection for a branch operating in the 
host country is lower than that of its home country). Until the crisis broke out, an overwhelming 
majority of consumers was not aware of the consequential differences in protection schemes. 
In the midst of the crisis, the member states provisionally agreed in the EU Council to increase 
the minimum levels to €50,000, but did not change the basics of the 1993 EU directive, nor the 
method of funding or the statute of the national deposit protection schemes. The European 
Commission will need to decide soon in the second Barroso Commission on how to reform the 
system for the long-term. In the interest of the single market, it will need to decide to create a 
European-wide fund, analogous to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of the US, but 
this will undoubtedly lead to acrimonious discussions with the member states.
Other elements will need to be reformed to get consumers back on board of the single market. 
Mortgage lending, for example, is not subject to any degree of EU harmonisation, whereas 
(short-term) consumer lending is. although mortgage lending is about 9 times more important 
than other forms of consumer credit, a consultation in 2007 concluded that the different 
forms of national legislation seemed to work well enough, and that there was no immediate 
need for European harmonisation. However, principles such as responsible lending and loan-
to-value ratios could well be harmonised and enforced at European level, as lax mortgage 
lending standards in one member state have European-wide implications.
a related priority for the incoming European Commission is to continue to stimulate self-reg-
ulation. The principle may have been discredited in the crisis, but it is an illusion to believe 
that everything can be regulated and controlled by public authorities. Strengthening the role 
and clout of standard setters and self-regulatory organisations is a part of a well-functioning 
enforcement system.
apart from the regulatory agenda, the Barroso II Commission will also have to continue the 
work of applying the EU’s state aid rules to the financial sector. This work led to the first 
results in November 2009, with the first Commission decisions on state-aided banks, such 
as ING and KBC, but many more are in the pipeline. It will be important to examine how the 
Commission will enforce the Treaty rules to maintain an integrated financial market, and 
which principles will be applied.
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Recommendations
Post-crisis, the EU will have to ensure that all the commitments taken during the crisis are 
respected and lead to effective change, as much in the new institutional structure of super-
vision as in rule-making and enforcement. The pressure is already widespread to return to 
business as usual in the financial sector, but with this financial crisis having cost about 11% 
of the EU’s GDP according to the European Commission, a fundamental change is imperative. 
This is also in the interest of the EU, since Eurobarometer surveys indicate that EU citizens’ 
trust in the EU institutions was badly damaged during the crisis, and demand for stronger 
statutory regulation has increased. Policy makers will thus need to take utmost care that the 
lessons of the crisis are not forgotten.
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in the SBH Trio Presidency
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Towards the new multilateral regionalised world order
In the tough global competition of the early 21st century, which includes conflicting efforts at 
global governance, the main issue for the EU is globalisation-cum-regionalisation – namely the 
regionalisation of its neighbourhood as a special kind of the EU ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’. 
Due to its subsequent enlargements, parallel with its own internal regionalisation, the EU has 
restructured the political space in its increasing ‘near abroad’ and it has generated external 
regionalisation around the EU. Rightly so, since a ‘new multilateral regionalised world order’ 
has been emerging and the EU as a global actor can only be successful if organises its own 
regionalised neighbourhood. Europe as a soft, civilian power can only play a leading role in 
the new global governance and world order when and if it organises a special relationship as a 
means of stabilisation in the West Balkans, as well as in the neighbouring Eastern and Southern 
mega-regions. The main principle of regionalisation for the EU is ‘integrative balancing’. 
Integrative balancing means empowering the unequal ‘external’ partners by applying the part-
nership principle in the process of widening, through which the neighbour states are to be inte-
grated into the common policy-making process at all levels. Integrative balancing implies a 
sense of partnership with a balancing mechanism by which the relatively weaker partners are 
empowered, thereby creating synergy by optimally representing common interests.
Globalisation has generated regionalisation at four levels:
 Mega-regions  • embracing continent-size territories of several countries like the EU, 
NaFTa and aSEaN, or the ‘East’ and ‘South’ around the EU; the dominating trend in the 
global system has been their interaction and competition with the entry of the mega-
region-sized great powers into the global competition, like the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China).
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 Macro-regions  • containing some countries within the EU, like the Nordic Region or 
Central Europe; this regionalisation will be a continued process in and around the 
enlarged EU – thus the West Balkan region, or Eastern Europe proper (Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine); South Caucasus (armenia, azerbaijan and Georgia) are also emerging 
macro-regions, like the North african and Middle East macro-regions in the South.
 Meso-regions  • like the sub-national regions (NUTS2) in the EU member states and the 
corresponding territorial units of other states; they can also cooperate intensively 
with the proper regional partners across borders and they usually strive for some kind 
of autonomy / self-governance within their states.
 Micro-regions  • like the smaller sub-national territorial units (NUTS3, or earlier NUTS4, 
now LaU1) in the EU with their trans-border organisations (for instance euro-regions 
and / or territorial cooperation); again, they can establish strong ties across the state 
borders, or even across the borders of macro- and mega-regions.
Multilateral regionalisation as widening and deepening of the ENP
The EU Neighbourhood Policy needs its own ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ to fill the obvious 
gap in the EU’s planning for its neighbourhood. Widening in this respect means the geograph-
ical extension of partial / sectoral European governance, and deepening presupposes the 
better extended governance with a more differentiated institutional system for more policies. 
The ENP has been so far a series of the ad hoc reactions to the emerging conflict situations 
in an increasing number of neighbours instead of a proactive project with a coherent vision 
for the Neighbourhood Policy. The development of widening, like the efforts for extended 
European governance, has taken place in three main stages. These three efforts for creating 
the Southern, Northern and Eastern Dimensions came together in the late 1990s and influ-
enced the emergence of the ENP document on 12 May 2004. Since then, beyond the basic 
convergence, this mega-regional competition and tension between East and South has also 
re-emerged. For its part, in april 2008 the European Commission formulated “the need for 
an increased visibility of the European Neighbourhood Policy to advance ownership of the 
reform process, and to underpin the EU’s support for its neighbours as they come closer to 
the Union. (…) Within the EU, the importance of strengthening relations with our neighbours 
has moved closer to the centre of the policy debate”.
In order to make the ENP manageable given this tremendous heterogeneity, it would be 
necessary to separate the ENP into two regional organisations or units, under a larger common 
umbrella. First, to create symmetry between its two parts, some kind of an ‘EU-Eastern 
European Union’ (in brief Eastern Union) would also need to be established in parallel with 
the Mediterranean Union (in brief Med Union). There are three reasons to organise these 
two separated ‘Unions’. First, as the above Communication of the Commission has also 
explained, there is a large “political, economic and cultural diversity among ENP partners”. 
Therefore it would be better to have a more differentiated institutional framework according 
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to the existing separation of association agreements (aa) in the South from the Partnership 
and Cooperation agreements (PCa) in the East. This would enable the East to move forward 
towards the planned ‘deep’ and comprehensive free trade area as a core element of the New 
Enhanced agreement (NEa). Second, the intra-regional cooperation has to be intensified 
in both mega-regions as “promoting regional integration beyond the borders of the Union”, 
but the ‘deepening’ of the ENP presupposes the separation of South and East according to 
their regional specificities. This will allow also the fine-tuning of the sectoral policies, since 
these sectoral policies still are, and must be even more, mega- and macro-region-specific. 
Third, although the enlargement to the Eastern Europe proper is not yet on the agenda in the 
foreseeable future, still the constitutional situation in these two mega-regions is basically 
different, since the South has no European perspective and the East has a virtual European 
perspective. The separation of the Eastern and Southern ENP-type of ‘widening’ policies 
could allow for a more accentuated separation of the Western Balkans (WB) ‘enlargement’ 
policies.
Under the pressure of global crisis, and as a result of the long-term preparation process, 
the EU has taken a further step in transforming its own global environment with the Eastern 
Partnership (ENP-EaP). The main actors in promoting of the EaP have been Germany, Poland 
and Sweden, since the ‘old’ Baltic cooperation and the ‘new’ Northern Dimension initia-
tives have been culminating in this new project. The other East-Central European (ECE) 
member states are not major players, since their main interest is the WB integration, and 
they have made initiatives in this field (see the Slovenian Presidency). This does not mean 
that they do not support the EaP initiative. On the contrary, they do so very actively, as the 
Czech Presidency proves. The EaP is high on the agenda for them too, because of the new 
key issues for the EU – especially since energy security and the promotion of democracy 
(with the decline of democracy in Russia) have recently come to the fore. The widening 
policy towards the East, meaning Ukraine firstly, is important also for the ECE countries, 
both positively (trade, culture, minority issues) and negatively (migration, crime and black-
market labour). Therefore, Hungary plans to continue the EaP initiatives from the Czech 
Presidency during its Trio Presidency with Spain and Belgium, and to retain momentum in 
order to hand these over successfully in 2011 to the next rotating presidency, Poland.
For the whole structure of the EU moving to the East, the European Council decided on 20 
March 2009 about the Eastern Partnership. On 10 June 2009 the Baltic Strategy was formu-
lated in the Commission document, and the June 2009 European Council “welcomed the 
launch of the Eastern Partnership”. It may be a breakthrough in the treatment of the six 
Eastern neighbours as well as in the institution-building policy of the EU. already in the 
Declaration attached to the March 2009 Presidency Conclusions the European Council invited 
the heads of states and governments of the new 27+6 partnership formation to a summit 
meeting on 7 May 2009 in Prague. The Declaration reorganises that the main objective of 
the ENP’s Eastern Dimension is “to create the necessary conditions for political associa-
tion and further economic integration between the European Union and Eastern partners” 
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by introducing ‘the principle of joint ownership’ and suggesting a ‘multilateral framework’ 
for regional cooperation. The most important message is that “the European Union’s 
Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes will help the participating countries to 
improve their administrative capacity”. In this spirit “the multilateral framework (…) should 
operate on a basis of joint decisions of EU member states and Eastern partners”. The Prague 
Summit has adopted a Joint Declaration on the Eastern Partnership by the participating 33 
states. Based on that Declaration there will be a summit of heads of states and govern-
ments once every two years, and the foreign ministers will meet once every year. after this 
basic turning point, introducing partnership at macro level, the elaboration of multi-level 
and multi-actor democracy can begin in the six Eastern partner states. Given the fact that 
the EaP is a Swedish-Polish common proposal, the Swedish Presidency has continued to 
push energetically for this initiative.
all in all, the shift of focus in the ENP from the South to the East has been an unavoidable 
process with the Eastern enlargement, since it has become necessary to develop new and 
more intensive contacts with the new neighbour states. as a result, it has also created 
tensions of necessity between the Southern and Eastern ENP directions, including their 
financing. These tensions have been increased by French efforts to transform the Barcelona 
process according to their tastes, which have produced new misunderstandings and con-
troversies. From the very beginning of the Eastern enlargement there have been overheat-
ed statements on “the dilution of the commitments of the EU towards the MEDa region” or 
about “the end of the Euro-Mediterranean vision”. The shift of the focus in ENP to the East 
should not mean that the EU neglects its commitment to the Med mega-region. On the 
contrary, it is the clear interest of all member states that the EU should provide enough 
support for the economic, social and cultural developments of the Med mega-region. 
Instead of victimising the Eastern ENP for the rebalancing of their relationships with the EU, 
those directly interested in the development of the Southern ‘Near abroad’ should inves-
tigate the internal obstacles slowing down the Barcelona process. The ‘modest results’ of 
the Barcelona process have occurred for three main reasons: (i) the failure of democrat-
ic conditionality in the South, (ii) the interference of the United States and (iii) the lack 
of horizontal or intra-regional cooperation of the states concerned. The removal of these 
obstacles to ENP deepening in the South is of great importance for the EU as a whole. Its 
delay is not due to any financial controversy, but to the growing uneasiness and reluctance 
of the Southern ENP partners towards further Europeanisation. Therefore the shift of focus 
in the ENP to the East has not done any harm to the South – on the contrary, the achieve-
ments in the East suggest new ideas for the widening in the South, too.
The functional regions (EbS and EdS) as flagships of regionalisation
The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EBS) and most recently the European 
Danube Strategy (EDS), and to some extent the Black Sea Synergy, have brought a turning 
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point in the EU regionalisation / widening policy as in terms of extended European gov-
ernance. The mega-regions in the East and South, as well as their macro-regions, can be 
described as large geographical-geopolitical units – but they are not functional units, since 
they have not been interconnected through some key policies. They hardly form real units 
because they have not became interdependent by the common functions of the economy 
oriented policies – or, taken in the wider meaning, they are not organised into one unit 
by development policy. Of course, the mega-regions (and even more their macro-regions) 
have their own traditional contacts and forms of cooperation, but usually these are not 
intensive enough and not made by ‘design’, i.e. not sufficiently planned and regulated, to 
form a functional macro-region. In fact, the first step was only taken ‘inside’ the EU by the 
EBS. The June 2009 Communication also claimed to show the model for the other function-
al macro-regions: “the area could be a model of regional cooperation, where new ideas and 
approaches can be tested and developed over time as best practice examples”.
Consequently, the regionalism has to be understood as a complex of parallel intra-region-
al and inter-regional, multidimensional and multilevel region-building processes based 
on a strategic design elaborated and agreed upon by the partners concerned with the 
spirit of integrative balancing that empowers all partners. Thus, the EBS goes very much 
beyond the simple territorial definition of the Baltic Sea area and it has been conceived as 
a project, involving bigger and smaller states in a common scheme as integrative balancing. 
The Baltic Sea cooperation occurred organically in its earlier institutions, but the EBS was 
much more, since it emerged ‘by design’. The strength of the EBS is that it has been built on 
the existing and well-functioning cooperation schemes – and that it has developed them 
further by a comprehensive strategic project. This project has also offered a perspective for 
the ‘outsiders’ —Norway and Iceland on one side and Russia on the other side— to intensify 
their cooperation in key policies, driven by their own direct interests. The Baltic Sea Region 
Strategy is a ‘bottom-up’ project, which starts from the existing policies, instead of the 
usual ‘top-down’ approaches in the EU, in which the EU suggests only general schemes 
that could be filled by concrete projects as action Programs, somewhat later if at all.
The strategic commitment of the EBS in the June 2009 document leads to the implemen-
tation of the idea of territorial cohesion requested in the informal meeting of Ministers at 
Leipzig already in 2007: “The Baltic Sea Region is a good example of a macro-region – an 
area covering a number of administrative regions, but with sufficient issues in common to 
justify a single strategic approach. Other areas of the European Union are beginning to self-
identify as macro-regions and the approach adopted in this strategy will offer important 
lessons as to the potential of the macro-regional approach. This follows the territorial 
cohesion proposals of the Commission in the Green Paper of October 2008, whereby 
interventions are built around the needs of functional regions rather than according to 
pre-determined financial and administrative criteria. (…) The analysis described above 
demonstrates the need for a common strategic vision to guide future territorial develop-
ment for the Baltic Sea Region”.
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From boring to daring – from status quo to political innovation  
in the Eu
In 2008-2009 there has been a sharp turn from ‘boring’, status-quo-oriented and routine 
approaches to ‘daring’, brave visions in the EU widening policy. The main issue on the 
Western side is still the incoherent, patchwork character of widening policy. The transforma-
tive power of the EU has been tested with little impact so far in the Med Union. It remains to 
be tested in the WB region as well as in the Eastern Union in the next decade. Therefore, the 
invention of the future widening policy means above all the creation of a coherent and inte-
grated system by connecting the ‘technical’ issues in ‘low politics’ with the security issues 
in ‘high politics’, organically and systematically – i.e. the whole range of policy areas has 
to be arranged into one strategic ‘macro-project’, as seems to be emerging in the EBS, and 
in the European Danube Strategy (EDS) to follow. Given the reform fatigue or treaty fatigue 
in the EU, the preparation of a new vision for the EU widening policy can only be a very long 
process. Hence, the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency has to start to prepare 
a new vision very early in a draft stage by suggesting new ideas and elaborating the next big 
vision step-by-step, instead of the business-as-usual approach. The WB ‘enlargement’ and 
the ENP ‘widening’ innovations have to appear well before the new budgeting period in order 
to be taken into account in terms of financial impact.
Globalisation-cum-regionalisation has been the main effort of the EU to answer the global 
challenge. This effort has recently been reinforced by the EU due to the global economic 
crisis. ‘Regionalism’, or organising various levels of regions by strategic design, has come to 
the fore, as in the cases of EBS and EDS. Multi-dimensional external and internal regionali-
sation has enabled the EU to play a dynamic role in creating global governance in a multilat-
eral regionalised world order. It has also been a win-win game of integrative balancing for the 
other global powers, as the first tentative steps of the G20 organisation suggest.
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Building a European External  
action Service: a Difficult Birth?
hugo brady Senior Research Fellow, CER
Natividad Fernández Sola Research associate, Real Instituto Elcano
“In fulfiling his mandate, the High Representative (HR) shall be assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS). This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as 
well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states. The organ-
isation and functioning of the EEAS shall be established by a decision of the Council. The 
Council shall act on a proposal from the HR after consulting the European Parliament and 
after obtaining the consent of the Commission” (article 27.3, Treaty of Lisbon).
In foreign policy terms, the EU’s global partners often have to deal with the competing 
external relations bureaucracies of the European Commission, the EU’s Council Secretariat 
(itself acting separately for both the HR and the six-month EU Presidency) as well as the 
different diplomatic services of the member states. That situation reflects the uneven 
development of the Union’s foreign policy machinery since the development of ‘European 
political coordination’ in 1970 and the EU’s beginnings as a purely economic entity. 
Nevertheless the Union has managed – through the creation of a HR for Foreign Policy and 
almost 20 years of adopting common positions on all but the most controversial external 
issues – to create the expectation that it ‘should’ have a serious foreign policy that can 
mobilise diplomatic, military and civilian resources and deploy them worldwide.
The foreign policy provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are a clear effort to satisfy that expecta-
tion. The clauses sketch out how the EU should over-come the mess of bureaucratic (and the 
resulting legal and political) obstacles to more coherent decision-making and delivery on 
external policy. On the delivery side, a major priority is the need to overcome the artificial 
separation between the political wishes of the EU’s foreign ministers and the Commission’s 
technical and financial resources. Hence the Treaty’s negotiators agreed to the establish-
ment of a foreign policy council and quasi-diplomatic service to link the political legitimacy 
of the member states to the EU’s amalgamated foreign policy machinery.
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Moving on from ambiguity: confronting difficult questions
The establishment of a new semi-permanent Presidency for the European Council and a 
newly empowered HR are attempts to make EU external action more politically legitimate. 
Though the politicians and civil servants will wrestle to define the boundaries between 
those posts, two factors would seem to suggest the posts will add value. First, similar 
tensions tend to exist between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in normal nation 
states, but these are not insurmountable. Second, the first incumbents of the posts – 
Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine ashton – are consensual rather than combative figures. 
Their shared disposition is likely to keep inter-institutional rivalry under control.
However, the job of designing an effective external action service to support both the HR 
and the Council president will still be a complex and complicated business, not least due 
to the challenges of incorporating over 130 Commission overseas representations and 
establishing control over a foreign policy budget worth up to €50 billion (over the period 
2010-2013). Other key issues to be tackled in the negotiations that will establish the 
service are its scope and size, legal status, the recruitment, rotation and promotion of EU 
‘diplomats’, the establishment of a headquarters, and the level of control the service will 
have over its own organisation and finances.
Scope and staffing
The EEaS should start small, but should be flexible enough to grow where there is demand 
for its services. Early proposals tabled by the EU’s Swedish Presidency show that the core 
of the new service will be composed of single geographical and thematic desks (human 
rights, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and so on) currently working separately in the 
Council and the Commission. Enlargement will remain the responsibility of the Commission 
even where the EEaS has geographical desks dealing with candidate countries. Trade 
and development policy will also remain the responsibility of other Commission director-
ates. This rather minimalist approach highlights the natural reluctance of well-established 
Commission directorates to be absorbed into any new body and underlines that effective 
coordination with other bodies will be a central factor in whether the new EEaS works as 
a concept. However, the EEaS will – uniquely – incorporate the EU’s crisis management 
structures set up to service the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That includes 
the so-called ‘Crisis Management and Planning Directorate’, the ‘Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability’, the EU military staff and the Joint Situation Centre, a small unit of 
seconded intelligence experts. EU ‘special representatives’ – political figures appointed 
as the EU’s face in particular regions or on thematic issues – will be included, too. The 
EU’s entire budget for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters as well as its 
supplemental ‘Stability Instrument’ should become the core of the EEaS budget, though 
spending decisions will still have to be rubber-stamped by the Council and largely adminis-
tered through Commission structures.
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Member states seem content to let the Council and Commission decide between themselves 
how best to amalgamate their services. But the governments have set the proviso that one 
third of staff vacancies in the EEaS should be filled by secondees from their own services. 
This is to avoid excessive weighting of the service towards the organisational culture of the 
Commission. a formula for making HR decisions on EEaS appointments compatible with geo-
graphical balance is to recognise the HR as the appointing authority, using a transparent 
and meritocratic procedure while ensuring adequate geographical balance (due to the need 
for a meaningful presence in the EEaS of nationals from all EU member states). a recruit-
ment procedure would be established, associating representatives of member states, the 
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council.
Finally, it has been accepted that the EEaS should have a wide scope, assisting not only the 
HR but also the President of the European Council and the President as well as the members 
of the Commission in their respective functions. The EEaS will be more useful and relevant, 
and ensure coordination between the new President with the new HR. Of crucial impor-
tance is whether the EU’s external delegations will serve as an effective information-gather-
ing system, which is the key added value the EEaS might provide to member states and the 
Union’s institutions. Central to this is how effective its heads of delegations become in coor-
dinating external EU action. For example, not all staff in the new ‘EU’ overseas representa-
tions will be EEaS-affiliated: the Commission will still post separate representatives abroad, 
for example, for trade and development. But the head of the EEaS delegation will need to 
coordinate the activities of all EU staff serving under the delegation’s roof, a power that the 
Lisbon Treaty does indeed imply (under the Treaty, the HR has the right to coordinate all exter-
nally related policies of the Union, an authority which presumably will extend to the manage-
ment of the overseas missions.)
Training
The EEaS will gradually develop its own diplomatic culture. In the absence of a European diplo-
matic school, this will occur through an organic blending of different foreign policy traditions 
from the member states and the administrative culture of the Council and Commission. It is 
too early to tell if this will culminate in something more profound: a sense of purely ‘European’ 
interests in international relations. But at the start the service will at least require basic diplo-
matic training programmes, the embedding of Brussels ‘fonctionnaires’ in national diplomatic 
ministries, and special accelerated training for specific vacancies in delegations overseas.
There are currently two different EU diplomatic programmes, funded and owned by the 
member states that could be a useful basis and experience for training in the new service. 
These are the ‘young Experts in Delegation’, started in 1984, and the ‘Seconded National 
Experts in Delegations’, started in 2002. The aim of both was originally to train young 
experts and officials from member states, over a two-year period, to serve in the European 
Community External Service. But since an external action service was first proposed almost 
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ten years ago, both programmes have been developed as a basic training platform for a 
future EEaS (the yED even styles itself as a nascent “European Diplomatic School”.) Both 
programmes also offer one-month crash courses to officials due to be posted to delega-
tions overseas.
In the longer term, the EU may decide to establish an actual European Diplomatic School. 
Such an academy would be designed to give junior diplomats the linguistic, diplomatic, lead-
ership, negotiating and protocol skills necessary to do their jobs. But the parameters of such 
training could only be set after the service has existed for at least a few years.
organisational and financial independence
EU leaders have already agreed that the EEaS – and therefore the HR – should have full 
control of its own budget and staff. The High Representative will propose an EEaS budget as 
a separate section of the EU budget and be the final authority for the release of funds and the 
appointment of staff. This system would allow the European Parliament to have an indirect 
but important instrument to control the EEaS (the leaders ignored a weak attempt by the 
European Parliament to make the service financially dependent on the Commission, but the 
Parliament will still have some control of the service via its control of the overall EU budget). 
Staff from member states should have temporary status, but with the same opportunities, 
rights and obligations as those of staff coming into the service from the Commission or from 
the Council.
Relationship with national diplomatic services
Inevitably, the EU’s national diplomatic services will have mixed reactions to the fledgling 
EEaS. Many ambitious diplomats are naturally attracted by the new opportunity that the EEaS 
represents. But some will see it either as a competitor or a potential nuisance. The appointment 
of two relatively unknown candidates to the posts of Council President and HR in November 
2009 was a ‘coming down to earth’ moment. It is clear that most member states will not wish to 
interpret much of the Treaty in an ambitious way where this could constrain their future action. 
The Treaty already contains two declarations underlining that the HR or the EEaS will not 
affect the current competences of member states in foreign policy or their standing in bodies 
like the UN. But the main text of the Treaty requires the member states to second staff to the 
service and provides for close coordination between the service’s overseas delegations and 
the member states’ diplomatic and consular missions around the world. Hence a rather exis-
tential question facing the EEaS at its inception would seem to be: if it cannot become a cen-
tralised ‘European diplomatic service’, how exactly can it add value to the efforts of national 
services and how will it work with them abroad and in international institutions? 
In general, one area of value-added is coordination: the head of the EEaS delegation in 
each country should coordinate overall EU policy on site with the so-called national ‘heads 
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of missions’. But a more specific idea is that the new EU delegations would assume some 
responsibilities for consular services, the coordination of humanitarian assistance and inter-
ventions in crisis situations. Though diplomatic protection can only be provided by a state, 
emergency consular services could be carried out by the seconded national diplomats serving 
in EU delegations. The EU delegations could also assist in the processing of visa applications 
in some regions. This is also a national power but member states have long applied uniform 
rules for the standard issuing of visas. Member states – while insisting that they maintain the 
final say on whether to grant or refuse a visa – have indicated they are open to the EEaS per-
forming such tasks, not least because of the costs of individually equipping their consular 
services to deal with biometric technologies. However, the establishment of a European 
external action service will not automatically imply a reduction of most national diplomatic 
services: the majority of member states will still wish to conduct most of their foreign relations 
on a bilateral basis. It is more important in the medium-term that the Union’s current foreign 
policy becomes more coordinated and more tangible than rhetorical, particularly in interna-
tional organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and United Nations.
other recommendations
The reality is that it will be several years before observers can measure whether the reforms 
to the EU’s external representation laid out in the Lisbon Treaty can be judged as fundamen-
tal improvements. For example, most analysis carried out to date do not consider what role 
the EU’s rotating presidency will have at working group level, or whether these will now be 
chaired by an EEaS official. But in the initial period of creation it seems certain that – to have 
a discernible impact – the service must:
 Begin cautiously. The EEaS will take at least five years to build before it is able to  •
display its potential and make a proper submission for funds from the EU budget. a 
simple merger between the relevant desks of the Council and Commission will be work 
enough for the first two years. More ambitious structures and roles can be developed 
later, such as consular services and so on. The member states should be patient and 
give the service time to deliver.
 Develop a system of deputies. Javier Solana, the previous HR, worked an average of  •
100 hours per week. The very significant expansion of the new HR’s role will require 
deputies to be appointed. There should be at least two: one in the Council and one in 
the Commission. The HR should expand the current system of double-hatted special 
representatives, which will form the upper tier of the EEaS.
 Develop unique specialisations. aside from its peacekeeping and civilian protection  •
wing, the EEaS should have a special representative to oversee external action related 
to internal security threats like terrorism and mass migration. This person should sit on 
the proposed Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), also being established 
in the 2010-2011 period, as a means of joining up the different EU agencies working in 
the area. The EEaS should keep abreast of the external effects of EU internal security 
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cooperation and be able to feed in its own priorities from the foreign policy side, for 
example, on counter-terrorism.
 Be elite. To succeed, the EEaS will need the best people. This is an obvious point but  •
one which cannot be taken for granted. In the past, member states have off-loaded 
difficult or below-par staff to the Council and Commission. Commission delegations 
abroad have been criticised at times for lacking staff with proper diplomatic training 
or crisis management credentials, and for poor political reporting. It is crucial that the 
EEaS avoids such a reputation and develops a tradition of excellence early on. In this 
initial period, the onus needs to remain with the member states to ensure that the 
service has some of Europe’s most capable diplomats and for the HR to insist that this 
is the case from the start.
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a Realistic ambition:  
Setting Priorities for CSDP
Sven biscop Director of the Security and Global Governance Programme, Egmont
Tomáš weiss Research Fellow, Europeum
T he 2008 ‘review’ of the European Security Strategy (ESS), as it was often called – although that was never the mandate given to Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council – generated great expectations. That the European Council in 
December 2008 decided, after a long debate, to leave the ESS untouched should in itself 
not be a reason for disappointment. If the EU today is not the global power that it could 
have been, it is not because its strategy is invalid, but because it has been half-hearted 
about implementing it. Rather than amending the ESS, the European Council adopted a 
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in 
a Changing World. The report did not meet expectations for a true strategic review. It 
provides a concise overview of implementation, confirms the holistic and multilateral 
approach, and ends with a firm call to action: “To build a secure Europe in a better world, 
we must do more to shape events. and we must do it now”. But it offers little in terms of 
concrete recommendations.
The problem is that one is now left with the impression of unfinished business. The report 
can therefore only be the end of the beginning: once started, the exercise must be brought 
to a good end, regardless of one’s initial opinion about its opportunity. On the basis of 
the report a true strategic review can yet take place. On the one hand, such a review will 
lead to a more complete ESS, notably in terms of objectives: today the ESS mostly tells us 
‘how’ to do things – it is much vaguer on ‘what’ to do. The result will be a grand strategy, 
because that is the scope of the ESS already today, embracing all of the instruments and 
resources at the disposal of the EU and the member states, and because that expresses 
the high level of ambition which the EU as a global power must have. On the other hand, 
this review will determine the topics on which more detailed ‘sub-strategies’ to the ESS 
have yet to be adopted.
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is undoubtedly one the major areas in which 
more strategic thinking is required.
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The elaboration of a military strategy?
There are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for the EU to deal effectively with all of them, 
certainly in a leading role. Therefore, as the report states, “We need to prioritise our com-
mitments, in line with resources”. The ESS is not very clear on priorities for CSDP operations 
though, resulting in a missing link between the overall political objective in the ESS – “to share 
in the responsibility for global security” – and CSDP operations and capability development. 
Quantitatively, CSDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 60,000 troops. Not only 
has this objective been overshadowed by the much more limited battlegroup project, but the 
actual availability of the forces declared cannot be assessed, as they are not pre-identified 
and member states have mostly declared similar numbers to NaTO as well. If all ongoing CSDP, 
NaTO, UN and national operations in which EU member states participate are counted, Europe 
today deploys more than 80,000 troops, but EU member states obviously cannot mobilise 
60,000 additional troops. It is equally obvious however that even the combined CSDP and 
NaTO level of ambition still falls far short of the total combined armed forces of the EU-27: 2 
million troops. Here there is no grand vision, even if collective defence is taken into account.
What is required is a unified vision on the level of ambition, cutting across organisational 
divides – whether operations are conducted through CSDP, NaTO, the United Nations or an 
ad hoc coalition, is secondary. The EU as the political expression of Europe must decide on a 
military or civil-military strategy for CSDP, a ‘White Book’ that would function as a sub-strat-
egy to the ESS. How many forces should the EU-27 be able to muster for crisis management 
and long-term peacekeeping, for which priorities, what reserves does that require, and what 
capacity must be maintained for territorial defence? In all probability the result will be that 
Europe does not need 2 million uniforms.
Elaborating such a CSDP strategy will require a thorough debate, but some outlines can 
already be discerned. Because of its proximity, the neighbourhood logically appears as a 
clear priority. In the ESS, “Resolution of the arab / Israeli conflict is a strategic priority” – 
although that clear statement does not necessarily translate into proactive engagement – 
and the report adds that “We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern 
Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the arab States”. But if the neigh-
bourhood is a clear geographic priority, it is less clear in which types of situations the EU 
will undertake which type of action. Whether the ‘broader neighbourhood,’ including Central 
asia and the Gulf, is a priority as well should also be debated. Next to the neighbourhood, 
only Iran is singled out as a priority, and the EU has indeed been “at the forefront of inter-
national efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme,” as the report states. Other conflicts 
are mentioned in the ESS: “Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and 
the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts 
nearer to home, above all in the Middle East” – whether that implies the EU should actively 
contribute to their resolution is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan africa has been an important 
area of focus for CSDP, though the strategy behind it is not always clear – e.g., if the EU twice 
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intervened in the DRC at the request of the UN, why was the third request refused? This dem-
onstrates that without strategy, it is impossible to define what operational success means. 
Other strategic players are becoming increasingly active, but are mostly unwilling to con-
tribute to crisis-management on the african continent – what are the EU’s priorities there? 
Securing Europe’s lines of communication with the world, of which the operation off Somalia 
is an example, is a more obvious priority.
Importantly, the collective security system of the UN, and therefore of the EU, as its main 
supporter and with two permanent members of the Security Council in its ranks, can only 
be legitimate if it addresses the threats to everyone’s security – too much selectivity under-
mines the system. Even though it cannot always play a leading role, the EU must therefore 
also shoulder its share of the responsibility for global peace and security by playing an active 
role in the Security Council and by contributing capabilities to UN (mandated) crisis manage-
ment and peacekeeping operations. In particular, if anywhere in the world the threshold to 
activate the mechanism of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is reached, the EU, in view of 
its support for the principle, and in view of its vital interest in upholding international law, 
should contribute.
Capabilities
all of these commitments require deployable military capabilities that the EU is currently 
lacking. a substantial increase in deployments is only possible in the medium-to long-term, 
as a function of the ongoing transformation of European armed forces. Member states should 
abandon the national focus: rather than at the level of each individual member state, the EU-27 
together must be capable. a resolute choice in favour of pooling could reduce intra-Europe-
an duplication and thereby produce much more deployable capabilities within the current 
combined defence budget, notably in the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty.
Permanent Structured Cooperation can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU member states 
to participate, if they so choose, according to their own means, in the way that they choose: 
 Member states wanting to take part can declare which contribution, of which size, in  •
which timeframe they are considering; in which specific capability areas, and / or with 
which force packages, and / or with regard to which longer-term, future capabilities.
 Simultaneously, the participating member states, with the support of the European  •
Defence agency (EDa), can agree on criteria that apply to each specific contribution, 
regardless of size, in terms of deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per-
capita investment in equipment, in addition to a minimum level for participation in 
EDa programmes and, perhaps, operations.
 The EDa can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation and  •
pooling in accordance with member states’ declared intentions, allowing member 
PART IV – EU IN THE WORLD | 167
states to decide which contributions they will offer on a national basis and which in 
cooperation, in which format, with other member states.
 This will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be achieved by pre-identi- •
fied units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed timeframe.
 The EDa is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions against  •
the agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously updating and 
proposing opportunities for cooperation.
One specific capability that ought to be focused on is ‘gendarmerie-type’ forces. Most 
analyses of the current security environment agree that today’s threats to the EU countries 
differ from what we have witnessed in past. Not only do the threats cross traditional state 
borders, blur the distinction between inside and outside and take on various forms, but 
they also strengthen and depend on each other. as a consequence, they must be tackled by 
various means, such as military, police or administrative support, and they cannot be dealt 
with one by one, but rather as part of the whole picture only. The ESS has acknowledged the 
holistic approach from the very beginning, emphasising the link between different threats 
and stating that different instruments and capabilities should be brought together as all 
the threats require a mixture of responses. It also believes that the EU is particularly well 
equipped for a comprehensive approach to crises management.
The lessons from Iraq and afghanistan have vindicated the ESS’s conviction that nothing 
can be achieved by purely military means. They have also confirmed that even if we know 
it is necessary, the implementation of a common civil-military crisis management is a great 
problem in reality. although military leaderships are not as afraid of ‘mission creep’ as they 
were in Bosnia in the 1990s, we still lack sufficient capabilities to bridge the gap between 
a high-end military operation and a low-end law enforcement mission. The same problem 
remains: soldiers are not trained and equipped to fulfil law-enforcement tasks and police are 
not ready to work in a violent environment.
However, there is an option that may serve as a remedy to the gap between military and 
police operations. The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), fully operational since July 2006, 
is not part of the EU institutionally, but clearly aims at providing the EU with the necessary 
niche capability: police forces with military status. The ‘gendarmerie-type’ forces are a 
flexible instrument that can be deployed under both military and civilian command, thus 
providing the missing link between the two. at the moment, only six EU countries contribute 
to the EGF (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Romania; Poland is associat-
ed and Turkey is an observer to the EGF), but their forces have already been deployed under 
the EU flag in Bosnia. It cannot be expected that countries without a gendarmerie tradition 
in their force structure would introduce one. The tasks, however, will remain and there is a 
need to deal with them. Giving regular soldiers some quick additional training in handling 
a crowd before sending them on a mission cannot be a long-term solution. an option might 
be a ‘gendarmerie minus’ or ‘military police plus’ – not creating a proper gendarmerie as 
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known in France or Italy, but expanding the role of the military police outside the scope 
of the internal military order and training them in engaging with civilian populations. The 
Polish military police / gendarmerie may serve as an example of such transformation.
The issue deserves a high-profile debate at the EU level and the current Trio Presidency is 
well suited to launch it, as Spain is one of the EGF members and has long-term experience 
with this type of force. Even if the final decision remains with the member states themselves, 
the EU debate would help to attract the attention of politicians and European publics alike. 
Implementation of a comprehensive EU crisis-management solution will not be success-
ful without filling niches that have the potential to undermine all previous efforts, be it by 
high-end military forces or low-end preventive assistance.
Conclusion
2010 is an important year for makers of strategy. President Obama will undoubtedly mandate 
the elaboration of a new National Security Strategy (NSS). at the NaTO Summit in april 2009, 
the drafting of a new ‘Strategic Concept’ has been tasked. If it wants its interests and priori-
ties to be taken into account, the EU must make sure to have its voice heard. Rather than every 
member state participating individually, EU strategy should be the basis for the European 
input in the debate: only where the NSS and the ESS overlap, can a truly shared NaTO strategic 
concept emerge, reflecting the growing importance of the EU as a global security actor. The 
report on the implementation of the ESS is important in this regard – but it should be the start 
rather than the end of a process. On the basis of the work done, the next European Council 
should identify the priority areas in which action plans must be drawn up to improve imple-
mentation, or ‘sub-strategies’ elaborated to steer policy, with follow-up assured at the next 
meeting of the heads of state and government. CSDP is an obvious priority. a continually 
proactive stance must follow.
The current Trio should focus on the following issues in particular:
 The debate on an EU grand strategy must not wait for the next ESS review in four or five  •
years’ time. Instead, the Trio should keep the strategic debate high on the agenda of CSDP 
in particular, possibly feeding the parallel work on the new NaTO strategic concept.
 The debate should focus on linking the EU’s overall objectives to particular tools. Sub- •
strategies may be a useful instrument in this respect, allowing for better formulation 
of concrete programmes and their implementation.
 The European Defence agency should be used in the implementation process, as well  •
as the new options included in the Lisbon Treaty.
 The idea of comprehensiveness should guide implementation, building on the EU and  •
its member states’ comparative advantages in crisis management.
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FoREIGN PolICy ANd dEFENCE
More Coherence, more Normative Power: 
Key Elements in the Consolidation  
of CFSP / CSDP
János Terényi Director, Hungarian Institute of International affairs; for GKI
Gergely Romsics Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International 
affairs; for GKI
The foreign policy challenge is twofold and serious
The 1990s brought about the emergence not only of an institutional framework for a common 
European foreign policy, but also of a discourse that sought to define a specifically European 
approach to interacting with the world. at the same time, commentators also noted the – 
initially – ‘empty drawers’ of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was the late 
1990s and the new millennium that saw the broader CFSP framework really come to life in 
a series of institutional innovations beginning with the amsterdam Treaty. Placing a skilful 
supranational entrepreneur (Javier Solana) with little formal power but great informal clout 
in a position to oversee and energise the process while streamlining decision-making and 
approving a flexible institution-building process in the second pillar led to a rapid expansion 
of capabilities. at the same time, these developments also contributed to a steep increase 
in the complexity of European external action. This, in turn, has understandably led many to 
deplore the lack of coherence and coordination between community and intergovernmental 
branches, which was seen as hampering both policy-making efficiency and contacts with 
third parties.
It follows from the above that the European Union today faces the daunting challenge of 
making its foreign policies more coherent if it is to increase its influence in its neighbour-
hood and in the world at large. This institutional dilemma is, however, compounded by a 
second dilemma: that of adapting its branches of external action to the changes in the inter-
national system and providing them with the appropriate procedures and guiding princi-
ples. This paper therefore urges European Union players, and especially the incoming Trio 
Presidency, to adopt a two-pronged approach to CFSP and CSDP. This approach would 
include making a concerted and sustained effort to facilitate and optimise the transition to 
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the new institutional structure, while also constructively contributing to the rethinking of 
the principled foundations of European foreign policy. Only through the buttressing of new 
offices and institutions and the consolidation of the ideational backbone of foreign policy 
will the Lisbon Treaty reforms pay the expected dividends. The alternative scenario, one of 
turf battles, dragged out transition and a foreign policy torn between particular interests, 
would seriously hurt CFSP and the Union as a whole.
halfway to policy coherence: CFSP / CSdP and the ideational 
backbone in the ongoing reform process
The European Union is currently in the midst of reforming its institutional structure. With the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, an extensive institutional overhaul is about to commence, yet 
in the case of CFSP / CSDP this is complemented by other strategic tasks, such as adopting a 
new European Security Strategy and planning for the next Headline Goal and Civilian Headline 
Goal. a number of changes are predetermined by the Treaty, yet it is clear that the upcoming 
period will be one of bargaining and working out compromises.
The “demise of the rotating Presidencies in External Relations,” as observed by antonio 
Missiroli among others, has many commentators fearing various informal bargains among 
clubs of member states that would aim at ensuring visibility for the rotating presidency 
beyond the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Some degree of visibility and representa-
tion will (and should) of course remain for the rotating presidency, but it is of vital importance 
that efforts at securing this do not hamper the emerging foreign policy architecture. This 
means, for instance, that the new European External action Service (EEaS) should be given 
unambiguous priority in representing the Union, and the Trio Presidency could, as has been 
proposed, ‘co-locate’ diplomats to its delegations. Obvious parallel structures, however, 
should be avoided.
Furthermore, the EEaS, as a key element of the new institutional structure, should be seen 
through to emerge as a balanced organisation in the end. The new High Representative 
(HR) is expected to submit a draft proposition in spring 2010, and it will thus fall upon 
the Spanish Trio member to launch its discussion and try to secure consensus among the 
member states.
The office of the HR is itself undergoing significant changes, and will be overseeing the 
External action Service as well as presiding over the new Foreign affairs Council. also, 
the European Council is to be chaired by the new permanent President. This does not 
mean, however, that the Trio Presidency will have only the choice between trying to avoid 
complete eviction from CFSP through prevarication and obstruction, or politely bowing 
out of the foreign policy game. It will have to cooperate with the new HR, notably through 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), since COREPER will continue to 
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deliberate on all issues of external relations that are nested in the community pillar or, 
after Lisbon, community dimension of policy-making. The situation of the General affairs 
Council, strengthened as a horizontal coordinating body while divested of its foreign policy 
tasks, will not be dissimilar: it will also have to coordinate various policies that are linked 
with CFSP tasks and priorities. The frequent linkages in these areas have fuelled much dis-
cussion about ‘grey’ or inter-pillar areas of European external action and the lack of policy 
coherence in recent years. Through cooperation and support afforded in such areas, and by 
setting an example in unambiguously entrusting the High Representative with managing 
external relations, the Trio Presidency can do more for an efficient European Foreign Policy 
than any amount of retained influence could ever help to achieve.
In terms of the new institutional structure and the new set of roles needed to make it function-
al, an additional, more informal role should also be considered by the Trio Presidency. Much 
of European foreign and external security policy is being overseen by the High Representative 
and various directoires composed of interested and large member states. This is simultane-
ously an efficient and a Realpolitik arrangement, and it would be both overly idealistic and 
potentially unproductive to upset it. at the same time, in the long-term it will be imperative to 
establish complementary channels for all member states to feel included as ‘indirect players’ 
if massive disenchantment amongst the European public and smaller member states is to 
be avoided. This will require either the High Representative as chair of the Foreign affairs 
Council or the new permanent President as chair of European Council meetings to assume 
the task of acting as liaison between directoires and member states. The Trio Presidency 
should push to direct attention to the need to include this among the duties of the new office-
holders, and, at least for the transition period, will have to be involved in ensuring effective 
liaising in such areas.
Beyond the new offices and responsibilities, there are also a number of policy questions 
where the Treaty represents clear advances over previous conceptualisations. These include 
the emphasis on explicitly linking all branches of EU external action under the label of 
promoting good relations, sustainable development, trade liberalisation and democracy 
in one framework. The Treaty also introduces the concept of structured cooperation for 
CSDP which represents a grafting of the enhanced cooperation mechanism into the areas of 
security and defence, and formalises existing practices of ad hoc coalitions for participating 
in CSDP missions. These represent points where institutional reform is able to contribute to 
a more regulated and calculable operation of foreign policy.
at the same time, the Treaty text leaves a number of ongoing ad hoc institutionalisation 
processes unchanged and in some other sub-sectors it does not provide an answer to new 
challenges and dilemmas, simply because these are not institutional in character. What these 
areas require is a sustained thinking through of how existing and emerging instruments and 
resources can be used, and, perhaps even more fundamentally, what principles should be 
invoked in deciding upon their use.
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One of the fundamental and problematic features of current European external action has 
become the overlapping of policy target regions. accession and neighbourhood in the 
Western Balkans and in the East overlap today with important CFSP and CSDP tasks. This 
should not be perceived as a handicap, but capitalised upon to make EU influence more var-
iegated and establish more interface points than would otherwise be possible. at the same 
time, the situation does call for a clarification of foci.
In this respect, it is tempting to conceive of CFSP as the proper incarnation of an emancipa-
tory Normative Power Europe, a partner that provides assistance in times of crisis, yet has the 
important long-term goal of helping autonomous, peaceful and stable political structures to 
emerge in partner countries and regions. This idea represents a strong conceptual decou-
pling from conditionality-based enlargement and neighbourhood policies and redirects 
focus towards helping others, especially neighbours, to experience political entrepreneur-
ship, responsibility and cooperation themselves – elite and societal skills that will be useful 
in the future, potentially during an eventual accession process.
The above implies adding emphasis to existing practices geared towards promoting stability, 
good governance and related capabilities, as well as functioning economies and societies. This 
additional point is the promotion of local and regional fora of dialogue at all levels and in various 
degrees of institutionalisation, in a manner that transcends borders and where, if applicable, 
neighbouring or otherwise involved member states, municipalities and / or Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) may sit next to partners as equals and sharing agenda-setting powers.
This would represent a return to the narrower idea of a Normative Power Europe where pro-
cedural norms are permitted to transpire or emerge through practice, as opposed to being 
prescribed in an itemised fashion. Importantly, such innovation neither prevents existing 
programmes from functioning in the future, nor does it undermine their rationale. It merely 
locates in the more permissive environment of CFSP an additional space of emancipation and 
cooperation that contributes to helping fashion regionally distinct communities of political 
partnership with a meaningfully broad notion of legitimate local difference.
Recent initiatives such as the relocation of the Regional Cooperation Council from Brussels to 
Sarajevo and the Baltic and Black Sea initiatives represent promising inroads into what might 
otherwise look like a desperate attempt at squaring a circle: exporting the EU model in a 
non-imperial fashion. It is this dimension of external action that could find a new permanent 
home in CFSP, if given the appropriate form and support and properly linked with the appro-
priate community portfolios, such as development and trade.
The question of how to formalise and thus render permanent this dimension of foreign 
policy leads one to the most pressing issue concerning the ideational backbone of European 
external action, and CFSP / CSDP in particular. The European Security Strategy was formulat-
ed in 2003 and its updating has been on the table since the initiative of the French Presidency. 
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It is high time to close this process (productively, of course), finishing the discussion which 
has already yielded a valuable report by the High Representative.
The imperative to conclude the process, however, must not overshadow the challenges and 
opportunities that need to be addressed in the future document. In particular, increased 
attention should be given to the civilian dimension of CSDP and even to some interlinked 
aspects more properly constituting CFSP affairs. alternatively, a second Strategy Paper could 
be launched which would complement the revamped ESS. Either way, a more comprehensive 
set of strategic guidelines would be made available for the newly reinforced CFSP architec-
ture, ensuring its functionality in practice and its legitimacy at the same time.
all players have at least a rough idea of what CFSP and CSDP have been about and all have 
some sense of where on occasion this idea has been insufficiently served by decisions and 
institutions. Helping these ideas to be updated and further specified will do a world of good, 
as they are one of the instruments that have a real effect on policy coherence and contribute 
to preventing both rumours about and instances of European foreign policy initiatives being 
hijacked by particular preferences. While institutional transition is of paramount impor-
tance, it is hardly less important to keep alive the process of defining the ideas that govern 
European external action.
Recommendations to the Sbh Trio
as the above perhaps shows, it is very hard to talk about CFSP / CSDP in the present tense. 
The EU is moving from a period of intensive, but ad hoc growth towards a more consolidated 
structure. Currently, it is neither ‘there’, nor ‘here’, but under construction. In this delicate 
situation, facilitating agreement, brokering long-overdue deals such as accepting the new 
ESS, smoothing edges and actively searching to fill the residual permanent niches for the 
rotating Presidency is not a task that should be looked down upon or taken lightly. as a tran-
sitional Trio Presidency, the SBH team can make a unique contribution to a future, more 
coherent European external action. In this regard, a number of key items may be listed.
 Providing support to the new office-holders, especially the High Representative of the  •
Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy (HRFaSP), and foregoing any visibility or 
representational prerogatives that would hamper the efficiency of emerging Lisbon 
structures such as the EEaS.
 Developing a conscious attitude towards linkages in the institutional structure that  •
are required for CFSP to function effectively and where the Trio Presidency will still 
have tasks and responsibilities. COREPER and the new General affairs Council stand 
out in this respect.
 Helping procedural norms to emerge which ensure that small and medium member  •
states can act as participants in CFSP / CSDP operations and not feel excluded from 
the processes.
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 Preventing the institutional overhaul from overshadowing the importance of the ide- •
ational backbone of all branches of EU external action. Focusing on having the new 
European Security Strategy and the post-2010 Headline Goals accepted is eminently 
important.
 Promoting the idea of a second Strategy Paper, complementary to ESS, that would  •
complement its scope by laying out the contours of normative foreign policy action.
 Making sure that CFSP focuses also on fostering an autochthonous political culture of  •
coexistence and cooperation in partner regions that lays the groundwork for a future 
of stability and prosperity both outside and inside the EU. This involves daring to think 
about the EU as an entity which may act through its political identity, and prevent 
relations with neighbouring regions from becoming excessively determined by various 
conditionality schemes. In practice, this requires focusing on projects such as the 
Black Sea Initiative, the Regional Cooperation Council and the new Danube Strategy.
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Becoming a More Effective actor  
in Crisis Management and Post-Conflict 
Peace Building: Strengthening CSDP 
Missions and Operations
Muriel Asseburg Head of the Middle East and africa Research Division, SWP
Ronja Kempin Research Fellow, SWP
 In 2003 the EU declared its civilian and military crisis management instruments ready for deployment. Since then, EU member states have convincingly demonstrated their capabil-ity to act as a global security player: they have deployed civil missions and military opera-
tions to Sub-Saharan africa, the Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, the Near and Middle East 
and even to asia. These engagements have encompassed a variety of approaches and tools for 
crisis management and stabilisation, ranging from the training of security forces and the support 
for the rule of law, to the provision of a military or civilian presence to safeguard elections or 
to monitor border arrangements and ceasefire agreements, to the fight against piracy or other 
forms of organised crime. altogether, the EU has conducted 23 missions and operations under 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Two of the current engagements – the ceasefire 
monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the anti-piracy operation atalanta in the Gulf of aden 
– have been decided and launched under the last Trio Presidency. In order to achieve the EU’s aim 
of effectively providing security in a changing world, Spain, Belgium and Hungary will have to 
lead a process aimed at substantially improving the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and 
operations and at smartly putting into practice the CSDP-related clauses of the Lisbon Treaty.
CSdP missions and operations in practice: a mixed record
So far, CSDP deployments have seen varying degrees of success with regard to the imple-
mentation of their mandates, their contribution to conflict management and stabilisation, 
and their usefulness in serving additional European policy objectives, such as the fostering 
of effective multilateralism. Without any doubt, in some cases EU deployments have con-
tributed to the peaceful settlement or management of conflicts. Here, the 2005-2006 aceh 
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Monitoring Mission (aMM) or the operation EUFOR DR Congo, are cases in point. aMM was 
instrumental in pacifying a decade-old conflict by actively monitoring the implementation of 
a ceasefire and peace agreement between Indonesia’s central government and the Free aceh 
Movement. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU in 2006 temporarily supported and 
backed up UN troops (MONUC) and thus made it possible for presidential elections to take 
place without any serious disruptions or violence.
However, other CSDP deployments have been less successful. EUPOL afghanistan, for 
example, which was established in mid-2007, has lagged far behind its objective to substan-
tially contribute to the training of afghan police forces. The monitoring mission at the Rafah 
border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, established in late 2005, has been de 
facto suspended since mid-2007. The 2008-2009 operation EUFOR Chad / CaR did neither 
help to tangibly improve the refugees’ plight in Chad nor was it in a position to indirectly con-
tribute to conflict resolution in Darfur.
Thus, the EU cannot be identified as being particularly successful or unsuccessful in any 
specific type of engagement. The assumption, for example, that the ‘civilian power Europe’ – 
with its rich experience in helping states with reforms so as to make them fit for EU mem-
bership – would be particularly capable, and therefore do well, in its support for structures 
and institutions safeguarding the rule of law, has not been confirmed by the CSDP experi-
ence. Rather, looking at the total of deployments so far, one cannot avoid the impression 
that member states and European policy makers have focused on demonstrating their ability 
to intervene globally. In addition, some seem to regard the CSDP as being in an experimen-
tal phase, in which they consider it more important to try out the whole of the CSDP tool box, 
rather than focusing on a specific component of the EU’s instruments for crisis prevention 
and management.
weaknesses and potential for improvement
as a consequence, no clear criteria or agreed-upon priorities exist on which member states 
could base their overall planning for CSDP deployments – with regard to where, when and 
how to get engaged – in addition to individual decisions as to whether or not to engage in a 
specific context. On the contrary, it seems that member states have not shown an interest in 
achieving consensus on priorities with regard to certain regions or types of activities. They 
have also abstained from early planning for possible future deployments. and CSDP deploy-
ments have not been preventative, but rather reactive and driven by acute crises or external 
demand. In this way strategic planning has remained elusive. In addition, rapid deployment 
– an essential factor if the EU wants to be on the spot so as to manage acute crises – has not 
been a general feature of EU deployments. Only the missions in aceh, Rafah and Georgia, 
as well as the operations atalanta in the Gulf of aden and artemis in the DR Congo, were 
in place within less than four weeks. In other cases, actual deployment was delayed due 
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to disagreements among member states over the mandate (EUFOR Chad / CaR, EUFOR DR 
Congo), the necessity to clarify the legal basis (EULEX Kosovo) or, as has turned out to be a 
major difficulty, the slow response from member states to provide personnel. Furthermore, 
decisions on a concrete operation, its objectives, the resources and equipment needed, are 
taken without sufficient recourse to the expertise and knowledge prevailing among other EU 
institutions in the region or country of deployment. as links between EU policies and bodies 
remain weak, the EU Special Representatives and the EC Delegations are barely consulted 
or made part of the operational planning process – with few exceptions to the rule. It is 
precisely such expertise, however, that would help to realistically define the objectives of 
the CSDP engagement in question, to identify actors on the ground with whom to cooperate 
and actors who might operate as spoilers, and to establish coherence between the mission 
or operation’s objectives and measures and those of the local EC Delegation.
Coordination between CSDP missions and EC Delegations also remains particularly difficult, 
although its success would significantly increase the EU’s effectiveness abroad. Even if 
cooperation works out on the ground, competing institutions in Brussels keep a suspicious 
watch and hence often undermine its success. This unhealthy competition is especially pro-
nounced in cases in which CSDP activities touch upon traditional tasks of the Commission, 
e.g. support in the justice sector. But exactly these missions need an ‘integrated approach’ 
in the form of close cooperation and a reasonable division of labour between EU institutions. 
How can police training and security sector reform be expected to contribute effectively to 
stabilisation if they are not accompanied by measures to improve the rule of law?
Disputes between the Council and the Commission have in some cases also prevented CSDP 
missions from having sufficient or even any financial resources of their own (other than their 
running budget). Such monetary means, however, would significantly increase the chances 
for success of CSDP deployments on the ground. Having a budget for ‘quick impact projects’ 
would enable the missions to back up training measures for police forces with necessary 
infrastructure investments – such as communication facilities or other basic equipment of 
police stations. This in turn could provide palpable incentives for local officials to cooperate 
and make reforms more attractive.
Solidarity among member states appears to be another determining factor in the success of 
CSDP missions. In several cases, CSDP engagements have been set up on the initiative and 
pressure of one of the larger EU states. They were realised in spite of serious reservations of 
other member states. In these cases, the bargaining process usually led to a narrow mandate 
regarding the deployment’s duration, tasks, theatre of operation, etc. What follows is that 
the EU’s engagement often contributes little to conflict management (as the case of EUFOR 
Chad / CaR demonstrated) or the operation’s success is imperilled (as was the case with the 
restricted duration imposed on EUFOR DR Congo). Besides, such missions and operations 
suffer in particular from the reluctance of other member states to deploy sufficient personnel. 
The cases of EUFOR Chad / CaR and EUPOL afghanistan show that while EU member states 
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have been willing to go along with a professed interest of one member state to have the EU 
act, they expect the initiator to bear the main burden of the engagement.
Last, but not least, once CSDP missions are launched, member states rarely critically follow 
up on their progress. In fact, while Brussels regularly receives Heads of Mission reports, these 
often gloss over the missions’ difficulties. The practice of overemphasising the EU’s achieve-
ments is criticised in national ministries as well as in Brussels, but tacitly accepted by member 
states. Hence, for lack of adequate information, there cannot be a sincere and continued 
examination of achievements, setbacks, and stumbling blocks, nor a serious debate on when 
and how to redirect a mission. This is all the more problematic considering that a number of 
deployments have struggled with fundamentally changing conditions over time. If member 
states and experts were to review ongoing missions more closely, they would be in a better 
position to react to changes in the theatre of operations and to adapt the mandate, staffing 
and equipment of the mission or operation accordingly. Whenever mandates have been 
adapted promptly, e.g. when the aceh mission’s mandate was expanded to actively oversee 
disarmament, it proved essential to the successful completion of the mission.
Recommendations
While the EU has proven to be capable of initiating civil missions and military deployments 
on an almost global scale and of a variety of types and profiles, it has much less effectively 
employed these missions and operations to follow through on the objectives it has set for 
itself in the ESS. It is time now for EU member states to conclude the ‘experimental phase’, to 
draw the lessons of hitherto existing deployments, and to move ahead and use the tool more 
strategically. Only then will EU member states be in a position to effectively and sustainably 
fend off threats to European security emanating from fragile states and regional conflicts, to 
stabilise the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, and to enact effective multilateralism in crisis 
management in a more meaningful way.
In this, the Lisbon Treaty does not show the way forward. While it extends the Petersberg 
Tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, and the 
support of third countries in combating terrorism on their territories, it does not indicate how 
to improve the EU’s operational performance in crisis management. There is one exception: 
two mechanisms should allow for ‘guaranteed rapid access’ to the community budget or to 
a ‘start-up fund’ financed by member states depending on the type of mission or operation. 
If these mechanisms are put into practice in a way that does indeed guarantee rapid access 
to funding, they would certainly help to speed up deployment. In this vein, the current Trio 
Presidency should work towards putting into practice the CSDP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
in a fashion that allows effectively for rapid deployment. It should also focus on setting up 
an External action Service that increases coherence rather than allowing member states and 
Brussels institutions to get bogged down in disputes over personnel and posts. With regards 
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to CSDP missions and operations, Spain, Belgium and Hungary should join forces to initiate 
a serious debate among member states and convince them to: 
 Establish long-term, strategic planning for CSdP deployments� •  It is in the nature of 
crisis management that the EU will always have to respond to crises, often unexpected 
ones, at short notice. That fact is, however, not in contradiction with the requirement 
to initiate a discussion and seek a consensus among member states on criteria and pri-
orities for deployments. against the backdrop of limited resources, EU member states 
will have to take decisions about where to engage and under which circumstances. 
as a rule, the EU should rather concentrate on few deployments that start early, are 
carefully chosen and consistently implemented, and integrated into a comprehensive 
approach of conflict management. With regard to deciding about a concrete deploy-
ment, an important question to ask is if and as to how far the EU can make a decisive 
contribution to crisis management and long-term stabilisation with the capabilities 
at its disposal and in a given situation. It will also be important to ensure that deploy-
ment of personnel can be sped up by early planning, genuinely available personnel 
reserves and flexible procedures.
 Ensure member states’ active support for deployments� •  ahead of a specific deploy-
ment, member states should discuss openly whether a sufficient number of them are 
willing to actively support a planned EU deployment, rather than just reluctantly agree 
to it. The fact that member states ‘tolerate’ deployments, but then impose all kinds 
of restrictions on their mandates, do not provide sufficient personnel and at times 
withdraw their personnel (“vote with their feet”) undermines not only the specific 
deployment’s success in the field, but also the EU’s credibility as an actor in crisis 
management in general. Member states should also think about mechanisms that 
ensure that the burden of deployments is shared among all. One possibility could be 
to cover all (or part of the) cost incurred in military operations by a common budget 
rather than continuing the aTHENa mechanism (the mechanism for financing military 
operations) and the practice of “costs lie where they fall”.
 Establish a binding and institutionalised ‘lessons learned’ process and constant follow  •
up� Missions and operations can only be concluded successfully if mandates and codes of 
conduct can be easily adapted to changing circumstances and if lessons learned in other 
deployments are taken into account. Such a process would systematically and sincerely 
evaluate strengths and weaknesses of current and previous missions. It would then 
feed into the conceptualisation and adaptation of new and existing mandates and plans 
of operation. In this context, the collaboration of functional and regional units within the 
Council Secretariat would have to be improved and EU Special Representatives, the EU 
Commission and EU Delegations as well as independent experts be incorporated in the 
endeavour. also, measures aimed at enhancing the EU’s ‘institutional memory’ would 
be needed so as to make sure that valuable experience is not lost.
 Endow CSdP missions and operations with financial resources and overcome com- •
petition between Eu institutions in brussels and on the ground� Having independent 
budgets would allow CSDP deployments to complement training activities by technical 
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and infrastructure support. In this context, cooperation between CSDP deployments 
and the work of EC Delegations needs to be improved – activities should always be 
executed by the EU institution that is best suited to ensure successful implementa-
tion. Here, the establishment of the External action Service provides an opportunity 
for increased coherence between various EU activities – but only if member states and 
Brussels institutions allow for that to happen. Ensuring a smoother process of coordi-
nation between the Council’s Secretariat, Special Representatives, member states, and 
EU Delegations would significantly enhance the standing of Europeans and facilitate 
coherent action in conflict zones. Coordinated action would also provide the Europeans 
with meaningful incentives for local actors to cooperate and be induced to reform.
PART IV – EU IN THE WORLD | 181
FoREIGN PolICy ANd dEFENCE
a New Standard for Fighting Terrorism 
under the Rule of Law
Anthony dworkin Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
T he support of human rights and the rule of law are among the primary goals of the European Union’s external policy. These principles are reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, and there is a new obligation to ensure that they apply consistently across the EU’s 
internal and external policies. One area where these principles have particular relevance is in 
fighting terrorism. In the years since the attacks of 11 September 2001, governments around 
the world – and most damagingly the United States – responded to the threat of terrorism 
with measures that violated human rights in far-reaching ways. Now there is an opportuni-
ty for the EU to take the lead, in collaboration with the Obama administration in the United 
States, in defining a new set of principles for fighting the new security threats posed by inter-
national terrorism in a way that complies with human rights and the rule of law.
The response of the United States to the attacks of 11 September was widely decried in 
Europe. Such policies as indefinite detention of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay, 
the use of interrogation techniques that Europeans generally regard as torture, and secret 
detention in ‘black sites’ did more than anything else to discredit the Bush administration 
in European eyes. These policies also had direct and harmful consequences for EU member 
states. In the eyes of many Europeans, they provided a propaganda gift for al-Qaeda 
and associated groups that threaten European countries as much as the United States. 
They made operational cooperation between EU countries and the US on the ground in 
afghanistan and elsewhere more complicated, because Europeans could not presume that 
american forces and intelligence agents would comply with international standards. Most 
importantly, they drew many European countries into complicity with policies that violate EU 
principles, and prevented Europe from projecting a clear message about the importance of 
respecting human rights and international law while confronting terrorism.
For these reasons, the European Union responded enthusiastically to early moves by President 
Obama to reverse the legacy of his predecessor. In June 2009, European foreign ministers 
agreed a joint statement with the United States reaffirming that “respect for the rule of law 
and our respective obligations under international law, including international human rights, 
182 | PART IV – EU IN THE WORLD
refugee, and humanitarian law makes us more secure and strengthens us in the fight against 
terrorism”. The statement committed the EU and the US to deepen their dialogue on interna-
tional legal principles relevant to counter-terrorism, and said the EU and US might explore 
“the possibility of developing a Set of Principles that might serve as a common reference 
point within the context of our shared efforts to counter terrorism”.
Not only would such a common set of principles put the EU and its closest security partner 
at the forefront of a principled approach to contemporary security threats, but it could also 
establish an international standard of ‘best practice’ and a reference point towards which the 
practices of other countries might be pulled.
This chapter aims to outline the contours of a possible set of principles, and to suggest how 
the European Union should pursue this objective in light of developments in the United States 
and globally since the agreement with the US was concluded last June. To reach agreement 
on a set of principles, the EU will have to refine its own thinking on some difficult issues 
raised by overseas military operations that engage with terrorist groups. It will also have to 
take account of the political climate in the United States, where issues of national security 
and international law have become the subject of intensely partisan debate.
European approaches to counter-terrorism
European countries do not all view terrorism in the same way, but it is possible to speak in 
broad terms of a European approach to fighting terrorism. Europeans regard terrorism, at 
least in its domestic manifestations, as a law enforcement problem, to be handled primarily 
through the system of criminal justice. Human rights law, in the form of the European 
Convention on human rights, provides a limiting framework. Where there is a threat to the 
life of the nation that cannot be met using criminal justice methods, European countries can 
derogate from some – though not all – human rights obligations, but only as far as is strictly 
necessary. Europeans also believe that human rights law provides the primary framework for 
action against terrorists overseas, except in a situation of armed conflict, where internation-
al humanitarian law is also relevant. There is no significant support in Europe for the concept 
of a world-wide armed conflict against terrorist groups that brings with it a global entitlement 
to kill terrorist suspects or detain them without trial.
There are some areas, however, where European thinking on counter-terrorism remains 
unresolved. above all, European governments do not have clearly agreed policies on some 
difficult questions raised by external military operations against non-state armed groups, 
where the United States has largely taken the initiative. In afghanistan, European members 
of NaTO have struggled to deal with the problem of detaining people suspected of hostile 
activity. Initially, some European countries adopted a quiet policy of handing prisoners over 
the US forces, but this approach became untenable after it was revealed that some of these 
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men had been transferred to Guantánamo. NaTO subsequently agreed on a policy of handing 
all detainees over to afghan authorities within 96 hours, but this has also attracted criticism 
because of widespread reports of abuse of prisoners by afghanistan’s National Directorate 
of Security. The underlying problem is that European nations do not have a common under-
standing of what the appropriate standards are for determining the detention authority of 
armed forces fighting against a non-state group on the territory of a third state.
An assessment of obama’s record
European officials were encouraged by the early actions of the Obama administration to 
hope that a new common approach to counter-terrorism between the EU and the United 
States might be possible. Within two days of entering the White House, Obama directed that 
the Guantánamo Bay detention facility should be closed within a year, ordered the closure of 
the CIa’s secret prison system, and restored the United States to a conventional understand-
ing of the Geneva Convention standards for treatment of detainees. He also set up a series 
of task forces to advise about future US policies on detention, interrogation and the transfer 
of prisoners.
a year later, European perceptions are more mixed. The greatest cause for concern among 
European observers is that the Obama administration has not renounced the idea of a global 
armed conflict against al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups (though it has abandoned the 
inflammatory concept of a “war against terror”). It is not clear (at the time of writing, in early 
January 2010) what the implications of this will be for US detention policy. Will the United 
States continue to assert that it is entitled to detain without criminal trial people alleged 
to be linked to al-Qaeda, even if they were not apprehended in a zone of hostilities? Or will 
it move to put in place a standard for future detention that is more clearly limited to people 
detained in connection with an armed conflict as traditionally understood? The situation is 
complicated for the Obama administration by the fact that it must not only determine policy 
for future captures, but must also deal with the legacy of the Bush administration, in the form 
of just under 200 detainees held at Guantánamo. President Obama has said that there is a 
group of these prisoners against whom the United States cannot bring charges, but whom it 
is reluctant to release. Obama has also said he will miss his one-year target for closing the 
detention camp.
as Obama’s team struggles with these complex questions, they have also been faced with 
a series of harsh attacks by Republican opponents charging that Obama is weakening US 
defences against terrorism. The attempted bombing of an airplane en route to Detroit on 
Christmas Day 2009 intensified the political debate within the United States on counter-
terrorism policy. against this background, US officials appear reluctant to move quickly 
to agree a new and comprehensive set of principles with the European Union. EU officials 
involved in discussions with the United States report that the Obama administration does 
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not want to begin formal consideration of such an agreement before it has concluded its 
own review process. Senior US officials have made the same point in discussions with the 
present author. at the same time, these officials have said that the Obama administration 
remains committed to the long-term project of establishing a shared framework for counter-
terrorism between the United States and the European Union.
European officials had initially hoped to conclude a joint set of principles with the United 
States during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. This would have particular resonance in light 
of Spain’s experience of Islamist terrorism with the Madrid bombings of March 2004. Spanish 
officials still intend to propose an EU-US declaration on terrorism during their Presidency, 
but it now appears highly unlikely that any substantive set of principles could be agreed in 
time to be attached to this declaration. It may therefore fall to the succeeding Presidencies of 
Belgium and Hungary to continuing working with the United States on principles for counter-
terrorism. In addition, the declaration proposed under the Spanish Presidency might reaffirm 
the possibility of a joint set of principles in order to give continued momentum to the idea.
at the same time, a closed-door dialogue between EU and US legal advisers on counter-
terrorism which was launched during the second term of the Bush administration is set to 
continue. EU officials and EU member states have also had input into the task force reviews 
conducted by the Obama administration. In these ways, discussions that promote mutual 
understanding and convergence between EU and US approaches are already taking place 
and can feed into any future work on a formal set of principles.
An outline of a common approach
While any precise outline of a suggested common framework must wait for the conclusion 
of the US internal reviews, it is still possible to sketch out the areas of likely agreement and 
potential discord.
General principles
an agreement on a shared framework of principles should start by affirming that terrorism 
represents a serious threat but that it must always be fought in accordance with the rule of 
law and human rights. There must be oversight and accountability for all forms of counter-
terrorism activity, including that of intelligence agencies and military forces.
detention
This remains the issue of greatest complexity, in particular regarding the definition of 
armed conflict and the detention powers associated with it. However it may be possible to 
agree principles that set reasonable limits to detention and prescribe meaningful forms of 
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due process. Such principles might include that detainees can only be held without charge 
if they are held in connection with an armed conflict or a state of national emergency (or 
perhaps where authorised by the UN Security Council); that even in these cases, security 
detention (except in the case of prisoners of war in an international armed conflict) can 
only be ordered on an individual basis for imperative reasons of security; that all security 
detainees are entitled to challenge the grounds for their detention before an independent 
body; and that they are entitled to regular review.
It seems likely, however, that EU officials will only regard such a principle as meaningful 
if the United States is willing to recognise some geographical limitation on its definition 
of armed conflict. One touchstone issue may be the fate of detainees at the US detention 
centre at Bagram in afghanistan who were captured outside the afghan military theatre. It 
would be helpful for European officials to try to clarify their own views on detention, and 
what their minimum requirements for an agreement with the United States would be.
Secret detention
This issue has caused problems for EU member states as well as the US, following claims that 
the CIa maintained secret prisons on the territory of European countries including Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania. However both the EU and US should now be able to commit them-
selves to hold all detainees in a registered place of detention and give their names to an inde-
pendent organisation such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Torture
The use by the United States of interrogation techniques widely regarded as torture, such as 
waterboarding (near-suffocation with water), was perhaps the most divisive issue between 
Europe and the US under President Bush. Since President Obama has renounced the use of 
such ‘enhanced interrogation techniques,’ it should be possible for both the EU and the US 
to reaffirm that the use of torture or cruel and inhuman treatment is never justifiable. a more 
complex problem, on which the EU should try to clarify its policy, concerns the questioning 
or provision of information about detainees held by third countries that do not comply with 
human rights standards.
Rendition
The policy of ‘rendition’ whereby individuals are transferred from one country to another 
outside any legal process of extradition was not invented by the Bush administration. What 
was new in the Bush administration’s use of rendition was that suspects were transferred 
not to face legal process but for the purposes of interrogation, often to countries with a 
well-documented history of using torture. While Obama’s government has suggested it will 
continue to transfer suspects outside legal processes, it has committed itself not to do so 
where there are substantial grounds for believing they might be tortured. Within Europe, too, 
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there is controversy about EU governments’ use of diplomatic assurances to return foreign 
nationals to countries that are known to use torture. although neither European countries 
nor the US appear willing to abandon the use of such assurances, which they claim provide 
effective protection against abuse, they should be able to reaffirm that there are no circum-
stances where individuals should be transferred to countries where they face a significant 
risk of torture.
Fair trials
The decision by President Obama to continue with the use of military tribunals for some 
terrorist suspects came as a disappointment to European officials, but at the same time the 
United States has introduced further protections for defendants. These include a complete 
ban on evidence obtained through coercive interrogation, restrictions on the use of hearsay 
evidence, and greater powers for the defence. For the EU, the important question is whether 
any trials before military commissions comply in practice with international standards of due 
process. assuming they do, the EU and the US could jointly reaffirm that anyone charged with 
a terrorist offence is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial and regularly constituted court 
offering all essential procedural guarantees.
Targeted killing
This is one area where President Obama has continued the policies of the Bush administration 
with little change. His administration has authorised a series of strikes by pilotless ‘drone’ 
aircraft over Pakistan, and in September 2009 it carried out a helicopter attack that killed a 
leading al-Qaeda suspect in Somalia. Many European officials regard the widespread use 
of such targeted strikes as ill-advised, but there is little consensus in Europe about their 
legality. Moreover, the subject is clouded with ambiguity, as there is often little certainty 
about how far such attacks have consent of the government of the country where they are 
carried out. For these reasons, this topic should probably be omitted from any agreed set 
of principles.
Conclusion
The European Union has a strong interest in working with the Obama administration in 
the United States to establish a new set of principles for combating terrorism in a way that 
respects human rights and the international rule of law. Such a set of principles would 
remove difficulties that European countries have faced in working together with their most 
important security partner. They would indicate to the world that the EU is firmly committed 
to the highest standards of human rights in its counter-terrorism policy. Most important, they 
would prevent injustice and would help establish an international standard for confronting 
new security threats in a legitimate and accountable way.
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The domestic political situation in the United States, and the complexity of some of the 
issues involved, will probably mean it is not possible to conclude a full set of principles 
during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. However, the EU should seek to ensure that the 
commitment to explore the possibility of a set of principles is not abandoned – for instance, 
by including a reference to it in any declaration signed in the next six months. EU officials 
should work among themselves to refine their own views on the appropriate standards for 
counter-terrorism, especially regarding operations overseas, and should continue to deepen 
their dialogue with the United States. The ambition of working toward a new transatlantic 
framework for counter-terrorism should remain on the agenda for the forthcoming Belgian 
and Hungarian Presidencies.
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FoREIGN PolICy ANd dEFENCE
Integrating Peace, Security  
and Environmental Priorities in  
EU Development Cooperation Policies
Ruby Gropas Research Fellow, ELIaMEP
New challenges for the Eu development cooperation policy  
in the global context
Development, peace and security are at the top of the EU’s external agenda. The EU and its 
member states have long constituted a critical mass in the field of development coopera-
tion. Solidarity and cohesion are declared aims both within the Union and globally. as such, 
the EU and its member states constitute the world’s largest development assistance and 
humanitarian assistance donor. The investment that has been made – in terms of resources, 
human capital and political involvement – renders European development policies highly 
relevant in advancing the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.
In the current global context, development, peace and security need to be approached in 
dynamic, flexible, inclusive and participatory ways. The challenges to the triptych – devel-
opment, peace and security – come from a number of directions. The most disconcerting 
ones can be grouped into three core categories: the consequences of climate change; the 
implications of situations of ‘state failure’ or ‘state fragility’; and the effects of the global 
financial crisis.
Climate change
Environmental degradation and climate change have been identified as development 
challenges, particularly as their adverse effects will disproportionately affect poorer 
countries with economies predominantly based on natural resources and related 
economic sectors (agriculture, forestry and fisheries). Environmental sustainability is 
identified as one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), yet prospects for a 
global framework within which to address climate change – one that will be workable and 
will have impact – are still grim.
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State fragility and the poverty trap
Fragile countries that do not possess the capacity or legitimacy to govern effectively account 
for a third of the world’s poor. Fragility – combining underdeveloped infrastructure, wide-
spread food insecurity, low levels of human capital – severely affects the development 
prospects of these countries, as well as their security. There are serious repercussions for 
the countries’ citizens, for neighbouring states and for the global community as a whole.
The global financial crisis
The global financial crisis has been exacerbating the situation for the poorest of the poor. 
In a period where financial resources are scarce it is vital that the EU maintains its devel-
opment commitments to the more vulnerable regions of the world in order to contain – and 
eventually break – vicious cycles of poverty. Increasingly restrictive migration policies, 
falling remittances, shrinking aid budgets and a shift of political and administrative focus 
to other policy priorities are each posing significant challenges to the global development 
goals.
In this context, the commitment that the EU has demonstrated to the development of the 
world’s poorest and most vulnerable needs to be maintained. Ideally, it needs to be further 
improved. Moreover, the security-development nexus which has been at the core of the EU’s 
foreign policy and its steady emergence as a global civilian power needs to be expanded. 
This contribution therefore attempts to elaborate on some of the relevant dimensions of 
integrating and addressing security and peace-related priorities in order to contribute to 
sustainable development. It also notes the role that regional cooperation initiatives on 
environmental issues can play in assisting sustainable development and peacebuilding.
The current state of affairs
Development has been at the core of EU external action for decades, and cooperation policies 
have defined a significant portion of EC / EEU relations with african, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries since the 1960s.
The European Community and the member states are the largest Official Development 
assistance (ODa) donors representing over 55% of total ODa and more than two thirds of 
grant aid, while the European Community’s share is more than 10% of total ODa worldwide. 
Through DG ECHO, the EC is also the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world, with 
grants covering emergency aid, food aid and aid to refugees and displaced persons which 
worth a total of more than €700 million per year. The share of European aid managed by the 
European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has gradually increased to 
just under 20% today.
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Without a doubt, the EU has been pivotal in framing global development priorities. Poverty 
eradication in the context of sustainable development, including the achievement of the MDGs, 
has been among the overarching objectives of the EU’s development policy. The EU’s Policy 
Coherence for Development Initiative aims at reinforcing the EU’s assistance to developing 
countries pursuing the MDGs. It made an essential contribution to the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on aid Effectiveness and the subsequent accra agenda for action (aaa), aimed at improving 
aid effectiveness. Meanwhile, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of 
law, promotion of peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, solidarity and justice 
have been placed at the centre of EU partnerships and dialogue with developing countries.
In this context, it is worth considering two dimensions in particular that are interconnected 
with development cooperation: security and climate change.
To take security first, the European Report on Development (2009) placed the security-devel-
opment nexus at the core of the EU’s distinctive approach to foreign policy and its ambitions as 
a civilian world power. There has been much rhetoric, over decades, about the importance for 
development of individual security, sustainable security, the need to address the root causes of 
‘state failure’ or ‘state fragility’, and the moral and practical imperatives of the need to address 
security challenges – real and potential – arising from climate change and environmental deg-
radation. There remains, however, an exasperating gap between declared intentions and the 
implementation of policies building security and sustainable development ‘on the ground’.
There is already wide acceptance across the EU and its member states (see EU Council Conclusions 
November 2007; European Report on Development: 2009, Overcoming fragility in Africa – Forging 
a new European approach) of the need for development policies and security-building activities 
that are holistic in scope, people-centred, transparent, locally appropriate and locally owned. 
However, there are significant implementation gaps and challenges in trying to translate EU 
policy commitments into actions – particularly into actions that have impact and results.
Five core challenges can be identified in this context:
 Development cooperation projects and security-building initiatives have little (if  •
any) impact and result in conflict-ridden regions if they do not involve local commu-
nities and actors at all stages of the policy formulation and implementation process. 
Even though there is wide-spread recognition of the importance of participatory and 
people-centred projects, there is still limited public / local participation in many EU 
projects, which restricts their impact and legitimacy.
 Donor governments and agencies involved in security projects rarely exchange infor- •
mation and communicate with donor governments and agencies involved in develop-
ment projects, or with the respective, relevant agencies and actors of the recipient 
countries. Development and security actors fail to coordinate their agendas: they are 
frequently oblivious of each others’ priorities and actions leading to missed opportu-
nities for synergies and wasted resources.
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 actors involved in security-building programmes tend to rely on weak analyses  •
and evidence and are rarely informed by adequate monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms.
 There has been a growing effort to mainstream gender issues in Security Sector Reform  •
practices and to bridge this with gender mainstreaming in development policies, 
however, this is still hap-hazard and treated more as an ad hoc consideration rather 
than a core issue to address.
 Development and security programmes frequently stumble due to widespread lack of  •
trust and a culture of impunity and lack of accountability in conflict-ridden societies, 
and due to recurring outbreaks of violence. a sense of justice is necessary for security: 
restoring the rule of law contributes to re-engaging all segments of society. The reform 
of the justice sector is key in this and is frequently overlooked as Security Sector 
Reform efforts overwhelmingly focus on reforming and democratising the military / 
paramilitary / police forces.
Second, global climate change has its place on the agenda for sustainable development and has 
been at the core of EU development policies since the late 1990s. although the EU is undoubt-
edly the leader in this area, it needs to further upscale its efforts and integrate environmental 
concerns more comprehensively into its development projects. There is potential for more.
Managing natural resources and addressing the effects of climate change are both clear oppor-
tunities for regional cooperation (including among rival populations and countries). They offer 
the platform for working across conflict divides in order to address shared problems for mutual 
benefits (Commission Communication, COM(2003) 85 final – Climate change in the context of 
development cooperation). Water cooperation initiatives in the Middle East and biodiversity pro-
tection in the South Caucasus can serve as confidence-building efforts in spite of the political 
and military tensions in both regions. Similarly, energy cooperation in the Great Lakes Region can 
also serve as a peacebuilding potential. yet, significant obstacles hamper the potential that these 
challenges offer for tackling both sustainable development and regional peace and security.
asymmetric power relations between involved parties hamper efforts to meaningfully pursue 
regional environmental projects. asymmetry may apply to different levels of capacity between 
the stakeholders; different levels of political will; different sorts of resources available and 
invested in a project; and different benefits – or even rival / diverging interests – for the 
various partners involved. These asymmetries need to be taken into consideration from the 
outset of any development, peacebuilding, conflict resolution or confidence-building initia-
tive on behalf of the EU. It is important, and so far it has been quite rare, to include needs-and-
interests assessments of all concerned parties from the preparation of regional cooperation 
initiatives. The needs and interests of all parties must be acknowledged and addressed in 
order for local actors to have a stake and an interest in motivating cooperation across dividing 
lines, and in investing (usually very scarce) resources in environment-protection objectives 
that will also contribute to longer-term development plans.
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Thus, there is frequent confusion about what needs to be prioritised in development 
planning, with little if any attention given to synergies and complementarities with conflict 
prevention / peacebuilding projects and environmental protection projects (particularly 
regional ones).
Proposals
Development, peace and security interdigitate and are mutually reinforcing. Improved coor-
dination and coherence are needed not just between donors and between donors and 
receivers; they are also needed between security, peacebuilding and development strate-
gies. This must be translated into policies that respond to both security and development 
needs on the ground.
The Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio Presidency can constructively contribute to these 
efforts, given the priorities that they have identified in common and individually.
Spain has declared its intention to attribute renewed attention to the MDGs and to Europe’s 
relationship with the aCP countries. Similarly, Belgium wishes to play an important role in 
the reform of the European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU’s Development Cooperation 
policies. In the context of the 2010 third EU-africa Summit, Belgium has declared its intention 
to concentrate on africa – where development, security and peace are core priorities. The 
follow-up to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit (December 2009) constitutes another 
cornerstone of the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Presidencys’ priorities.
Thus, this Trio Presidency can concentrate efforts on three areas:
 Encourage developing partner countries – and especially the aCP – to pursue compre- •
hensive development policies that branch out to include Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
strategies and environmental considerations;
 Strengthen EU commitment to development cooperation projects that take into consid- •
eration security-building activities and conflict-prevention priorities in their planning, 
formulation, funding and implementation phases;
 Identify areas where regional cooperation on the environment and natural resources  •
can contribute to specific environmental protection goals and wider security implica-
tions (i.e. feed into wider peacebuilding efforts).
Finally, Hungary has decided to attribute a major role to NGOs during its Presidency. It can 
ask NGOs and research networks that have partners both on the ground (and are therefore 
aware of the local constraints and vulnerabilities) and in the policy-making centres (and are 
therefore aware of the policy and resource constraints and political concerns and balances) to 
develop tool-kits, handbooks and training seminars for EU policy-makers and state officials 
in the recipient countries.
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ENlARGEMENT ANd ThE NEIGhbouRhood
Enlargement: Stalemate or Breakthrough?
Adam balcer Senior Fellow and “EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy” 
project leader, demosEUROPa
Vladimír bartovic Research Fellow, Europeum
david Král Director, Europeum
T he year of 2009 has not been very promising for the enlargement process. Despite hopes associated with the respective Presidencies of the Czech Republic and Sweden – both countries with clear political support for enlargement and which put them high on 
the Presidency’s agenda – little has been achieved in practice. Some problems relating to the 
enlargement were carried over from the previous period: ‘enlargement fatigue’ on part of the 
EU member states, reiterated by the nervousness surrounding the Lisbon Treaty ratification 
and due partially also to the somewhat poorly perceived accession of Bulgaria and Romania, 
as well as to sceptical public opinion especially in the older EU member states. Some addi-
tional points, however, played into the stalemate in the enlargement process. Firstly, the 
bilateral disputes of some EU members and the candidate countries blocked the process to a 
degree unseen before: this relates to the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute, the Turkey-Cyprus 
issue over extending the ankara protocol to Cyprus, and the Greece-Macedonia name dispute. 
although the unblocking of the Slovenian-Croatian dispute in September 2009 could pave 
the way for the negotiations to proceed fast, it might still create a backlash – as the disagree-
ment has not been settled and a solution will have to be found before Croatia’s accession, 
expected in early 2012.
Despite enlargement featuring high on the Czech Presidency’s agenda, the Presidency’s 
activities eventually focused more on crisis response and the Eastern Partnership, thus 
derailing the Western Balkans accession agenda in particular. The planned high-level 
summit between the EU and Western Balkans, intended to boost the countries’ accession 
drive, turned into a mere ministerial meeting ahead of the spring 2009 Gymnich that dealt 
mainly with Bosnia. also the Swedish EU Presidency, with large parts of its diplomatic efforts 
concentrated on finalising the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and ensuring a strong outcome 
of the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change, limited the importance of the enlargement 
agenda, despite areas where Sweden could potentially play a strong role, such as brokering 
the Cyprus negotiations and making progress with Turkey.
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also the European Commission, the traditional driver of the enlargement process, took a 
lower profile with its approaching end of term: it was unwilling to push for a politically more 
sensitive and divisive agenda.
On the contrary, the determination of the potential candidate countries to pursue the enlarge-
ment path was demonstrated by the lodging of the membership applications by Montenegro 
in December 2008, albania in april 2009 and Iceland in July 2009. These illustrate certain 
enduring dynamics. During the Czech EU Presidency, the Council referred the Montenegrin 
application to the Commission for evaluation while no such step was made in relation to 
the albanian application. The length of the process (several months) sharply contrasts 
with the application of Iceland, where such a decision was taken by the Council only in one 
month, thus raising questions about the possible fast-track accession of Iceland and the 
likely negative response from the other candidate countries – despite Iceland’s undoubted-
ly superior alignment with the EU through its participation in the European Economic area 
(EEa). In case of Montenegro the Commission’s evaluation is expected to be given only in the 
autumn of 2010, which seems to be appallingly late given that the Commission is regularly 
and deeply monitoring the developments in all the candidate countries. 
western balkans: new perspectives ahead? 
Despite the lack of movement in the enlargement process in the Western Balkans, some 
positive trends in the region could be observed. 
The most visible and tangible progress was undoubtedly achieved in the visa liberalisation 
process, where three countries of the region – Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – will 
be granted a visa-free regime as of January 2010, while the others have such a perspec-
tive during 2010, supposing they further comply with the criteria set out in the roadmaps. 
This example clearly demonstrates that the EU conditionality still brings results, if concisely 
defined benchmarks are set and applied. This begs a question of whether such an approach 
could be used for the enlargement process as whole. 
One of the major problems of the EU vis-à-vis the region is the absence of a clearly defined 
roadmap, describing when each country will be able to receive candidate status and open 
accession negotiations. This lack of vision is undoubtedly a result of politicisation of the 
enlargement process, where the Commission strives to meet various concerns of the EU 
member states rather than act as an independent policy driver. One could argue that based 
on the example of the 2004 accession, the greatest reform progress in candidate countries 
is achieved once the negotiations are open. This allows a clear set of criteria defined for each 
negotiation chapter through the EU common positions. Furthermore, opening the negotia-
tions with more candidates from the Western Balkans will create the desired competitive 
race which worked so well in the case of the previous enlargement. This momentum is badly 
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missing now, as the Turkish accession is still very much decoupled from others and blocked, 
thus leaving Croatia being the only negotiating candidate.
also, the progress reports of the European Commission issued in October 2009 are positive 
about the developments in the Western Balkan countries, except for Bosnia and Kosovo. 
The key elections in Serbia in 2008 brought to power a pro-European government as well as 
President, which can be illustrated by the decision of the Serbian government to unilater-
ally apply the Interim agreement between the EU and Serbia. The Commission reports also 
praise the uncontested elections in Macedonia and albania, which was an important litmus 
test in terms of their compliance with the political part of the Copenhagen criteria. In relation 
to Montenegro, strengthening of the administrative and institutional capacity, formerly 
the most criticised point, progressed significantly. This positive assessment indicates that 
obstacles to labelling other countries as candidates should not be invented and that a swift 
opening of negotiations can take place. The newly appointed European Commission with a 
fresh mandate should, along with the next Trio Presidency, try to give a new boost to the 
enlargement process.
However, at the same time, the European Union must be aware of the worrying developments 
in the region and should adopt a more courageous strategy of tackling them. More attention 
and resources have to be given to the two most vulnerable states in the region: Bosnia and 
Kosovo. With the gradual departure of the international community from both states, the EU 
is assuming more responsibility. Neither of the countries is self-sustainable at the moment, 
but the EU is doing very little to remedy this. In Kosovo, the biggest problem is that the EU 
has failed so far in ensuring Kosovo’s full participation in all the regional initiatives, stabilisa-
tion and association process and visa liberalisation due to the lack of consensus among the 
member states over its recognition. The EU is even now unwilling to put the issue on the table 
when dealing with Serbia, hoping for some kind of gradual settlement and the preservation 
of the status quo, which might be tackled only once Serbia is close to actual accession. apart 
from the fact that this policy creates false expectations in Serbian society that are fed by 
even some pro-European politicians, it has many other negative consequences. It preserves 
a de facto frozen conflict on the doorstep of the EU, hampers economic development in the 
country, stalls its integration prospects, and makes Kosovo a hostage to the EU’s own inca-
pacity to enforce a solution proposed and endorsed in the ahtisaari plan. If Kosovo is further 
derailed from the enlargement process, the ensuing instability seriously risks spilling over to 
the neighbouring countries in the region. 
In case of Bosnia, the main problem in relation to the EU is the weakness of its institutions, 
which are not able to manage the integration process of the country. The representatives of 
Bosnian entities are not able to agree upon an institutional settlement which would allow the 
country to implement necessary reforms and undertake steps bringing Bosnia closer to the 
EU. at the same time the EU is afraid of using its different tools in order to push for solutions 
on which the Bosnian entities cannot agree – but which would benefit the country and 
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espe cially its citizens, regardless of their nationality. If the Bosnian politicians are not able to 
agree upon new state arrangements within a certain time, the EU should – through the Office of 
High Representative – make extensive use for the last time of its powers to create, implement 
and enforce new institutional arrangements. These would enable Bosnia to emerge from the 
stalemate situation that is a negative externality of the Dayton agreement arrangements.
Turkey and ukraine: a permanent stalemate?
Turkey and Ukraine’s European aspirations are in serious crisis. The pace of Turkey’s accession 
negotiations is very slow. Since October 2005 Turkey has opened 13 negotiation chapters out 
of 35 and closed only one. Five negotiation chapters are blocked informally by France on 
the pretext of their link to full membership. Since December 2006 eight negotiation chapters 
have been frozen because Turkey has not fulfiled its obligation to extend the Custom Union 
to all new members of the EU, including Cyprus, whose Greek Cypriot government ankara 
refuses to recognise until a negotiation settlement between both communities living on the 
island is reached. The new phase of peace talks started in September 2008 but until now has 
not brought a breakthrough. 
after the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukraine did not receive incentives similar to those of 
Turkey in 1999, when it obtained candidate status despite all its shortcomings. In case of Kiev 
the EU was willing only to declare that “the future of Ukraine is in Europe”. Until now Brussels 
has not been treating Ukraine as a potential candidate like the Western Balkan states. On the 
other hand, the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite – in contrast to Turkey’s political elite in 
the 90s – quickly lost its commitment to the European project. In consequence, European-
Ukrainian relations focused on the ‘low profile’ issue of negotiations for the association 
agreement (aa), which started in March 2007. Nevertheless, the pace of these is slow. a new 
impetus to the process could bring Ukraine’s application for candidate status. according to 
declarations by Ukrainian officials, this will take place in spring 2010. 
The stalemate in Turkey’s accession process arises from the exceptional character of the 
Turkish candidacy in comparison to previous ones. Turkey’s uniqueness originates from 
its ‘super heavyweight’ demographic, the religious-cultural ‘otherness’ factor which influ-
ences both sides, and serious internal and external problems. In particular, the Muslim 
character of Turkish society, which is more conservative than societies in Europe, and has 
the potential to increase in population to 100 million, causes stronger opposition from EU 
societies and political elites than with past European accession candidates. according to the 
Eurobarometer 69 (2008), 45% of Europeans approve Turkey’s accession after fulfiling all the 
conditions and 45% are against. 
Turkey’s candidacy is also the most controversial because it has to cope with serious internal 
challenges (e.g. Kurdish armed separatism) and external ones (e.g. non-recognition of 
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Cyprus). In consequence of these challenges Turkey remains a partially democratic country, 
and fears concerning its accession are strongly rooted in Turkish society (loss of territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and national identity). The golden age of Turkish-European relations 
was between 1999 and 2005, when Turkey obtained candidate status and then launched 
democratic reforms that were unprecedented in its history. These developments showed 
explicitly that Turkey’s democratisation strongly depends on the Europeanisation process 
and that this could not start without a favourable political balance of power in the EU. The 
increase in opposition towards Turkey’s accession in Europe after 2005, the changes of gov-
ernments in France or Germany unfavourable to Turkey’s European aspirations and deadlock 
in the Cyprus peace process (the rejection of the annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots in 2004) 
caused a significant slow down, even regression, in Turkey’s democratisation process, as 
well as a spectacular fall in public support for accession. Nevertheless, 55% of Turks still 
support accession and 35% oppose it. The Turkish government can reverse at least partially 
the negative trends concerning democratisation, by implementing “the Kurdish opening” the 
package of reforms aiming at significantly extending the Kurds’ rights.
In the case of Ukraine, European public opposition to its membership is weaker than to the 
accession of Turkey and even to some potential Balkan candidates. The European political 
elite is not explicitly opposed but rather very reluctant to take a stance on the issue of 
Ukraine’s bid. This cautious approach can be explained by Ukraine being a demographic 
‘heavyweight,’ its poverty, extremely high level of corruption, and the Russian factor. Support 
in Ukrainian society for accession to the EU has never been massive and has in fact decreased 
in the last few years. at the moment, around 40% of Ukrainians support EU membership and 
almost 30% oppose it. Close cooperation with Russia is a strategic priority for around half of 
Ukrainians, and with the EU for less than 30%. Significant regional discrepancies in attitudes 
towards the EU exist between the decidedly pro-Russian Southern and Eastern Ukraine, and 
anti-Russian Western Ukraine. Last but not least, Moscow is still the most important player 
in the Black Sea region. Russia perceives Ukraine as being in its own sphere of interest, and 
possesses military bases on Ukraine’s territory (Black Sea Fleet).
The deadlock in Turkey and Ukraine’s relations with the EU has a negative impact on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU’s geopolitical position – its soft 
power potential in the neighbourhood and credibility in the international arena. The dis-
agreement among EU members on Turkey’s and Ukraine’s accession is one of the most 
serious challenges to the cohesion of the CFSP. Tensions between Turkey and the EU are one 
of the factors increasing ankara’s tactical cooperation with Russia and Iran, which could sig-
nificantly diminish the EU’s influence in the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus, Central asia 
and the Middle East. On the other hand, the reluctance of Brussels to officially recognise 
Ukraine as a potential candidate strengthens Russia’s aspirations to be the main centre of 
gravity for the post-Soviet countries. Since the Turkish negotiations are intensely followed 
in Muslim countries and treated there as a test of European intentions towards Muslims, the 
impasse in Turkey’s negotiation process limits the EU’s soft power capacity in the Middle East. 
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The informal blocking of some of Turkey’s negotiation chapters by France is plainly going 
against the principle of pacta sunt servanda. according to the EU-agreed negotiating 
framework, “the shared objective of the negotiations is accession”. another challenge to the 
credibility of the EU is that it did not keep its promise to lift the embargo from the Turkish 
Cypriots as a reward for their support of the annan Plan. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine 
has been a democratic country, and according to article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty, any dem-
ocratic European state may apply to join the Union. 
Top 10 recommendations to the Eu:
 1�  Use the unique opportunity of the EU institutional settlement to give a new boost to 
enlargement policy and put it higher on the EU agenda. This should be done in cooperation 
between the Trio Presidency, the new Commission and the new EU High Representative 
and President.
 2�  Pave the way for opening the negotiations with all the Western Balkan countries – which 
will create a regatta, encourage the reforms most effectively in these countries and lead 
to a healthy competitive group dynamic, as was the case of the 2004 enlargement.
 3�  adopt a more assertive role in Bosnia and Kosovo, since the membership perspective 
alone cannot deliver a solution to the issue of Kosovo status and the necessary constitu-
tional and institutional arrangements in Bosnia.
 4�  Work consistently on EU public opinion through awareness raising campaigns, using the 
positive example of the 2004 enlargement.
 5�  Increase funding to and open a dialogue with civil society organisations in Western Balkan 
countries and Turkey, to legitimise their effort for democratisation and implementation of 
necessary EU related reforms, as with the Civil Society Forum launched as the part of the 
Eastern Partnership.
 6�  accelerate negotiations on the aa with Ukraine. In the aa, Brussels should officially 
state that “Ukraine’s future is in the EU”. The next steps should be clear roadmaps for 
candidacy status and liberalisation of the visa regime.
 7�  Engage much more assertively in the peace processes concerning Cyprus. a settlement on 
the island would accelerate Turkey’s European bid and have a positive impact on Turkish-
EU cooperation within the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
 8�  Invite Turkey to all European missions in Eurasia (using the Western Balkans as a paradigm). 
Establish a strategic partnership with Turkey in the CFSP.
 9�  Increase energy sector cooperation with Ukraine (modernisation of its infrastructure) and 
Turkey (Nabucco project).
10�  Increase pressure on France to respect the principles of the negotiating framework and 
unblock Turkey’s accession process.
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ENlARGEMENT ANd ThE NEIGhbouRhood
The EU’s Role Towards Russia  
and the Eastern Neighbourhood:  
Between Consultation,  
Cooperation and Confrontation
Annegret bendiek Research Fellow, SWP
Andrew wilson Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
T he EU’s relations with Russia are shaped by the tensions between Central and Eastern European security interests and Western Europe’s energy needs. after a brief honey–moon at the start of Putin’s first term in 2000, and unsuccessful attempts to revive the 
spirit of cooperation after 11th September 2001, relations with Russia have consistently been 
one of the most divisive issues within the EU. Whereas France, Germany and Italy tend to take a 
relaxed position in relations with Russia (not least due to their dependency on Russian energy 
supplies) some of the Central and Eastern European states (though Poland under Tusk is keen 
not be perceived as anti-Russian within the EU) and states such as Sweden see Russian politics 
in the Caucasus as an immediate threat to their own security and therefore join Britain (as the 
foreign policy ally of the United States) in calling for the EU to take a harder line on Russia.
These differing preferences are also reflected in the different approaches to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where major political pro jects such as the Mediterranean 
Union initiated by Paris stand un con nec ted ly side by side with the Polish / Swedish Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) for deepening co oper ation with the EU’s Eastern neighbours. It also 
remains unclear how the Eastern Partnership will fit in with the Northern Dimension (EU, 
Russia, Norway and Iceland) and the Black Sea Synergy. Nor has the EU yet developed suc-
cessful instruments for preventing conflict in the Eastern neighbourhood. Finally the EaP 
does not contain any forward-thinking proposals as to how the EU’s proposed multilater-
al cooperation with armenia, azer baijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine could constructive-
ly complement the existing EU-Russia relationship. Following the events in Georgia in 2008 
and the positioning of the EU as the only mediator in the conflict, EU member states now 
find themselves forced to rethink their policies in the Southern Caucasus, and how to handle 
Russia. Three alternative para digms offer themselves to the EU.
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Consensus-building within Europe and consultation with Russia
Russia’s latest demonstration of military strength and power aspirations in neigh bouring ter-
ritories has clearly widened the gap between the EU member states that call for a more con-
frontational course towards Russia and those that prefer to pursue cooperation.
The EU wants to remain present in the Caucasus through the vehicles of the United Nations 
and the Organisation for Security and Cooper ation in Europe (OSCE). Beyond that, it has sent 
a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to monitor the ceasefire agreement. 
The EU will continue supporting Georgia with humanitarian aid and reconstruction assis-
tance. as well as a donors’ conference and talks about a free trade zone, it is also planned to 
lift visa restrictions on Georgian citizens enter ing the EU.
It is quite possible that Russia aims to become a new hegemonic power and restore former 
spheres of influence, which is bound to give rise to new disagreements between EU member 
states. In November 2008, the EU decided to return to the negotiating table with Russia in 
order to agree a new Partnership Treaty. But Lithuania refused to endorse the move, describ-
ing it as ‘a mistake’. Consultations with Russia by individual member states and the EU as 
a whole are necessary to make sure the distance between the two sides does not become 
so large that it ends up being difficult to bridge (a tendency that is also en couraged by the 
american course). The conflicts that need tackling within the EU and with Russia are obvious. 
apart from the crisis in the Caucasus, they include cooperation on global issues, the US 
military presence in Poland and the Czech Republic (which Obama’s 2009 decision to drop 
missile stations has not entirely defused), and common energy policy in the neighbourhood 
(and in the EU, given the penetration of the EU market by Russian energy companies).
Certain EU member states are interested in maintaining or even expanding existing relations 
with Russia. alongside dependency on Russian energy imports and other economic interests, 
they are motivated by the con viction that many crucial global problems cannot be solved 
without Russia, certainly not those in Russia’s own neighbourhood. The European Commission 
emphasised in its communication of December 2006 on strengthening the ENP that a state 
of lasting peace in the neigh bour hood can only be achieved with Russia’s participation. But 
in line with its self-image as a ‘global actor’ Russia rejected integration in the ENP, instead 
agreeing a ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU designed to shape four ‘common spaces’: a 
Common Economic Space; a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Common 
Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research and Education, including 
Cultural aspects. However, progress in the development of these four common spaces has 
recently been stalled; Russia is not even a World Trade Organisation (WTO) member.
Despite the crisis in the Southern Caucasus and differences within the EU on how to deal with 
Russia, certain core states of the EU might seek to intensify dialogue in order to prevent Russia 
slipping into isolation. Germany, France, the Benelux countries and Italy could continue the 
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nego tiations over the Treaty on Strategic Partnership. One central project in this partnership 
could be the planned development of a Common Space of External Security. a cooperative 
course towards Russia would initially find the approval of just a few EU member states, but 
it only really makes sense if it enjoys the fundamental support of all the EU member states. 
The ‘new Euro peans’ are not yet convinced that urgent international problems are un solvable 
without Russia’s participation.
The goal of a cooperative policy towards Russia must be to prevent new arms races in Europe 
and jointly tackle global and regional problems (whether they be hard security risks like 
Iranian nuclear weapons or soft risks like organised crime). The precondition for the success 
of such a policy would be a willingness on Russia’s part to take the EU’s interests into account 
in its activities in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. Has Russia under Medvedev changed to 
the extent that cooperation with the EU in this area could be boosted?
The Eastern Partnership: good start or false start?
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was not conceived as a response to the war in Georgia in august 
2008 (as the original Polish-Swedish non-paper was drawn up months before), but it was 
certainly given additional momentum at the special EU summit after the war in September 
2008. 
However, several underlying issues have not been solved. Is the EaP a training ground or clearing 
house for eventual EU membership or an alternative to it? Is engaging with the six former Soviet 
states (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, armenia and azerbaijan) an alternative to an 
EU-Russia relationship which is increasingly dysfunctional, or a means of rebuilding it? Or is 
the EaP nothing to do with Russia, and solely a matter between the six states and the EU? How 
can the EaP deal with the conditionality principal, especially as Belarus, which was never a 
member of the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, has leap-frogged straight into the EaP? 
One group of EU member states – the Reinvigorators – thinks the Eastern Partnership got 
off to a poor start. Normally this group would include the Baltic States, many but not all in 
‘new Europe’, Sweden, sometimes Denmark and the UK. They would like to see the EaP play a 
stronger role in building up a belt of friendly states that would serve as a buffer zone against 
an unfriendly and revisionist Russia and maintain and even advance the case for a member-
ship perspective for its leading states – Moldova and Ukraine, and sometimes Georgia. But 
the Prague Summit that launched the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 was a disappointing 
affair. Only two member states failed to send a President or Prime Minister to the Union of the 
Mediterranean Summit in July 2008; but ten were absent from Prague, including big hitters 
like Brown, Sarkozy, Berlusconi and Zapatero. The austrians only sent their representative 
to the EU, the Italians their welfare minister. Even Sweden, one of the co-sponsors of the EaP 
project, failed to send Foreign Minister Bildt. In the Summit communiqué, the neighbourhood 
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states were downgraded from ‘European countries’ – a phrase which it was feared would 
encourage hopes of accession – to ‘partner countries’. and Germany and France succeeded 
in watering down the language on visa liberalisation, a key issue for neighbourhood states.
The Swedish Presidency added some extra momentum, including a key foreign ministers’ 
meeting of the EaP six in December 2009 and the start of visa facilitation negotiations with 
EaP states; but there were also problems in incorporating the civil society dimension in 
the EaP’s project ‘platforms’. Supporters of the EaP worry it will lose momentum under the 
Spanish and Belgium Presidencies in 2010. 
another group of member states – the Stand-Patters – think the EaP was actually launched 
with relative speed, with less than a year from conception to the first summit. Harsh economic 
realities after the global economic crisis mean that its budget of €600 million over four years 
is actually quite generous. The existing framework is deemed sufficient, as the six states are 
a long way from meeting the Copenhagen criteria and anyway should achieve its targets by 
their own efforts. 
This second group has arguably grown in the last two years, as a result of several factors. 
Traditional friends of the East like the Baltic States have their own problems with the global 
economic crisis. So-called ‘Ukraine fatigue’ has spread with the country’s endless internal 
bickering and the gas crisis with Russia in January 2009, even affecting states like Slovakia. 
Poland under Donald Tusk has pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy, less focused on 
’special causes’. ‘Neighbourhood fatigue’ is also a reality for those who see a region of 
constant crisis, ranging from political deadlock in Ukraine to war in Georgia to Moldova’s 
constant elections, with corrupt and incompetent governments. 
a third group of states – Russia Worriers – such as Spain, Italy, and traditionally Germany, 
though the FDP is pushing for a more balanced eastern policy, worries about Russia’s hostile 
initial reaction to the EaP. They would like to use the ‘third party’ provision in the EaP to 
include Russia in some key areas, or reassure Russia by offering it some parallel synergies. 
This group also suffers from ‘neighbourhood fatigue’, but is often prepared to go further in 
instrumentalising the EU’s relations with the EaP six in the name of ‘broader’ policy goals, 
such as disarmament or Russian cooperation on Iran.
Policy recommendations
Avoiding confrontation with Moscow
Some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 are pushing 
for a policy of confrontation towards Russia. For instance, Poland delayed the EU’s nego-
tiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation agree ment with Russia. The Polish-Russian 
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conflict escalated when Russia restricted energy supplies to Europe and banned imports 
of Polish meat. More recently – two weeks after the fighting broke out in Georgia – Poland 
signed a treaty (which had been under negotiation for two months) allowing the United States 
to station missile defence systems on its territory. However, both US and Polish policy has 
become less confrontational since 2008. 
When the conflict in Georgia escalated in august 2008, the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe, supported by Britain and Sweden, called for the nego tiations over a new Partnership 
and Cooperation agreement with Russia to be suspended and for visa restrictions to be 
reimposed. Other sanctions were also proposed, such as refusing membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), excluding Russia from the G8, freezing Russian bank accounts or 
boycotting the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia. Since the spring 2008 NaTO Summit, some 
of the new members like Poland have been calling for quick NaTO membership for Georgia 
and Ukraine.
 In view of the ongoing tensions in Georgia, one of the tasks of the current Trio Presidency  •
(Spain, Belgium, Hungary) is to sensitise the EU to Central and Eastern Europeans’ fears 
about Russia, while at the same time preventing a policy of confrontation on the part of 
individual states from narrowing the options for the EU as a whole. a harder line would 
perhaps increase the political pressure on Mos cow in the short-term. But in the longer 
term confrontation would be coun ter-productive for overall European security. Foreign 
and security policy interests in the EU-27 diverge and the Central and Eastern European 
states will not succeed in preventing ‘old Europe’ from coming to an arrange ment with 
Russia, so in the medium-term there is a risk of a deep and lasting internal rift in the EU.
 The EU could try to establish a small group of EU member states repre senting the  •
widest possible range of stances on Russia to act as consensus-creators. Following 
the great expansion of 2004, the obvious core of such a group would be the Weimar 
Triangle, supplemented by Britain and the two countries following France in the Council 
Presidency, Sweden and the Czech Republic. There is certainly a chance that Germany, 
France and Poland working with selected partners would be able to find a foreign 
policy consensus on Russia that was acceptable throughout the EU, especially given 
that Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski see 
Europe as the channel of choice for Polish for eign policy.
Getting the Eastern Partnership right
Whatever the internal differences, the EU debate on the Eastern neighbourhood needs to be 
reframed away from the case for and against enlargement. Instead the EU should concentrate 
on three key realities. First, it is not the only pole of attraction in the region – Russian soft and 
hard power is a factor that was largely absent for the accession states of the 1990s. Second, 
the Eastern states are weak states, not the acquis-absorbing states of the 1990s. Third, they 
are sovereignty-seeking states. Their leaders’ priority is to use ‘Titoist’ balancing strategies to 
build up weak statehood, strengthen their personal position and excuse a lack of reform.
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The EU should therefore tread carefully. It should support cooperation with Russia in the 
neighbourhood where possible: it should, for example, be prepared to discuss President 
Medvedev’s proposals for talks on a ‘new European security architecture,’ first floated in 
June 2008. But member states must also accept that a significant degree of competition will 
remain in the neighbourhood between an activist Russia that aims to bring countries into its 
sphere of influence, and an EU that wants to spread democracy, stability and the rule of law – 
although this is mainly a competition between different modus operandi.
Rather than a one-size-fits-all policy of enlargement-lite, the EU therefore needs to 
develop a two-pronged political strategy to complement the bureaucratic processes of 
the ENP and EaP. First, EU member states and institutions need to boost their powers of 
attraction in the neighbourhood. Second, the EU needs to develop imaginative policies to 
help its neighbours prevent (where possible) and cope with (where necessary) political 
and economic crises.
There are many practical measures the EU could take in 2010, but in the limited space 
available here it will suffice to mention five examples.
 ‘Political theatre’ – all six EaP states are geographically or psychologically small. a  •
little diplomatic attention – more visits by the President of the European Council, the 
new High Representative, and national foreign ministers – would go a long way. 
 Visa liberalisation is the number-one issue for public opinion in the EaP states, but  •
is currently stalled. The EaP states should learn from the experience of the Western 
Balkan states that put delivery (passport and border reform, etc.) before declara-
tion. EaP ‘27+6’ meetings of ministers of internal affairs and regular working groups 
on immigration and organised crime would help ease fears about organised crime 
and mass emigration amongst member state public opinion. Until visa liberalisation 
is achieved, member states could follow the example set in Chişinau in establishing 
joint visa centres and easing the bureaucracy of today’s Schengen visa system (the 
problem is not only fees, but the number of different documents each state requires 
the applicant to bring). EU states could establish ‘visa white lists’ for groups of people 
(students, civil society activists / journalists, tourists) who would not have to pay the 
fees and present the same high number of documents every time they apply for a visa. 
If this can’t be achieved within all Schengen countries, states willing to do so should 
establish their own national visa white lists for their national visa. 
 Security solidarity – the EU has announced a mission to Crimea, but not yet decided  •
how it will function. Such a mission should focus on helping diversify the economy of 
the region. It could also massage local egos by celebrating the rich Russian-language 
culture of the region, perhaps by making yalta a City of European Culture. The guiding 
principle should not be sending Europeans to Crimea, but opening up Europe to the 
isolated peninsula. an EU contribution to the construction of infrastructure in EaP 
countries (roads, drainage systems, etc.) and support for inter-regional cooperation 
would also help – and these EU funds are quite easily accessible.
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 The EU should think imaginatively about ways of countering Russia’s strong position in  •
local mass media. Under the EaP’s civil society dimension, the EU should help create a 
regional network of free media funds and a ‘new media school’ to encourage bloggers 
and net-starters, promote web fora that strengthen networks and exchange ideas, and 
websites that translate western media. ‘Internetisation’ would be also helpful, espe-
cially in rural areas.
 EaP is a sensitive matter not only for Russia – Turkey should also be involved in multi- •
lateral projects, especially energy security and security (it has already become one of 
the leading partners in the Nagorno-Karabakh process).
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ENlARGEMENT ANd ThE NEIGhbouRhood
The European Neighbourhood Policy  
and North africa: acknowledging Tensions 
and Putting Reforms First
ulla holm Senior Researcher, DIIS
Fabrizio Tassinari Head of Research Unit on Foreign Policy and EU studies, DIIS
The context
Since 2004, bilateral relations between the EU and North african countries – Morocco, algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt – have been organised through the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). as a result of a ‘variable geometry’ of sort, this has led to some arab-Mediterranean 
states being drawn closer to the EU than others.
Some North african countries are indeed regarded as part of a ‘ring of friends,’ as the 
European Commission initially characterised it. In October 2008, Morocco was the 
first ENP partner to be granted an advanced status, in the framework of the so-called 
‘Governance Facility,’ which the European Commission had proposed in its December 2006 
Communication in order to encourage neighbouring countries in their reform process. By 
embarking on selective top-down liberalisation, and by presenting itself as a vanguard of 
arab reform, Morocco is presented as a success story in this context. Rabat has also been 
willing to cooperate on illegal immigration, drugs trafficking and crime prevention, all items 
dear to some EU member states.
Tunisia is also considered a good partner. Its repeated infringements of human rights have 
apparently not weighted heavily in EU considerations; Tunisian economic reforms, wester-
nised elite and ‘stable’ regime have instead made it an attractive country. Tunisia was the 
first south Mediterranean country to establish a free trade zone with the EU when the last 
remaining customs barriers were lifted on 1st January 2008. Tunisia, like Morocco, needs 
Europe because of its lack of natural resources. Some EU member governments in turn need 
to cooperate with them, in order to show progress on sensitive issues such as illegal immi-
gration and terrorism. Morocco and Tunisia have as a result turned into Brussels’s poster 
children for the ENP in North africa.
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The case of Egypt is different. Cairo is an important player in the Middle East, and perceives 
itself as having a pivotal role between North africa and the Middle East. Furthermore Egypt 
has major gas and oil resources, which makes it attractive to some EU countries. Whereas 
Morocco and Tunisia signed the action Plans in 2005 without any major contentions, Egypt 
did not sign until 2007 because ENP’s political conditionality is (mildly) critical of President 
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime and particularly of its unwillingness to recognise influential 
opposition movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
algeria is a ‘reluctant’ neighbour. It remains the only South Mediterranean country included 
in the ENP not to have signed an action Plan. algeria is one of the main oil and gas ‘arteries’ 
towards Europe, which makes it strategically relevant not only for the EU, but also for Russia, 
the United States, and China. Thanks to skyrocketing oil prices, it has amassed huge foreign 
currency reserves and has paid its foreign debt. Seen from algiers, the ENP does not provide 
added value. as an indirect testament to this, algeria is displaying more interest in member-
ship of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Libya, the former rogue state, has come in from the international cold after the lifting of 
the UN and US sanctions. With billions of dollars collected from the oil and gas sector, 
combined with a small population, Libya is the North african nation that appears best 
prepared to weather the global economic downturn. Like algiers, Tripoli does not need 
the ENP; it is not part of the policy and has declined the invitation to be a member of the 
Union of the Mediterranean. Libya is interested in exporting hydrocarbons and cooper-
ating with the EU on illegal immigration and terrorism. as EU Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner recognised in a visit to Tripoli in February 2009, Libya has 
the potential to be an extremely important partner to the EU with regard to energy, illegal 
immigration and trade. 
The unintended effect of the ENP’s bilateralism is that it exposes how differently the five 
North african countries react to European proposals of joint partnership. It uncovers the dif-
ficulties in creating a North african region that is ridden by inter-state conflicts (including 
the frozen West-Sahara conflict) and closed borders (between Morocco and algeria since 
1994). Wealthy regimes, such as algeria and Libya, can cope and go global. Morocco and 
Tunisia look for the EU for support, while Egypt is situated somewhere in the middle. 
although the narrative underpinning the ENP has concerned avoiding new dividing lines 
being erected between the EU and its neighbours, these recent developments confirm 
there is an inbuilt tension between the declared goals of the policy and their implementa-
tion. This tension is primarily due to the ambiguous relationship between the EU’s self-rep-
resentation as an exporter of standards such as democracy, and the threat perception in 
relation to the Mediterranean neighbours. The EU discourse on the promotion of its norms 
and values has been challenged by a perception of the Southern Mediterranean space as 
inherently conflictual.
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The threat of Islamist terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime have made a more 
cautious and less pro-active EU policy look justified, which has in turn indirectly contributed 
to the preservation of regime status quo in the Southern Mediterranean countries. Southern 
Mediterranean regimes have themselves been willing to cooperate with the EU and in the ENP 
context on Islamist terrorism and illegal immigration because these items are perceived as 
threats to their own stability. as a result, threat perceptions on both sides have reduced the 
space for political reform in the arab-Mediterranean space. EU initiatives aimed at promoting 
democracy in these countries have so far have primarily concentrated on technical support, 
e.g. the purchase of electronic equipment for monitoring elections, rather than focusing on 
the institutions and standards that are supposed to strengthen a functioning liberal demo-
cratic process. 
The European Commission is well aware of these dilemmas. For example, the General affairs 
and External Relations Council stated in the June 2007 document Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy that “the shared political commitment must be translated into more 
attractive and palpable incentives for the partners, notably in the area of democracy, gov-
ernance and the rule of law”. But notwithstanding some notable innovations such as the 
so-called Governance Facility, aiming at rewarding well-performing neighbours, not even this 
enhanced Neighbourhood Policy ‘Plus’ has turned the tide on democracy promotion in the 
Southern Mediterranean. This is ultimately not related to the type of incentives that the EU 
is able to put on the table, but rather to the limits of EU conditionality-based mechanisms. 
North african regimes are interested in access to the EU internal market and in European 
investments in their countries. at most, they want freer movement of persons, a long-term 
goal that is hampered by restrictive EU visa-policy. 
EU statements frequently acknowledge that political and economic reforms cannot be 
imposed from the outside. While it is hard to disagree with such statements, this insistence 
on a currently non-existent inside-out dynamic has ended up as a justification for placing 
political reforms on a backburner of EU policies in the Southern Mediterranean. as a result, 
the record of the ENP in the South testifies to the crisis in the EU’s self-representation as 
an exporter of universal values. It demonstrates the obvious difficulties in defining a policy 
towards the neighbours that have no prospect of EU membership. It leaves unanswered the 
question of whether and how the EU can resume the ‘pull factor’ that has defined the relations 
with its neighbours elsewhere in the European periphery.
Significant developments of the past eighteen months
at a pan-European level, the most significant development during the past Trio Presidency 
has been the launching and initial implementation of the Union for the Mediterranean, at the 
outset of the French EU Presidency. In the run-up to the grand opening of the Union for the 
Mediterranean, when 43 heads of states and governments joined President Sarkozy in Paris in 
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July 2008, a compromise was struck on the actual scope and structure of the new initiative. The 
new Union would be embedded within EU policy, upgrading and complementing the ongoing 
work in key sectors such as the environment, energy, research, and transportation. In order 
to signal the desire to revitalise existing institutions, its official name has become ‘Barcelona 
Process: union for the Mediterranean’. Rather than a centralising executive, the secretariat 
of the Union was designated to be a technical office for project coordination, chaired by two 
rotating consul-like figures, one from the EU and one from a North african country. The first 
should be from France and the second from Egypt which has a long, special relationship with 
France and serves as a pivotal point between the Middle East and North africa. 
Less than two years after its inception, it is too early to evaluate and pass judgement on the 
implementation record of the Union for the Mediterranean, but a few considerations can nev-
ertheless be made. For one, the Union for the Mediterranean, diluted as it now is, remains 
aimed at addressing some of the more blatant shortcomings of the regional approach of the 
EU policy. The holistic approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, although endowed 
with some €8.8 billion in financial assistance between 1995 and 2006, failed to deliver 
concrete benefits for North african partners. The rather delimited scope of action of the 
Union of the Mediterranean aims at tackling this deficiency and may well succeed in deliver-
ing some significant results.
On the other hand, the more inspired political rhetoric that accompanied Sarkozy’s initial 
project has underlined the same contradictions, and so far suffered a similar fate, of previous 
EU initiatives, most notably the Euro-Mediterranean Policy. Over the past eighteen months, 
a blatant example of EU foreign policy fragmentation in the region was the war in Gaza in 
January 2009 and the European reaction to it. The Gaza war painfully underlined EU policy 
constraints, with the Czech EU Presidency sending a diplomatic mission on behalf of the 
Union, several European governments placing the blame for resuming the hostilities squarely 
on Hamas, while some segments of the French government condemned the Israeli offensive 
and President Sarkozy put together a diplomatic mission of his own. 
as is the case with other policy issues and in other geographical areas, EU divisions also have 
a more pro-active dimension, taking shape in bilateral relations between EU member states 
and individual partner countries in North africa. Over the past year and a half, the more high-
profile cases in this respect have arguably pertained to Libya’s fledgling ‘normalisation’. In 
august 2009, Scotland released (on compassionate grounds) convicted Lockerbie bomber 
abdelbaset ali al-Megrahi. European public opinion was outraged to witness the hero-like 
welcome that Megrahi received upon his arrival in Tripoli. Opinion makers voiced concerns 
about the negative impact of commercial interests on the relationship between the British 
government and Gaddafi’s dictatorship. 
The evolution of the bilateral relations between Italy and Tripoli has also proven contro-
versial for the EU’s international standing. Since august 2008, the Italian government is 
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tied to Tripoli by a ‘Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation,’ under which Rome 
has agreed to paying $5 billion in economic reparations as compensation for Italy’s colonial 
rule. The agreement also opens the way for substantial Italian investments in Libya’s hydro-
carbon sector, and for investments by Libya’s sovereign wealth funds in the Italian market. 
Moreover, the accord provides for the ‘forcible return’ of african migrants – and potential 
asylum-seekers – trying to reach Italy from Libya by sea. Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi has defended the deal as being about “less illegal immigrants and more oil”.
The limits of the EU’s holistic approach as perpetuated in the Union of the Mediterranean, 
coupled with EU foreign policy fragmentation as witnessed in initiatives involving individual 
EU member states, point to the broad themes which we wish to identify in our conclusion. 
Conclusions
Five years since the inception of the ENP and two years since the launching of the Union for 
the Mediterranean, the current Trio Presidency needs to look again into the under-perfor-
mance of the EU policy mix in North africa. The foreign policy architecture provided by the 
Lisbon Treaty – including the new High Representative and the External action Service – will 
take shape during this time-span and it is likely to have only a limited impact on the more 
profound deficiencies of Euro-Med relations. at the same time, for reasons pertaining to its 
geo-strategic positioning and interests, the Spanish EU Presidency is likely to inject some 
political momentum into the EU’s North africa dossier. 
If anything, the past fifteen years of European engagement have confirmed that the EU recipe 
has not notably affected the societal, political and economic situation in North africa. It will 
not be possible to turn this tide in 18 months. at the same time, the EU’s attempts have per-
petuated a number of trends, in some cases rooted in serious strategic and conceptual mis-
conceptions, which the current Trio should reflect upon for further consideration. 
First, there is the tension between multilateralism and bilateralism – and between the 
strategic logics underpinning both – which have led to what might be termed a malign compe-
tition among the parties involved. This competition is not always perceptible, but it explains 
how the policy formats launched by the EU over the past fifteen years have, in effect, under-
mined each other. On the multilateral side, competition has played out most notably in the 
animosities among the Southern EU member states that should be most naturally interest-
ed in fostering cooperation with North africa (as well as between these countries and the 
European Commission).
On the bilateral side, the ‘positive conditionality’ promised in the ENP has yet to bear fruits in 
terms of North african’s reform potential and its approximation to EU standards. In fact, it is 
fair to argue that the ENP has so far failed to deliver on the virtuous cycle, whereby progress 
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in one country was expected to encourage reforms in neighbouring countries. If anything, 
Brussels’ hub-and-spoke bilateralism may have indirectly reignited entrenched rivalries and 
made international partners other than Europe look more attractive. To make the point: the 
EU’s rewarding of Morocco’s performance has not been conducive to reforms in algeria or 
Libya. Quite to the contrary: emboldened by their hydrocarbon riches, the regimes in these 
countries have opened up to other geopolitical scenarios and investors, including Sub-
Saharan africa, Russia and China. Multilateralism and bilateralism are indeed ‘complemen-
tary,’ as the standard EU mantra on this matter goes. But specific sectoral niches for each 
need to be identified, and more importantly, they require painstaking work in order to be 
reconnected to an overarching, shared narrative about the EU’s goals in the region.
Not unrelated to this priority, the second theme concerns the ways in which the discourse and 
practice of EU democracy promotion have played out in North africa. Differently from the EU 
enlargement process, in which the advancement of democratic standards in the candidate 
countries is embedded in the conditionality machine, in ENP countries, and in the South in 
particular, the assumption has been that economic cooperation and development would even-
tually spill over into political reforms. The catch with this approach is not only that, as North 
african policy makers and observers constantly point out, economic cooperation prospects 
have been hampered by protectionism on the part of EU countries in key sectors such as 
agriculture and textile. It is that the actual debate on democracy in the countries in question 
has been systematically coupled with real or perceived security concerns. This ‘securitisa-
tion’ has featured prominently among some North african autocratic regimes, which argue 
that reforms on their part would pave the way for a takeover of Islamist extremists. The EU 
(and, to be fair, also the United States) has reinforced this argument by linking the promotion 
of democracy in the region with the fight against terrorism. a more pragmatic EU strategy on 
this point would counsel a lower profile for the strategic importance of political reforms in the 
domestic transformation of these countries.
The EU can improve its democracy promotion record by concentrating on what can actually be 
achieved on the ground in terms of, e.g. independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, sep-
aration of powers and the inclusion of non-violent Islamist parties in the political process. 
Notwithstanding the relatively scarce means available to Brussels institutions to promote 
democratic reforms, some EU governments, political foundations and civil society actors 
have provided the kind of long-term engagement with regional actors whose potential 
impact remains underexploited at the EU level. a more coordinated approach on democracy 
promotion among the European parties involved could in turn go some way towards reconcil-
ing the tensions between the multilateral and bilateral agendas highlighted above. 
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INSTITuTIoNS / EuRoPEAN PolITICAl SPACE
It is of course no surprise that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is either 
the subject or the starting point of all the contributions contained in this chap-
ter. From the Laeken Declaration, which launched a new dynamic of institution-
al reform, it took almost ten years for the new Treaty to come to life. In such a 
context, most authors understandably welcome this progress with a sense of 
relief and an eagerness to see the new system rapidly functioning in the most 
effective way. The growing gap between an EU stuck in institutional deadlock 
and the fast-changing world around it could not have gone on any longer. The 
challenges facing the EU are numerous and of an unprecedented scale since 
the economic crisis broke out in 2008. The Trio Presidency led by Spain, Bel-
gium and Hungary will therefore hold an important responsibility as the first 
to implement the new Treaty provisions and the main agent of this transition to 
a new phase of development for the EU. During this new period, most authors 
agree that there will be no wide-ranging Treaty reforms in the short-term, and 
that the focus will rather be on policy delivery.
However, the papers of this chapter draw 
the attention of the Trio Presidency to at 
least three major challenges they will be 
confronted with while acting on their re-
sponsibility.
The first is of course the multiple-choice 
question that will arise at every stage of 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
And the answer that will finally (and prob-
ably painfully) be worked out is crucial, as 
it will establish either the definitive norm 
or at least a practical precedent likely to survive after the Trio. This is particu-
larly obvious with regard to the relationship between the new stable President 
of the European Council and the rotating presidencies. The search for a harmo-
nious modus vivendi is not only needed at the level of meetings of Heads of 
State or Ministers but also in the functioning of the different preparatory bod-
ies, the list of which is impressive for those not acquainted with the work of the 
Council (demosEUROPa). The European External Action Service, conceived as 
the diplomatic force to back up the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, is definitely the second most difficult dossier. This major 
innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, designed to give greater coherence to the EU’s 
external action and to develop its strategic culture, could be deeply damaged by 
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administrative rivalries. The Trio Presidency is particularly well-placed to medi-
ate between member states in order to avert that outcome (demosEUROPa).
But implementation of the Lisbon Treaty conceals many issues other than these 
two major subjects much covered by the media. One of them is the question of 
competences. The Lisbon Treaty provides for a classification of competences in 
different categories but leaves many loopholes in the way the distribution of 
these competences between the EU and the member states will work in practice. 
The Trio Presidency can play a constructive role in guaranteeing the coherence 
of the system by enhancing the strategic role of the General Affairs Council. The 
Trio could also take the initiative to establish a working group of high-level ex-
perts on better distribution of competencies and policy efficiency (ELIaMEP).
In their rush to implement the Lisbon Treaty efficiently, the Trio should be care-
ful not to forget the citizens on the side of the road. Past referenda and Euro-
pean elections have sent worrying signals about citizens’ satisfaction with and 
understanding of the European construction in its present state. Engaging citi-
zens within the Union after Lisbon is also a matter of urgency. Contributions in 
this report have highlighted at least two means by which the Trio could address 
the ‘citizen issue’. It could, firstly, take a decisive role in promoting a healthy 
politicisation of EU debate. This does not signify the transposition of a bipo-
lar left-right majority model to the EU, but rather the creation of conditions for 
the expression of more clearly identified opposition in the EU political system 
(Notre Europe, SIEPS). There are at least two arenas where these more overt 
political confrontations – likely to raise citizens’ interest and clarify the terms 
of the debate – could take place: the European and the national parliaments. In 
particular, their close links with three national political scenes could help make 
the Trio instrumental in ensuring that the new role of national parliaments in 
the control of subsidiarity is exercised in a constructive way, as a tool to stimu-
late more regular and timely national debate on EU affairs, with the full involve-
ment of national legislatures (Notre Europe, SIEPS). The Trio Presidency will 
also have the responsibility of ensuring the proper implementation of the citi-
zens’ initiative. It could, in particular, ensure that those initiatives considered 
inadmissible by the Commission on a competence basis are not simply thrown 
into the bin but that the Commission identifies who has the power to address 
the issue and commits itself to report on further developments (CEPS).
As mentioned earlier, it is commonly accepted among the authors of this 
report that the Lisbon Treaty will be the last full-scale revision of the EU for 
quite some time, given the immense difficulties that the ratification process 
has encountered. However, they also point to two factors that the Trio should 
keep in mind. First, it may not be the end of national expressions of reticence 
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towards the pursuit of European integration and towards a maximalist appli-
cation of the innovations in the Lisbon Treaty (SIEPS). The recent ruling of the 
German Constitutional Court and the subsequent change in the law in order to 
further define the role of the German parliament in monitoring the exercise of 
EU competences, are probably the best illustration of this point. It is not to be 
excluded that other member states decide unilaterally to introduce new consti-
tutional requirements of this sort, thus hindering the smooth development of 
the EU (SIEPS). Furthermore (and all the more so given this context), it is nec-
essary to keep alive and make the most of all the elements of flexibility allowed 
by the Treaty or to be developed outside its realm. Modes of differentiated 
integration (Real Instituto Elcano), the new formula of enhanced cooperation 
or passerelle clauses provided by the Treaty (Notre Europe, Egmont), or more 
narrowly-focused Treaty revisions (demosEUROPa) are all possible avenues to 
be considered by the Trio in trying to unleash the potential of the Lisbon Treaty 
after years of caution and stagnation.
budGET
As the EU turns the page of institutional debate, a decisive new issue is emerg-
ing with the reform of its policies and budget. The Trio will lead these debates 
with the review of EU spending and the adoption of the post-2013 pluriannual 
financial framework. Spain, Belgium and Hungary will have the challenging 
task of avoiding the deadlock of national interest and net payments which in-
fluences the current structure of EU spending, and instead responding to the 
needs and challenges of the 21st century, as European citizens expect of it (SWP, 
Europeum). A debate which proceeded in the right order would focus firstly on 
future challenges of the EU, secondly on discussion of policy instruments and 
lastly on budgetary aspects (Notre Europe). The authors of this report mention, 
in particular, the need for the Spanish Presidency to launch a discussion on the 
budget before concrete negotiations begin. This debate would deal with a ‘new 
Lisbon Strategy’, the crisis and the reform of the CAP (Europeum, Notre Europe, 
SWP). A few guidelines are also recommended for reshaping the budget – for 
example, taking into account the European-level added value of spending and 
the solidarity principle.
The Trio should also avoid unproductive debates on the budget, particularly 
relating to the CAP. Firstly, the common EU budget does not reflect the total 
public expenditure of European countries; it reflects a heterogeneous political 
integration process in which agriculture is the only economic sector which de-
pends on a common budget and common policy (Notre Europe). Secondly, the 
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debate often ignores the fact that the proportion of CAP expenditure has been 
constantly decreasing (Europeum). The current CAP does not respond to agri-
cultural and rural needs. The Trio should seize this opportunity to thoroughly 
reform this policy, in response to imperatives such as food security, water scar-
city and climate change (Europeum). Neglecting this reform would deprive the 
EU of one of its most effective tools for protecting its environment, and would 
destabilise both the farming sector and the European countryside (Notre Eu-
rope). The unknown quantity in these debates on EU policies and budget is the 
impact of the new institutional context and particularly the strengthened role 
of the European Parliament.
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INSTITuTIoNS
Delivering on the Institutional Reform  
of the Lisbon Treaty and Looking beyond
Pawel Swieboda President, demosEUROPa
Challenges of governance in the lisbon Treaty framework
The new institutional set-up is the biggest promise of the Lisbon Treaty and the much 
awaited result of a reform that it has taken nearly eight years to approve. High hopes and 
expectations will be associated with the new institutional framework irrespective of the 
sense of exhaustion that accompanies the last leg of the Treaty ratification process. The key 
aspect will be the functioning of the new triad of the permanent President of the European 
Council, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative (HR) for 
Foreign affairs and Security Policy as well as their relationship with the rotating presiden-
cy. The Treaty is far from providing all the answers as it creates a hybrid system with many 
intrinsic relationships still to be sorted out. It is the practice of the current three presiden-
cies that will determine the functioning of the Lisbon framework.
The key question mark lies over the new permanent President of the European Council and 
the role he manages to carve out for himself. The permanent President is meant to “chair [the 
European Council] and drive its work” (article 9b). On the basis of the work of the General 
affairs Council, he shall also ensure the “preparation and continuity of the work of the 
European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission”. Finally, he “shall, at 
that level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues con-
cerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy, without prejudice to the powers of the HR 
of the Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy”. The way that President van Rompuy has 
launched his term in office, calling an extraordinary European Council on economic issues 
in February 2010, signals an activist approach with a strong commitment to shaping the EU 
agenda.
The HR receives a stronger mandate and role in the system as chair of the Foreign affairs 
Council but the relationship with the rotating presidency and the permanent President of 
the European Council will also need to be worked out. The rotating presidency remains in 
charge of the new General affairs Council and COREPER and by those means will continue 
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to have a bearing in the area of external relations. The personalities of the first duo of 
top leaders as well as the operational code that will be agreed at the time of the entry 
of Lisbon Treaty into force or immediately after will guide the eventual outcomes. One 
can assume that the first two-and-a-half year term of the President of the European 
Council will be a period of many adjustments. The rotating presidency will play the role 
of a critical intermediary given its responsibility for the work of the Council formations 
and especially the General affairs Council as well as COREPER (Committee of Permanent 
Representatives). New competencies of the European Parliament will obviously also be 
an element of the equation. a pattern of cooperation, consultation and coordination will 
be indispensable.
The new institutional set-up will require a fresh discussion about the relevance of the 
programme of the Trio of successive Presidencies and their efforts to coordinate among 
themselves. The Brussels-centric view suggests that there will be less and less rationale 
for cooperation between the Trio to continue. On the other hand, the capitals will undoubt-
edly cling even more strongly to the remaining vestiges of power. The work of the Trio could 
be helpful in that process and is likely to be maintained.
The spirit of the Lisbon Treaty points to a functional system within which the High 
Representative and the supporting European External action Service (EEaS) are given a 
clear role in the new chain of command on foreign policy issues. The one issue that still 
remains to be resolved is the chairmanship of the Council’s preparatory bodies. Declaration 
9 annexed to the Final act makes it clear that the presidency of the COREPER is to be chaired 
by the rotating presidency and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is to be chaired 
by a representative of the HR. article 2 of the Declaration indicates that the preparatory 
bodies of the Foreign affairs Council configuration should not be chaired by the rotating 
presidency (“the chair of the preparatory bodies of the various Council configurations, with 
the exception of the Foreign affairs configuration, shall fall to the member of the group 
chairing the relevant configuration, unless decided otherwise in accordance with article 
4”.). In its note to COREPER / Council, the Presidency has put forward a number of sug-
gestions as to the chairmanship of the respective working parties and preparatory bodies 
(Presidency note on the state of work on the Chairmanship of the Council’s preparato-
ry bodies – Foreign affairs Configuration, Brussels, 22 October 2009, 14852/09). These 
envisage that the rotating presidency would remain in charge in the trade and develop-
ment area while the geographic and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) related 
preparatory bodies will be chaired by representatives of the HR. a transitional period of 
6-12 months was proposed during which the rotating presidency would remain in charge. 
Horizontal preparatory bodies should be chaired by a representative of the HR except for 
RELEX Counsellors (Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors), COTER (Working Party 
on Terrorism), COCON (Working Party on Consular affairs), COJUR (Working Party on Public 
International Law) and COMaR (Working Party on the Law of the Sea), which should be 
chaired by the rotating presidency.
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The European External Action Service
The bringing into life of the European External action Service is perhaps the greatest single 
promise of the institutional order introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. In line with article 27 (3) 
TEU, the EEaS is meant to assist the HR in fulfiling his mandate. Its formation is bound to 
be the most extensive merger operation ever undertaken in Brussels and a taste of things 
to come if the experiment is successful. The EEaS is to comprise officials from the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the Commission as well as seconded from the national dip-
lomatic services in the member states. The activities of the EU Special Representatives will 
also fall within the area of responsibility of the EEaS.
The October 2009 European Council invited the future HR to present a proposal for the 
organisation and functioning of the EEaS as soon as possible after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, with a view to its adoption by the Council at the latest by the end of april 
2010. It should be a service of a sui generis nature separate from the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat with autonomy in terms of administrative budget and staff. Officials 
from all three categories of personnel will be equally treated and will be able to assume all 
positions within the Service. With their status as temporary agents, staff from the member 
states will be in the same position as staff coming from the two other sources of origin.
The preparatory work on the EEaS has been carried out by the Presidency, the member 
states, the Commission and the Council Secretariat and endorsed by the European Council. 
It has already been decided that the scope of the EEaS should allow the HR to “carry out his 
/ her mandate as defined in the Treaty”.1 In order to avoid duplication and ensure cohesion, 
the EEaS is also to assist the President of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission in their external relations functions. Crucially, it has also been decided that 
the EEaS will be composed of single geographical and thematic desks bringing together 
tasks performed separately by the Commission and the Council Secretariat today. They are 
meant to play “a leading role in the strategic decision-making”.
The red lines for the future scope of the EEaS have been drawn by reference to enlarge-
ment, trade and development policy as the continued prerogative of the Commission. 
On the other hand, the CSDP structures, including the Crisis Management and Planning 
Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military 
Staff (EUMS) will be integrated into the EEaS. The Situation Centre will also be part of the 
EEaS while continuing to service the European Council, the Council and the Commission.
Operational problems are bound to be experienced in the field of financing where the HR 
is expected to prepare actions related to the CFSP budget and the Instrument for Stability 
1.  Presidency report to the European Council on the European External action Service, Brussels 23 October 2009, 
14930/09.
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but the decisions will be taken by the Council and the Commission respectively with 
the Commission running the technical implementation. achieving clarity between the 
Commission and the EEaS on the division of labour with respect to the geographical and 
thematic instruments will be extremely important.
Undoubtedly, cooperation and consultation between the HR, the EEaS and the relevant 
directorates in the Commission as well as EU delegations will be crucial throughout the pro-
gramming and implementation activities. Consultation will need to be streamlined with the 
services of the Commission which have external responsibilities. The EEaS will also have to 
explore ways of strengthening communication with the European Parliament, given that the 
HR will need to regularly consult the Parliament on key CFSP issues.
The EEaS will need to strike an equilibrium between the different components of the service, 
with at least one third coming from the member states, including in senior positions and in 
delegations. It is already decided that the HR will be the appointing authority while repre-
sentatives of the member states, the Commission and the General Secretary Council (GSC) 
will be associated in the recruitment procedure. There will be a rotation inside the service, 
including between Brussels and the delegations, between the EEaS and the national dip-
lomatic services as well as between the EEaS and the Commission and the GSC. This will 
require a solid degree of joint training.
Transitional arrangements with respect to the financing of the EEaS will be a challenge. The 
EEaS should aim at avoiding unnecessary duplication of tasks, functions and resources with 
other structures. apart from direct transfers from the Commission and the GSC, transfor-
mation of temporary posts in the Commission and the Council Secretariat will be necessary, 
as will the filling of posts freed up through retirement and other means. The October 2009 
decisions speak of “a limited number of additional posts for member states temporary agents” 
that will need to be financed within the current financial perspectives.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will transform the existing Commission delegations into 
EU delegations under the authority of the HR and as part of the EEaS structure. They will contain 
both regular EEaS staff and staff from the different Commission services, although in a clear 
chain of command under the Head of Delegation. Since delegations will take instructions from 
both the HR and the different services of the Commission, there will continue to exist a margin 
for disagreement. The Delegations should stay in close touch with the diplomatic services of 
the member states. There should be an active exchange of information between the EEaS, the 
delegations and the member states. The HR is meant to draw up a roadmap and timeframe for 
upgrading the EU delegations in close coordination with the incoming Presidency, so that they 
assume the role and functions of the rotating presidency in terms of local coordination and rep-
resentation. The EU delegations should play a supporting role when it comes to diplomatic and 
consular protection of Union citizens in third countries. Modalities for the EU delegations to be 
accredited to international organisations still need to be worked out.
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The European Council has already endorsed a roadmap for the preparation of the EEaS 
which envisages three stages: 
 From the entry into force of the Treaty to the adoption of the Council Decision on organ- •
isation and functioning of the EEaS, when preparatory work should be carried out. a 
small preparatory team composed of representatives of member states, Commission 
and the GSC should assist the HR in this function right from the start.
 From the adoption of the Council Decision onwards, with the first status report in  •
2012.
 Several years into the functioning of the EEaS, when a review could be carried out  •
(most likely in 2014).
The future of the Treaty reform in the European union
Whatever the challenges of implementing the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, it may be the 
last for a generation. One reason for which it has been so difficult to agree is its all-embrac-
ing character. The Lisbon Treaty is a typical revision treaty which aims to modify aspects of 
nearly all areas of the EU’s activity. It reflects the conclusion that was drawn from the failed 
French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, that citizens did not accept a high 
level of ambition for Europe. as a result, a lot of attention went into pricking the bubble of 
Europe’s constitutional aspirations, much less into having the public on board.
It seems that holistic Treaty reforms, in the course of which all issues are open and re-
examined, are no longer feasible in the EU of twenty-seven members with the require-
ment of ratification by all. They are an invitation to all sorts of populism which exploits 
the complexity of the European process. The answer is not only to try to write treaties 
in a more understandable fashion. as a community of law, the European Union needs 
contracts to be concluded between the member states. These are bound to be complex 
and unreadable for the general public.
The way forward for the EU is to accept the current Treaty base as having constitutional nature 
and envisage thematic treaties comparable to the United State style constitutional amend-
ments, rather than today’s fully-fledged Treaty reforms. Surgical precision will help the 
public debate and improve understanding of what Europe is trying to achieve. Future Treaty 
reforms should be about single issues such as energy and climate, or foreign policy. This 
would mean referring back to the point of departure and in particular to the European Coal 
and Steel Community, which had a clear emphasis on an area of vital importance to Europe’s 
future at the time.
Single issue treaties would contribute to better communication with the citizens by tackling 
one question at a time. Such an approach would make life difficult for governments since 
they can now pick and choose what aspects of an EU treaty they want to communicate to 
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the citizens. as a result, public debates in the member states often run in opposite direc-
tions. Single issue treaties would mean that the citizens are taken seriously and considered 
partners in the discussion. Importantly, the integration project would advance on substance 
rather than merely on the institutions as in the last decade. a commentator said after the 
1997 Treaty of amsterdam was passed that “fudge is the necessary condition of progress 
in Europe”. This does not need to be the case. Fudge is not the condition of progress; it is a 
condition of regression. The sooner we realise it the better.
Recommendations to the Spanish, belgian and hungarian 
Trio Presidency
The first Trio Presidency taking place under the Lisbon Treaty has a special responsibility for 
implementing the document’s institutional innovations and living up to its spirit. It needs 
to agree with the new permanent President of the European Council and the reformed HR 
the new modus operandi and the functional division of labour. The patterns of consultation, 
cooperation and coordination that emerge in the course of 2010 and 2011 are likely to be 
binding for future presidencies.
The Trio Presidency should assist in the creation of a strong EEaS. The logic of this institu-
tional innovation points to a Service with a vital role to play, both in representing the EU 
externally and in forging a strategic culture in the EU. The Trio Presidency should ensure 
that the establishment of the EEaS takes place in a conducive environment, not troubled by 
excessive rivalry with the other institutions and with the member states.
The issue of the future of Treaty reform in the European Union should not be cast aside as 
irrelevant or unnecessarily divisive. The EU needs a serious discussion about the methodol-
ogy of improving and modernising its legal basis. The ground for this needs to be prepared in 
the near future, regardless of the sense of exhaustion surrounding the Lisbon Treaty.
PART V – GOVERNING THE EU: WayS aND MEaNS | 225
INSTITuTIoNS
The Distribution of Competences under the 
Reform Treaty: Some Suggestions towards 
an Improved Policy-Making Process
Filippa Chatzistavrou Research associate, ELIaMEP
New challenges in the global context
The question of distribution of competences within the European Union has often been over-
looked in policy-making discussions as a purely legal matter. In fact, the way competenc-
es are exercised within the EU is mainly a political matter and one of the ‘core issues’ to be 
tackled by the EU over the coming years.
The new Reform Treaty of the EU abolishes the so-called ‘pillar structure’ and proposes to 
give the EU competence in new areas such as energy, climate change, and fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, it proposes the extension of existing competences, such as the environ-
ment, right to asylum, or social security matters.
Notwithstanding such changes, the new Reform Treaty adopts a similar approach to all 
previous amending treaties. It proposes the classification of different domains according to 
the classical categories of competences (exclusive, joint, complementary, and the specific 
arrangements for the coordination of economic and employment policies, and for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP]). However, it does not specify the distribution 
of competences in the EU, thus leaving open the relevant question regarding the separation 
of powers between the EU and member states. This vague definition of competences is still 
broadly considered to be the best solution in order to preserve the essence of the European 
construction (internal market and compensatory policies). according to the majority of EU 
legal experts, such flexibility on the allocation of competences is deemed necessary for 
enhancing the EU capability to respond to new challenges.
Indeed, the new Reform Treaty comes into force within a context of specific challenges for EU 
governance. These challenges result from economic, social, and demographic shifts in the 
regional and international context.
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The following question is posed here: what are the distinctive features of such challenges? 
Three medium-term challenges for the EU may be identified:
The challenge of inter-policy coherence in a multi-level system of governance
The interdependence among policies at international level is increasingly striking nowadays, 
suggesting that no policy can be put forward without considering other policies. For example, 
managing the Common agricultural Policy (CaP) is just one aspect of the EU’s responsibili-
ties, which also include the global fight against hunger, the protection of nature and biodi-
versity, trade policy, development policy, etc. In general, the EU’s ability to anticipate or deal 
with interconnected risks is fragmented in different policy domains. Enhancing inter-policy 
coherence, while achieving the optimal balance between centralisation and decentralisation 
of competences, might prove a difficult task for the EU and its member states.
Political challenges during crisis
We have entered a new era where human activity entails potential risks for human security, 
which may result in crisis situations. Transnational business, commercial, and financial 
activities increase the probability of facing similar types of risks (economic risk, ecologi-
cal risk, public health risk, energy supply risk etc.). The global economic downturn has set 
a new agenda while raising one fundamental question: which eurozone mechanism would 
assist individual countries, thus averting the financial crisis, or preventing its consequences? 
Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need to develop crisis mechanisms at the EU level.
The challenge of preserving the Eu’s economic, political and legal acquis
The prospects for a growing, dynamic and popular Europe are not encouraging. The failure of 
the member states’ recovery plans may erode the stability of the EU system. The preserva-
tion of a single market with a single currency is considered to be the most important task and 
a major objective for the EU. Furthermore, the controversial experience of the Constitutional 
Treaty and its replacement by the new Reform Treaty may lead to further disbelief in European 
politics. The opt-out facility sets a dangerous precedent for other member states to exclude 
themselves from aspects of emerging common policies, thereby causing fragmentation.
How well-equipped is the EU in terms of decision-making capacity under the new Reform 
Treaty to deal with such challenges? 
Current situation
While the Reform Treaty stipulates the formal delimitation of competences, it is widely 
accepted that their practical exercise comprises the most decisive factor for policy outcome. 
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One of the key drivers of European integration is the fact that the extension of competences 
from the national to the supranational level has been defined by power struggles (creeping 
competences). Despite disagreements, the Reform Treaty maintains the current legal 
provision that opens the possibility for the expansion of the EU agenda. Nevertheless, the 
risk of this mechanism being terminated should not be underestimated. Some reasons that 
may hinder the EU’s ability to expand its competences are presented below.
In recent years, an ‘increased fear of centralisation’ within the EU has been reported. In fact, 
European law specialists confirm a reduction in the number of hard EU law acts since the 
mid-90s. Such concerns regarding the shift in the loci of authority and power are expressed 
through the strong dissent among member states over which level should different policies 
be conducted at (e.g. redistributive policies, core functions of the welfare state, employment 
policy, fiscal policy etc.).
The new set-up still entails many overlapping fields of competence between the EU and 
member states (i.e. policies, such as social or health policy, identified with more than one 
category of competence). Due to the vagueness of competence allocation pursuant to the 
Reform Treaty, the precise practical functioning of subsidiarity will become even more a 
matter of political negotiation. The greater involvement of national parliaments in EU law-
making should reinforce this trend. according to the new Treaty, the question of whether a 
newly proposed EU law ought to be dealt with at European level, or at national or local level, 
will be answered in close consultation with national parliaments.
The Reform Treaty will significantly extend the scope of the classic ‘Community method’ from 
2009 by introducing majority voting in new areas (e.g. energy policy, international repre-
sentation of the euro area) as well as in other areas currently under the unanimity require-
ment (e.g. areas in the field of Justice and Home affairs). Nevertheless, some might argue 
that the stronger role of the European Parliament might sometimes make it harder to reach 
consensus, for instance in the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism. Moreover, the 
new qualified majority voting system applied from November 2014 is rather complicated, 
giving primacy to the population criterion. The fact that no government will be able to easily 
predict its relative weight in the negotiation process will reinforce further consensus building, 
thus affecting the EU ability to adopt coherent decisions.
Finally, while new dispositions towards enhanced cooperation propose a solid framework 
for joint action within the EU’s legal framework, much doubt exists about its feasibility. 
This form of cooperation put forward by the new Treaty has been conceived as an instru-
ment for the enhancement of policy-making rather than the promotion of the idea of a multi-
speed Europe. However, this reform will not necessarily make enhanced cooperation less 
complex; given its complexity and current flexible forms of cooperation (opt-outs or pre-
defined forms of intergovernmental cooperation), triggering enhanced cooperation will be 
a difficult task to achieve.
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Proposals
The Reform Treaty came into force on 1st December 2009. This makes Spain, Belgium and 
Hungary the first Trio to take office under the new institutional provisions. While the new 
key functions of the President of the European Council and the HR for Foreign affairs 
and Security Policy should be properly defined, the nature and role of other aspects of a 
rotating Council Presidency deserve further clarification.
The EU rotating presidency must take direct political responsibility for the work done 
during its six-month presidency in all areas except external relations. During the transi-
tion period (2010-2011), the Trio Presidency will probably exert great influence over the 
usual activities of the European Council.
Under the authority of an institutionalised and, therefore, long-term Presidency (European 
Council, Foreign affairs Council), the rotating presidency chairs most Council configu-
rations, with the exception of foreign affairs, as well as Coreper. More precisely, Prime 
Ministers of rotating presidencies maintain the Presidency of the various formations of 
the Council.
In accordance with the new provisions, the President of the European Council has more input 
in agenda setting. Moreover, it is clearly stipulated that the new General affairs Council 
(GaC) should promote greater coordination and consistency in policy between the European 
Council and the other configurations of the Council.
In this context, the rotating presidency will play a leading role in shaping EU policy. The 
GaC faces the challenge of moving beyond the routine tasks of organisation and repre-
sentation that are often driven by purely national concerns and interests. In fact, the 
overall effectiveness of the EU Presidency will also depend on the role given to the GaC.
Under the auspices of the GaC, the rotating presidency may embrace a strategic role 
in improving EU decision-making capacity in day-to-day politics and guaranteeing the 
political coherence of the whole system. By adopting a competence-coordinator role, 
the rotating presidency may contribute to the control of the allocation of competences 
between the EU and member states and support the European Commission’s legislative 
work. Thus, the issue of optimal assignment of policy tasks to different levels of gov-
ernment could be addressed according to specific policy priorities, as set out by the 
Presidency of the EU and the European Council. The creation of a working group (com-
prising high-level experts) on better distribution of competences and policy efficien-
cy would certainly be helpful. It could enhance discussions among member states on 
controversial issues (preferences for core public goods or macroeconomic stabilisation 
etc.) and promote constructive debate on any issue deemed essential to be dealt with 
at European level.
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By promoting joined-up thinking in various EU policies, the GaC may combine issues and 
set objectives in close cooperation with the European Commission (e.g.,establish a con-
nection between free movement and family law matters). The GaC may also develop a 
genuine collective strategy, fully supported by sectoral ministers representing relevant 
policy domains.
The further expansion of the co-decision procedure may signal the beginning of the rotating 
presidency’s role as a negotiator between the Council and the European Parliament. 
Moreover, national parliaments may become an informal negotiating partner for the 
rotating presidency in order to facilitate the application of the principle of subsidiarity, or 
even the activation of passerelle clauses for the simplified revision procedure that until 
now has remained a dead letter.
Finally, the GaC may assist the triggering of an enhanced cooperation procedure. Enhanced 
cooperation might be envisaged in areas where flexible forms of cooperation, other than 
enhanced cooperation stricto sensu, are already operational (for instance in the field of 
Justice and Home affairs or in policies directly connected to European Monetary Union, as 
well as in areas of joint competence (community policies governed by unanimity, such as 
social policy or taxation, as well as energy policy).
as part of its overall coordination role, the GaC will be informed of any existing political 
constraints or potential blockages to the adoption of new legislation. Enhanced cooper-
ation will present an alternative option to all inefficient, low-denominator compromises, 
which may include soft law instruments to the detriment of legislation or privilege other 
flexible forms of cooperation outside the institutional framework of the EU. The GaC may 
examine the feasibility of any cooperation granted as a last resort in the event of emerging 
dissent among member states. Besides, the decision authorising enhanced cooperation 
will be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament (except in the case of cooperation within the CFSP). 
Enhanced cooperation will create hard law, which is binding on participating member 
states and potentially binding upon all future participants.
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INSTITuTIoNS
The Potential of the Lisbon Treaty: 
How one Treaty May Conceal another?
Jacques Keller-Noëllet Senior Research Fellow, Egmont
Sami Andoura Research Fellow, Notre Europe
 Understanding the present and controlling the future require a proper assessment of past events, however unpalatable they may be. The upsets recently experienced by the Union in the latest revision of the Treaties, the Constitutional and then the Lisbon 
Treaty, come into that category. It would therefore be a serious mistake to move on without 
learning the lessons from them. This long and painful process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty 
illustrates, once again, the need for more flexible mechanisms to adapt the EU’s institutional 
framework and substantive policy options to the rapidly changing reality of an enlarged EU. 
Indeed, the difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement at an Intergovernmental Conference 
and subsequent ratification within the member states in accordance with their constitutional 
procedures is only exacerbated in an EU of 27, with its increased degree of national diversity. 
In view of these limitations of the traditional treaty amendment procedure, the Lisbon Treaty 
contains certain alternative revision strategies intended to facilitate this process, but also 
to facilitate the potential for differentiated integration. The purpose of this contribution is to 
assess the potential of those various flexibility instruments.
learning the lessons from recent experience:  
future Treaty revision prospects
How has the Union managed, within the space of three years, to move from a draft ‘Constitution,’ 
seen by many as the penultimate step on a federal path and drawn up with the utmost trans-
parency in a prestigious forum, the Convention, to an unreadable Treaty, definitely represent-
ing a step backwards in form and, in a way, also in substance, produced by an exercise in 
diplomatic secrecy living up to the worst pre-enlightenment traditions? How has such a U-turn 
been carried out with the active collusion of the European Parliament, not long ago so critical 
of the slightest liberty taken with transparency and democracy? The answer is simple: just 
by virtue of the principle of reality, whereby dreams cannot be sustained indefinitely and any 
venture ignoring the facts, which are well known to be stubborn, is doomed to failure.
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Under that principle of reality, there is little or no likelihood of any similar exercise over the 
next few years. While the Treaty does lay down a revision procedure involving the convening 
of a Convention, which suggests that any such aspiration has not been killed off altogeth-
er, it goes on straight away to stipulate that, with the European Parliament’s agreement, 
that formality may be dispensed with where the issues at stake do not require it. It is a fair 
assumption that, for a decade or more, member states will make sure they do not lose control 
of the basic treaty-revision procedure, as they did recently; the price to pay for that would be 
too high.
There is another lesson to be learned from this sorry tale: in allowing multiple potential 
vetoes, the present treaty-revision procedure courts disaster. as the course of full-scale 
revision is fraught with risk, the new Treaty’s authors took care to offer their successors a 
range of means of adapting the basic texts to the new opportunities and fresh challenges to 
be faced by the Union over the years ahead. The general thinking behind those future-devel-
opment clauses is to provide the Union, from the outset, with the political and legal tools with 
which to make inconspicuous yet tangible progress as needs and openings arise. This can be 
seen as a way of reverting to the founding fathers’ pragmatic, workmanlike approach.
General treaty-revision clauses
The revised Treaty thus brings a radical innovation, in stipulating that the provisions of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – i.e. policy formulation in particu-
lar – may be amended merely by a unanimous decision of the European Council, subsequent-
ly ratified by member states in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures 
(art. 48(6) Treaty on European Union [TEU]). While this arguably does not involve any great 
change, as the need for consensus and national ratification still remains, the effect of the inno-
vation is to be seen elsewhere. It lies in the option of dispensing with an Intergovernmental 
Conference, which will make the use of this procedure more routine, taking the heat out of 
substantive debate and in all likelihood improving the chances of a favourable outcome. It 
should be pointed out, however, that, in making use of this provision, the European Council 
cannot “increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties”.
also in the interests of calmer, more focused discussion of any new needs, it will in future 
be possible to move from unanimity to a qualified majority and hence from a special leg-
islative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. a qualified majority and code-
cision) merely by a decision of the European Council, together with a procedure for tacit 
consent by national parliaments (article 48(7) TEU). This general bridging clause passer-
elle is, however, subject to restrictions: its application is limited to the provisions of the 
TFEU and Title V of the TEU; aside from the need for the European Council to adopt such a 
decision unanimously and obtain the consent of the European Parliament, the national par-
liaments de facto obtain the right to ‘veto’ that decision within a six-month period; moreover, 
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for decisions with military implications or in the area of defence, no such adjustment from 
unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) can be accepted. It should also be noted 
that article 353 TFEU explicitly excludes the application of this general bridging clause in 
respect of the voting and decision-making procedures laid down in the following articles: 
article 311(1) and (4) TFEU relating to decisions on ‘own resources’; article 312(2) TFEU on 
the adoption of multiannual financial frameworks; article 352 TFEU incorporating the ‘flex-
ibility clause’ and article 354 TFEU on the suspension of membership rights.
Enhanced cooperation and other bridging clauses in particular areas
another factor making for flexibility in the revised Treaty stems from improvement of the pro-
visions on enhanced cooperation. In a Union with a wider membership and greater diversity, 
use of enhanced cooperation would seem, in theory at any rate, the prime way of enabling the 
Union, for the time being at least, to live with differing levels of ambition, while maintaining 
overall political consistency and preserving the unity of the institutional framework. Since its 
introduction under the amsterdam Treaty, enhanced cooperation has not met with the antici-
pated success, firstly because it was available in another form where the need was greatest 
(currency, Schengen, etc.) and secondly because the requirements for its implementation 
were too stringent. The new Treaty tries to put this right in a number of ways.
First of all, by generally relaxing the requirements for use of enhanced cooperation. The main 
instrument available for enhanced cooperation between some member states is article 20 of 
the Lisbon Treaty, allowing them to “establish enhanced cooperation between themselves 
within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences”. This new article 20 thus 
provides opportunities to cooperate on policy issues, even if the support and participation 
of all EU member states is not (yet) forthcoming. Under enhanced cooperation, the member 
states can make use of the EU institutions and exercise those competences by applying the 
relevant provisions of the treaties. The three main innovations meant to facilitate the trigger-
ing of enhanced cooperation are as follows: firstly, the last-resort condition has been clarified 
and downgraded, i.e. a deadlock in the decision-making process can now be established 
by the Council in the initial decision authorising enhanced cooperation; secondly, the initial 
authorising decision is to be enacted by a qualified majority, without any further qualifica-
tions (except in Common Foreign and Security Policy); thirdly, the authorising decision may 
lay down conditions for participation, to test the capacity, or the goodwill, of the initial par-
ticipating members states. This is aimed at preventing the participation of unwilling member 
states, only interested in keeping some influence over the development of enhanced coop-
eration, or even impeding it.
However, the use of article 20 is subject to certain conditions: the scope for enhanced coop-
eration is limited to non-exclusive competence; at least nine countries should participate; 
the decision authorising enhanced cooperation is to be adopted by the Council; it should 
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respect the acquis communautaire and not undermine the internal market or the social and 
economic cohesion of the Union; and the instruments, procedures and rules laid down in EU 
primary law also apply to the operation of differentiated cooperation.
Secondly, by stipulating that the countries participating in enhanced cooperation may 
decide of their own accord to move from unanimity to a qualified majority, in order to facili-
tate adoption of implementing measures. Under article 333 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty provides 
that the Council can adjust either the voting requirements from unanimity to QMV or the deci-
sion-making procedure from a special to an ordinary legislative procedure, although such 
an amendment to the Treaty provision to which enhanced cooperation relates still requires 
unanimity within the Council. The application of the bridging clause might be easier in that 
it will only be necessary to reach such unanimous agreement among those member states 
that participate in enhanced cooperation, in order to approve the amendment to the deci-
sion-making procedure.
It is clear from the analysis so far that a serious effort has been made, in the Lisbon Treaty, 
to render the enhanced cooperation mechanism more attractive and effective, at the initial 
stage (triggering arrangements), at the functioning stage (bridging clause) and in relation to 
non-participants. However a number of uncertainties, ambiguities and potential problems 
remain. Some of those uncertainties are legal in nature. How will enhanced cooperation affect 
the Union’s judicature, e.g. in assessing the applicability of decisions enacted in enhanced 
cooperation to situations in one way or another involving non-participating members states 
or their nationals? What will be the impact of enhanced cooperation on the Union’s external 
action and on further enlargements? What may turn out to be the legal nature of enhanced 
cooperation and its acquis?
Lastly, in some areas where the value of such cooperation is already acknowledged, such 
as security and defence or justice and home affairs, by laying down various pre-established 
arrangements (structured cooperation and opting out or in) in anticipation or furtherance of 
enhanced cooperation.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including minimum harmonisation of national 
criminal law, is another potential area for enhanced cooperation. In the Lisbon Treaty, an 
‘emergency brake’ on the legislative procedure has been devised but, in the event of continu-
ing deadlock, authorisation to pursue enhanced cooperation “shall be deemed to be granted” 
to willing member states. It is therefore the whole former third pillar (Title VI of the TEU) 
which will be covered by that special procedure aimed at easing the creation of enhanced 
cooperation.
another innovation under the Lisbon Treaty concerns extension of the scope of enhanced 
cooperation to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), without confining it to mere 
implementation of common action or positions on behalf of the Union. Being formally part of 
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CFSP, defence policy has also become a potential area for enhanced cooperation. Enhanced 
cooperation is allowed in that field under the heading of “permanent structured coopera-
tion”. This is to be set up in order to increase and further integrate the forces of the partici-
pating member states and to engage in the most demanding Petersberg missions. Permanent 
structured cooperation resembles enhanced cooperation in that it will be set up by a Council 
decision identifying the participating member states. It will be confined to willing member 
states that fulfil the criteria and have made the predefined military capability commitments 
set out in a protocol in that regard. Non-participants will be precluded from voting in the 
Council (whereas no express provision is made regarding their right to take part in delibera-
tions). and they can at a later stage submit to the Council their intention to participate. Such 
cooperation consists in practice of entrusting the implementation of a Petersberg mission 
to a group of states “which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task,” 
presumably on behalf of the Union. Such missions are supposed be carried out “within the 
framework of the Union”. The Council is to be kept informed and may amend the mandate 
for the mission. However, management of the mission remains in the hands of the group of 
States, “in association with the High Representative”.
Even though the rather disappointing experience to date gives reason for some caution, the 
combined value of these highly technical-looking provisions should not be underestimated. 
The Union can now, with the new treaty, be said to have a more flexible and more appealing 
framework providing real opportunities for those member states wanting to fulfil their legiti-
mate ambitions without undermining the whole edifice.
Conclusion
To conclude, assuming there to be no substantial revision of the Lisbon Treaty within the fore-
seeable future, it is highly probable that a need will be felt to make use of the wide range 
of instruments available under the new Treaty in order to adapt the Union’s policies to the 
opportunities or needs of the day. The most go-ahead member states are also likely to try 
out the various options opened up by the new arrangements for enhanced cooperation, an 
inclination naturally made all the stronger as considerable reluctance is shown by the slow-
est-moving member states, particularly in justice and home affairs, under the ‘brake / accel-
erator’ system. Other potential areas of application can be identified, including Community 
policies governed by unanimity, like taxation, social policy and some aspects of energy 
policy, as well as European citizenship.
This trend, were it to materialise, could in time lead to the formation of the oft-mentioned 
‘pioneering group,’ long called for in some quarters. Time will tell, although the main obstacle 
standing in the way of that development continues to be the diversity and wide range of 
aspirations, making it more realistic to refer to ‘pioneering groups,’ in the plural, particular-
ly regarding the euro and defence, rather than any real structured, homogeneous political 
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avant-garde. Such clearer, more radical differences in aspirations cannot be ruled out in 
the longer run, however, depending in particular on proper use being made of the practical 
opportunities opened up here by the new treaty.
In addition, use of various means of reflecting such differences would then have to be accom-
panied by greater practice of democracy within the Union, something at present largely arti-
ficial in the absence of any real shared policy. Some reforms introduced by the new Treaty 
should help bring that about.
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INSTITuTIoNS
Differentiated Integration and Flexibility  
in the EU under the Lisbon Treaty: 
Challenges for the Trio Presidency
Carlos Closa Montero Research associate, Real Instituto Elcano
T he entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brings a number of institutional innovations. among these, the Treaty includes a number of modalities of differentiated integration which did already exist (such as enhanced cooperation or opt-outs) and it adds some 
new forms: ‘oriented’ enhanced cooperation; opt-ins and permanent structured coopera-
tion on defence. Given the subsidiary character that these forms have vis-à-vis the standard 
Community methods (all states through the same legal instruments), the Trio cannot antici-
pate an agenda of application for any of them. Nevertheless, some issues may crop up in 
the agenda that require action by means of these instruments.
The term differentiated integration refers to a variety of forms of cooperation and / or 
integration in which not all members of the EU take part, and which therefore do not 
have uniform legal and political effects for all of them. all of these modalities owe their 
existence to the answers they provide to this question: how can one move forward if 
there are countries which can and want to do so but there are others who do not want to 
or cannot? Flexibility is the operating principle that allows the EU to conceive of and put 
into practice methods of differentiated integration, as opposed to institutional, proce-
dural and formal ‘rigidity’ that implies exclusive application of the EU system in all cases 
and for all countries.
Debate on differentiated integration and flexibility intensified with the failure of the EU 
Constitution and the troubles the bloc faced in getting the Lisbon Treaty ratified. This is not 
a new issue, however. In fact, proposals for and discussion of differentiated integration go 
back to the 1970s, to the time Britain joined the EU, and since then they have been a fixture, 
updated depending on the circumstances.
In the current context, there are essentially two circumstances that raise interest in 
this issue. On one hand, the size of the EU (27 members and rising) introduces a growing 
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‘heterogeneity’ (size, per capita income, geopolitical orientation, etc.) that causes 
European leaders and commentators to wonder if, at times, some of these member states 
have the will and / or ability to move forward in some policies and even with the process 
of integration in general (that is to say, if they really want to accept EU policies across the 
board and have the means to do so). along with this traditional question, a non-inclusive 
idea is being hinted at more and more openly: that one group of states might want to 
provide themselves with a public good from which the rest is excluded.
Meanwhile, this growing heterogeneity among states coincides with a greater ‘internal 
diversity’ in political options regarding the EU. In some of the older member states, the 
existence of Eurosceptic parties, groups or tendencies has been constant; such is the case 
of Britain or France (where part of the left or right have at several times objected to the EU 
project). Joining them are some of the new states that became members in 2004, such as 
the Czech Republic (where Vaclav Klaus voices strong criticism of the EU), Poland (where 
conservative parties hold a reactionary vision of the EU) and even new anti-EU splinter 
groups in traditionally pro-European countries such as the Netherlands and even Italy. 
Indeed, there is a greater internal plurality that also means the absence of national con-
sensuses on the EU and its integration project.
Theoretical conceptual schemes for differentiated integration
 The theoretical schemes that have been presented over the years tend to be rather 
ambiguous approaches which often overlap and have little ability (beyond visual images) 
to get to the heart of the real problems involved in differentiated integration. as they are 
mixtures in this sort of discourse, a brief description of the concepts most often used is 
useful.
 Core (vanguard): •  this notion means that a group of countries take part in all possible 
schemes and modalities of integration and / or cooperation, in such a way that they 
automatically define the centre of gravity around which policy in Europe pivots. The 
idea of a ‘vanguard’ or ‘pioneering group’ is halfway between the ‘hard core’ (static) 
and the ‘multi-speed Europe:’ The vanguard seeks to open up a path that other 
countries will follow later. 
 Concentric circles: •  this concept was more in fashion in the 1980s and 90s, and has 
since fallen into disuse. although it is applied both to the EU and its relationship with 
its surroundings, it actually serves more to relate the various international European 
organisations with the idea of integration. Starting off from a central core, coopera-
tion and integration among states would be organised through different bodies, the 
greater or lesser intensity of which would generate circles around this central point. 
The circles would essentially define areas of cooperation and / or integration and 
their legal-political intensity (EU / European Economic area / Council of Europe / 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
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 directory: •  more than an academic approach, this is an idea that is occasionally raised 
in political circles and involves (unlike the more neutral concept of a central core) a 
conscious will to direct, guide or influence policy in Europe and the EU. Obviously, it is 
not a ‘formalised’ concept stemming from an organisational or institutional model.
  • Variable geometry: this is a descriptive model of the system in which, within a common 
integration scheme, different groups of states participate in different policies.
 Multi-speed Europe: •  unlike the previous concept, all states would take part in all EU 
policies, also within a common integration scheme, but would embrace these policies 
at different times, depending on their ability to implement them.
  • Europe à la carte: the areas of specific policies and ways of cooperation / integration are 
presented as if on a restaurant menu, from which countries can choose at will, depending 
on their interests.
 In relation with the previous concept, the idea of  • selective or differential membership 
is being increasingly used in order to describe the United Kingdom’s position within 
the EU (because of its selective repeal of parts of the EU acquis), but also as a possible 
model for incorporating Turkey, for instance. Here, it should be mentioned that Norway 
has adopted much of the EU acquis without being a member.
Existing modalities
Of course, the existing models of differentiated integration have not followed these theoreti-
cal models, but rather have responded to the need to provide ad hoc solutions to the specific 
demands of certain states in given circumstances. Formulas for differentiated integration 
were incorporated for the first time into the Single European act and have been retained, in 
their different variations, up to and including the Lisbon Treaty.
Voluntary exclusion (opt-out)
The opt-out is characterised by the following features. In the first place, it is defined under 
primary law (normally, through protocols) which, furthermore, spells out specifically which 
states accept this voluntary exclusion (in other words, it is not a generic option that is open 
to each and every state at all times). also, the opt-out is applied to issues and areas that 
are clearly defined (it is not something that is available for any EU policy). Strictly speaking, 
the first case was Britain’s opt-out from the European social charter adopted as a protocol 
to the Single European act. The best known case, however, was the British and Danish 
opt-out from the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union (Sweden, which in a refer-
endum rejected joining EMU, has no de jure opt out, although it does have a de facto one). 
Curiously, article 139 of the current Lisbon Treaty refers to states which have not fulfiled 
the criteria for advancing to the third phase of EMU as ‘member states with a derogation’. 
Opt-outs have gone from the monetary realm to the Schengen acquis (once it was incorpo-
rated into the Treaty), from which the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are excluded. 
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Finally, the last case of an opt-out came with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was 
incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty with a protocol. The United Kingdom and Poland have 
excluded themselves partially (the Czech President Klaus has demanded similar treatment 
for his own country).
Opt-outs have traditionally been viewed with wariness, the idea being that they undermine 
the EU integration model. But the cases mentioned earlier show the positive side: opt-outs 
allow integration to be applied to a sector without depending on the will of those who 
exclude themselves. Furthermore, such countries are the ones who assume the cost of 
their own exclusion (although Britain’s opt-out from the social charter did involve a lot a 
free-riding on the higher social standards that the charter introduced for other member 
states. Nevertheless, the UK did finally renounce its opt-out).
Enhanced cooperation
Unlike opt-outs, enhanced cooperation is a mechanism for affirming a will to advance and 
by definition it refers only to participating states. Primary law defines a framework but 
does not identify a priori the areas for specific application (although those in which it can 
be applied are identified: they are non-exclusive areas of jurisdiction which do not affect 
the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion) nor the specific countries 
which participate and which are excluded a priori. On the other hand, the pre-requisites for 
activating this policy are spelled out: there have to be at least nine member states inter-
ested (it was eight under the Nice Treaty), it must be open to including new participants, 
although “conditions of participation” can be established (articles 328.1; 333.1 of the 
Lisbon Treaty).
In the first place, the Treaty defines the ‘situation’ in which enhanced cooperation can be 
activated (as a last resort, once it has been confirmed that agreeing on ordinary EU rules is 
impossible) and also the ‘procedure’ for doing so: the initiative affects the relevant states, 
and the proposal is to come from the European Commission or the High Representative if 
it is a question of foreign and security policy. The final decision is adopted by the Council 
by a qualified majority (or unanimity in the case of foreign and security policy) and the 
European Parliament must grant its consent (in the case of foreign and security policy, the 
Parliament will only be informed).
Enhanced cooperation has drawn attention because it brings together the appeal of 
‘cartesian’ models favoured by academics with its concrete legal existence. However, its 
greatest defect is the scant operational effectiveness it has shown since being created 
in the amsterdam Treaty (1996). So far only one case of ‘enhanced cooperation’ has been 
implemented: the European norm that allows couples from different member states to 
choose which national jurisdiction will apply in divorce cases (the participating states are 
Spain, France, Italy, Romania, Luxembourg, Greece, austria, Hungary and Slovenia). aside 
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from whether it is actually used or not, some commentators say that the value of enhanced 
cooperation lies more in its value as a threat to get a particular measure approved through 
regular EU channels.
‘oriented’ enhanced cooperation…
This is a variation of the previous concept, applicable to certain realms defined a priori within 
the area of freedom, security and justice: under the Lisbon Treaty, mutual recognition of 
sentences, judicial and cross-border police cooperation (82.3), the creation of a European 
Public Prosecutor’s office (86.1), and judicial cooperation (87.3). The most notable innova-
tion is that its activation is almost automatic if the ordinary legislative procedure fails; only a 
unanimous ‘no’ vote from the European Council can block its implementation (the so-called 
‘accelerator’). This automatic mechanism is the biggest advantage of a system designed with 
the goal of overcoming the prospect of a British veto.
…and its corollary, discretionary participation (opt-in)
The aforementioned modality is pre-configured to anticipate a British (and possibly Irish) 
opt-out. It carries with it the possibility of Britain deciding in a discretionary fashion if it wants 
to take part in those areas in which it has previously stated it wants an opt-out (sic) (Protocol 
22 of the Lisbon Treaty). In the past, member states of the EU adopted two Regulations 
(establishing the Frontex agency and regulating the anthropomorphic data to be included 
in databases on electronic passports) and the United Kingdom appealed both before the 
European Court of Justice on grounds that it had been illegally excluded! The Court wisely 
rejected both lawsuits (sentences C-77/05 and C-137/05).
Permanent structured cooperation
applying enhanced cooperation to the area of defence (permanent structured cooperation) 
involves some differences compared to enhanced cooperation in foreign and security policy. 
Fundamentally, decisions can be adopted by a qualified majority, and participation requires 
the reaching of more binding commitments to carry out more demanding missions and the 
fulfilment of higher-level military capability criteria. The French government has already 
presented a proposal to begin articulating permanent structured cooperation.
Besides this, in the area of defence there are modalities which, without being forms of struc-
tured cooperation in the strict sense, nevertheless apply the principle of flexibility. Thus, the 
Lisbon Treaty allows for member states to organise cooperation and coordination among 
their administrations responsible for national security (art. 73); for the European Defence 
agency (art. 45.2), in which any member state which wishes can participate (in actual fact, all 
do except for Denmark); and to organise missions outside the EU to preserve peace, prevent 
conflicts and boost international security – this can be assigned to groups of countries 
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(art. 42). However, it should not be forgotten that there is flexibility within the structure of 
security policy. Thus, a joint action within the framework of security and defence in which 
only some EU countries take part is what gave rise to the EU mission in waters off Somalia to 
prevent piracy (EU NaVFOR Somalia).
Parallel functional integration
The choice of the term ‘functional’ is not arbitrary. In the 1950s, the functionalist theore-
ticians of integration (Mitrany, etc.) embraced the principle that form (legal and political) 
would flow from the function that was sought and the top priority was in fact to define 
these functions and tasks. Thus, this modality involves creating schemes, which are 
parallel and concurrent with the goals of the EU, with participation by a number of members 
smaller than the total in the EU and which do not adopt its institutional model or its regula-
tory model. There are many examples, from the oldest ones (the Western European Union, 
finally absorbed by the EU itself) to the most current ones, such as the Prüm Convention 
(2005) and the European Space agency (1975), the Schengen agreement (1985) or the 
Eurocorps (1992).
Pros and cons of differentiated integration
after this descriptive summary, it is a good idea to evaluate differentiated integration as a 
whole, albeit briefly. The disadvantages it entails can be summarised in the following:
Potential for reversing integration
Most advocates of orthodox EU thought systematically conclude their analysis by saying 
that differentiated integration modes can undermine what has already been achieved and 
block further progress. But this argument is inaccurate because differentiated integration 
proposals have emerged rather as a reaction to the lack of drive toward integration on the 
part of the EU as a whole. The idea that there are integration-curbing mechanisms in these 
modalities is correct only if one contrasts integration with differentiated integration. However, 
the comparison is incorrect.
Rupture of legal unity within the Eu
This argument is constructed in a parallel fashion to the previous one, and stresses the 
application of some EU norms only in some countries and to some EU citizens. at a tactical 
level, there is no denying this. But if we are realistic, it should be viewed as a problem only in 
certain circumstances: if discrimination and / or legal insecurity arise. Without downplaying 
this possibility, it does seem clear that the existing modalities of differentiated integration 
discussed earlier have not caused major problems in this regard.
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Encouraging free-riding
Perhaps the most solid objection refers to the possibility of free-riding: obtaining benefits 
from differentiated integration without assuming the costs of taking part in it. Some of the 
existing examples, namely EMU, show that these schemes actually externalise (transfer to 
countries not included) some of their costs (as seen in the lack of autonomous monetary 
policy of those which are excluded). Looking to the future, defence is often cited as an area 
in which free-riding will be inevitable. However, this argument can be countered in two ways. 
Firstly, some of the existing schemes (the European Defence agency and Eurocorps) have 
generated momentum in which participation is extended. Secondly, it is doubtful that a 
common, alternative scheme in which the possibility of free-riding disappears altogether 
can be attained.
The democratic nature of certain kinds of differentiated integration
Finally, many commentators are concerned by the inter-governmental tendency inherent in 
these modalities. although it is hard to generalise, some of these escape the Commission’s 
capacity to take initiatives, and / or the control of the European Parliament, and / or the juris-
dictional control of the Court of Justice, and / or could even skirt control by member states. 
This is a real problem, but the scope of it should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, rather 
than prejudged as a possible generic situation.
as for the pro’s, they should be viewed with this in mind: differentiated integration exists 
and seems inevitable (in one form or another) in the future. Given this fact, the following 
advantages should be considered:
 Differentiated integration does not curb progress, but rather just uniform progress  •
by all the member states of the EU.
 Differentiated integration serves to accommodate the diversity and plurality of  •
the member states. What is more, if its creation, probably as part of primary law, is 
handled skilfully, the EU might be able to avoid downward negotiation by offering 
escape routes to minimalists (as happened with the United Kingdom with the 
Charter).
 In general, costs are assumed by those which are not integrated and / or those which  •
are excluded (in actual practice cases of free-riding have not arisen, although they 
cannot be ruled out in areas such as defence policy).
 Finally, from the point of view of the Trio Presidency, it must be underlined that the  •
3 countries share a similar approach: Spain and Belgium participate in all existing 
modalities (with the exception of Belgium’s non-participation in the norm on appli-
cable national jurisdiction for divorces) and Hungary has shown its willingness to 
take part as soon as possible in the most significant one (the euro). This means that 
they may easily share a similar approach towards these modalities and, eventually, 
they may steer any eventual prospective application.
PART V – GOVERNING THE EU: WayS aND MEaNS | 243
INSTITuTIoNS
Use or abuse of National Constitutional 
Requirements in the Dynamic 
Development of EU Treaties?
Carl Fredrik bergström Researcher, SIEPS
T he Lisbon Treaty is the result of a process of at least ten years, which aimed to clarify in which fields the member states wish the EU to have competence and to improve its capacity to exercise that competence. Following the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty this process may finally be said to have come to an end. Considering 
the efforts made to negotiate the Treaty, and the difficulty to complete ratification in all 
member states, it is not likely that another full-scale reform will be ventured upon within 
a foreseeable future. and quite probably, the time is forever gone when disparate, even 
competing, demands for improvements of the constitutional framework of the EU could 
be melted together in all-amending ‘fudge’ treaties.
But it is a lot less difficult to imagine that the simplified revision procedures set out by 
the Lisbon Treaty will be operated in order to enhance the capacity of the EU to exercise 
that competence which has already been conferred upon it. Most notable among these is, 
first, a procedure which enables limited amendments to be made to existing treaty provi-
sions on internal policies and action, and, second, a general bridging clause or passerelle 
which enables shifts in decision-making procedures from unanimity to qualified majority 
voting and increased participation of the European Parliament.
another type of treaty changes which must be expected is that which will accompany 
future enlargements and admission of new member states. Even if such changes are 
supposed to be confined to the “adjustments of the treaties… which such admission 
entails” it is likely that attempts will be made, successfully, to give this a very broad 
meaning. Indeed, it would seem that the political reasons to use future acts of accession 
as vehicles for other treaty changes than those strictly needed for admission of new 
member states (i.e. redistribution of votes in the Council and the European Parliament) 
are growing with the awareness how difficult it is to conclude an ordinary procedure for 
treaty revision.
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Support for that conclusion can be found in the promises made to the Irish people and the Czech 
President during the run up to Lisbon Treaty ratification. In both these cases the concessions 
granted will only acquire their legal status after being introduced in the form of “Protocols to 
the Treaties” and as such “form an integral part” of the Treaties and thus, the primary law of the 
EU. But this in turn requires that the procedures which may be used for adopting or amending 
protocols must be the same as the procedures which may be used for adopting or amending 
treaties. This leaves not only the ordinary and simplified revision procedures provided for by 
the Lisbon Treaty, but also the procedure for making adjustments in the context of enlargement. 
It is important therefore to note that the commitment to transform the promises made by heads 
of state or government into protocols “at the time of the conclusion of the next accession Treaty” 
is the centrepiece of the solution to the Irish and Czech demands.
But even if political agreement has already been reached between the heads of state or gov-
ernment, the fact remains that a future accession treaty – and every protocol attached to 
it – will require fresh support from all member states and subsequent ratification “in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional requirements”. This in turn means that there is an 
obvious risk, first, that member states represented by new governments will find an oppor-
tunity to invoke new demands and, second, that national parliaments will want a return to 
concerns that were held back during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
So, for example, there was considerable support in the Swedish Riksdag for making a demand 
that the Lisbon Treaty ought to be supplemented by a ‘social progress protocol’ which could 
correct the effects of the European Court of Justice’s ruling in the notorious Laval case. But 
despite knowing that postponing its approval of the Lisbon Treaty could be strategically 
useful, the Riksdag did what was expected of it, sticking loyally to the government’s tight 
schedule for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Perhaps a responsibility was also felt not to 
create a situation which could handicap the upcoming Swedish Presidency of the EU. But, 
importantly, none of this meant that the perceived need for a social progress protocol dis-
appeared from the political agenda. Therefore, the next round of ratification of another 
(accession) treaty may be seen as a new opportunity for strategic considerations. This is par-
ticularly relevant if such ratification is not limited to questions of new accession(s) but cover 
also questions of former concessions. Obviously, the logic holds not only for the Swedish 
Riksdag but for everyone in all member states who is granted a decisive say in accordance 
with national constitutional requirements.
In the light of the above it would appear that the remaining step in delivering the conces-
sions made to the Irish and the Czech cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, the risk must 
be acknowledged that the required approval will have to be paid for by new concessions to 
others. Presumably, if member states’ negotiation or ratification of the next accession treaty 
– and protocols attached to it – turn out to be problematic, the principal responsibility for 
securing resolution will fall upon the European Council. Therefore that treaty is also likely to 
offer a first major test for its new President.
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This text emphasises the significance of the national constitutional requirements which must 
be complied with before amendments can be made to existing primary law of the EU, whether 
in the form of treaties or protocols. From the perspective of the EU, the cumulative content of 
such requirements is a crucial factor to consider before attempts are made to obtain amend-
ments or adjustments. From the perspective of each member state, the content of its own 
national requirements is a factor which may complicate its relationship with the EU: repre-
senting an obstacle to integration but also a protection. In the light of the experience of the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty there are more compelling reasons than ever before to assess 
the national constitutional requirements – in both existing and incoming member states – but 
also how they can be changed and how much they can be allowed to change. The contrast-
ing images which immediately come to mind are the honest concerns of the Irish people and 
the one-man charade which the Czech President was allowed to play. But it is submitted that 
nothing deserves more serious attention than the ruling of the German Constitutional Court.
The dynamic development of the treaties after lisbon:  
a lesson from Germany?
The official reactions to the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ruling on the Lisbon Treaty of 30 
June 2009 were surprisingly positive. Not only the German Chancellor angela Merkel but also 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso and Council President Fredrik Reinfeldt immediate-
ly embraced the ruling as an eagerly awaited ‘yes’ to the Lisbon Treaty. But for a less uncritical 
reader it is clear that the answer of the German Court rather amounted to ‘no,’ and that ‘yes’ was 
not possible until a new law, fulfiling specific criteria, had been adopted by the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. It was only after the demand stated by the court had been complied with – when a 
more modest law first intended to accompany the Lisbon Treaty had been replaced by a stricter 
one – that Germany could finally complete its part of the process for ratification.
In its ruling the Bundesverfassungsgericht confirms that the EU, after the Lisbon Treaty, will 
continue to rest on a principle of conferral of competence to act in limited fields. But, impor-
tantly, emphasis is placed on the difficulty in deciding exactly which those fields are, or, in 
other words, what the EU has been authorised to do. The existing ambiguity is added to by the 
Lisbon Treaty, which introduces new provisions that give rise to such questions. according to 
the German Court the situation is still acceptable as long as the institutions of the EU behave 
responsibly: not evidently transgressing the limits of the competence entrusted to them or 
the conditions underlying its conferral. But this requires sufficient mechanisms for national 
control of what these institutions do and how they do it.
against the background of that reasoning, what the Bundessverfassungsgericht found most 
objectionable were a number of situations where it would become possible, after the Lisbon 
Treaty, to bring about Treaty amendments “without a ratification procedure solely or to a 
decisive extent by the institutions of the Union, albeit under the requirement of unanimity”. 
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With respect to those situations, the Court said, a special responsibility is incumbent on the 
German parliament – rather than the government – as regards participation. Therefore, in 
order not to have to judge the Lisbon Treaty incompatible with the German Constitution, the 
Bundessverfassungsgericht concluded that a new law had to be adopted which would fill the 
gaps of the Lisbon Treaty, thus enabling the Bundestag and the Bundesrat to “exercise their 
responsibility for integration in numerous cases of dynamic development of the Treaties”.
The new law resulting from the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the act Extending 
and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and of the Bundesrat in Matters Concerning 
the European Union, was adopted on 22nd September 2009 and three days later the German 
procedure for ratification was concluded by President Horst Koehler. apparently, what that 
law did was to enable German ratification of the Lisbon Treaty – a ratification which for a 
while was not possible – by introducing national constitutional requirements that could com-
pensate for the lack of corresponding requirements in that treaty.
In the light of the German experience and after the Lisbon Treaty, it is said to be clearer than 
before that national parliaments may have different roles and different strengths within the EU 
depending on the design of national constitutional requirements. So, for example, the new con-
stitutional requirements resulting from the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht – the pro-
nouncements of the Court and the resulting legislation – mean that the German Parliament is in 
a position which is formally stronger than that of the Swedish Parliament. Similarly, because of 
the corresponding constitutional requirements in the UK, introduced prior to ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty (at the insistence of the House of Lords), the UK parliament is in a position which is 
formally stronger than that of the Swedish Parliament but weaker than that of the German one.
In the case of both Germany and the United Kingdom, the new constitutional requirements 
that have accompanied ratification of the Lisbon Treaty focus on those situations where sim-
plified procedures may be used to make amendments to Treaties and other EU instruments 
of primary law. Because of the concerns of Bundesvarfassungsgericht about the “numerous 
cases of dynamic development of the Treaties,” the situations covered by Germany include 
also the future application of the so-called flexibility clause as a legal basis for adoption of 
secondary law (and also cases where member states can halt a deepening of European inte-
gration subject to so called ‘emergency brakes’). Essentially, in the case of both Germany 
and the United Kingdom, constitutional requirements have been introduced which serve to 
secure a decision-making role for the national parliament in some of those situations where 
the Lisbon Treaty only stipulates such a role for the national government. Overall, these 
requirements are constructed so that where any draft decision under the relevant procedures 
comes before the European Council or the Council, the national government may not agree to 
the adoption of the decision unless the national parliament has first given its approval.
In comparison with the way in which Germany and the United Kingdom have made use of 
the possibility to unilaterally supplement the Lisbon Treaty with constitutional requirements 
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that give the national parliament a formally stronger role, the solution opted for in Sweden 
(and probably most other member states) is somewhat more minimal. Here focus has been 
placed on the wish to establish in national constitutional law the procedures needed for the 
tasks which the Lisbon Treaty explicitly expects national parliaments to perform, in particu-
lar subsidiarity control. But in sharp contrast to Germany and the United Kingdom, there has 
been little interest so far in the tasks which the Lisbon Treaty implicitly expects. In Sweden 
this may perhaps be explained by the fact that there is no Constitutional Court or, indeed, any 
House of Lords. But once the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force and there has been some 
time to reflect over reactions, Sweden and its Riksdag may find it difficult to reconcile an 
increasing awareness that the EU has become an integral part of modern democracy with an 
understanding that this democracy is being built on an asymmetric constitutional construc-
tion where national parliaments are not equal.
The most practical conclusion which may be drawn from this is that no national parliament has 
to satisfy itself with a weaker role than any other and that every national parliament holds the 
power to do something about this. But at the same time it is important not to forget that the 
existing possibility – to unilaterally supplement the constitutional framework of the EU with 
national provisions that give one’s own parliament a stronger role – must be balanced against 
the need for a common system which is able to act. In every situation where the requirement 
is made that one national parliament or, indeed, 27 must give approval prior to the adoption 
of a common decision, the likeliness increases that there will never be any decision. The 
dilemma finds no better illustration than the new requirement, with which we all have to live, 
that the flexibility clause may not be acted upon unless support for this is first manifested in 
a law carried by two thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the 
Bundesrat. Undoubtedly, this will deprive that provision of much of its usefulness.
Conclusion
The experience of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the result of the ruling 
of the German Constitutional Court, suggests that the particular design of national consti-
tutional requirements may have far-reaching effects on the overall system. It remains to be 
seen whether a process of constitutional protectionism has been set in motion, where more 
member states unilaterally introduce new requirements in order to restore balance. However, 
there are more compelling reasons than ever for the European Council and its new President 
to undertake a thorough assessment of these requirements, and of how they can be changed 
and how much they can be allowed to change. But every government in charge of the rotating 
Presidency is well advised to pay attention. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the successful operation of the EU will become more vulnerable than ever before to 
national constitutional requirements. and the importance of the matter reaches far beyond 
the practical or strategic considerations that will need to precede the next attempt to secure 
treaty changes.
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EuRoPEAN PolITICAl SPACE
From Institutional Reform  
to Mass Politics or How to Engage Citizens 
in the Union of Lisbon
Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul Secretary General, Notre Europe
Göran von Sydow Researcher, SIEPS
T he coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty will most probably mark the start of a new phase of the EU’s development. The institutional fatigue provoked by the multiple hurdles that the ratification process had to overcome will probably, for a relatively long time, exclude 
wide-ranging treaty reforms. The EU can now concentrate on making the most of the Lisbon 
Treaty and creating the policies that are urgently needed in a globalised world confronted 
with huge challenges such as climate change, migrations or the spread of inequalities. and 
this development should indeed be welcomed with a sense of relief. However, there is a trap 
into which the EU could easily fall – that of focusing exclusively on what should be done and 
forgeting to reflect on how it should be done.
Referenda, European elections and opinion polls have all pointed to a growing distance between 
citizens and the EU that needs to be taken seriously (1). In that perspective, the ‘how’ question 
is essential. The popularity of the European project may grow if the EU is successful in deliver-
ing policies. But, connecting with citizens upstream of decisions is fundamental for the clarity 
and the legitimacy of the action. Citizens need to feel that they can influence not just the pace 
of European integration, but also its content, and that they can do this through a recognisable 
democratic process. This implies the introduction of more overt political confrontation within 
the European institutions in order to enable citizens to determine political options and to partici-
pate in a debate (2). However, the politicisation of EU institutions should be done in a way that is 
faithful to the nature of the EU and does not impede its ability to reach compromises.
In the new institutional setting of the Lisbon Treaty, the Trio Presidency has a pivotal role to 
play when it comes to ‘bringing in’ the citizens. They can contribute to breaking the artificial 
wall that separates the European political scene and the national one. The Spanish, Belgian 
and Hungarian Presidencies hold a specific responsibility in this regard, because they are the 
first to address the ‘citizen’ issue in the EU of Lisbon (3).
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Addressing the ‘citizen’ issue
The problem of a ‘disconnection’ between the EU project and its citizens is a rather volatile 
issue when it comes to mobilising the attention of Europe’s elites and media. With the 
Lisbon Treaty ratification now completed, the issue will probably be once more relegated 
to a low priority or even considered by some as a waste of time considering the pace with 
which the world is changing around the EU.
The EU indeed has enormous challenges to face in a global and fast-changing world. 
However, minimising or denying the ‘citizen issue’ could be very damaging for the 
prospects of the European project. Even if the debate on the relevance of referenda for 
ratifying such documents as EU treaties is legitimate, the fact that the Irish no of 2008 
marked the 5th rejection (the first being the Danish ‘no’ to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992) 
by a national population, through a referendum, of a treaty intended to deepen European 
integration should not be disregarded. These negative results do not come out of the blue: 
Eurobarometer surveys have indeed shown a decline in popular support for the EU which 
began around the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
The situation regarding European elections should not be underestimated either. 
average turnout across the EU for the elections of June 2009 was 43.2%. It was 45.5% 
in 2004 and 62% in 1979. Even though participation increased in 8 member states and 
remained stable in 7, it remains that 18 countries – two thirds of member states – have 
had turnouts of less than 50%. Eurobarometer surveys carried out before the European 
elections showed that a majority of citizens justified their intention not to participate 
by a lack of interest. 60% of the respondents explained this lack of interest by the belief 
that their vote would not change anything. The surveys also show that if one out of two 
citizens believes that his or her voice is heard in his or her country, only one out of 3 
believes so in the case of the EU.
Politicising the debates in the Eu
From the ‘majority straitjacket’…
The ‘citizen issue’ has been a concern of most institutional reforms, especially since the 
2001 Laeken Declaration made it particularly prominent. It is in this perspective that the 
powers of the European Parliament have been regularly extended. The Lisbon Treaty goes 
even further by making the co-decision procedure the rule and giving national parliaments 
a specific task in the control of subsidiarity. Time will be needed to see whether these 
changes have an impact on the involvement of citizens. But in an era of no treaty reforms, 
it is time to think about the political dimension of EU policy-making, about ‘mass politics’ 
rather than institutional developments.
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The content of EU policy-making has evolved. alongside the traditional debates about ‘more 
or less Europe,’ more familiar controversies from a national point of view, such as the level of 
regulation of the market, the place of social issues, the mix of energy or green taxation, have 
emerged. The evolution of political debate within the European institutions was brought into 
sharp focus by the discussions around the ‘services directive,’ which highlighted the com-
plexity of the European political arena and, to some extent, the increasing politicisation of 
European institutions in which a classic debate between left and right became apparent.
However, these developments have not really affected the national political scene and citizens 
generally realise what is at stake very late in the legislative process (for example when an EU 
directive is transposed into national law). It is high time to stimulate and propagate political 
debate within the EU, making it more transparent and familiar to European citizens. This 
implies injecting into the system some competitive elements characteristic of the political 
process, which would help citizens to identify the major players and force these players to 
express their positions and respond to their opponents in the media. It would thereby help 
the citizens to understand the possible consequences to which they would be exposed if one 
actor or the other succeeds in implementing its agenda.
But those, like Simon Hix, who advocate this kind of politicisation are too often trying to 
transpose the bipolar ‘majority model’ as is found in some member states such as France 
or the United Kingdom. They advocate an opening of EU political debates to partisan com-
petition along traditional left-right lines and the application of the majority principle in the 
decision-making process – a principle which might eventually lead to the same majority dom-
inating in the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. However, in doing so, 
they fail to consider the EU’s political system as it has taken shape over the last sixty years, 
as it is likely to develop and as it would be desirable to develop it. as Lijphart has shown, in 
political regimes that are geographically, culturally or socially pluralist, such as the EU, a 
concept based on consensus, proportional representation and coalition government is pref-
erable to a majoritarian approach implying the centralisation of the power to set the agenda 
and a single-party government.
Moreover, the ‘constitutive’ questions (linked to membership of the EU, its frontiers, com-
petences and the decision-making process) are still far from exhausted within the Union. 
and in EU policy-making it is harder than in domestic politics to separate those issues from 
ones of substance. The division over ‘more or less European integration’ and the need to 
find the right balance between the supranational and intergovernmental nature of the EU 
remain pertinent. This is why federal political systems are more useful sources to draw on 
when envisaging the politicisation of the EU because they involve the articulation of unity 
with diversity and of politics with territorial (or constitutive) concerns. In that perspective, 
politicisation cannot be applied in the same way to all EU institutions. It has a clear logic 
within the European Parliament, where MEPs sit according to their political affiliation. But the 
Commission is the supranational body supposed to promote the common European interest, 
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while the aim of the Council is to defend the interests of member states – i.e., two missions 
not essentially defined by ideology.
The inadequacy of the system to a clear-cut majority approach has been demonstrated by the 
latest developments. When looking at the 2009 EP-elections, one could argue that there were 
favourable conditions for the establishment of a clear EU political majority. The outcome of 
the elections indicated a loss for social democratic parties across the continent, leading to a 
relatively stronger European centre-right. at the same time most governments around the EU 
are mainly centre-right, which means that this political orientation dominates the council and 
that the composition of the Commission is of a similar kind. The alignments of the three insti-
tutions are therefore unusually homogenous. This could foster greater policy coherence and 
a better opportunity for citizens to hold office-holders accountable in a way that is familiar 
with majority regimes.
However, if the renewing of Barroso mandate as President of the Commission was a direct 
result of the European elections, the drafting of the Commission programme as well as the 
nomination of the entire Commission did not proceed with the same logic. Faithful to its 
mission of defending the common European interest and anxious to win a large majority in the 
European Parliament to support this claim, Barroso launched a work programme which aimed 
at pleasing the opposition. Moreover, national governments nominated Commissioners who 
in their political affiliation reflect the incumbent governments around the EU (meaning that 
the centre-right and liberals dominate the new Commission), but it appeared that balancing 
the main party families is still the normal procedure in European politics. This was indeed the 
way it worked for the allocation of portfolios and the debate surrounding the nomination of 
the President of the European Council and the High Representative.
…to ‘opposition politics’
Rejecting a strict majoritarian approach and respecting the specific missions assigned to 
the institutions by the Treaties does not imply that we should be happy with the status quo. 
The EU system is excessively geared towards consensus and often characterised by secrecy. 
Political alternatives should be made more visible and political parties are key actors in 
formulating these alternative policy frameworks. One aspect of democratic politics as we 
know it from the nation-state but which is missing in the EU is the notion of opposition. We 
argue that the expression of a clearer opposition is possible in the EU without applying strict 
majority logic and damaging the ability of the EU to find the best compromise. The consensu-
al policy style and the collusive forces within the nascent EU party system need to be shaken 
up in at least two arenas: the European Parliament and the national political scene.
The EU will remain a Union founded on two kinds of legitimacy: one coming from the states 
and the other derived directly from the citizens. The European Parliament incarnates the 
second and, as was said earlier, it has been the great winner of the latest institutional reforms, 
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constantly extending its powers so that nowadays it is a quasi co-legislator with the Council. 
The European Parliament should not be shy in claiming to be the centre of political debate 
within the EU institutions. It should make more visible, for citizens and the media, the healthy 
political confrontations that take place within it on major political dossiers. This will probably 
imply a more frequent breaking of the grand coalition between the European People Party and 
the European Socialist Party in order to allow more diverse and ad hoc coalitions to be formed.
European elections are the major moment when citizens can express a choice between 
European policy alternatives. The decline in citizens’ participation in these elections over 
the last thirty years, parallel to the gradual increase of the European Parliament’s power, 
is not acceptable. With all the caveats described earlier on the role of the Commission and 
the limits of the majoritarian approach, the stakes of these European elections should be 
raised by establishing a clearer link between parliament and executive – essentially by 
elaborating upon the mechanism that makes the choice of the President of the Commission 
dependent on the results of the elections. For this mechanism to work properly, the 
European political parties must be able to present their candidate and campaign around 
him or her. There should be public and media debates between these candidates. The idea 
is not new and has been gaining ground, but during the last elections the European parties 
failed to act on it. Even if a Commission President will always try to accommodate different 
political sensitivities during his or her five-year mandate for the reasons expressed above, 
his or her personality and personal political affiliation has an obvious impact on the overall 
orientation of EU policies.
One of the major problems regarding the democratic functioning of the EU is the fact that there 
seems to be an artificial wall between the EU political scene and the national one. Ministers 
come to Brussels to decide in the Council as representatives of states in a legislative process, 
but they do not communicate on their decisions once back in their country. Sometimes they 
even end up blaming ‘Brussels’ for that decision. There are at least two ways to fight that 
tendency: one is to strictly apply the Lisbon Treaty prescriptions about the transparency of 
the work of the Council when it acts as a legislator; the other is to rely on national parliaments 
to become more demanding watchdogs of their governments’ activities in Brussels.
With the current institutional set-up of the EU, there is a tendency towards national-execu-
tive dominance. The Lisbon Treaty acknowledges the essential role of national parliaments 
in EU decision-making. The issue now is for national parliaments to seize on these new 
powers to act as a catalyst of political debates on EU issues rather than as a simple control-
ler of subsidiarity. The fact that the action of national parliaments is foreseen by the Lisbon 
Treaty at the stage of policy formulation is a good thing. Debates surrounding EU policies 
often emerge too late on the national scene. Such time-lags exacerbate the problems of the 
democratic credentials of the political system. National parliaments are the natural venue 
for political confrontations. The shortcomings of the Europe-level parties (lack of cohesion 
etc.) are less present in the national setting and parliamentary life is structured around 
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government-opposition relations. Therefore, parties belonging to the opposition should 
more actively engage in debates about policy formulation at the EU level and have more 
regular contacts with their European network.
Politicisation and the Trio Presidency: some recommendations
The Trio Presidency can play a key role in activating these two arenas of potential political 
debates on EU issues. More particularly, it could:
 Make sure that preparations for the next European elections begin now and not on the  •
eve of the next ones in 2014. The reflection on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
and more particularly on the mechanism planned for the election of the Commission 
President by the European Parliament should provide the occasion for the Trio to 
formalise the need to have a more open competition between candidates proposed by 
European political parties. as the High Representative is now another key post within 
the Commission, a similar more open confrontation between candidates could also be 
considered. Other actions aimed at fostering more active European citizenship in the 
EU, such as EU mobility programmes, should also be promoted.
 Improve the transparency of the work of the Council as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty.  •
The Council has much to do in terms of transparency in order to catch up with the 
Commission and the European parliament. It seems indispensable to open up the 
debates in the Council and make more systematic the recording of its votes. although 
the ‘Chamber of States’ will undoubtedly retain a mode of functioning focused more 
strongly on negotiation, there is no reason why its legislative practice should always 
remain so different from that of the European Parliament.
 Communicate in the media and before the national parliaments before and after Council  •
meetings. This should be done by the Trio not only in their role as EU Presidency but 
also as examples of national good practices to keep the political debate alive on EU 
issues.
 Contribute to the implementation of the new role of the national parliaments in a way  •
that will encourage a broader perspective than the one foreseen by the ‘orange card’ 
mechanism. The Trio should support the role of national parliaments in stimulating EU 
policy debates at the national level at an earlier stage than at present.
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EuRoPEAN PolITICAl SPACE
Citizens’ Europe: How to Re-Engage  
the ‘European Political Public?’
Piotr Maciej Kaczyn´ski Research Fellow, CEPS
 In June 2009 European citizens voted in the 7
th direct elections to the European Parliament 
(EP). What really happened on that election night? Why a year later do very few people 
remember the debate of spring 2009 and the alarming prognosis of the lowest ever 
turnout? The June 2009 elections presented European decision-makers with two main 
messages. First, the turnout was the lowest in the history of the EU. 43% does not wholly 
undermine the legitimacy of the European project, but it sounds an alarm bell that action 
needs to be taken to reverse a 30-year trend. To correctly identify the necessary action it 
needs to be understood that the declining participation rate in EU elections does not prove 
that there is disappointment with the European project. Declining turnout proves that 
there is a growing lack of interest on the part of the European electorate with the European 
political class (turnouts in national elections are also decreasing).
The second message is equally significant. The party balance has shifted radically towards 
the conservative parties. This fact has already impacted the way the Parliament takes 
decisions, as seen with the elections of the European Commission president last summer 
and autumn. What is most striking in the results is that the geographical distribution of the 
election results was more unified than ever before in the history of Europe. Cross-border 
cohesion, in terms of turnout as well as results for leading right-wing and left-wing parties, 
has increased radically. In a way, in a situation where there were simultaneous elections in 
all EU member states rather than a one pan-European vote, and where national campaigns 
were run by national actors, the message sent by the peoples of Europe was clear: they 
trusted the conservative politicians to lead the way out of the crisis, regardless of whether 
they already held office nationally (i.e. in France or Poland), or whether they were in opposi-
tion (i.e. in the UK and Spain). If these trends continue in years to come, it may mean that in 
June 2009 we witnessed the emergence of a European ‘political public’ – one where people 
in their national contexts, asked by national politicians, give a pan-European answer.
The EP election results gave a new legitimacy to the centre-right majority in the Parliament. 
The domination of the ex-European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) 
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group (now in two groups, EPP and ECR) could challenge the conservative-socialist ad 
hoc coalition, as it existed over the past decade. We have seen the first examples of a 
coalition composed of the conservative groups and the liberal formation. More impor-
tantly, the issue of the legitimacy of conservative or conservative-liberal (rather than 
grand coalition) political choices has been removed, since the national party members 
of the ex-EPP-ED group won in 18 member states, including all the six largest ones. It 
was not legitimate (or possible) in 2004 to elect a conservative-dominated Commission, 
as the electorates of France, Italy, Spain and many smaller nations gave priority to 
social-democratic parties. In 2009 this problem was averted in a concerted vote by the 
European public. In this way, a major legitimacy obstacle for the further partisan politi-
cisation of the European decision-making has been overcome. The appointments in the 
new European Commission suggest that enhanced politicisation took place in this insti-
tution too.
What we have seen since the elections is indeed a much greater partisan politicisation then 
ever before. The new European Commission can no longer claim to be a purely bureaucrat-
ic, politically balanced body if a majority of the Commissioners are conservative, and the 
number of left-wing Commissioners is equal to the number of liberal Commissioners. The 
new European Commission is therefore a conservative dominated body; and this reflects 
not only the majorities in the European Council and the European Parliament, but also the 
political choice made by Europeans.
There is a significant problem with the established European political public: its fragility. 
For this reason, together with falling interest and falling participation rates, there is a 
growing need for action. What can the Trio Presidency do to engage the European political 
public? The obvious first task is to fully and correctly implement the Lisbon Treaty. among 
the most important institutional innovations is the citizens’ initiative. This provision can 
help engage European citizens with the European project; in particular it can help mobilise 
civil society and strengthen the pan-European debate on European policies.
In November 2009 the European Commission published a Green Paper. In the consultation 
process it asked for feedback on ten issues:
 1�  Minimum number of member states from which citizens must come;
 2�  Minimum number of signatures per member state; 
 3�  Eligibility to support a citizens’ initiative – minimum age; 
 4�  Form and wording of a citizens’ initiative;
 5�  Requirements for the collection, verification and authentication of signatures;
 6�  Time limit for the collection of signatures; 
 7�  Registration of proposed initiatives;
 8�  Requirements for organisers – transparency and funding;
 9�  Examination of citizens’ initiatives by the Commission; 
10�  Initiatives on the same issue.
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The process initiated with the Green Paper will end with a new law organising not only how the 
citizens’ initiatives should be collected, but also what citizens’ initiatives are in the political 
sense. From this perspective, there is a major missing link in the Commission’s Green Paper 
consultation process, one which possibly will be missing in the implementing legislation. 
This concerns the Commission’s response. In the Green Paper the Commission asks one 
question on the issue: “should a time limit be foreseen for the Commission to examine a 
citizens’ initiative?” 
The answer to the question cannot be full, because it does not concern the timing alone. It 
also concerns the Commission’s proper reply. In the Green Paper, it said the following: “during 
this period the Commission would assess both the admissibility of an initiative – i.e. whether 
the initiative falls within the framework of its powers – and whether the substance of the ini-
tiative merits further action from its side. Once the Commission has examined an initiative, 
its intention would be to set out its conclusions in relation to the action it envisages in a com-
munication which would be made publicly available and notified to the European Parliament 
and the Council. The action envisaged in the communication may include, as appropriate, 
the need to carry out studies and impact assessments in view of possible policy proposals” 
(COM(2009)622/3).
It is therefore clear that the first stage is the proposal’s admissibility. Once the proposal 
is admissible, the outlined procedure would begin and be finalised with a communication, 
perhaps leading to a change in policy legislation.
That is all very noble, but what would happen if the proposal is considered inadmissible? 
If this is the case, the citizens’ initiatives should not end in a bin. Such a response by the 
Commission, without due explanation, would actually risk further alienating millions of 
citizens from the European project. Every single citizens’ initiative means that there is a 
societal problem that calls for an action by a public institution. Therefore a simple reply to 
the effect of ‘this is outside of EU competences’ is far from enough. If the Commission rejects 
the motion and has no legal power to initiate legislative process on the proposal in the given 
initiative, then it should do two things. First, it should say who has the powers to address 
the problem in question; and second, it should commit itself to monitoring how the process 
develops and report on it.
There should be also a role for the European Parliament in the process. The chamber should 
be the ‘guardian’ of citizens’ initiatives and follow up on them with the European Commission. 
In the event that the Parliament feels that the Commission has not done everything possible 
to address a specific issue, it should reserve a right to call on a responsible Commissioner to 
give an explanation to the Parliament on the issue.
In political terms, the citizens’ initiative should be treated by the European Commission 
in a similar way as it approached the Parliament’s requests to “submit any appropriate 
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proposal[s]” (current article 225 TFEU) and the European Council’s invitations to address 
issues it considers important. In this way the EU’s decision-making process would distinguish 
between the formal exclusive competence of the Commission to initiate legislative process 
(with a few Lisbon Treaty exceptions) and a ‘political’ right of initiative. This political right 
of initiative would then belong on an equal basis to the European Commission, European 
Council, European Parliament and organised civil society (through the citizens’ initiative).
The Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Trio Presidency will not have sole responsibility for the 
correct implementation of the citizens’ initiative. It will be the first task during the first half of 
the 18-month cycle. In the second half, the real life tests will come: how are the citizens’ ini-
tiatives to be dealt with by the Commission? Will they be given appropriate attention? It will 
be the rotating presidency’s task also to monitor on an ongoing basis the application of the 
citizens’ initiative law. If there should be a review clause in the system, then the rotating pres-
idency should examine the issue.
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budGET
The Forgotten Reform
Peter becker Senior associate, SWP
 R eforming the EU budget will be the next major reform after the settlement of insti-tutional reform with the Lisbon Treaty. In the context of the financial framework 2007-2013, the Council of the European Union called on the Euro pean Commission 
in December 2005 “to undertake a full, wide ranging review” of how the EU funding system 
can be reformed and to present a report on this in 2008-2009. On the basis of this report 
the Council would then “take decisions on all the subjects covered by the review,” which 
are to be taken into account in the negotiations for the next financial perspective.
The European Commission will present in early 2010 its long-awaited communication 
presenting proposals to make the European Union fit for the next decade and to tackle 
economic, demographic and social challenges. The aim of the revision debate will be a 
comprehensive and far-reaching reform of the EU’s financial constitution, which examines 
both the spending and revenue sides. It is expected that the Commission will propose new 
spending priorities and a new own resource.
although the member states mandated the European Commission to review the budget in 
depth, it seems that their resolve and the incentives to thoroughly overhaul the European 
budget have faded somewhat. Instead the member states are preparing to negotiate the 
next financial framework 2013-2020 as business as usual. Today it seems that they will 
miss the opportunity of the mid-term review.
But the next negotiation round will be different for two reasons:
 The Commission started the mid-term review of the financial framework in  •
September 2007 with a broad public consultation. all member states submitted 
their position papers and national parliaments, regional and local authorities, 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and interest groups also took part and 
outlined their expectations. This broad public discussion, with close to 300 contri-
butions discussing the priorities of European policies, equipped the Commission 
with some new ideas and with some public support to propose a complete refocus-
ing of EU spending priorities.
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 The Lisbon Treaty provides a different arena for the budgetary negotiations, with a  •
new player. The new Treaty removes the distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure and this strengthens the European Parliament’s role in 
European budgetary policy. In addition the prerogatives and sources of influence 
enjoyed by the European Parliament in the adoption of the annual budget have been 
reinforced too. This massive strengthening of the European Parliament means an 
upgrading of the parliamentarian dimension of European budgetary policy.
The European Parliament adopted in March 2007 a report on the future of the European 
Union’s own resources, the so-called Lamassoure Report. It proposed a two-stage reform, 
with the first step being to abolish all exceptions and rebates by 2013 and to fund the EU 
budget through a uniform percentage of the gross national income of each mem ber state. The 
second stage, starting in 2014, would be to introduce a system of genuine ‘own resources’ for 
which the European parliamentarians proposed the payment of a limited and clearly identifi-
able proportion of an existing national tax. a second resolution argues for a prolongation of 
the current financial framework as a transition to future financial frameworks of five years’ 
duration. This means there is new player with its own interest and its own agenda – and the 
member states will have to respect this and include the new player in the game.
The budget review must bring together various contradictory aims: 
 The interest of the member states to keep budgetary discipline, to limit the volume of  •
the financial framework and to retain more or less the status quo of spending policies. 
The national policy-makers show little inclination to venture away from well-trodden 
negotiating paths. any fundamental change to the negotiating framework at first 
brings only increased insecurity and reduced predictability, especially where the 
national net balance is concerned. So, as a rule, the member states stick to existing 
agreements and merely attempt to influence the outcome of the negotiations by 
tweaking existing controls.
 The interests of the European Commission and the European Parliament to obtain a  •
higher degree of budgetary independence from the member states and to be able to 
decide autonomously on spending priorities.
 The interest of European citizens, who expect that the European Union will be  •
prepared for the challenges of the 21st century and will have the financial means for 
efficient and purposeful European policy-making.
The member states conduct usually the budget negotiations strictly according to the 
outcome for their national net balance. This net balance logic has a number of negative 
consequences. Firstly, the negotiations regularly involve a large number of quid pro quo 
deals, which are mostly not the forward-looking compromises needed by the European 
Union to meet the challenges of diminishing cohesion and increasing competition in a glob-
alised world. The net-balance logic and the dominance of national fiscal interests therefore 
prevent solu tions orientated towards the common European interest. The result of this kind 
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of behaviour is that necessary modifications are delayed and the results are often inade-
quate or come too late. additionally, once compromises have been reached and exceptions 
agreed (and concessions made too), these tend to become entrenched. Because such com-
promises can subsequently only be altered by consensus they thus attain a binding status 
that is equivalent to European treaty law.
On the other hand it is obvious that the Commission’s first proposal will touch on all dimen-
sions and aspects of the EU budgetary policy – revenues, spending, institutional and proce-
dural questions and some matters of principle:
 To steer the process, some principles or leitmotifs are necessary to balance the  •
different aims and interests. The Commission, referring back to the public consulta-
tion, will underline the principles of generating European added value as a kind of 
yardstick to justify European spending policies. It will be difficult to define a common 
understanding of what European added value could or should mean and how it could 
be measured. Improved efficiency, economies of scale, cross-border or transnation-
al improvements and measures integrating European markets are probable indica-
tors for European added value. The principle will therefore be similar to the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. However, these principles will not weaken the 
Community policies like Common agricultural Policy (CaP) or cohesion policy. The 
leitmotif of European solidarity will remain.
 Nevertheless, the Commission is expected to propose a shifting of spending policies  •
from the current CaP to new policies like research and innovation or climate and 
energy. This means the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs will serve as the guide for 
the financial framework 2013-2020, as President Barroso has already laid down in his 
guidelines for the new Commission.
 The current system of own resources, with the UK rebate and the other exceptions,  •
is becoming increasingly complex and unfair. abolishing the Value added Tax (VaT) 
resource and linking national budget contributions more clearly to the wealth of indi-
vidual member states would transform the system of own resources into a more conven-
tional system of financing for international organisations. Therefore the Commission 
will propose to phase out all rebates and correction mechanisms, and it will probably 
also raise the possibility of introducing a new own resource.
It is thus the special format of the negotiations – and especially the net-payer logic – which 
defines the rationales of national positions. It is not the revenue or the spending side of 
the EU budget which structure the negotiations and the national positions; it is rather their 
interplay and the effect on the net-payment balance which national governments calculate. 
For that reason, it is important that the overhaul of the financial perspective explicitly links 
the revenue and spending sides as the two main components of reform.
The Trio Presidency will have to steer the debate in the Council between the member states. 
However, a format for the negotiating process has not been specified. The wording of the 
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revision clause is extremely vague, not naming any key points or setting any objectives for 
the in-depth overhaul of the EU financial framework. For example, will the review lead to a 
definitive result, concrete proposals and targets for adapting the political and budgetary pri-
orities for the next financial framework, and will those proposals be expressed in precisely 
calculated budgetary terms? 
Only the timetable for the revision process is set. The Commission was asked to present a 
report in 2008-2009, but it decided to publish this report early in 2010. The current financial 
framework runs until the end of 2013, giving the EU a solid legal and financial basis. 
Negotiations on a new financial perspective will begin as usual with the publication of a com-
munication by the Commission. In the Interinstitutional agreement the Commission agrees 
to publish this communication no later than 1st July 2011. So the time frame for a thorough 
reform debate among the member states is limited to no more than one year.
The member states should use the revision process to discuss new principles, targets, and 
structures, and to agree upon them unanimously. Then these demands should gain the 
necessary political weight by a decision of the European Council. The review process should 
then enable a decision of the European heads of state and government in accordance with 
the European Parliament, containing the guiding principles and priorities to be respected by 
the Commission, European Parliament and the Council when negotiating the next financial 
framework. The revision can subsequently be implemented in the course of the regular nego-
tiations in 2011-2012. The European Council will have to prepare the regular negotiations 
of the financial framework 2013-2020. a common understanding of reform necessities and 
an agreement on common policy priorities should be the first aim of the budget review. The 
member states will need to take the European Parliament’s positions into account. This 
process will stand on two pillars: (1) the improved Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, to 
modernise the European Union and to make the Union fit for new challenges and global com-
petition, and (2) the principle of solidarity and social justice to strengthen the cohesion and 
the stability of the Union.
The European Council will discuss the matter for the first time under the Spanish Presidency. 
This should be the occasion to agree on a negotiation framework, a timetable and the 
expected results of the process. The heads of state and government could connect the 
renewal of the Lisbon Strategy – which is on the agenda of the Presidency – with the identi-
fication of policy priorities for the budget. In addition, the European Council could mention 
the upcoming reform of European cohesion policy and the publication of the Commission’s 
next cohesion report.
The Presidency conclusions could emphasise two key points for the budget review: the 
strategy for growth and jobs, including the focus on research, development and innovation, 
and the principle of solidarity expressed by European cohesion policy. These had been the 
two key points mentioned in the government’s position papers for the consultation process. 
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Solidarity will remain a cornerstone of European integration. However, all member states 
should share the understanding that European solidarity has to be more than European 
cohesion policy or redistribution. The European Union cannot abandon compensation and 
redistribution instruments. However, if solidarity develops into a mere redistribution instru-
ment and the Union changes into a Union of financial transfers, mutual understanding will be 
lost and the EU will lose one of its fundamentals. Hence, the principles of solidarity, efficien-
cy and European added value must be brought together.
Using the revision clause to reform the EU’s financial constitution depends on the common 
will of all participants to overcome the status quo and the net-payments logic. The revision 
process creates the opportunity to agree on a clear shift in the priorities of EU spending to 
allocative policies, and on the revenue side to give the EU greater autonomy. In the medi-
um-term the multi-annual financial perspective could then be developed into an integration 
planning instrument where political priorities are given concrete financial backing.
It will be the task of the presidencies and the new President of the European Council to 
develop a revision debate orientated around these goals.
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budGET
The EU Budget Reform: agenda for and 
beyond the Next Trio Presidency
lukáš Pachta Research Fellow, Europeum 
a fter the Lisbon Treaty came into force, protracted institutional debates have ended and the Union could now focus on its policies at last. One of the main issues the EU will be dealing with during the upcoming years is the reform of the budget. First 
of all, the EU will have to adopt a new financial perspective for the period of 2014-2021. 
Furthermore, the 2005 deal on the perspective 2007-2013 contained the condition of a funda-
mental review of EU spending with a special focus on reform of the CaP. Under this condition 
the United Kingdom agreed to the phasing out of its rebate and the retention of agricultural 
subsidies at the current level of more than 40% of the EU budget. The first phase of the CaP 
reform took place in 2008 with the so-called ‘health check’ of agricultural spending. It was 
decided to abolish dairy quotas, bolster rural development and cut direct subsidies. This 
deal will expire in 2013 when an in-depth reform will have to be adopted.
Positions of the Commission and the Trio Presidency 
The second Barroso Commission has already announced its plan to make the budget reform 
one of its top priorities. In its 2020 vision, the Commission outlines its basic stance on the 
issue of CaP reform. This will be further developed in a white paper dedicated to the new EU 
budget. The Commission insists agriculture has its place in EU expenditure but must undergo 
adjustments in order to be modernised for 21st century needs and in response to challenges 
such as food security, water scarcity or climate change. The Commission launched a public 
consultation procedure and organised a high-level conference dedicated to EU budget reform. 
a number of European think tanks are following the issue (CEPS, Notre Europe, etc.). The results 
of the public consultation reflected a general perception of needs and expectations regarding 
policies of the European Union. It found that the EU budget should mainly cover competitive-
ness (research and development), energy security and the environment (climate change).
The budget reform will be a challenge for the current Trio Presidency as well. The three 
Presidencies are supposed to lead the debate on behalf of the EU Council on the Commission 
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reform proposal. Nonetheless, the concrete negotiations on the budget reform will not take 
place before mid-2011, when the Commission is due to present its proposals for the next 
financial perspective. The Spanish Presidency is expected to launch a discussion on a new 
‘Lisbon Strategy’ and its interconnection with the current economic crisis. Such a debate 
could affect budget reform discussions to a large extent as the Spanish Presidency may try 
to link the two issues together. Discussion on future competitiveness strategy is likely to 
put the main emphasis on research and development and the knowledge-based economy 
as preconditions for sustainable growth in Europe; similar arguments are used in the budget 
reform debate. On the other hand, the Hungarian Presidency, the last of the Trio, will probably 
stress the importance of regional policy, as all new member states oppose cuts in this kind of 
spending from which they profit greatly.
Pitfall of the budget debate
The EU budget is generally considered outdated. The structure of its expenditures reflects 
national desires to get back as much as possible from the EU budget (the logic of juste 
retour) and does not reflect the real needs of Europe’s economies and societies. There is an 
‘evergreen discourse’ that with reform, more money should be allocated to R&D, infrastruc-
ture or internal and external security, while less or no money to agriculture or regional devel-
opment. Such a critique, however, omits the fact that the proportion of CaP expenditure has 
been constantly decreasing.
Expenditures structure in 1988-2013 (% of total)
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On the other hand, solidarity between the rich member states and the poorer ones should be 
embedded in the EU budget. This principle, however, has been substantially weakened by the 
above-mentioned logic of juste retour and by the decreasing trend of the overall EU budget 
figure in relative proportions. While there is a cap for the EU budget proportion (1.27% of 
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the Gross National Product), there is no bottom limit which would provide more long-term 
stability to EU financing. Progressive decreasing of the budget in both absolute and relative 
terms is a real threat, especially in a time of economic crisis. 
The size of the Eu budget (% of Eu GNI)
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The income side of the budget will need to be reformed, too. The system of traditional own 
resources (import duties) and VaT-based (Value added Tax) own resources has become very 
complicated and obscure with so many correction mechanisms. The general trend (evident 
for some time already) is to abandon the own resources system and finance the budget only 
from GNP-based national contributions.
Revenues structure in 1988-2013 (% of total)
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Some suggest introducing a European tax, which would provide resources to the budget, 
bring citizens closer to EU and make them more sensitive to EU issues. Such an impact on 
citizens is, however, very arguable: most people still do not see tangible benefits of the EU 
membership and the media often give an image of the EU as an institution producing a large 
amount of useless regulation. If a special direct European tax was imposed on citizens, those 
citizens might become even more discontent with the EU.
Similarly, Daniel Gros from the Centre for European Policy Studies suggests that the financial 
perspectives should be synchronised with the European Parliament mandate so that the EU’s 
only directly elected body would gain more importance in people’s eyes and thus benefit 
from increased elections turnout. On the other hand, the European Parliament has gained 
substantial budgetary powers and its role in this area is further reinforced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, while positive impact on elections turnout has not been noticed.
although all the main recipes for a better EU budget are known and generally accepted, the 
debate follows a Catch-22 logic. Everybody knows what must be done, but the deal will none-
theless be difficult and it will probably take the form of a compromise reconciling all national 
interests (seeking to get back as much money as possible). The vicious circles cannot be broken 
unless political will is found from all countries over the idea of a fundamentally different EU 
budget. Net contributors should accept the prospect of ‘no money back’ (at least in the short-
term) and the net beneficiaries should embrace the view of less solidarity of the rich with their 
poorer regions. above all, there are France, Poland and Romania, and politically influential 
farmers who must be willing to give up their generous agriculture subsidies. However, none 
of those actors will surrender easily and the 2011 reform is thus threatened from the very 
beginning. Furthermore, a new conservative government in the United Kingdom may turn into 
a real obstacle to any kind of compromise. British pressure for reform of the budget will be 
enormous, but the ‘Thatcher logic’ of “I want my money back” could easily prevail in the minds 
of British government officials. although Tony Blair and Gordon Brown accepted the phasing-out 
of the British rebate in 2005, it is possible that the Conservatives would revoke the decision.
Is there a way out of the deadlock? 
The EU budget represents ‘only’ 1% of the EU’s GDP. It is, however, a substantial amount of 
money which can make a difference and produce tangible results. Undoubtedly, the budget 
needs a reform and this reform will be difficult to achieve. an increased role of the European 
Parliament, now empowered by the Lisbon Treaty to give assent to all expenditures, could be 
a promising factor, hinting that the upcoming negotiations could extend beyond the so-far 
predominant (and antagonistic) national interests.
In order to avoid another halfway reform, the EU’s main actors (Commission, Parliament 
and the member states) need to adopt a holistic approach towards budget issues. Package 
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deals are likely to lead nowhere as well as dogmatic economic attitudes arguing in favour 
of the complete replacement of redistributive policies by investments. What has to change 
is the very reasoning about the EU budget. So far, the criteria for allocations have been 
too political. The CaP was set up to respond to a political demand by France, and all other 
‘costly’ policies – notably regional and cohesion policy – were added as a sort of compen-
sation for those predestined to exploit them. Politicisation of the EU budget decision-
making, locked up by the purely national interests, is the first thing to blame for an EU 
budget that does not correspond to real needs. Nonetheless, political logic should not be 
replaced by pure economic (or neo-classical economic) logic. The latter would mean all EU 
money being allocated to R&D (Research and Development) and new technologies, to the 
detriment of less developed countries and regions, and the solidarity element disappear-
ing. Such a scenario is unlikely to happen given the strong national preferences in redis-
tributive policies.
This paper argues that the best way to handle the EU budget reform is to embrace the ‘fiscal 
federalism’ logic as a main criterion for EU funding.
POLITICAL CRITERIA
Conformity
with EU policies?
Political 
acceptability?
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Public failure 
or equity?
Regulation, 
taxation or funding?
Cost-effective 
in practice?
FISCAL FEDERALISM
Positive cross-border
externalities?
EU public goods?
Economics of scale 
and scope?
Wide income dispersion
between EU countries?
Source: Copenhagen Economics
Such an approach is an analogy of the ‘subsidiarity principle’ in EU regulation. It 
consists of evaluation of expenditures on the basis of the added value at the European 
level. all expenditures should be assessed from the point of view of the advantages of 
pooling capacities and spending at the EU level (e.g. positive cross-border externalities). 
Coherence with other kinds of EU actions has to be taken into account, too. The fiscal 
federalism approach would therefore downsize agricultural payments because those 
have already been nationalised and there is no added value of a common budget in this 
area. On the other hand, regional policy makes sense with regard to fiscal federalism if 
cross border regions are targeted in the first instance. Similarly, support to infrastructure 
should place emphasis on trans-European networks etc. Such an assessment should be 
carried out for all EU expenditures, even at the cost of completely redesigning spending 
structures within EU policies.
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Key recommendations for the Trio Presidency: 
 adopt the fiscal federalism approach and re-assess all expenditures in relation to the  •
European-level added value
Keep a solidarity element in the EU expenditures •
Introduce a bottom limit for the GNP proportion of the EU budget (e.g. 1%) •
Connect the budget debate with the new ‘Lisbon Strategy’ discussions •
 abandon traditional own resources and VaT-based resources together with all correc- •
tion mechanisms
Respect the expectations of EU citizens regarding EU policy outcomes •
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budGET
Reforming the CaP Budget – a Perfect Test 
for the EU
Nadège Chambon Research Fellow, Notre Europe
“E U money for jobs, not cows”. Who can forget Tony Blair’s 2005 speech when he asserted before the European Parliament that a “modern budget is not a budget which, in 10 years, will still dedicate 40% (of EU spending) to the 
Common agriculture Policy (CaP)”? at that time, the British Prime Minister was formulat-
ing a concept that has since become widely accepted – namely, that any sort of budget 
that devotes most of its spending to agriculture, food and rural development should be 
viewed as obsolete. Tony Blair’s criticism would have been justified if the EU budget was 
that of a federation, but rather it is one of a heterogeneous political integration process. 
as the only common economic policy to be endowed with an EU budget, the agricul-
tural and rural policy is also the only one almost entirely funded by Brussels. This par-
ticular Community status has earned the reputation of being an ever-recurrent topic of 
contention in budgetary negotiations since 1979. Viewed as being costly, as compared 
to cumulated European public spending (member states and EU spending) broken 
down by sector, agricultural policy ranks only 11th, with 1.1% of total public spending 
(Bertoncini, 2009).
Spain, Belgium, and then Hungary, will share the challenging task of initiating debate 
within the European Council on budget revision followed by the post-2013 Financial 
Perspectives. These negotiations will be a perfect test for assessing the EU’s ability to 
venture beyond the ‘budget rebate’ approaches which have impeded the latest budgetary 
discussions since then. By demonstrating its ability – or inability – to reform the CaP, 
along with the agriculture budget, the Council will prove that it is capable of formulating 
a renovated agricultural common project. But the context bodes difficult negotiations: 
27 member states share a budget nearly identical to that of the EU-15 and the EU is facing 
new climate and energy – as well as economic and social – challenges. Failure to seize 
this opportunity would deprive the EU of one of its most effective tools for protecting 
its environment, cause a definitive destabilisation of the sector and of European 
campaigns, and threaten the EU’s food production capacities. Leading this debate goes 
to the Trio Presidency.
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Agriculture in the 21st century:  
a key for food and natural resources management
Global agricultural markets are increasingly unsettled
In a context of rising volatility in commodity prices, bolstered by the interconnection of 
global markets, farmers will be facing additional uncertainties in the next few years on top 
of the long list of natural vagaries that periodically destabilise their sector. The horizon 
is becoming more complex due to a combination of several phenomena, with uncertain 
consequences for European agricultural markets. as developing countries become 
richer, consumption patterns are changing to include more meat products, leading to an 
expansion of agricultural demand (one animal protein requires, on average, seven plant 
proteins in order to be produced). World population is currently increasing at a rate of 80 
million people annually (a population equal to that of Germany), and is expected to reach 
9 billion people by 2050. To these developments may be added an increased demand for 
energy production (biofuels) which increases the volatility of some commodity prices 
now linked to petrol prices. In order to deal with this growing challenge, and after having 
spent more than 20 years backing policies aimed at liberalising the agricultural sector, 
international institutions (World Bank, OECD) are calling for massive investments in 
Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) agriculture. In rich countries these changes remind 
us of the elementary role of agriculture and of the need to be cautious when reforming 
market regulation instruments, which are needed when prices are uncertain.
The environmental challenge
Protecting natural resources and biodiversity has become a primary concern, in view of 
accelerating environmental damage. at the same time, given the increase of agricultural 
demand in the medium-term, an intensification of production will be necessary. and yet 
farming activity has a considerable impact on natural resources. On the one hand, agri-
culture can pollute and overexploitation often leads to the irreversible destruction of an 
ecosystem. Rich countries’ agricultural policies, inspired by green revolution principles 
such as those of the CaP, are still helping to foster the intensive use of exhaustible natural 
resources, particularly water. On the other hand, agriculture can enhance the preservation 
of biodiversity and natural spaces. In that case abandoning the practice of farming can 
lead to very serious environmental problems. Fragile zones (such as mountains and the 
Mediterranean region) are still experiencing soil erosion and depopulation phenomena.
The uncertain fight against global warming
The inclusion on the global and EU agenda of the fight against climate change issue has 
recently generated new expectations with regard to the agricultural sector, which produces 
13.5% of the world’s Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). However, beyond statements about the 
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necessary participation of agriculture in the fight against global warming, no clear and 
precise implementation plan has yet been formulated. Moreover, research findings – still 
highly experimental at this stage – have yet to identify any promising options for farms with 
carbon-neutral environments. In addition, agriculture’s contribution to the reduction of GHGs 
is bound to be offset by the extensive reshaping of the global agricultural map which should 
result from the rise in the average temperature. This uncertainty is compounded by consid-
erable doubt as to whether populations in the newly productive areas will be able to attain 
productivity levels equal to, or higher than, what they are today. Will they reserve sufficiently 
fertile land for farming? Will they invest in the sector in order to equip themselves with the 
necessary means of production? Will they secure the manpower and know-how needed?
Reforming the CAP in order to meet 21st century challenges
agriculture, the environment and European rural areas would ultimately suffer as much 
from a dismantling of the CaP as from a lack of reform. The very likely reduction in the agri-
culture budget anticipated in the next financial perspectives should usher in a new policy 
approach – one which offers answers to future challenges and serves the medium-term 
strategy of the EU. a flawed policy, despite past reforms.
Reformed since 1992, the CaP has been constantly revised in order to improve its regula-
tions. The Single Payment Scheme nonetheless plays a particularly noteworthy role as a 
price-fluctuation shock absorber; eco-conditionality has begun to have positive results for 
natural resources as has the increased expenditure in favour of the environment and rural 
development. The merits of the improvements made and of budgetary discipline should 
not mask the current system’s limitations. The primary criticisms concern the efficiency of 
support for 1st pillar income; the efficiency of the transfer of income linked to aid distributed 
under the 2nd pillar; management costs; the leakage of aid towards unintended beneficia-
ries; the concentration of payments; and the unequal exposure of sectors to price volatility. 
In environmental and rural matters, criticisms deal with water pollution incentives and the 
limited impact of agri-environmental and eco-conditionality aid programmes. Next, agri-
cultural crises are continuing despite the market instruments available. Lastly, the CaP has 
not yet been made consistent with other EU policies: it is still a more agricultural than food 
policy; the EU competition policy sanctions some organised groups of producers, while it 
tolerates certain excessive concentrations within the agro-food industry; 1st pillar financial 
aid is sometimes deployed in a way that conflicts with the cohesion principle because of 
its inequitable distribution.
Reforms should not be made for the wrong reasons
In 2008, the CaP represented 44% of the EU budget, or €52.3 billion. Many protesters 
have denounced this situation, even though Eurobarometer survey has shown in March 
272 | PART V – GOVERNING THE EU: WayS aND MEaNS
2008 that 58% of EU citizens believed that the CaP’s budget should either stay the same 
or increase. The recurring criticisms of the CaP are sometimes surprising inasmuch as 
it ranks eleventh in the cumulated national and EU public expenditures with 1.1% – far 
behind the leading trio, which are social protection and active policies in the labour 
market (41.4%), health (14.2%) and education / training (11.3%) (Bertoncini, 2009). also, 
a brief worldwide comparison shows that Europeans rank among an average of developed 
countries in terms of the relative share of GDP devoted to this sector with 0.5%, compared 
to 0.2% in the United States, 0.4% in Canada and 2.4% in Japan. Similarly, while the pre-
reform CaP may have had a negative impact by allowing for unfair competition against 
LDCs agricultures, that is no longer the case. In view of the current CaP’s flaws, particular-
ly its inequitable way of distributing aid by sector – few realise that a majority of European 
farmers and breeders are not benefiting from the CaP – it appears possible to regulate 
more effectively with equivalent financial resources by formulating new rules and using a 
new method of allocating funds.
A distinctive economic sector which calls for cautious CAP reforms
The 27 member states could thus decide not to improve the regulation of their agricul-
tures, considering the strongest farm businesses should, as in other sectors, be able to 
compete and food supplies could be secured through international trade. Nonetheless, 
some economic foundations dictate that the regulation of the agricultural sector should 
differ from that of the industrial and service sectors. Indeed, the ‘health check’ (adopted 
in 2008) and the informal agricultural Councils’ discussions led by the last Trio Presidency 
on the CaP’s post-2013 objectives have all confirmed unanimous agreement on this issue. 
Several points of consensus emerged from these discussions between the 27 member 
states on the need for a common agricultural policy in order to avoid competitiveness dis-
tortions to the greatest extent possible. The question of the potential dismantling of this 
common policy is raised outside of non-specialist circles which are unaware of the sector’s 
economic specificities. all agricultural economy analyses point at least to the following 
conclusion: agricultural markets must be regulated, for three reasons. First, the limited 
elasticity of agricultural demand (once consumers are satisfied, they no longer buy agri-
cultural commodities) is facing an extremely variable supply that is not closely linked 
to price level (attributable, for example, to unpredictable weather conditions). Second, 
supply and demand adjustment mechanisms do not operate properly and take too long 
to be implemented (for example, crop growing time). Lastly, these markets include major 
entry barriers because of investment level, land capital, necessary know-how and time 
necessary to become competitive in the marketplace.
A budgetary and political intolerable situation
For the first time in its history, the EU will institute a budgetary negotiation involving 
27 voices whose tone will translate highly heterogeneous economic and agricultural 
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backgrounds, amplified by the crisis. The positions in the future negotiation and 
alliances which may formed are still uncertain. However, the member states who joined 
the EU in 2004 and in 2007 are expected to be opposed to the current allocation of funds. 
Indeed, the Copenhagen European Council (2002) which completed negotiations for the 
accession of ten new member states anticipated that the latter would receive 2nd pillar 
aid and benefit from market measures, but would only gradually be entitled to receive 
direct assistance. Therefore, since 2004 and 2007, the allocation of CaP support has 
been following a discriminatory principle with respect to the 12 newest EU members. This 
situation, which has allowed the CaP budget to remain stable, has confirmed an inequi-
table situation that the 12 States expect to see eliminated after 2013. This claim is all 
the stronger in that since 2008, the crisis has curtailed the granting of loans to farms 
and, in some cases, deprived the States of resources needed in order to co-finance the 
aid planned by the EU. It is against this background, in which wide gaps in agricultural 
competitiveness subsist between older and newer member states, that the negotiations 
will take place.
Good ways to reduce the CAP budget
debating issues in the right order
The way in which the price regulation system derailed in the 1980s tarnished the CaP’s 
image. Various reforms have corrected these problematic mechanisms but they were 
never accompanied by a revision of the fundamental CaP principles. Today, this multi-lay-
ered policy suffers from a lack of legibility that is eroding its legitimacy. Therefore, before 
debating the budget, the EU should assess medium-term challenges, in order to define 
new agricultural policy objectives. J.C. Bureau and L.P. Mahé (2008) stressed that “any 
serious effort to undertake a long-term analysis of the CaP objectives for this 21st century 
must begin with two questions: what types of market failures require an agricultural 
policy? What policies should lie within the EU’s competence and funding?” Discussions 
could then logically focus on the toolbox needed to attain those objectives, and lastly on 
the funding level.
Avoiding unproductive debates on CAP funding
Due to the exceptional nature of the CaP’s governance which, unlike the other sectors, is 
common and to the fact that 72% of the expenditure is incurred by the common budget, this 
minority spending within the European public expenditure is automatically more closely 
scrutinised. In a primarily urban Europe which has witnessed a decline in the number of its 
farmers and in the share of European GDP produced by the economic sector, it is an easy 
mistake to view that trend as a Community money reserve from which it can draw to fund 
other projects or to meet new challenges.
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Even though the CaP’s budget has not been extensively changed in terms of its allocations 
between the two ‘pillars,’ the aid modulation mechanism – which transfers part of the aid 
from the 1st pillar towards the 2nd – provides some more flexibility to States which co-finance 
2nd pillar measures. Moreover, the recent milk crisis allowed the States to raise the national 
aid ceiling. This rampant renationalisation of the CaP is exposing farmers to differentiated 
amounts of aid from one country to the other. The consequence of this could be the return of 
competitiveness between national agricultural policies in a distorted market.
Calling for an overhaul of European public support for agriculture
Setting aside the CaP’s normative achievements, which are very positive (in health security, 
for example) to consider measures which have had a budgetary impact, three objectives 
can be assigned to the post-2013 CaP: the environment (preservation of natural resources 
and the fight against global warming); the regulation of agricultural markets (inherently 
unstable); and rural public goods (i.e. landscapes, recreational areas). The directions to 
be taken call for the creation of objective-specific instruments so as to better identify and 
measure their effectiveness. European public funds must finance European public goods 
and the payments must be designed as incentives rather than as ‘rights’. Indeed funds must 
be allocated according to a contractual principle that compels the Community to remuner-
ate farmers who provide a service (such as farming lands in rural regions according to strict 
environmental rules; compensation associated with natural handicaps; services in envi-
ronmentally sensitive or high nature-value areas). Finally the CaP helps to ensure agricul-
tural competitiveness, rather than income, but it must also anticipate the safety nets and 
guaranties which will enable agricultural markets to withstand price volatility.
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1� Ensure that the new General affairs Council – chaired by the Trio Presidency – 
fulfils the role of a strategic coordinator of policy-making in the EU.
2� Focus on improving European economic governance and strengthening 
Economic and Monetary Union within a broadened framework of macroeco-
nomic coordination and surveillance.
3� Endorse a highly constructive role for the Ecofin presidency, along with a 
pro-active Commission and a strong Eurogroup chair, in order to foster better 
economic coordination.
4� Maintain the momentum for reform of financial-market regulation, specifi-
cally through close coordination with the G20.
5� Strengthen EU influence through a single representation in international 
bodies, starting with the Eurogroup, in the institutions and forums of world 
economic governance (G20, IMF, World Bank).
6� Ensure that the EU-2020 Strategy, integrating social, environmental and 
growth objectives, rests on an in-depth diagnosis of the economic crisis and 
its social impact. Striving for quick agreement should not take precedence 
over the need to build a solid political consensus.
7� Identify complementary EU initiatives within a framework of European-
wide employment policies in order to better meet the challenge of high 
unemployment.
8� Build an internal European energy market supported by a Europe-wide 
infrastructure network.
9� Complement the EU climate change strategy by a transport and climate 
change package, major initiatives on clean coal technologies, and an increase 
in carbon prices, with the aim of preserving the credibility of the EU’s emissions 
trading scheme.
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10� Guarantee that cooperation with third countries concerning illegal immi-
gration and pre-border controls does not undermine the right of asylum 
and other human rights obligations.
11� Work with the United States towards shared priorities on counter-ter-
rorism, specifically on aid for North and West africa as well as stabilising 
Pakistan.
12� Help the High Representative set up a European External action Service 
(EEaS) that adds real value to EU foreign policy. The EEaS should be given 
the means to deliver high-quality political reporting and to tackle energy, 
migration, and security issues.
13� Contribute to a peaceful debate on enlargement in order to maintain 
the issue high on the agenda, with a clearer roadmap, and to make sure 
that the momentum for reform in the countries applying for accession is 
not damaged.
14� Encourage intensified dialogue with national parliaments in order to 
foster constructive attitudes in a way that allows EU affairs to enter the 
national political scene earlier in the policy-making process.
15� Start the debate on the revision of the EU budget with a clear under-
standing of political priorities and common principles, such as coherent 
and consistent EU funding for traditional policies (particularly Cohesion and 
agriculture) and for new priorities (such as the EU-2020 Strategy); work on 
overcoming the net-contributor logic, linking revenue and spending sides 
and reforming the Common agriculture Policy beforehand.
Attila Ágh Corvinus University/GKI, Adam balcer demosEUROPa, hugo 
brady CER, Filippa Chatzistavrou ELIaMEP, Elvire Fabry Notre Europe, 
Jacques Keller-Noëllet Egmont, Thomas Klau ECFR, david Král Europeum, 
Piotr Maciej Kaczyn´ski CEPS, Ignacio Molina Real Instituto Elcano, Gaëtane 
Ricard-Nihoul Notre Europe, daniela Schwarzer SWP, Anna Stellinger 
SIEPS, Fabrizio Tassinari DIIS
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NoTRE EuRoPE 
(TGAE Founder and Coordinator), Paris
Notre Europe (www.notre-europe.eu) is 
a European independent think tank dedi-
cated to promoting closer European unity. 
Under the guidance of Jacques Delors, the 
association’s aim since 1996 has been to 
“think a united Europe”.
This involves participating in current debates 
from a vantage point of informed positions 
based upon thorough policy analysis and 
relevant policy proposals that are designed 
to help Europeans achieve closer unity. It 
also entails fostering the active involvement 
of citizens and civil society in the process of 
European integration and in the emergence 
of a European public space. Its analyses and 
policy proposals focus upon four themes: 
Visions of Europe; European democracy in 
action; Competition, cooperation and soli-
darity; Europe and world governance. Notre 
Europe is committed to maintaining strict 
independence of thought as well as work, in 
keeping with the spirit of promoting the pub-
lic good. The association was successively 
headed by Jacques Delors (1996-2004), Pas-
cal Lamy (2004-2005), and Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa (since November 2005).
Contributors:
dr Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul Secretary General
Sami Andoura Research Fellow
Nadège Chambon Research Fellow
dr Elvire Fabry Research associate
dr Eulalia Rubio Research Fellow
REAl INSTITuTo ElCANo
Madrid
The Elcano Royal Institute (www.realinstitu-
toelcano.org) is a private entity, indepen-
dent of both the public administration and 
the companies which provide most of its 
funding. It was established on 27th Decem-
ber 2001, under the honorary presidency of 
HRH the Prince of Asturias, for the purpose 
of generating ideas on the international sce-
nario and on Spain’s strategic options in in-
ternational relations that are of practical use 
to politicians, the business world, academ-
ics, the media and public opinion at large.
From its inception, the Elcano Royal Insti-
tute considers itself a non-partisan – but 
not neutral – institution that seeks to pro-
mote the values by which it was inspired 
and which, by means of multidisciplinary 
analysis of existing and, especially, forward 
developments, aims to establish a global 
strategy resulting in political proposals hav-
ing a practical application. The chairman of 
the Elcano is Gustavo Suárez Pertierra.
Contributors:
dr Charles Powell Deputy Director
dr Carlos Closa Montero Research associate
Clara Crespo, Research associate
dr Natividad Fernández Sola Research 
associate
Paul Isbell Senior analyst
dr Ignacio Molina Senior analyst
Alicia Sorroza analyst
dr Federico Steinberg Senior analyst
Editorial Committee
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EGMoNT 
Royal Institute for International Relations 
brussels
Egmont – The Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations (www.irri-kiib.be) is an in-
dependent think tank based in Brussels. Its 
interdisciplinary research is conducted in a 
spirit of total academic freedom. Drawing on 
the expertise of its own research fellows, as 
well as that of external specialists, both Bel-
gian and foreign, it provides analysis and 
suggests international policy options that 
are meant to be as operational as possible.
Along with research and meetings, the Insti-
tute has also developed specialised training 
activities both in Brussels and abroad. It can, 
on request, offer specific programmes for 
visiting and resident diplomats and foreign 
professionals.
Closer collaboration with other research 
centres, both in Belgium and in the rest of 
Europe and beyond, has resulted in a grow-
ing number of joint conferences and in more 
structured cooperation on research and 
publications. It has proved to be mutually 
beneficial and enriching. The president of 
Egmont is Etienne Davignon.
Contributors:
dr Sven biscop Director of Security and 
Global Governance Programme
Jacques Keller-Noëllet Senior Research 
Fellow
Peter Timmerman Former Research Fellow
GKI Economic Research Co
budapest
GKI Co. (www.gki.hu) is the market leader 
in the market of independent macroeco-
nomic analyses and forecasts. It continues 
and refreshes the best traditions of its pre-
decessor, the Economic Research Institute 
(established in 1928 by István Varga). It 
uses the most up-to-date domestic and 
foreign research achievements and the 
methods developed in the European Union. 
It is member of the AIECE – Association of 
European Conjuncture Institutes and of the 
joint organisation of institutions that follow 
the economic expectations (CIRET – Centre 
for International Research on Economic 
Tendency Surveys). Its basic principle is the 
objectivity: it regularly revises and publicly 
corrects its forecasts.
GKI Economic Research Co. continuously de-
velops and expands its activity. By 2002 it 
had developed into a group of companies. It 
is the majority owner of the: GKIeNET Inter-
net Research and Consulting Ltd.; GKI Health 
Care Research Institute Ltd.; GKI Energy Re-
search and Consulting Ltd.; GKI Consulting 
Ltd. The president of GKI is András Vértes.
Contributors:
 dr Attila Ágh Department of Political 
Science, Corvinus University of Budapest
 dr András Inotai Director of the Institute 
for World Economics of the Hungarian 
academy of Sciences
 dr Gergely Romsics Research Fellow at the 
Hungarian Institute of International affairs
 Amb� János Terényi Director of the 
Hungarian Institute of International affairs
 András Vértes Chairman
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associated Think Tanks
bRuEGEl
brussels
Bruegel (www.bruegel.org) is a European 
think tank devoted to international eco-
nomics.
It was created in Brussels in early 2005 with 
the intention of bringing a new voice into Eu-
rope’s economic policy discussions.
Its governance and funding model makes 
Bruegel unique, being the only think tank 
partly funded by EU member states. It is sup-
ported by 16 European governments, as well 
as a number of leading private corporations.
Bruegel does not represent any particular 
policy doctrine. It aims to contribute to 
economic policy-making in Europe through 
open, fact-based and policy-relevant re-
search, analysis and discussion. The direc-
tor of Bruegel is Jean Pisani-Ferry.
Contributors:
Jean Pisani-Ferry Director
dr bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 
Senior Research Fellow
Jakob von weizsäcker Research Fellow
CEPS
brussels
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (www.ceps.be) 
serves as a leading forum for debate on EU 
affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capac-
ity, complemented by an extensive network 
of partner institutes throughout the world.
CEPS’ funding is obtained from a variety of 
sources, including membership fees, proj-
ect research, foundation grants, conference 
fees, publication sales and an annual grant 
from the European Commission.
The goals of the CEPS are essentially to 
carry out state-of-the-art policy research 
leading to solutions to the challenges fac-
ing Europe today; to achieve high stan-
dards of academic excellence and maintain 
unqualified independence; to provide a 
forum for discussion among all stakehold-
ers in the European policy process; to build 
collaborative networks of researchers, pol-
icy-makers and business representatives 
across the whole of Europe; to disseminate 
our findings and views through a regular 
flow of publications and public events. The 
chairman of CEPS is H. Onno Ruding.
Contributors:
Karel lanno Chief Executive Officer
Arno behrens Research Fellow
Anaïs Faure Atger Researcher
Piotr Maciej Kaczyn´ski Research Fellow
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CER
london
The Centre for European Reform (www.cer.
org.uk) is a think tank devoted to improving 
the quality of the debate on the European 
Union. It is a forum for people with ideas 
from Britain and across the continent to 
discuss the many political, economic and 
social challenges facing Europe. It seeks to 
work with similar bodies in other European 
countries, North America and elsewhere in 
the world. The CER is pro-European but not 
uncritical. It regards European integration 
as largely beneficial but recognises that in 
many respects the Union does not work well. 
The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas 
for reforming the European Union.
The CER makes a point of bringing together 
people from the worlds of politics and busi-
ness. The conclusions of our research and 
seminars are reflected in our publications, 
as well as in the private papers and briefings 
that senior officials, ministers and commis-
sioners ask us to provide. The CER’s work is 
funded by donations from the private sector. 
It has never received core funding from go-
vernments or EU institutions. The director of 
CER is Charles Grant.
Contributors:
hugo brady Senior Research Fellow
Simon Tilford Chief Economist
demosEuRoPA
warsaw
demosEUROPA – Centre for European 
Strategy (www.demoseuropa.eu) is an in-
ternational, non-partisan, policy-oriented 
research institution which aims to provide 
answers to the challenges facing the Eu-
ropean Union, its member states and its 
citizens. It is a forum for ideas about the 
political, social and economic dimension 
of European integration and international 
relations. demosEUROPA – Centre for Euro-
pean Strategy has four programmes which 
have to do with the political aspects of Eu-
ropean integration, economic reform in the 
EU, sustainability and the EU’s role in the 
world. The think tank publishes policy pa-
pers and reports formulated on the basis 
of interactive discussions, conferences and 
seminars. The president of demosEUROPA 
is Pawel Swieboda.
Contributors:
Pawel Swieboda President
 Adam balcer Senior Fellow, Project Leader, 
EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy
Agatha hinc Project Leader, Low Emission 
Economy
Adam Jasser Member of the Board, Director 
of Programmes
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dIIS
Copenhagen
The Danish Institute for International Stud-
ies (DIIS, www.diis.dk) is an independent 
research institution engaged in research in 
international affairs. The institute started 
activities on 1st January 2003. The institute 
draws up reports and analyses and follows 
developments in international affairs con-
tinuously in order to assess the security and 
foreign policy situation of Denmark.
DIIS also communicates research findings, 
analyses and knowledge, and performs 
functions concerning documentation, in-
formation and library services. Further-
more, DIIS contributes to the education of 
researchers, supports the development of 
research capacity in developing countries 
and establishes contacts between Danish 
and international research environments.
DIIS’s research and activities are organised 
in several research units and a few major 
commissioned works. DIIS and the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) together 
constitute the Danish Centre for Internation-
al Studies and Human Rights (DCISM), shar-
ing a common administration and library.
The chairman of DIIS is Georg Sørensen. The 
management of the institute is the responsi-
bility of the director, Nanna Hvidt.
Contributors:
Katrine borg Albertsen Researcher
dr ulla holm Senior Researcher
dr Thomas Gammeltoft-hansen Project 
Researcher
dr Fabrizio Tassinari Head of Research Unit, 
Foreign Policy and EU studies
ECFR
london – Madrid – berlin – Paris – Sofia
The European Council on Foreign Relations 
(www.ecfr.eu) was launched in October 2007 
to promote a more integrated European for-
eign policy in support of shared European 
interests and values. ECFR was founded by 
a Council whose members include serving 
and former ministers and parliamentarians, 
business leaders, distinguished academics, 
journalists and public intellectuals. ECFR 
has developed a strategy with three dis-
tinctive elements that define its activities: a 
pan-European Council; a physical presence 
in the main EU member states; and a distinc-
tive research and policy development pro-
cess. With its unique structure, ECFR brings 
a genuinely pan-European perspective on 
Europe’s role in the world.
ECFR’s pan-European work through advo-
cacy, the mass media and campaigns make 
the necessary connections between innova-
tive thinking, policy-making and civic action. 
The director of ECFR is Mark Leonard.
Contributors:
Anthony dworkin Senior Policy Fellow
dr Andrew wilson Senior Policy Fellow
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ElIAMEP
Athens
Established in 1988, the Hellenic Founda-
tion for European and Foreign Policy (www.
eliamep.gr) is an independent, non-profit 
and policy-oriented research and train-
ing institute situated in Athens, Greece. 
ELIAMEP’s mission is to provide a forum for 
public and political debate on issues of Eu-
ropean integration and international rela-
tions and to conduct scientific research that 
supports policy makers in making informed 
decisions.
ELIAMEP provides decision-makers, both 
in the public and private sectors in Greece, 
Europe and beyond, with authoritative and 
independent information, analysis and pro-
posals for action. The president of ELIAMEP 
is Loukas Tsoukalis.
Contributors:
dr Filippa Chatzistavrou Research associate
dr Ioannis N� Grigoriadis Research Fellow
dr Ruby Gropas Research Fellow
EuRoPEuM
Prague
Europeum Institute for European Policy 
(www.europeum.org) is a non-profit, non-
partisan and independent institute. It focus-
es on the issues of European integration and 
its impact on the transformation of political, 
economic and legal milieu in the Czech Re-
public. Europeum strives to contribute to 
a long-lasting development of democracy, 
security, stability, freedom and solidarity 
across Europe.
Europeum formulates opinions and offers 
alternatives to internal reforms in the Czech 
Republic with a view of ensuring her full-
fledged membership and respected position 
in the European Union. Its mission statement 
is: “Czech visions for Europe, European vi-
sions for the Czechs”. The director of Eu-
ropeum is David Král.
Contributors:
david Král Director
Vladimír bartovic Research Fellow
lukáš Pachta Research Fellow
Ivo Šlosarcík Director of Research
Tomáš weiss Research Fellow
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SIEPS
Stockholm
The Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (www.sieps.se) conducts and pro-
motes research on European policy and 
policy-making. The research is conducted 
under three broad themes: power and de-
mocracy; the external dimensions of the 
European Union; consequences of EU poli-
cies. SIEPS considers that it is important to 
broaden and intensify research into matters 
that are significant for the future develop-
ment of the European Union and, towards 
that end, actively seeks to develop close co-
operation with institutes and research cen-
tres in Europe and globally.
SIEPS strives to act as a link between the 
academic world and policy-makers at vari-
ous levels. By publishing reports and ar-
ranging seminars and conferences, SIEPS 
aims to further stimulate research on the 
future of Europe. The director of SIEPS is 
Anna Stellinger.
Contributors:
dr Maria bergström Research Fellow at 
Uppsala University
dr Carl Fredrik bergström Researcher
Göran von Sydow Researcher
SwP
berlin
The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – Ger-
man Institute for International and Security 
Affairs (www.swp-berlin.org) is an indepen-
dent scientific establishment that conducts 
practically oriented research on the basis 
of which it then advises the Bundestag (the 
German parliament) and the federal govern-
ment on foreign and security policy issues. 
The analyses and publications produced by 
SWP researchers and their participation in 
national and international debates on key 
issues help to shape opinion in their respec-
tive domains.
Since January 1965, the Institute has been 
federally funded. This support is supple-
mented by contributions from other re-
search sponsors. The director of SWP is Dr. 
Volker Perthes.
Contributors:
dr Steffen Angenendt Senior associate
dr Muriel Asseburg Head of the Middle 
East and africa Research Division
Peter becker Senior associate
dr Annegret bendiek Research Fellow
dr Ronja Kempin Research Fellow
Roderick Parkes Head of Brussels office
dr daniela Schwarzer Head of the EU 
Integration Research Division
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W ith the establishment of the permanent European Council presidency and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the role of rotating presidencies has changed. This will have an impact on the role of the 
Trio Presidency in future. Does the rotating presidency still matter?
In this new edition of Think Global – Act European (TGAE), launched by Notre Europe, 14 Europeans 
think tanks answer that question by scrutinizing the 18-month agenda of the Spanish, Belgian 
and Hungarian Trio Presidency. For each specific issue (structural reform, economic governance, 
energy, climate change, migration, internal security, global governance, foreign policy defence, 
enlargement, neighbourhood, EU institutions, European political space and budget) they 
analyse the global context, existing challenges and put forward concrete proposals concerning 
key initiatives that can be taken by the Trio Presidency during this period.
In the sensitive context of the Lisbon Treaty implementation and complex management of the 
economic crisis, specific attention is given to the decisive coordination role that can be played 
by the Trio Presidency in defining more efficient – more integrated – European strategies.
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